Actions for Rent, when Local-Defect aided by Verdict. assignee of the lessee against the lessor, or the grantee of the reversiou, is also local; for it lies at the common law in respect of the privity of estate, which is always local. 5 Rep. 17 a, Spencer's case. F. N. B. 146 C. But in all these cases, if such local action be brought and tried in a wrong county, the defect is aided after verdict by statute 16 & 17 Car. 2, c. 8; and therefore, when the defendant intends to take advantage of the wrong venue, he must demur to the declaration. 7 T. R. 583-588. Mayor of London v. () As the modern mode of declaring is not to set out the parcels in the declaration, the defendant cannot in general demur for this cause, but should set out the indenture in his plea. [A wrong venue is no ground of nonsuit. 2 Bing. N. C. 575. Boyes v. Hewetson. 2 Scott, 831. S. C. 7 C. & P. 127. See also 15 M. & W. 244. Richards v. Easto. 8 Exch. 431. Simmons v. Lillystone. But where the county in the margin Cole. Willes' Rep. 431. Bailiffs of Lichfield v. Slater (1). It should seem that the lessor cannot bring an action of covenant after he has parted with the reversion. for any breach of covenant accrued subsequent to the grant of the reversion, but the action can only be brought by the assignee of the reversion; for the statute of H. 8 has transferred the privity of contract together with the estate in the land to the assignee of the reversion. See 3 Lev. 154. Beely v. Purry. was Surrey, the action being local in its nature, (the cause of action appeared to have arisen in Essex,) it was held that there was a variance which entitled the defendant to a nonsuit. 6 B. & Sm. 777. Richardson v. Locklin. Ante, p. 6, n. (). Much valuable learning on the subjects of the principal note will be found in 1 Alcock & Napier, Q. B. (Irish), 366. Grogan v. Margan.] CRAFT v. BOITE. 1 Saunders' Reports, 241f-2466 [abridged]. Venue in Slander. WHERE in an action laid in London for slanderous words spoken there, defendant pleads a local justification at Oxford, and the issue thereon is tried in London, and not at Oxford, as it ought to be, this is aided by the statute 16 & 17 Car. 2, c. 8. This was an action on the case for slanderous words. The plaintiff declared that the defendant at London, in the presence (1) and hearing of divers subjects of our lord the king, (1) The declaration must shew a publication of the slander, otherwise the action does not lie; and therefore it is averred in this declaration, that the defendant spoke the words in the presence and hearing of several persons. But these words, though generally used, are not absolutely necessary: any others that denote a publication are sufficient; as, that the defendant spoke the words "palam," or 'publice." Cro. Eliz. 861. Taylor v. How. So, alleging the words to be spoken in the presence of several persons, (a) In an action for a libel in a foreign language, the original must be set out, and not a mere translation. 6 T. R. 162. Zenobio v. Axtell. The libel itself must be set out in the declara omitting the word "hearing," is held to be sufficient; for it shall be intended to be in their hearing. Cro. Eliz. 486. Hall v. Hennesley. Cro. Jac. 39. Kellan v. Manesby. Cro. Car. 199. Smart v. Easdale. And, as the declaration must shew a publication, therefore, if the words are Welsh, French, or other foreign language, the plaintiff must aver that the hearers understood such language; Hob. 268, in Fleetwood v. Curley. Cro. Eliz. 865. Price v. Jenkings. 1 Rol. Abr. 74, (A.) (a); unless, indeed, with respect to Welsh tion; hence, it is not sufficient to state that the defendant published a libel, "purporting that the "plaintiff's beer was of bad "quality, and sold by deficient measure," &c.; for such a mode Slander-Publication. falsely and maliciously ((2), post, 313) spoke these scandalous words of the plaintiff ((3), post, 314)-" Look, there is a thievish words, the action is brought in any of the courts of great sessions in Wales (b); for it shall be intended the hearers understood the words. But it does not seem necessary, though usual, to give the signification of such foreign words in the declaration; for the court will inform themselves by those who understand the language, what of statement deprives the defendant of taking the opinion of the court upon the words of the libel by demurrer. 6 Taunt. 169. Wood v. Brown. 1 Marsh, 522. S. C. S. C. [See also 3 B. & A. 503. Wright v. Clements, ante, p. 139, n. (c).] So in actions for verbal slander, the words must be stated. 3 M. & S. 110. Cook v. Cox. [And this general rule, requiring the words to be specified, is applicable to cases where special damages are made the ground of the action. Therefore, a declaration for words imputing that tulips of the plaintiff, about to be sold by auction, were stolen property, whereby purchasers were deterred from bidding, and the sale was defeated, was held bad in arrest of judgment for not setting out the words verbatim. 1 Mees. & W. 495. Gutsole v. Mathers. The rule is the same where a previous publication is referred to, if it is neces CRAFT v. BOITE. English. the words mean in Hob. 126. 