and Baltimore, he brought the existing sad calamity upon the Union. Sir, I have no regard for your position. You have stood with the Republicans, and have aided them in elevating Mr. Lincoln to the Presidency, by dividing the Democratic party; and now, sir, you make that the pretext for breaking up this Government. I stand here and declare that fact in the face of the nation. It is true, sir. I understand it as well as any man in this house or in this country." Mr. Burnett: "Will the gentleman permit me to ask him a question? Mr. Richardson: "Certainly, sir." Mr. Burnett: "Then, when the gentleman states that at Charleston-and I do not mean to go into a discussion of the matter-I was engaged in plotting to break up the Democratic party, he states that of which he knows nothing, for, sir, I had no agency or hand in it; and, if he will permit me to say one more word, I will tell him that, when State delegations went out of the Charleston convention, I was the only man, I believe, from any of the slave States, who went into the hall and made a speech appealing to them to come back." Mr. Richardson: "I am not mistaken, Mr. Speaker, in the position I assume. I found the gentleman there in association and cooperation with those who created distraction in that convention, and who did all that was done to destroy it. I stand here and say that; and for what I say I am responsible. "Mr. Speaker, I have spoken of this conspiracy to break up the Democratic party and the country, and I have said that the gentleman from Kentucky was in it. I know the fact, and I will not permit him to shrink from it.” Mr. Burnett: "Let me tell the gentleman from Illinois, once for all—" Mr. Richardson: "I know you were in it, and that is enough." The Speaker: "Does the gentleman yield to the gentleman from Kentucky?” Mr. Richardson: "I do not yield. I have one more word to say, and I want to say it to the other side of this House. This organization of the Breckinridge party was for the purpose of destroying the Government. That was its purpose and its object. What do we see? Without the aid and coöperation of the men of the North, that party was powerless. The men from the Northern States, who aided and encouraged this organization which is in rebellion, are at the head to-day of our army. Butler of Massachusetts, Dix of New York, and Patterson of Pennsylvania, and Cadwalader-all of them in this movement to break down and disorganize the Democratic party and the country. Why is it? This Douglas party furnished you onehalf of your entire army. Where is your general-where is your man in command to-day who belongs to that party? Why is this? Have you Republicans sympathized with this Breckinridge party? Are you sympathizing with them, and lending your aid to the men who lead our armies into misfortune and disgrace? I ask you to look. * "I stand here to-day for the purpose of saying one word more. I have spoken with some feeling. I have spoken with feeling because I feel, and feel deeply. You have at the head of your army a man who carried your fiag through the war of 1812, and through the war with Mexico, with a strategy unequalled. You have sought to disgrace him, and you have sought to impair the public confidence in him. He fought this battle over here, which was disastrous to our army, against his judgment. Who caused it? You have forced it upon him. I tell you that, unless you rally around him, this great fighting army at the North, which is Democratic, will not support you. I have no sympathy with General Scott's political opinionsnot a particle. When he was a candidate for the Presidency, I fought against and resisted his election with all my power. I would vote against him for the Presidency to-morrow; but I tell you that, when you look over the list of all the military men of the earth, he is the greatest of them all. He fought the battle of Sunday last against his plan. The strategy of General Scott was the finest ever seen. If he had not been forced to precipitate our army, he would have won a victory without fighting a battle. Again I say, you have forced this battle upon General Scott, and it has been lost because you have forced it upon him; and I declare before God to-day, as my solemn conviction, that if this thing is to be permitted to continue, you destroy this Government forever. I stand here in my place and make the declaration that, if General Scott cannot conduct this war, we have nobody that can. If he cannot, by strategy, skill, and courage, save this Government, it is impossible to save it. On this matter I have said all I desire to say." Mr. Blair, of Missouri, followed: "The gentleman alleges that General Scott was driven into this battle the other day by some of the persons upon this side of the House, as I understood him. Now, there has been nothing said of General Scott here so derogatory to him as that which the gentleman himself has uttered. Is he fit to command the army of the United States if he can be forced into a battle when he is not prepared for it, and against his own best judgment, by the outcries of outsiders, as the gentleman has characterized them? No one here has attempted to traduce or say aught against General Scott, except the gentleman himself, and he has levelled at him a charge which is derogatory to him in the very highest degree." Mr. Richardson: "Well, I take it back if I have." Mr. Blair: "If he takes it back, I have nothing further to say upon the matter." Mr. Richardson: "I believe the gentleman from Missouri has taken issue with me upon the * Bull Run. fact that General Scott was forced to fight this battle. I will tell the gentleman what occurred yesterday morning in the presence of my friends McClernand, Logan, and Washburne, of Illinois, and also in the presence of the President