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"concerning the Pretender, and 'his right to the crown of Great Britain," were a sufficient explanation to make good the charge. In the case of Rex v. Alderton, Sayer's Rep. 280, the libel was an advertisement, reciting certain orders made for collecting money, on account of the distemper amongst the horned cattle, advertised by the clerk of the peace for the county of Suffolk; and it charged, that by these orders the money collected had been improperly applied. The information charged this to be a libel on the justices of Suffolk. In the body of the libel it was not said by the order of the justices: nor did the information in the introductory part say, that it was a libel "of

(k) [The doctrines laid down in this once celebrated note have become, in a great measure, inapplicable to the existing law. For it is enacted by the C. L. P. Act, 1852, s. 61, that, "in actions of libel and "slander the plaintiff shall be at 'liberty to aver that the words or "matter complained of were used " in a defamatory sense, specifying "such defamatory sense without "any prefatory averment to show "how such words or matter were "used in that sense, and such aver

and concerning the justices of Suffolk." But when the information came to state any of the orders in the advertisement, it added this innuendo; "meaning an order of "the justices of peace for the "county of Suffolk." But these innuendos could not supply the want of an averment in the introductory part, of its being written of and concerning the justices; because they were not explanatory of, but in addition to, the former matter; and the court were of opinion, that the information having omitted the words "of and "concerning the justices," in the introductory part, such omission was fatal; and judgment was accordingly arrested (k).

(5) There is no special damage

"ment shall be put in issue by "the denial of the alleged libel or

slander, and where the words or "matter set forth, with or with"out the alleged meaning, show a "cause of action, the declaration "shall be sufficient." Since the passing of this Act, the innuendo is allowed to take the place of the colloquium, and renders it unnecessary. E. B. & E. 346. Hemmings v. Gasson. The declaration may set out the words complained of (see 9 B. & Sm. 279. Watkin v.

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laid in this declaration, the general words here used not amounting to such. Where the words are action

Hall), and put any construction upon them by innuendo, which must be left to the jury.

Words which are actionable in their plain and ordinary meaning, may be alleged in the declaration simply without any innuendo. But where the words, in their natural meaning are innocent, or where, though part of the English language, they have acquired a peculiar meaning, and have become what has judicially (see 3 H. & N. 376. Barnett v. Allen) been called "slang," e. g., the words "black-leg," "blacksheep," "lame-duck ; " 3 H. & N. 376, 382; or where the words are not part of the English language, but have a meaning well known in certain localities, or to certain classes of the community, the declaration, before the C. L. P. Act, 1852, must have had an explanatory traversable inducement. 11 M. & W.289. M'Gregor v. Gregory. 7 Bing. 123, in Cam. Scacc. Angle v. Alexander; and since that Act, must have an innuendo i. e., a statement of the meaning of the words, whereby they are made actionable, which, if traversed,

able, it is not necessary to lay special damage, in order to support the action. Sir W. Jones,

must be proved at the trial. But no innuendo is necessary where an ordinary person would be able to understand what was imputed by the language employed; as where there is an allusion to persons well known in history, or a mention of animals to which certain ideas are attached. Accordingly it was held that the jury might well understand a statement in the libel that

the plaintiff's friends had realized the fable of the "Frozen Snake," as charging the plaintiff with ingratitude to friends, and that no innuendo was necessary. 12 Q. B. 624. Hoare v. Silverlock. Where the libel imputed to the plaintiff that he was a "truckmaster," and there was no innuendo to explain the meaning of the word, it was held that the plaintiff was not bound to give evidence of its meaning, nor the judge to explain it to the jury; but that it was properly left to them to say whether, under all the circumstances, it was used in a defamatory sense. 5 H. & N. 661. Homer v. Taunton. And Pollock, C. B., is reported to have said that the case differed from a case where

196. Lowe v. Harewood (1). But if the plaintiff has sustained any special damage, he must state

the word is of itself unintelligible, as, for instance, some slang word which has no recognised meaning, except by those who are initiated into its use: whereas the word "truckmaster" is composed of two English words intelligible to everybody. But it may be doubted whether this distinction is satisfactory, or reconcileable with the previous cases.

It is for the judge to decide whether a publication is capable of the meaning ascribed to it by an innuendo, and for the jury to decide whether such meaning is duly ascribed to it. 10 Q. B. 899. Blagg v. Sturt.] If the declaration allege that the plaintiff carried on two trades, and that the words were spoken of and concerning him in the way of his trades, it will be sufficient to prove that the plaintiff carried on one of the trades, provided the words proved apply to him in that trade. 1 M. & S. 287. Hall v. Smith. 3 M. & S. 369. Figgins v. Cogswell. See further, as to introductory averments being divisible, 4 M. & S. 532. The King v. Sutton. [3 B. & C. 113. May v. Brown. 3 B. & C. 138. Lewis

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it; for it is an established rule, that no evidence shall be received of any loss or injury, which the

v. Walter. 4 D. & R. 810. S. C. 6 Bing. 458. Rutherford v Evans. 4 M. & P. 163. S. C. 2 Cr. & J. 361. Cox v. Thomason. 2 Tyrw. 411. S. C. 1 Chitt. Rep. 603. Teesdale v. Clement.]

