Indeed the candidate or member is now under a more stringent obligation than that proposed, as, in the event of a petition being tried against his return, he is aware that his seat will be perilled, if not absolutely lost, unless he be prepared to submit to a rigorous cross-examination on oath, and to purge himself from all complicity in, or connivance at, corrupt practices. The fear of such an ordeal, apparently more stringent than any form of promissory oath, has been insufficient to deter from, or more probably has induced a blindness to, such practices when resorted to by his agents. It appears, then, that as nearly all provisions for the suppression of such practices, by way of preventions or punishments, have failed, we must look to the laws in force for their detection and exposure; and inquire whether we have taken sufficient means to defeat the objects aimed at by those who resort to undue means to obtain parliamentary honours.

The object of the person practising corruption is the seat. In proportion as we can make the loss of that certain, immediate, and final, we discourage the resort to illegal means to obtain it; and in rendering the necessary inquiry less expensive and more searching in its character, and more decisive in its results, not only on the return, but on the constituency at large, we discourage not only the venal voter, but the authors and instruments of corruption. That the tribunals which at present perform the functions of correcting electoral abuses are incompetent, although much improved since the Grenville act and subsequent legislation, is admitted. The evils are manifest, but the remedy difficult.

The election committee, which has for its object the inquiry into, and decision upon, the validity of the return; the committees constituted under the 5 & 6 Vict., which, in case of a petition containing charges of bribery being withdrawn before or after the naming of the committee to try it, or, in case of its being withdrawn, and a further petition being presented containing charges of general and extensive bribery, can inquire into the circumstances, but have no power over the election, or return, or the issuing a new writ; and lastly, the commission constituted under 15 & 16 Vict. c. 57, which

is armed with large and stringent inquisitorial powers, but has no functions beyond those of reporting the results of its investigations to the House, are each defective in constitution and result.

It is to be observed that none of this machinery can be put in motion unless upon the petition of a candidate or an elector; that the origination of inquiry into matters affecting the gravest interests of the state, is left to the disappointment or resentment of those who have played an active part at the election, and who may have unsuccessfully resorted to the very practices of which they complain in their antagonists. It may be said that this is in conformity with the whole spirit of our law; that the criminal law, in most cases, is put in motion by the resentment of the party injured; and that, in practice, crime is discovered and punished by such means.

I will not here discuss whether such a course is defensible in theory or effectual in practice. It might be observed that in questions affecting the constitution of the representatives of one of the estates of the realm it is utterly undefensible; that in practice it has been found to be most inefficacious; and that by committing to private individuals the control of proceedings affecting such important interests, a wide door is opened to chicanery and fraud. Again, the petitioner is allowed to withdraw his petition without cause assigned; and the old and salutary law of parliament-confirmed by a series of statutes, which prescribed that the House, once being seized of the petition, will not allow its discontinuance without a statement, verified on oath, that something has occurred or been brought to the knowledge of the petitioners subsequently to such presentation, which justifies the complainants in refusing to prosecute it-has been abrogated.

In the Middlesex case, reported in Glanville, the House resolved "that they were not to be concluded by the neglect of the parties in not presenting their complaint, which, peradventure, they might desert by some underhand combination, to the prejudice of the whole kingdom, which hath an interest in the election of every member of the Commons' House of parliament; the ill consequence

