sue in trespass for the recovery of damages, or in ejectment for that of the premises themselves; or, if the tenancy be such as to admit of it, he may resort to the provisions of stat. 1 & 2 Vic. c. 74, by which two justices may by their warrant, issued in the manner pointed out by that statute, restore to the landlord possession of premises held [at will or] for a term not exceeding seven years, [either without rent, or] at a rent not exceeding £20 a-year, and in which the tenancy is legally determined.28

28 See as to the mode of pleading in trespass a justification under this act, Jones v. Chapman, 14 M. & W. 124.* Where the landlord takes proceedings under this statute, but has no right to the possession, he is liable in trespass. Darlington v. Pritchard, 4 M. & Gr. 783, (43 E. C. L. R. 404,). The provisions of this act have been in a great degree superseded by those of the County Court Act, 9 & 10 Vic. c. 95, which has provided a wider remedy of the same kind. It is enacted by s. 122 of this act, that when the term and interest of the tenant of any house, land, or other corporeal hereditament, where the value of the premises, or the rent payable, does not exceed 501. by the year, and on which no rent has been paid, has ended, or been duly determined by a legal notice to quit, and the tennant or (if he does not occupy, or only occupies a part) any person by whom the premises or any part of them, are then actually occupied, neglects or refuses to give up possession, the landlord or his agent may enter a plaint in the County Court, and obtain a summons to the person who retains the possession. These proceedings must be taken in the County Court for the district in which the premises are situated. See Rule 199 of the Rules of Practice of the County Courts.

v. Hannahan, 1 Strobhart, 313. It is also held in Pennsylvania, under the statutes in force in that State, that the indictment for forcible entry and detainer, to authorize an award of restitution, must set out the estate of the ejected party. Van Pool v. The Commonwealth, 1 Harris, 391; Commonwealth v. Toram, 2 Parsons, 411. Burd. Commonwealth, 6 S. & R. 252. Torrence v. The Commonwealth, 9 Barr, 184.

*There is another act [the 11 Geo. 2, c. [*244] 19, s. 16, extended by] the 57 Geo. 3, c. 52, which was passed to provide for the case of a tenant deserting the premises, and leaving them to go to ruin, and the landlord without remedy for rent ;(a) and it provides that in such case, two justices, taking a course therein specifically pointed out, may, in a summary way, deliver the possession back to the landlord. (b) See

If the tenant neglects to appear, or if upon the hearing of the case the County Court judge decides that the landlord is entitled to recover the possession, a possession warrant issues under the seal of the Court to a bailiff, requiring and authorising him to give possession of the premises to the landlord or to his agent, within a time not less than seven or more than ten clear days from the date of the warrant. See Pollock on the County Courts, Part I., Chap. XIII. In the Earl of Harrington v. Ramsay, 8 Exch. 879, the Court of Exchequer held, that this statute gives jurisdiction to the County Court where either the rent or the annual value does not exceed 507. The Court of Queen's Bench has also put the same construction upon the act. See In re Earl of Harrington, 2 E. & B. 669, (75 E. C. L. R. 669,). But in this case Mr. Justice Crompton dissented from the decision, being of opinion that the County Court has jurisdiction only, where neither the rent nor the value exceed this sum; an interpretation of the act which appears to be consistent with the view taken of it by the Court of Exchequer in an earlier case. See Crowley v. Vitty, 7

Exch. 319.

(a) See Jackson v. Hawkes, 2 Caines, 335, McKinney v. Reader, 7 Watts 123, from which it appears that in such case the landlord has a right to resume his possession without process. But see Saltonstall v. White, 1 Johns Cases, 221; Wood v. Wood, 9 Johns. 257. See also as to vacant possession, Doe d. Darlington v. Cock, 4 B. & C. 259 (10 E. C. L. 568); ex parte Pillow. 1 B. & A. 369; Hillary v. Gay, 6 Car. & Pay. 284, (25 E. C. L. R. 435,).

(b) Similar enactments have been made by the legislatures of most of the States.

In Pennsylvania, by second section of the Act 25th March, 1825, which is confined to the City and County of Philadelphia, (8 Sm.

on this act, Ashcroft v. Bourne, 3 B. & Ad. 684, (23 E. C. L. R. 301,); Basten v. Carew, 3 B. & C. 649, (10 E. C. L. R. 295,).29

29 Under this act the proceedings of the justices are examinable in a summary way by the judges of assize. See as to this provision, Reg. v. Traill, 12 A. & E. 761, (40 E. C. L. R. 377,); and Reg. v. Sewell, 8 Q. B. 161, (55 E. C. L. R. 161,).

