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104. Chapman v. Towner, by Parke, B. 12 A. & E. 476. Doe v. Amey. 10 M. & W. 494. Braythwayte v. Hitchcock. 9 Exch. 662. Lee v. Smith. [The law is the same where a man has possession under a lease which is void. 5 T. R. 98. Doe v. Bell. 1 A. & E. 52. Richardson v. Gifford. 2 M. & W. 365, 367. Doidge v. Bowers. 3 Bing. N. C. 850. Beale v. Sanders. 3 Mann. & Gr. 498. Berry v. Lindley. 4 Scott, N. R. 61. S. C. where a man has possession under an agreement to purchase, he is tenant at will, and not liable to pay for use and occupation; 7 Q. B. 611. Winterbotham v. Ingham. 1 M. & W. 700. Doe v. Stanion, by Parke, B. 5 C. & P. 595.

So

Doe v. Miller. 5 M. & W. 14. Doe v. Chamberlaine. 8 M. & W. 118. Howard v. Shaw; and he will not be converted into a tenant from year to year by a stipulation in the contract of sale for payment of interest on the amount of the purchase-money until the completion of the purchase 5 M. & W. 14: Secus, where there is a stipulation that the intended purchaser shall pay at the rate of a sum certain per annum, from the time of taking possession until the completion of the purchase. 6 B. & C. 524.

Saunders v. Musgrave. (See 4 A. & E. 328. Seaton v. Booth.) For other instances where a strict tenancy at will has been held to exist, see 9 Bing. 356. Doe v. Price. 10 B. & C. 718. Doe v. Jones. Ibid. 721. Doe v. M'Kaeg. 3 H. & N. 101. Ley v. Peter. 14 M. & W. 682, 684. Doe v. Wood. 11 Q. B. 122. Doe v. Cox. 7 Exch. 89. Doe v. Davies. 7 C. B. N. S. 371. Pollen v. Brewer.] As to how such a tenancy may be determined, see 9 Bing. 356. 10 B. & C. 721. 2 C. M. & R. 120. Ball v. Cullimore. 2 A. & E. 329. Roe v. Street. 4 Nev. & M. 42. S. C. 7 M. & W. 226. Doe v. Turner. 9 M. & W. 643. S. C. in Cam. Scacc. 8 Exch. 763. Pinhorn v. Souster. 5 C. B. 138. Benham v. Gray. A tenant who continues to occupy after the expiration of his term is a tenant at sufferance, and liable to pay for use and occupation; 5 C. B. 396. Bayley v. Bradley; until he pays rent, and then he becomes tenant from year to year; 7 T. R. 83. Doe v. Watts. 2 B. & C. 100. Bishop v. Howard; on any of the terms of the former lease which are consistent with a yearly tenancy. 17 Q. B. 505. Hyatt v. Griffiths: Secus, where the owner of the land, when the

lease expires, is not acquainted with the terms of the original letting. Oakley v. Monck, infra. A proviso in a lease for re-entry on nonpayment of rent, is such a term. 1 H. & N. 669. Thomas v. Packer. But not a stipulation that the tenancy shall continue until after two years' notice to quit has been given. 1 H. & N. 732. Tooker v Smith. It is a question for the jnry upon what terms the tenancy continues. 3 H. & C. 706. Oakley v. Monck. 4 H. & C. 251. S. C. on error. 17 Q. B. 505. So if the tenant performs services due from the tenant in the way of rent. 1 B. & Ad. 365. Doe v. Morse. But a mere payment of a compensation for the occupation will not thus change the nature of the tenancy. 1 Cr. M. & R. 261. Simpkin v. Ashhurst. In order to establish a tenancy from year to year, something must occur, besides the mere holding over, to shew the existence of a new contract for such a tenancy. 1 Mood. & R. 213. Jenner v. Clegg. 4 A. & E. 832. Jones v. Shears. 8 M. & W. 571, 575. Waring v. King. 1 Carr. & M. 280. Alford v. Vickery. See also Mood. & M. 19. Freeman v. Jury. 8 Bing. 170, 174. Woodcock v. Nuth. 1 M. & Sc. 317. S. C. However, where a