which might follow, by occasion of such as shall there serve without due election, trenching deeply upon the rights and liberties of the commonwealth": a resolution which contrasts strangely with the modern theory as expounded by some of the greatest authorities, and adopted by the modern statutes. In a debate which took place on the subject of numerous compromises, carried into effect by the withdrawal of petitions in 1842, sir Robert Peel said: "The impression of members on all sides of the House, I apprehend, is that, as election petitioners contract no other responsibility than that of defending individual rights, the parties are not bound to maintain any public principle. Such was the uniform opinion under the Grenville act, and such it remains in the present state of the law. If you make it optional for individuals to prosecute an election petition, what right have you to find fault with the exercise of their discretion?" Lord John Russell said: "I am ready to maintain that the consequence of the Grenville act, and of the other acts which have followed it, is that the question of a seat is treated, as it were, as a question of property; that individuals, having spent large sums of money at an election, are afterwards called on to spend other large sums on the prosecution of a petition, or in defence of their seats against such petition; and that they naturally and unavoidably, in the prosecution of those cases, look forward to the possession of the seats for themselves, disregarding the public interest, which demands protection." This view, which pervades the whole legislation on the subject, also affects the administration of the law by the committee. The tribunal is defective in constitution, in action, and in its administration of the law. The defects of its constitution; the union in its members of the functions of judge and jury; the confiding such grave interests to persons without legal training, and fresh from the excitement of party struggles; the want of any controlling power to maintain uniformity of decision—are so obvious and so glaring that it would be useless to enlarge upon them. In its action it is trammelled by laws of evidence, applicable indeed to trial of issues involving the rights of individuals before tribunals

constituted of judge and jury, each having their respective functions and attributes, and whose failures and errors are subject to correction on appeal, but inapplicable to an inquiry involving alike the rights of the public and the interests of the individual, and where no mode exists of such correction. It is frequently crippled by the privilege claimed by witnesses to refuse to answer questions which might render them criminally responsible, and often decides on the false issue of the complicity of the member in corrupt practices, and not on the question of real interest to the public, whether the election has been the result of the unbiassed voices of the electors, or whether the return has been gained by corrupt practices, by whomsoever resorted to.

But the most serious complaint against the present system is the delay which, in the event of a general election, is interposed to the decisions on contested seats. No other assembly proceeds to business until satisfied that it is properly constituted. Questions of policy of the gravest character are determined by the House of Commons when the seats of a large proportion of its members are impeached, and its authority with the public consequently impaired. The inquiry is central instead of local; dilatory where it might be expedi tious; and expensive where it might be cheap.

To enlarge further on its defects would be superfluous. I believe a remedy might be found if the necessary inquiry were deemed of public interest, and not delegated without control to individuals. The true difficulty lies in the reluctance of the House of Commons to part with its jurisdiction, a reluctance founded in its ancient jealousies, and recollections of its struggles with the crown, which for a series of years asserted its right, as the writs for the elections issued out of chancery, to correct any defect in the return; and partly in a well-founded opinion that to part with its privilege would lead to diminution of its dignity and power.

There are but three courses open:-To maintain these tribunals in their present state; to improve them; or, to transfer the jurisdiction to the courts of common law. The courts of common law are already oppressed with

business, nor are they well adapted to the task; but I believe that a remedy might be found in the House of Commons delegating to officers nominated by itself, and with a tribunal of appeal from the decision of such officers, composed of its own members, a task which every day grows more onerous in its present shape. I can only give here an outline of the principles on which such improvement should be based. I should then suggest

That a body of triers should be nominated by the judges, and accepted by the House as their officers; that, on a complaint being made against a return, one should be selected by ballot to proceed to the spot and hold an inquiry.

That the inquiry should be general, into the conduct not only of the sitting member and his agents, but of all the candidates, and the general mode in which the election was conducted, and whether bribery, treating, or undue influence prevailed. That the trier should have all the powers given now to commissioners by statute, and the same powers of giving indemnity, except to candidates and agents, which should be reserved to the House on the adoption of the report. That he should report specially on any corrupt practices disclosed at the hearing, and should have power to call witnesses not summoned by the petitioner or his opponent. That the time for petition should commence from the return, and the complaint, when parliament is not sitting, be lodged in the crown office. That the petitioners should give security for costs as at present, but that the recognisance should be conditioned to prosecute the petition with effect, and not to withdraw it without leave of the House. That no complaint once made should be withdrawn without leave of the House.

That the trier should have power to report whether the petition or defence is frivolous and vexatious, and in that case to saddle the parties with the costs.

That the House should nominate a committee of appeal; that any one affected by the decision should have power, on giving security for costs to be paid in case the decision was sustained, to appeal. But that any member reported against by the trier should not sit or vote pending appeal.