of the United States and the Secretary of War. I will try and repeat what was said. General Scott said: 'Sir, I am the greatest coward in America.' I rose from my seat immediately. Stop, sir,' said he, 'I will prove it; I have fought this battle, sir, against my judgment; I think the President of the United States ought to remove me to-day for doing it. As God is my judge, after my superiors had determined to fight it, I did all in my power to make the army efficient. I deserve removal because I did not stand up, when my army was not in condition for fighting, and resist it to the last.' If the gentleman controverts what I say, I furnish the evidence, the proof. Here are the gentlemen present who heard this conversation. There is your Secretary of War and your President. He said that he ought to be removed because he had fought the battle against his judgment. I stand here to vindicate him. "I am indebted to the gentleman from Missouri for the compliment which he has passed upon me. I desire to say for myself that I stand here the remains of three generations that have fallen in battle. The bones of my father and grandfather bleach upon the battlefields where they fell beneath the flag of my country. I have stood beneath its folds at home and abroad in the storm of battle, and, with God's blessing, I will stand beneath it to the end, and defend it with my life against foreign or domestic foe." Mr. Washburne: "As my colleague has referred to that conversation, I hope he will state to the House what the President said to General Scott." Mr. Richardson: "I will state it. The President said: Your conversation seems to imply that I forced you to fight this battle.' General Scott then said: 'I have never served a President who has been kinder to me than you have been.' But, sir, he did not relieve the Cabinet from the imputation of having forced him to fight this battle. He paid a compliment to President Lincoln personally; and, Mr. Speaker, standing here in my place, I desire to say of Abraham Lincoln-and I have known him from boyhood's hour till now-if you let him alone, he is an honest man; but I am afraid he has not the will to stand up against the wily politicians who surround him and knead him to their purposes." On a subsequent day this subject came up again in the House, when Mr. Richardson said in explanation, he did not intend to charge that General Scott, even by implication, declared that President Lincoln had contributed to force him into the battle of Bull Run. Mr. Blair, of Missouri, replied: "I allude to this matter for a double purpose. I find that the gentleman is reported as stating that Gen eral Scott intended to pay a personal compli ment to Mr. Lincoln; but that he did not exonerate the Cabinet. "I say that all that has been said on that occasion goes to show that General Scott did intend to exonerate the President from the allegation that he had forced him into a fight. I undertake to say that such is the fact, and I want it to go upon the record." Mr. Richardson: "Let us have no misunderstanding about this matter. My colleagues understood that I gave the language as near as I could. Whether I have been correctly reported or not, I do not know. If I did not then make the correct statement, let me do it now. "I did not understand General Scott, nor did I mean so to be understood, as implying that the President had forced him to fight that battle." Mr. Blair: "That is the very essence of this matter. But I go further, in reference to what occurred prior to that battle, and say that the President, after he had information that General Johnston had escaped through the hands of General Patterson, and had joined General Beauregard on Friday evening, went to General Scott and suggested the propriety of waiting until Patterson's corps could come up and reinforce the army that was then before Manassas; but so firmly fixed was General Scott's determination to attack the enemy then and there, that the President's suggestion was disregarded. The Secretary of War also returned from the field before the battle, and endeavored to induce General Scott to send forward reinforcements; he urged it again and again; and finally succeeded in having five regiments sent, two of which reached Centreville before the retreat commenced. I make these statements, and I make them for the purpose of preventing General Scott from being exhibited to the country, as has been attempted to be done by his friends, as assailing the President and his Administration. This conversation, as reported in the speech of the gentleman from Illinois-and that speech has other marks indicating a design to attack the Administration-holds out General Scott as assailing the President and the Cabinet. "But I have another purpose far more impor tant; and that is, that the President shall retain the confidence of the people of this country-of all who are in favor of preserving the Union; but as long as he is held out as interposing and forcing the Commanding General to fight a bat tle against his will, he cannot command that confidence. When the country knows the truth, as they will know, that the President did not take the responsibility to order a battle before our troops were prepared for it, he will retain, as he deserves, the confidence of the people of this country in the war." The Senate bill "to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes" was reported back by the Judiciary Committee with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. It provided that whenever hereafter, during the existence of the present insurrection against the Government of the United States, any person held to labor or service under the laws of any State shall be required or permitted, by the person to whom such labor or service is due, or