attack, have been eliminated. As the first-line trenches quickly disappear under the bombardment which precedes an attack, the advanced troops now take cover in shellcraters, in the adaptation of which, for purposes of shelter and defence, they display ingenuity. The positions in rear, which extend to a great depth, comprise isolated and irregular lengths of trench, designed for mutual support; and woods, villages and farms are utilised as tactical pivots, the buildings being demolished-should the artillery not have already done that service-to diminish their value as targets, and to obtain better concealment among the ruins. The blockhouse or 'pillbox' is ubiquitous, being concealed in the débris of woods and villages, or distributed, suitably disguised, in the open, and arranged in groups designed for mutual defence. These structures, with their armament of machine-guns, proved to be the most formidable obstacle to an attack, on account of their great strength, which renders them proof against anything but the direct impact of large shells, and their small size, which makes them a difficult target at the normal range of big guns.

These are some of the expedients devised by the Germans to impede and disorganise the attacking troops, and thus to prepare the way for the counter-attack, which remains the principal weapon of the active defence.t They cannot be said to have been altogether ineffective ; for the local attacks undertaken during the earlier part of the interval between the two battles produced inconsiderable results, and were relatively costly. But the experience thus gained suggested means for countering them; and, when subjected to the test of a general attack, the new system of defence proved by no means impregnable.

Profiting by the lessons learnt in previous battles, the Germans, at the first symptom of an attack in force, withdrew their heavy artillery beyond the probable

* Referred to in the last number of the 'Quarterly Review,' in connexion with the operations on the Arras front. They are formed of concrete, reinforced by steel girders. Height of chamber about 8 feet; walls 5 feet thick. Sunk into the ground for half their height. Machine-guns fire from loopholes at the minimum height affording a good field of fire.

†The disposition of reserves for counter-attacks followed the lines described in the Quarterly Review' for July, p. 262.

range of the advance, with the result that, while they lost fewer guns, their counter-battery work has been even less effective than before. They also, throughout the operations, adopted the plan of changing frequently the position of batteries, in order to secure some immunity from the effect of our superiority in artillery; and instances have been reported of batteries being advanced to closer range after dark, and withdrawn to safer positions before daylight.

While the mud of Flanders has done us a disservice by delaying the operations, it has afforded some compensation by providing a refutation of the theory, which had gained some support, that the rifle has been superseded by the bomb and the machine-gun. The state of the ground often made it impossible to bring machineguns into action, and interrupted the supply of bombs to the fighting-line. Under these conditions the rifle resumed its status as the premier arm of the infantry, a position which it may be expected further to vindicate if the present war of positions should, hereafter, give place to mobile warfare.

On Aug. 18 the Italians resumed on the Julian front the offensive which had been brought to a close, early in June, by the Austrian counter-stroke on the southern Carso. The front of operations extended from Auzza to the sea, a distance of about twenty-two miles. The preparatory bombardment was of great intensity but brief duration, lasting only twenty-four hours. Early in the operations the 3rd Army carried a strong position south-east of Dosso Faiti, occupied Selo, and made progress in the Brestovizza sector towards the northern slopes of Hermada; but its rôle was subsidiary to that of the 2nd Army, and was probably designed chiefly to prevent the enemy from drafting troops from the Carso to the principal scene of action, which lay north of Gorizia. On the night of Aug. 18-19, fourteen bridges were thrown across the Isonzo north of Anhovo; and the Italians, crossing in force, quickly seized the first hostile positions, which had been made untenable by the bombardment, and gained the edge of the Bainsizza plateau. On the left a Bersaglieri division, crossing above Canale, carried the heights overlooking Loga and

Bodrez, and fought its way towards Vrh; while the Florence Brigade, advancing across the Rohot, drove the enemy from their positions east of the valley. The range of heights culminating in the Jelenik summit, which formed the nucleus of the system for the defence of the plateau, withstood for some time the frontal attack from Anhovo, but ultimately succumbed to the outflanking movements on the north and south. The Bersaglieri division carried the heights of Frata and Sommer, and advanced southwards through Vrh; while the positions on the south were broken through on a broad front from the Rohot valley. Having captured the ridge, the Italians, pivoting on their right in the neighbourhood of Vodice, swept eastwards and southwards across the plateau, opposed only by Austrian rear-guards equipped with numerous machine-guns, and supported by light artillery.

For the moment it seemed as though the enemy's resistance had been broken. Monte Santo, being outflanked, fell on Aug. 24; and it appeared likely that San Gabriele, the main pivot of the enemy's defensive system north-east of Gorizia, would soon follow suit. On the 28th, however, the Italians found themselves in contact with a strong position on the Volnik ridge, which forms the eastern rim of the Bainsizza plateau. Here the Austrians were in force, having been joined by fresh troops lately arrived from the Russian front. The advance from the Isonzo had occupied ten days, an interval which General Boreovic had put to good account by reorganising his forces and preparing his system of defence. The slowness of the advance was probably due less to the opposition encountered than to the delay involved in passing over the river, and transporting across the roadless plateau, the heavy artillery, ammunition, and other supplies, including water, the local sources of which, naturally insufficient, are said to have been poisoned by the enemy.

In the circumstances above described, an immediate attack was not to be thought of. It would have been necessary to await the arrival of the heavy artillery, the preparation of emplacements for the guns, and the accumulation of a sufficient reserve of ammunition for a battle of the first order. The additional delay would