Laws, 411,) it is enacted, "If any lessee for a term of years, in the City and County of Philadelphia, shall remove from such demised premises without leaving sufficient property thereon to secure the payment of at least three months' rent, or shall refuse to give security for the payment thereof in five days after demand of the same, and shall refuse to deliver up possession of such premises, it shall and may be lawful for the landlord or lessor to apply to any two aldermen or justices of the peace within the City or County of Philadelphia, and make an affidavit or affirmation of the fact, and thereupon the said aldermen or justices of the peace shall forthwith issue their precepts to any constable of the proper City or County, commanding him to summon such lessee before such aldermen or justices on a day certain, not exceeding eight nor less than five days, to answer such complaint; and the said aldermen or justices shall, on the day appointed, proceed to hear the case; and if it shall appear that the lessee has removed from the premises without leaving sufficient goods and chattels, or giving security for the payment of the rent as aforesaid, and has refused to deliver up possession of the demised premises, they shall enter judgment against such lessee, that said premises shall be delivered up to the lessor or landlord forthwith, and shall, at the request of the said lessor or landlord, issue a writ of possession, directed to said constable, commanding him forthwith to deliver possession of the premises to the landlord or lessor; and also to levy the costs on the defendant in the same manner that executions issued by justices of the peace are directed by law." Under this statute it has been ruled that the record must show that the tenant was a lessee for term of years. Geisenberger v. Corf, 7 Leg. Int. 7, and that there must be an actual removal to justify proceedings under this act. "A lessee or tenant who removes, and does not leave property sufficient to pay the rent, or give security

Besides these remedies, there are two statutes which,, in case of a tenant holding over after the expiration of his interest, enable the landlord to subject him to considerable pecuniary loss. One of these is stat. 4 Geo. 2, c. 28, s. 1, which, in *case of his holding

[*245] over after demand and notice by the landlord, subjects him to pay for the future double the yearly value of the premises to be recovered by action of debt.30 (a) The other is the stat. 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, s.

30 The statute requires that there should be a "demand made and notice in writing given for delivering the possession" of the premises. A notice to quit, when regular, will operate also as a demand of the possession under the act without any more specific demand; and notices to deliver up the possession under the statute are not construed strictly. See Doe d. Matthews v. Jackson, 1 Dougl. 175; Poole v. Warren, 8 A. & E. 582, (35 E. C. L. R. 463,); Doe d. Lyster v. Goldwin, 2 Q. B. 143, (42 E. C. L. R. 610,); and Page v. More, 15 Q. B. 684, (69 E. C. L. R. 684,). But, where a notice required the tenant to give up the possession at twelve at noon on the day on which the tenancy was determinable, at which time the landlord would attend to receive the keys and the rent, and stated that in the event of his not so surrendering, the landlord would demand a certain daily rent mentioned in the notice, which exceeded in fact double the amount of the original rent, it was held that this notice was insuffi

for the payment thereof, if required, is within the provisions of the act; but a lessee or tenant who continues in possession, who neither removes himself nor his goods is not within the same." Freytag v. Anderson, 1 Rawle, 75; Black v. Alberson, 1 Ash. 127. A tender of security after the expiration of the five days is too late. Ward v. Wandell, 10 Barr, 98.

For what constitutes a removal, and the proceedings under the New York statute, see Stratton v. Lord, 22 Wend. 611; Jackson v. Hakes, 2 Caines, 335.

(a) These statutes were followed in the revised statutes of New York, but have not been adopted in other States.

Pennsylvania in 1792, and Maryland in 1793, passed laws to

18, which, if the tenant do not quit after determining his interest by his own notice, sub- [*246]

cient, the tenant being required to give up the possession before the expiration of the tenancy. See the case last cited. The act only speaks of tenants "for life or lives or years;" it has therefore been held not to apply to a weekly tenancy. Lloyd v. Rosbee, 2 Camp. 453; Sullivan v. Bishop, 2 C. & P. 359, (12 E. C. L. R. 616,). See also Bac. Ab. Leases (L. 3). It does not apply where the tenant retains the possession under a fair claim of right. Wright v. Smith, 5 Esp. 203. Where the owner of a woollen-mill and steam-engine let a room, with a supply of power from the engine by means of a revolving shaft in the room, it was held that in estimating the double value of the premises, the value of the power supplied could not be included; for the act speaks only of the value of the lands, tenements and hereditaments, which are detained. Robinson v. Learoyd, 7 M. & W. 48.* The action may be brought in the County Court; and the tenant cannot deprive the Court of jurisdiction by setting up a title to the premises in himself, if he has admitted the existence of the tenancy up to the time at which the holding over commenced. Wickham v. Lee, 12 Q. B. 521, (64 E. C. L. R. 521,). But he may, in accordance with the general rule, show that his landlord's title has expired, and so oust the jurisdiction of the County Court. Mountnoy v. Collier, 1 E. & B. 630, (72 E. C. L. R. 630,).

enable landlords to obtain possession summarily against tenants holding over.

The Pennsylvania act, which is to be found in 1 Smith, 373, is in these words:

"SECTION 12. Where any person or persons in this province, having leased or demised any lands or tenements to any person or persons for a term of one or more years, or at will, paying certain rents, and he or they, or his or their heirs or assigns, shall be desirous upon the determination of the lease, to have again and repossess his or their estate so demised, and for that purpose shall demand and require his or their lessee or tenant to remove from and leave the same; if the lessee or tenant shall refuse to comply therewith in three months after such request to him made, it shall and may be lawful to and for such lessor or lessors, his or their heirs and assigns, to complain