his legal agent, to take up arms against the United States, or to work or be employed in or about any fort, navy-yard, armory, dock-yard, ship, or in any military or naval service, against the Government of the United States, or as the servant of any person engaged in active hostilities against the United States, then the person to whom such labor is due shall forfeit all claim to such service or labor, any law of any State, or of the United States, to the contrary notwithstanding; and, in case of a claim for such labor, such facts shall be a full and sufficient answer. Mr. Wickliffe, of Kentucky, said: "I desire to ask the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary whether it is the design of this bill to confiscate the property of citizens in persons described there where they may be found at labor of any description which can be connected with war, except the carrying of arms? Suppose my negroes-I being a national man and a Union man-are taken without my leave and against my consent, to drive teams and carry provender to the rebel army: are my negroes to be confiscated? Mr. Bingham, of Ohio, answered: "I will state in reply to the inquiry of the gentleman from Kentucky, that this bill is drafted-the original bill as well as the substitute-in such a manner as expressly to preclude such a construction; because both the original bill and the substitute limit the penalties prescribed to such persons as are engaged in this rebellion by their own act." Mr. Burnett, of Kentucky, said: "Now, let me ask the gentleman from Ohio whether the Senate bill does not apply to all slaves who may be owned by persons now in this rebellion, and to their services in any wise used in aiding this rebellion, without limitation?" Mr. Bingham: "I state, unhesitatingly, that the Senate bill does no such thing, for it has limitation-that such services must be by the direct act of the owner himself; by the direct act of the owner, or by the act of his agent or employee." The substitute was rejected by the House, and the question recurred on the Senate bill. To this Mr. Bingham offered an amendment, "limiting the operation of the bill to the present insurrection.' The fourth section of the Senate bill was then read as called for. It was as follows: Whenever any person claiming to be entitled to the service or labor of any other person, under the laws of any State, shall employ such person in aiding or promoting any insurrection, or in resisting the laws of the United States, or shall permit him to be so employed, he shall forfeit all right to such service or labor, and the person whose labor or service is thus claimed shall be thenceforth discharged therefrom, any law to the contrary notwithstanding. Mr. Burnett: "The use of a slave, by authority of the owner, in any mode which will tend to aid or promote this insurrection, will entitle that slave to his freedom." Mr. Bingham: "Certainly it will." Mr. Burnett: 66 Now we understand each other. I ask the gentleman whether this bill is not to be construed by the executive authorities of the Government? Mr. Bingham: "No, sir; I undertake to say that this provision is like many others now standing upon our statute-books subject to judicial decision. It is simply an act which may become the subject of adjudication in the courts as between the owner of a person so employed and the person so claimed." Mr. Burnett: "That is what the gentleman says, but does it not mislead the House? On a certain state of facts to be assumed, and they are to a certain extent set out in the bill, then the contingency occurs upon which the slave is entitled to his freedom. Whenever that question is settled by judicial procedure hereafter, the slave sets up the fact that he was used in any way Mr. Bingham: "By his master." Mr. Burnett: "Or with his consent, or the consent of his agent, in any mode whatever, then that negro is entitled to his freedom." Mr. Bingham: "Yes, sir." Mr. Burnett: "Then, that amounts to a wholesale emancipation of the slaves in the seceding or rebellious States." Mr. Bingham replied: "I undertake to say that no just court in America will ever construe this fourth section, if it becomes a law, to the effect that, because it happens that citizens of the United States residing in a seceding State hold slaves, this law amounts to an emancipation of their slaves. I deny that that was the intention of the law, or that it will bear any such construction by a court of justice. I assert, further, that the very words of the statute eschew any such construction. By the express words of the act it is limited in its effect to those persons who themselves, by their own direct acts, for the purpose of overturning the powers of the Government, employ, or consent that others shall employ, the services of their slaves to that end. Does the gentleman complain that the Congress of the United States shall provide by law that any person owning slaves within his own State of Kentucky, who shall feloniously employ them in insurrection within his own State against the combined authority of the United States and of the State of Kentucky, for the destruction of his own life, or the lives of his kindred and friends, shall be his control over his slaves? I aver that a traitor so tenderly cared for, that he shall not forfeit should not only forfeit his slave, but he should forfeit his life as well. A traitor justly forfeits both life and property." Mr. Burnett followed: "The gentleman propounds to me the question whether I am willing that the slaves shall be used against the authority of the United States? This is what I object to: that when you pass a law in reference to property, you should take one species of property and put it upon a different footing from another. This Congress has no power, and