Use of a dead ly weapon with previous intention. Of Murder. the say to you;" whereupon the deceased returned into the room, If, after an interchange of blows on equal terms, one of the par- (w) Rex v. Oneby, 2 Str. 766. 2 Lord Raym. 1489. CHAP. I. §3.] Resisting Officers and Others. After two rounds, which occupied little more than two minutes, Levy was found to be stabbed in a great many places; and of one of those stabs he almost instantly died. It appeared that nobody could have stabbed him but the prisoner; who had a clasped knife before the affray. Bayley, J. told the jury, that if the prisoner used the knife privately from the beginning; or if before they began to fight he placed the knife so that he might use it during the affray, and used it accordingly, it was murder: but that if he took to the knife after the fight began, and without having placed it to be ready during the affray, it was only manslaughter. The jury found the prisoner guilty of murder. (a) upon counterfeit reconciliation. Though, where there has been an old quarrel between A. and B., Pretended or and a reconciliation between them, and afterwards, upon a new and sudden falling out, A. kills B., this is not murder; yet if the circumstances it appears that the reconciliation was but pretended or counterfeit, and that the hurt done was upon the score of the old malice, it is murder. (x) SECT. III. Cases of Resistance to Officers of Justice, to Persons acting in MINISTERS of justice, as bailiffs, constables, watchmen, &c. (y) (x) 1 Hale 451. 4 Co. 40. killing officers. Resisting and Persons acting in their aid. Private per sons. as to a watchman who is killed in the execution of his office. (g) This rule is not confined to the instant the officer is upon the spot, and at the scene of action, engaged in the business that brought him thither; for he is under the same protection of the law eundo, morando, et redeundo: and therefore if he come to do his office, and meeting with great opposition, retire, and be killed in the retreat, this will amount to murder; as he went in obedience to the law and in the execution of his office, and his retreat was necessary in order to avoid the danger by which he was threatened. And, upon the same principle, if he meet with opposition by the way, and be killed before he come to the place, such opposition being intended to prevent his doing his duty, (which is a fact to be collected from circumstances appearing in evidence,) this likewise will amount to murder. (2) The protection which the law affords to such ministers of justice is not, as we have seen, confined to their own persons. Every one coming to their aid, and lending his assistance for the keeping of the peace, or attending for that purpose, whether commanded or not, is under the same protection as the officer himself. (a) Nor is the protection which the law affords in these cases confined to the ordinary ministers of justice, or their assistants. It extends, under certain limitations, to the cases of private persons interposing for preventing mischief from an affray, or using their endeavours to apprehend felons, or those who have given a dangerous wound, and to bring them to justice; such persons being likewise in the discharge of a duty required of them by the law. The law is their warrant, and they may not improperly be considered as persons engaged in the public service, and for the advancement of justice, though without any special appointment; and being so considered, they are under the same protection as the ordinary ministers of justice. (b) But with respect to private persons using their endeavours to bring felons to justice, it should be observed, by way of caution, that they must be careful to ascertain, in the first instance, that a felony has actually been committed, and that it has been committed by the person whom they would pursue and arrest. For if no felony has been committed, no suspicion, however well founded, will bring the person so interposing within this especial protection of the law: (c) nor will it be extended to those who, where a felony has actually been committed, upon suspicion, possibly well founded, pursue or arrest the wrong person. (d) But the law is otherwise in the case of an officer acting in pursuance of a warrant. For if A., being a peace-officer, has a warrant from a proper magistrate for the apprehending of B. by name, upon a charge of felony; or if B. stands indicted for felony; or if the hue and cry is levied against B. by name; in these cases if B., though innocent, fly, or turn and resist, and in the struggle or pursuit is killed by A., or any person joining in the hue and cry, the person so killing will (g) Cases of Appeals and Indictments, 4 Co. 40. As to the authority for acting, and the exercise of that authority in a proper manner, see post, Chap. iii. s. 4. (z) Fost. 308, 309. (a) 1 Hale 462, 463. Fost. 309. (b) Fost. 309, (c) Cro. Jac. 194. 