VOL. I.

rector succeeded to a rectory upon the death of the former incumbent, in April, 1816, and found A. and B. in possession of the glebe lands, having been tenants under the former incumbent, and they continued in possession until after December, 1816, when the rector conveyed the glebe lands to a trustee for securing an annuity, it was held that the trustee could not maintain an ejectment against A. and B. without giving them a notice to quit; because, as they had been in possession for more than eight months between the rector's promotion and the grant of the annuity, and had not been disturbed, the rector must be presumed, after such a lapse of time, to have assented to the continuance of their tenancy under the same terms as before. 6 B. & C. 126. Doe v. Somerville. 9 D. & R. 100. S. C. A tenant who, after having given notice to quit, holds over for a year, paying double rent according to the statute 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 18, may quit at the end of such year without fresh notice. 1 B. & Ad. 904. Booth v. M'Farlane.]

A tenancy from year to year may be determined by either party giving notice to quit half a year previous to the expiration of any year of the tenancy, unless any other period be fixed by agree

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ment or local custom; which half year must consist of 182 days, except where the rent is payable on the usual quarterly feast days, when notice on one feast day to quit on the next but one, us, for instance, on the 29th of September to quit on the 25th of March, is sufficient. 4 Esp. 199. Doe v. Green. [6 Bing. 574. Doe v. Roe. 4 M. & P. 391. S. C.] The notice must be to quit at the end of some current year of the tenancy, computed from the original time of entry: 1 T. R. 159. Right v. Darby; although the rent be payable quarterly; 1 Esp. 267. Shirley v. Newman; or a quarter's notice be agreed on. 1 Taunt. 555. Doe v. Donovan. [1 Q. B. 806. Doe v. Dobell. 1 G. & Dav. 218. S. C. But see 18 Q. B. 496. Doe v. Grafton. As to when the tenancy must be considered to have begun, see 14 M. & W. 91. Doe v. Ingleby. 18 C. B. 323. Humphreys v. Franks. It is a question for the jury. 6 H. & N. 594. Walker v. Gode. If the tenant enters in the middle of a quarter, and he afterwards pays rent for that half quarter, and continues then to pay from the commencement of a succeeding quarter, he is not a tenant from the time of his caming in, but from the succeeding

quarter-day. 6 Esp. 10. Doe v. Johnson. 3 C. & P. 275. Doe v. Stapleton. But see Doe v. Selwyn, Adams on Ejectment, 129. It is otherwise if the tenant does not pay rent for the broken quarter. 11 C. B. 675. Doe v. Matthews.] Where the tenant enters on different parts of the premises at different times, the notice should be given with reference to the substantial and principal part of them, and will be good for all. 2 Black. Rep. 1224. Doe v. Snowdon. 6 East, 120. Doe v. Spence. 7 East, 551. Doe v. Watkins. 11 M. & W. 600.

Doe v. Rhodes. What is the substantial part, is a question for the jury. 11 East, 498. Doe v. Howard. [7 M. & W. 139. Doe v. Hughes.] If the tenant hold over by consent after the expiration of a lease, he becomes tenant from year to year [see ante, p. 284]; and notice to quit must be given with reference to the original time of entry under the lease; 5 Esp. 173. Doe v. Samuel; even where the lease was determined by the death of the lessor, tenant for life, in the middle of a year. 1 H. Black. 97. Roe v. Ward. But it is otherwise where an under lessee holds over. 11 Q. B. 402. Doe v. Lines. And though a parol lease for seven

years be void by the Statute of Frauds, yet a tenancy from year to year arises upon the terms agreed on, so far as they are applicable to such a tenancy [see ante, p. 284]; and if they specify the time of quitting, the notice must be given accordingly. 5 T. R. 471. Doe v. Bell. But it was held, that an action for use and occupation would not lie against one who had once been tenant from year to year, but who had not, within the last six years, occupied the premises, paid rent, or done any act from which a tenancy could be implied, though the tenancy had not been determined by a notice to quit. 1 B. & A. 625. Leigh v. Thornton. [Where a tenant entered under an agreement for a lease of seven years, which was never executed, it was held, that he was not entitled to notice to quit at the end of the seven years. 4 Bing. 446. Doe v. Stratton. 1 Moo.