the power exists nowhere in this Government, to set at liberty the slaves now held in bondage in the slave States; and when Congress undertakes to confiscate slave property, that species of property should be put upon the very same basis as all other property confiscated by the General Government. Let me state a case to the gentleman, and ask him a question. "I am a citizen of the State of Tennessee, which is now one of the rebellious States; I own slaves; I use those slaves upon my farm in the culture of tobacco, wheat, and the usual products of that State; they make corn and wheat and hay; and I take those things, the products of slave labor, and sell them to that rebel army. Now, the gentleman is a lawyer, and will he say that, by the provisions of this bill, my slaves are not entitled to their free dom?" Mr. Bingham: "I think, when the gentleman sells his produce to the rebels, he ought to forfeit all he has." Mr. Burnett: "Exactly; and that is this bill." Mr. Crittenden: "Mr. Speaker, it has been conceded in all time, I believe, that the Federal Government, the Congress of the United States, has no power to legislate upon the subject of slavery within the States. It has been conceded that that was a subject for State legislation only. Does war change the powers of Congress in this respect? It is the absence of all power upon the subject which has prevented your legislation. Absence of all power of legislation in time of peace must be the absence of the same power at all times. The constitutional power of this House does not come and go with a change of circumstances. That is a fixed rule of Congress, permanent, immutable, and made to govern Congress. Now, sir, if you can legislate in regard to slavery in this instance, and if you can, upon certain conditions in time of war, destroy the right of the master 'to his slave, why cannot you, upon conditions, in time of peace do the same thing? You do it here because the slave is employed to aid the master in the commission of a great crime, that is, the uniting in a civil war. Could you not apply the principle to times of peace, and make the conditions then? If a master uses his slave to aid in the commission of a trespass, or it may be a murder, can you declare that to be sufficient cause for the liberation of the slave? Why can you not? Becaue you have no power by your Constitution to touch slavery at all." Mr. Kellogg, of Illinois: "I wish to make this suggestion: while we concede that there is no power to interfere with the right to hold slaves in Kentucky, I suggest to him whether it is not competent to forfeit the claim that a man has to his slaves for treason in the master, in the same way that he would forfeit his claim to his horse, and yet not at all in conflict with, or abrogate the law that authorizes the holding of slaves? I deny any disposition on my own part to interfere with the laws of the States in reference to holding slaves, but I insist upon our power to make a forfeiture of the right to service or labor of a person or the title to a horse, when the master of one, or the owner of the other, has become a traitor to his country, and uses that property or right for the destruction of the Government. I wish the gentleman to make a distinction between the right a master has, and the idea of abrogating the State law of Kentucky, for instance, allowing him to hold slaves; and that is the point to which I wish to call his attention." Mr. Crittenden: "I answer the gentleman in the same general terms in which he argues his case. If you have no power, there the question ends. Well, have you a power to legislate concerning a slave in Kentucky, as to his rights present or future? Have you a right to impose any terms or conditions on the master, in time of peace, on which the slave shall be entitled to his liberty?" Mr. Kellogg, of Illinois: "My idea on that point is simply this: that the citizen of Kentucky, like the citizen of any State, by an infraction of law-of the highest law of the country-is liable to penalties and forfeitures. It operates on the person to forfeit his right by his own crime, and does not at all attack or invalidate the right to hold slaves or abolish slavery in Kentucky. It operates as a forfeiture on the person for his crime in precisely the same way as it operates as a forfeiture on other kinds of property." Mr. Crittenden: "I say, if you have no power directly, no matter what the advantages of the exercise of that power would be, no matter how just, no matter how necessary to the preservation of the Union, you cannot legislate about it for want of power. That is my point. You cannot make a general law that shall regulate slavery, that shall regulate the rights of the master or the rights of the servant, in a State of this Union, in time of peace. That will be admitted, I think. You cannot punish any crime in the State; that is for the State. It is a part of its interior police. It is the law, and you were willing to put it in the Constitution as a thing never denied. Now, I ask my friend if this bill is not getting around that, making use of a state of war, of a state of things that highly excites us all?" Mr. Kellogg, of Illinois: "I repeat that we have no more power to legislate on the subject of slavery in time of war than we have in time of peace. If a citizen of the United States commits high treason, or any other great crime known to the law, it is competent for the United States Legislature, if the crime be within its cognizance, (and treason is,) to provide for the forfeiture and confiscation of the offender's property. And it is because he is a criminal before the law that I propose that his horses, his houses, his lands, his mules, his cannon, yea, his right to service in another, shall be confiscated; not