() [For the law presumes that the uttering of the slanderous words has of itself a natural and necessary tendency to injure the plaintiff. 3 Bing. N. C. 382. 3 Scott, 736. Accordingly, in such case, a traverse of the special damage, if laid, is immaterial and bad. 2 Bing. N. C. 372, 380. Smith v. Thomas. 2 Scott, 546, 556. S. C. See also 7 Q. B. 918. Robinson v. Marchant.] If the words be actionable in themselves, they are not the less so, because they are laid to have been spoken of the plaintiff as a candidate for a seat in parliament. 1 N. R. 47. Harwood v. Astley. Although words be actionable in themselves without an innuendo, yet if an innuendo ascribe a particular meaning to them, the plaintiff is bound to prove that they are spoken in that sense. 3 Camp. 461. Smith v. Carey. [Ante, p. 316, n. (i).]

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plaintiff has sustained by the speaking of the words, unless it be specially stated in the declaration. In 1 Str. 666. Browning v. Newman, Lord Raymond took a distinction between the case, where the special damage is the gist of the action, and where the words are in themselves action

able: that in the former evidence of special damage is allowed, though the particular instances of such damages are not specified in the declaration; but in the latter case, particular instances of special damage shall not be given in evidence, unless particularised in the declaration (m). There the plain

(m) The same distinction seems formerly to have obtained as to giving in evidence other words than those laid in the declaration; but it has been held that the plaintiff may prove other words, whether actionable in themselves or not, as evidence of the animus with which the defendant spoke the words which are laid. Rustell v. M'Quister, cited in note to 1 Camp. 48. Thompson v. Bernard. [8 C. & P. 444. Delegal v. Highley. Where, however, there is nothing equivocal in the words charged, the usual course at one time was to exclude evidence of other words for which another action might be brought; otherwise the damages might be increased by those words, and yet the record would be no bar to a subsequent action founded on them. 2 Stark. 93. Stuart v. Lovell. 1 Mood. & R. 455. Pearce v. Ornsby. Ibid. 477. Symmons v. Blake. 7 C. & P. 112. Defries

v. Davies. But in Pearson v. Lemetre, 6 Scott, N. R. 607; S. C., 5 M. & Gr. 700, the plaintiff in an action for a libel, in order to show quo animo the libel which was the subject of the action. was written, gave in evidence two subsequent letters addressed by the defendant to third persons, containing substantially a repetition of the libellous matter; and it was held that they were properly received, though the libel declared on was free from ambiguity, and the letters offered were written after the commencement of the action: and the court laid down the rule that either party may, with a view to the damages, give evidence to prove or disprove the existence of a malicious motive in the mind of the publisher of the defamatory matter: (though if the evidence given for that purpose establishes another cause of action, the jury should be cautioned against giving any damages in

tiff declared that, by reason of these words, one J. M., and divers

respect of it:) for that his spirit and intention is fit to be considered by a jury in estimating the injury done by him to the plaintiff. See also 3 H. of L. 395. Barrett v. Long. E. B. & E. 346. Hemmings v. Gasson, where to an action for false imprisonment, on a charge of felony, the defendant pleaded in justification that the plaintiff had committed a felony; and at the trial his counsel abandoned the plea and exonerated the plaintiff from the charge; it was held that it was not a misdirection in the judge to tell the jury that the putting such a plea on the record was a persisting in the charge contained in it, and was to be taken into account by them in estimating the damages. 12 M. & W. 507. Warwick v. Foulkes. But this cannot be done, in considering whether there was express malice, so as to meet the case of a privileged communication. 7 Q. B. 68. Wilson v. Robinson. See also 12 Q. B. 511. Simpson v. Robinson.] In order to shew the malevolence of the defendant, previous slanders, for which damages have been recovered, may be given in evidence. 1 Mood. & R. 477. Symmonds v.

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other persons who were his customers, left off dealing with him.

Blake. When evidence of other words is admitted, the judge should tell the jury to consider both sets of words in order to ascertain the animus; but if their opinion on that point is against the defendant, to give the plaintiff damages in respect of those words only which are laid in the declaration. 1 Mann. & Gr. 807. Barwell v. Adkins. 2 Scott, N. R. 11. S. C.] The defendant may prove such other words to be true, because he has had no opportunity of justifying them. 2 Stark. 417. Warne v. Chadwell. [By stat. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 1, the defendant may give in evidence, in mitigation of damages, that he made or offered an apology. And by sect. 2, if the libel was contained in a newspaper the defendant may plead that the libel was inserted without actual malice, and without gross negligence, and that he inserted in such newspaper a full apology; and may also plead payment into court by way of amends. In the construction of this statute it has been held that the plaintiff, at the trial of an issue joined on a plea denying actual malice, may give evidence of other publications of the defendant, going back above