1 Rol. Abr. 86 (L.), pl. 5. And it is safer not to translate the words; for it has been held that, where the words. in Welsh signified that the plaintiff was perjured, and were therefore actionable, but the translation of them into English did not amount to perjury, but only that the plaintiff was forsworn, no ac sary to constitute the libel. 8 Q. B. 823. Solomon v. Lawson. There is an ancient form of count in slander, that the defendant "im"posed the crime of felony " on the plaintiff; which words are a bad translation of the Latin "crimen feloniæ imposuit." The legal sense and meaning of those words. is, that the party made the charge of felony before a magistrate; and it is not sufficient, in support of such a count to prove that the plaintiff was charged with felony in conversation. 2 B. & C. 283. Blizard v. Kelly. 3 D. & R. 519. S. C. See also 6 M. & S. 29. Davies v. Noake. The objection to which this form of count is open, that it does not specify the particular felony with which the party was charged, is not valid after verdict. 2 B. & C. 283.] (b) [Abolished by stat. 1 W. 4, c. 70, s. 14.] CRAFT v. BOITE. Slander-Publication. young rogue, he hath stolen two hundred pounds' worth of "plate out of Wadham College" ((4), post, 315), (meaning a tion would lie. Sty. 263. Ross v. Lawrence (c). It is an established rule, that slanderous words must be understood by the court in the same sense as the rest of mankind would ordinarily under (c) But it should seem, that it would now be held necessary to set out a translation in the declaration; for in Rex v. Manasseh Goldstein, which was tried at the Old Bailey, the prisoner was found guilty upon an indictment framed on the statute 43 Geo. 3, c. 139, for forging an instrument purporting to be a treasury note or receipt of the Prussian government. The case was afterwards argued before ten of the judges, abs. Bayley, J., and Wood, B., on 4th Feb. 1822; and a majority of eight to two of their lordships held, that the indictment was bad for want of a translation of the instrument, which was in German. 3 Brod. & Bing. 201. The reason appears to have been, that their lordships considered that the court ought to have the instrument before them in a language which they understand, to give them the means of deciding whether it be within the statute. Bayley on Bills, 5th ed. 445. (d) The words must be construed in the sense which hearers stand them (d). Therefore, where one said of another "that his cha"racter was infamous; that he "would be disgraceful to any "society; that those who proposed him as a member of any so of common and reasonable understanding would ascribe to them, even though particular individuals, better informed on the matter alluded to, might forma different judgment. 16 M. & W. 442. · The private intention of a man who utters injurious words is immaterial, if bystanders may fairly understand them in a sense and manner injurious to the party to whom they relate. 16 M. & W.442. Hankinson v. Billy. A hearer cannot be asked "what did you "understand by the words?" The proper question is, "was there Slander-Construction of Words-What amounts to Slander. CRAFT college called Wadham College, in the university of Oxford). By reason of the speaking and publishing of which words he, BOITE. (e) [1 Exch. 196, 203. Southee v. Denny, Accord.] "The rule "The rule "which at one time prevailed, "that words are to be understood "in mitiori sensu, has been long "ago superseded, and words are now construed by courts as they always ought to have been, in "the plain and popular sense in "which the rest of the 'world "naturally understand them.'" Per Lord Ellenborough, C. J., in 9 East, 95. Roberts v. Camden. [See also 1 Cr. & M. 11. Harvey v. French. 10 Bing. 402. Slowman v. Dutton. 4 M. & Sc. 174. S. C. 4 B. & Ad. 630. Tomlinson v. Brittlebank. 10 Bing. 478. Curtis v. Curtis. 4 M. & Sc. 337. S. C. 3 M. & W. 191. Francis v. Roose. 4 M. & W. 204. Hughes v. Rees. 7 M. & W. 12. Rowcliff v. Edmonds. 7 C. v. which, it was admitted, would not enlarge the sense. 5 East, 463. Woolnoth v. Meadows (e). (2) The declaration must also shew a malicious intent in the defendant; but it is not necessary to use the word "maliciously;" for the word "falsely" alone has been held to be sufficiently expressive of a malicious intent. Moor. 459. Ow. 51. Mercer v. Sparks. S. C. Noy, 35 (ƒ). In B. 591, 605. Wakley v. Healye.] To be actionable in themselves, the words when only spoken, not written, must be such as in their plain and popular sense convey to the minds of the hearers a charge of some offence for which the plaintiff is amenable to the law: or of having some disease which will exclude him from society. See Selwyn's N. P. tit. "Slander." 7 M. & Gr. 334. Bloodworth v. Gray. And the jury must be satisfied that the defendant used the words in the sense imputed. Ibid. It would be endless to cite the numerous instances of the application of these rules. Words importing a mere suspicion of felony are not actionable. 6 Exch. 539. Tozer v. Mushford. (f) [The malice here mentioned must be understood to mean |