2 Inst. 52, 172. (d) 1 Hale 490. Fost. 318. : be indemnified; and, on the other hand, if A., or any person joining in the hue and cry, is killed by B., or any of his accomplices joining in that outrage, such killing will be murder for A. and those joining with him were in this instance in the discharge of a duty required from them by the law; and, in case of their wilful neglect of it, subject to punishment. (e) Upon these principles it may be laid down as a general rule, that General rule. where persons having authority to arrest or imprison, using the proper means for that purpose, are resisted in so doing, and killed, it will be murder in all who take a part in such resistance; for it is homicide committed in despite of the justice of the kingdom. This rule is laid down upon the supposition that resistance be made; and, upon that supposition, it is conceived that it will hold in all cases, whether civil or criminal; for under circumstances of resistance, in either case, the persons having authority to arrest or imprison may repel force by force, and will be justified if death should ensue in the struggle; while, on the other hand, the persons resisting will be guilty of murder. (f) And it has been decided, that if in any quarrel, sudden or premeditated, a justice of peace, constable, or watchman, or even a private person, be slain in endeavouring to keep the peace and suppress the affray, he who kills him will be guilty of murder. (g) But in such case the person slain must have given notice of the purpose for which he came, by commanding the parties in the King's name to keep the peace, or by otherwise shewing that it was not his intention to take part in the quarrel, but to appease it; (h) unless, indeed, he were an officer within his proper district, and known, or generally acknowledged, to bear the office he had assumed. () As if A., B., and C., be in a tumult together, and D. the constable come to appease the affray, and A. knowing him to be the constable kill him, and B. and C. not knowing him to be the constable, come in, and finding A. and D. struggling, assist and abet A. in killing the constable, this is murder in A., but manslaughter in B. and C. (k) Where a constable interferes in an affray to keep the peace, and is killed, such of the persons concerned in killing him as knew him to be a constable are guilty of murder; and such as did not know it of manslaughter only. (a) legal proceed ings, &c. But it must be well remembered, that this protection of the law Questions as is extended only to persons who have authority to arrest or im- to authority, prison, and who use such authority in a proper manner; and that questions of much nicety and difficulty will often arise upon the points of authority, legality of process, notice, and regularity of proceeding. The consideration of these points will be attempted in a subsequent part of the Work; for as the consequences of defects in any of these particulars will generally be to extenuate the crime of killing, and reduce it to manslaughter, the discussion of them will perhaps be better introduced in the Chapter relating to that species of homicide. (1) (e) Fost. 318. (f) Fost. 270, 271. 1 Hale 494. 3 Inst. 56. 2 Hale 117, 118. (g) 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 31, s. 48, 54. (h) Fost. 272. VOL. I. 2 G (i) 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 31. s. 49, 50. (1) Post, Chap. iii. s. 4. As to persons taking part in the resistance. With respect to the persons who shall be considered as taking a part in the resistance, it may be observed, that if the party who is arrested yield himself and make no resistance, but others endeavour to rescue him, and he do no act to declare his joining with them, if those who come to rescue him kill any of the bailiffs, this is murder in them but not in the party arrested: but not so if he do any act to countenance the violence of the rescuers. (m) And where Jackson and four others, having committed a robbery, were pursued by the country upon hue and cry, and Jackson turned upon his pursuers, (others of the robbers being in the same field, and having often resisted the pursuers,) and refusing to yield, killed one of the pursuers; it was held, that inasmuch as all the robbers were of a company and made a common resistance, and so one animated the other, all those of the company of the robbers that were in the same field, though at a distance from Jackson, were principals, viz. present, aiding and abetting: and it was also held, that one of the malefactors who was apprehended a little before the party was hurt, being in custody when the stroke was given, was not guilty, unless it could be proved that after he was apprehended he had animated Jackson to kill the party. (n) If a man be arrested, and he and his company endeavour a rescue, and, while they are fighting, one who knows nothing of the arrest coming by act in aid of the party arrested, and one of the bailiffs be killed, the person so acting in aid is guilty of murder; for a man must take the consequences of joining in any unlawful act, such as fighting; and his ignorance will not excuse him where the fact is made murder by the law without any actual precedent malice, as in the case of killing an officer in the due execution of his office. (o) But it should be observed, that, in another report of the same case, it is said to have been resolved, that if a person, not knowing the cause of the struggle, had interposed between the bailiff and the party arrested, with intent to prevent mischief, it would not have been murder in such person, though the bailiff's assistant were killed by one of the rescuers; (p) and it should seem that, in a case of this kind, the material enquiry would be, whether the stranger interfered with the intention of preserving the peace and preventing mischief; for if he interposed for the express purpose of aiding one party against the other, he must abide the consequences at his peril. (q) A. beat B., a constable who was in the execution of his office, and they were parted; and then C., a friend of A., rushed suddenly in, took up the quarrel, fell upon the constable, and killed him in the struggle; but A. was not engaged in this after he was parted from B. And it was holden by two Judges, that this was murder only in C.; and A. was acquitted, because it was a sudden quarrel, and it did not appear that A. and C. came upon any design to abuse the constable. (r) But if a man begin a riot, and the same |