& P. 183. S. C. See also 3 Mann. & Gr. 498. Berrey v. Lindley. 4 Scott, N. R. 61. S. C. 15 Q. B. 257. Doe v. Moffatt. Accord.]-The courts listen with reluctance to objections to the form of notice. 14 East, 245. Doe v. Archer. Hence, "I desire 'you to quit," &c., or "I shall insist "on double rent," was held a good

Doe v. Jackson. [2 Q. B. 143. Doe v. Goldwin. Accord.] An obvious mistake will not invalidate the notice. Therefore notice at Michaelmas, 1795, to quit "at Lady-day, which "will be in the year 1795," was held good. 7 T. R. 63. Doe v. Kightly. So a notice dated Sept. 27th, and served on the 28th, requiring the tenant to quit 'at Lady-day next or the end of

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your current year," which was Michaelmas, will be understood. to mean Michaelmas in the succeeding year. 4 D. & R. 248. Doe v. Culliford. See also 5 A. & E. 350. Doe v. Smith. 6 Nev. & M. 829. S. C. In 7

Q. B. 577. Doe v. Morphett, it was said by Lord Denman and Patteson, J., and Coleridge, J., that Doe v. Culliford was not good law. A notice given on June 17th to quit "on Oct. 11th "now next ensuing, or such other

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mistake in the notice in describing the farm as being in the adjoining parish to that in which it really lies, is not material, if the tenant was not thereby misled. 12 A. & E. 743. Doe v. Wilkinson. 4 P. & Dav. 323. S. C.] So on an Old Michaelmas tenancy notice to quit at Michaelmas was held good, evidence being given that the tenancy commenced at Old Michaelmas. 2 Camp. 256. Doe v. Vince. 4 B. & A. 588. 4 B. & A. 588. Doe v. Benson. S. P. [9 C. & P. 467. Doe v. Perrin. But a lease by deed to hold from the feast of St. Michael, must be taken to mean New Michaelmas; and extrinsic evidence is not admissible to shew that it means a holding from Old Michaelmas. 11 East, 312. Doe v. Lea. So if a defendant avows that the rent was payable at Martinmas, to wit, on November 23, he must be taken to mean New Martinmas, ie., November 11th, and not Old Martinmas, notwithstanding the latter falls on the day laid under the videlicet, i.e., November 23. 8 Bing. 235. Smith v. Walton. 1 M. & P. 380. S. C.] Notice to quit "at the expiration "of the current year of your

day be mentioned; 2 Esp. 589. Doe v. Butler; [6 Bing. 362. Doe v. Scott. 4 Moo. & P. 20. S. C.; and is a sufficient demand of possession within stat. 4 Geo. 2, c. 28, s. 1, to render the tenant liable for holding over after the determination of the notice. 6 M. & W. 393. Hirst v. Horn;] and is perhaps the safest form. Neither does the landlord lose much by adopting it, since the insertion of a day will not make the notice prima facie evidence of a holding from that day; 2 Camp. 258 n. Ibid. 388. Doe v. Calvert, overruling Doe v. Harris. Dorchester Sum. Ass. 1784, before Eyre, B., cited in 1 T. R. 161; unless the service be personal on the tenant, and he make no objection. 13 East, 405. Forster. 2 Camp. 647. v. Thomas. 2 Camp. 459.

Doe v.

Thomas

Doe

v. Woombell. 2 Taunt. 109. Dce v. Leicester, which seems to overrule 4 T. R. 361. Oakapple v. Copous. [But it may be observed, that, in Oakapple v. Copous, it appeared at the trial that he held from a different day, and therefore the prima facie evidence was rebutted. A notice to quit given by the tenant must, in order to be good, be such as on a reasonable construction of it, denotes an intention to give