in this case, be extremely essential. We are raising an army of about 12,000 men. . . . I am appointed second in command."

And on October 19, General Miranda was writing back that "your wishes have been granted up to a certain point, since it is agreed here, on the one hand, that no English troops are to take part in the land operations, as the auxiliary land forces are to be entirely American; and, on the other hand, that the navy is to be solely English. Everything is straightened out, and we await only the decision of your illustrious President to start like lightning."

6

It is quite evident from all this that in 1798, under the pretext of the French war, preparations were going forward for a conflict with Spain, the outbreak of which was awaited with eager interest, not only in the Southwest which would undoubtedly have joined General Miranda's armada to a man, but in some of the highest military circles in the country-for it appears that General Pinckney and Secretary of War McHenry shared General Hamilton's enthusiasm, while President Adams was causing flat boats to be constructed at Fort Washington for the transportation of troops, in the event of a descent upon New Orleans. In view of not far distant events, it is interesting, surely, to observe that the notion of war with Spain was possessed of wide popular approval throughout the Mississippi Valley; and that the project of a glorified filibustering expedition enjoyed the sanction, and

was to profit by the leadership, of so prominent and correct a person as General Hamilton.

But what General Hamilton, and all of them, could not possibly have realized at the time, was that the Spanish government was probably fully cognizant of these preparations, through its Number Thirteen. For in February, 1799, General Hamilton, whose relations with him seemed to have remained sufficiently cordial, sent for General Wilkinson to come to New York-which he did by way of New Orleans -for a consultation. They met in August, and General Hamilton gave him a memorandum of the points to be covered in future conferences, including "the disposition of our western inhabitants towards the United States and foreign powers; the disposition of the Spaniards in our vicinity, their strength in number and fortifications . . . the best mode (in the event of a rupture with Spain) of attacking the two Floridas, the troops, artillery, etc., requisite; the best method of supplying the western army with provisions. .. the best arrangement of command, so as to unite facility of communication with the seaboard . . under the general commanding the western army.

And General Wilkinson told General Hamilton that "the imbecility of the Spanish government on the Mississippi is as manifest as the ardour of the gallant Louisianians is obvious. A single individual of hardy enterprize, presenting himself with directorial credentials, and hoisting the national standard at New Orleans, might depose the Spanish administration in one hour, and have the population of the country for any chivalrous enterprize." Such

as, for instance, an invasion of Mexico? "Under such circumstances, will it be indecorous should I express my apprehensions that we repose in false security, and that if we are not seasonably aroused, the dismemberment of the union may be put to hazard?" And General Wilkinson was certainly

in a position to know about that.

As for the rest, "let us," General Wilkinson suggested to General Hamilton, "let us contemplate the unmeasured range of the Mississippi, let us view its countless tributary waters which bathe the most extensive tract of luxuriant soil in the universe; let us reflect that the most valuable portion of this soil is ours of right, and that on the maintenance of this right must depend the national union: under such well founded reflections. . I flatter myself we shall not hesitate . . . for the safety, the subordination and prosperity of our western possessions, the most cheap and conclusive plan would be the capture of New Orleans; but as this step is at present unwarrantable we must turn our thoughts to the defensive protection of these settlements."

Copy to the Prince Godoy-or rather, to his successor, Don Mariano de Urquijo-not to mention Don Carlos de Yrujo, Spanish Minister at Philadelphia.

One has to rely for these matters on General Wilkinson's memoirs, a frequently imaginative work; how much better might one examine the correspondence of the two generals, now apparently destroyed, of which Mr. Edward Everett Hale said that "I have read the manuscript correspondence between Hamilton, the acting commander of the

new army, and Wilkinson, the commander of the Ohio, with reference to the proposed attack on Orleans. Wilkinson himself made a visit to Hamilton to adjust the details of the campaign. This mine was ready to be sprung upon poor Spain, when the republic of the United States should make war upon the French republic."

They were all ready to "start like lightning," but as it turned out, President Adams never answered the proposals from General Miranda; and General Hamilton's sword was not placed upon the altar of South American liberty. .

CHAPTER II

MOUNTAINS OF SALT

I

IN 1798, Mr. de Talleyrand had succeeded in driving out the Prince Godoy, but in 1799 he was himself out of power. But only for a while. Napoleon soon declared himself First Consul; the victory of Marengo made him master of Europe; and on September 30, 1800, he and Mr. de Talleyrand were signing a peace of sorts with the United States.

But in August they were negotiating a treaty of a vastly different nature. Marshal Berthier took it to Madrid, and with the Queen of Spain on his side, secured an agreement whereby, in return for the addition of Tuscany to the Duchy of Parmaand the daughter of the Queen of Spain was Duchess of Parma-Spain undertook to cede Louisiana to France. It was Mr. de Talleyrand's old idea of the French colonial empire, although as they explained it to Spain, it was to provide an efficient protection for her unwieldy dominions in the new world. The treaty was signed at San Ildefonso, on October 1, 1800, and the fact that its clauses were to all intents incompatible with the covenants signed