annulling the law by which he holds it: for that is a matter which neither in war nor in peace can we reach. But because of the crime, we may either in war or peace impose the penalty of the confiscation of the offender's right to hold property, or of the right to the service and labor of another. This bill is put on the ground of confiscation, on the ground of forfeiture." Mr. Crittenden: "Mr. Speaker, it is the crime against which we are legislating that irritates and provokes us to extremity in our legislation on this subject. We have a power in all cases within our jurisdiction to try persons in our courts for the crime alleged against them; and all the consequences which the law annexes under the Constitution follow the judgment. "Now, in reference to treason, which is the crime here. The Constitution defines what it is, and provides for its punishment. It declares that treason against the United States shall consist in levying war against them; and that no person shall be convicted of treason except on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on his confession in open court. It declares that Congress shall have the power to declare the punishment of treason; but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the offender. "Now, sir, the crime declared by this bill, and for which this forfeiture is to take place, is treason-treason by its very definition. It is so considered in this bill. It is so considered by my friend from Illinois. This law undertakes to deprive the owner of slaves of his entire property, and to give complete freedom to the slave. The Constitution says that even on conviction of treason, there shall be no forfeiture of property, of any description, beyond the lifetime of the offender. "Now, I ask my friends everywhere if it is not a plain breach of the Constitution that a man shall forfeit his slaves? Whatsoever of property he employs, or permits to be employed in a certain way in aid of treasonable purposes, he shall forfeit it absolutely, says this bill; and especially shall he forfeit his slaves forever. That is the language of the bill. The language of the Constitution is, that no title of his property shall be forfeited for longer than his life. In this, however else we may differ, there is an apparent unconstitutionality in this bill. "Gentlemen, for the sake of our country, I ask you not to enter upon such an experiment. Your laws already declare what is treason; they define what shall be the penalties of that crime. They are sufficient, and I hope there will be no further action, such as this bill contemplates. "Let us act our part like men; let us look above these little means of penal laws which, give me leave to say, will furnish those in arms against the Government a pretext for misrepre senting the purposes and objects of this war. We have declared that this war is not for the subjugation of the South, not for the overthrow of slavery, nor for the overthrow of their social institutions, but simply for the noble purpose of restoring our country and preserving the Union. That is our object. Let the means with which we pursue that object be as noble and elevated as the object itself. Let us raise ourselves to that high level. But what will be the effect of these penal laws? Does any man suppose they will assist you in gaining a single battle? When we have before us the noble purpose of uniting our countrymen under a common Government, and of restoring the supremacy of the Constitution, is it necessary to rake in the dust for these small, petty means of annoyance, the effect of which will only be to render those now in arms against the Government more bitter against us? " Mr. Diven, of New York, asked: "Is there any man who thinks that the passage of a law authorizing the confiscation of property can promote the success of our army? Why, then, do not other nations think so? When we were prosecuting our war against Mexico we respected the property of the enemy. When Garibaldi was prosecuting the war of independence in Italy, he respected the property of the Italians, without regard to what army they were giving their sympathies to. Have not the stern rigors of ancient law been relaxed in favor of justice? Why have we protested against indiscriminate piracy on the seas? Why has the custom been abandoned of giving up cities that had been besieged to the sack of the soldiery, as was once the universal usage of war? Did the sacking of cities promote the success of the besiegers? On the contrary, it stimulated the besieged to a more obstinate and determined resistance. If any man doubts it, let him read the wars of the Peninsula, where women, rather than undergo the rigors of such a code, fought and perished, till the streets reeked with their putrid bodies. No, sir. The attaching of such rigors and penalties to warfare only stimulates the resistance of the enemy. Let it be understood that all these Southern States, which may be regarded as in rebellion against the Government, are to have their property all confiscated if we are successful in the war, and do you not see that they will fight the battle to the bitter end? Do you not see that there is no hope for them, no home, no hearthstone; and that they may as well conclude to die on the field of battle as to surrender?" Mr. Stevens, of Pennsylvania, replied: "Mr. Speaker, I thought the time had come when the laws of war were to govern our action; when constitutions, if they stood in the way of the laws of war in dealing with the enemy, had no right to intervene. Who pleads the Constitution against our proposed action? Who says the Constitution must come in, in bar of our action? It is the advocates of rebels, of rebels who have sought to overthrow the Constitution and trample it in the dust-who repudiate the |