1867 v. TAYLOR. converted into specific debts. Nor could promissory notes be given HOGGARTH in respect of claims of that nature. I do not give any opinion as to whether or not there may be power after the execution of a deed like this to apply to the Court of Bankruptcy for the conversion of this demand into a debt, or as to whether the machinery applicable in case of a bankruptcy, can be applied here. But assuming that the plaintiff might become a "creditor," after adopting the process indicated in s. 153 of the act, still, until that process has been adopted, there is nothing on which a release in the terms contained in this deed can operate. I am therefore of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to our judgment. MARTIN, B. I am of the same opinion. The declaration is on an agreement whereby the defendant promised to employ the plaintiff as a clerk in his business for two years, and the principal breach alleged is, that the defendant wrongfully dismissed him before the expiration of that period. The transaction may have been an entry on the 25th of May, 1864, by the plaintiff in his employment, and a discharge on the next day, long before this deed was executed. To this cause of action a deed under the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, is set up as an answer; but I think the words used in it do not apply to this case. Whatever construction we may put on the act of parliament, we must construe deeds such as these, like all other deeds, by the usual rules of interpretation. Now this deed only deals in terms with the debtor and his creditors, in the ordinary meaning of the words. I wish to say nothing either for or against the decision in Woods v. De Mattos. (1) I regard that case as no authority for the present decision. We have to give effect to the deed according to its express provisions, and not to strain it to bring it within the alleged intention of the Bankruptcy Act. I think the plaintiff is entitled to our judgment. CHANNELL, B. I am of the same opinion. I think that this plea is bad. It cannot be contended that it is an answer to this action unless it absolutely releases the plaintiff's claim; therefore, apart from the case of Woods v. De Mattos (1), the point would be (1) Law Rep. 1 Ex. 91. 1867 V. TAYLOR. scarcely arguable. The release is of debts due to the defendant's creditors. As to the case of Woods v. De Mattos (1), that decision HOGGARTH was, I think, correct, but it does not govern this case. There the Court had merely to ask whether, under the circumstances, the deed could be enforced; and there was no such difficulty as exists here. The action there was not like the action here, but was on a bill of exchange, and the plaintiff was a "creditor" to the amount of that bill, and not for any unliquidated sum. We can hold, consistently with that case, that this deed is not pleadable in bar. PIGOTT, B. I am of the same opinion. Whatever construction may be placed on the term "creditor," the parties to this deed meant to do no more than to compound for specific debts. The release in the deed has no application to such a claim as is made by the plaintiff in this action. Judgment for the plaintiff. Attorneys for plaintiff: Parker, Rooke, & Parkers. BUTLER v. KNIGHT. Attorney and Client-Compromise-Retainer-Negligence. If the plaintiff in an action continues the authority of his attorney after judgment, by allowing him to proceed to obtain satisfaction, the attorney retains the power to bind his client by a compromise. DECLARATION stating the retainer of the defendant as attorney for the plaintiff in an action of Butler v. Ruffe, and that judgment was recovered in that action for 3007. damages and 907. costs.; that afterwards, and whilst the defendant was acting as such attorney for the plaintiff, he negligently and wrongfully omitted to enforce the judgment against Ruffe, and wrongfully and improperly, without the authority and consent, and against the will, and contrary to the directions of the plaintiff, agreed with Ruffe to accept 1007. in full satisfaction and discharge of the judg (1) Law Rep. 1 Ex. 91. Jan. 22. 1867 BUTLER V. KNIGHT. ment, and accepted the payment of the same, whereby the plaintiff lost the benefit of the judgment, and the benefit of the costs in the action, amounting to 1057., which she paid to the defendant as her attorney in the said action. Plea, not guilty, and issue thereon. The cause was tried before Keating, J., at Stafford, at the last summer assizes, when it was proved that the present plaintiff had brought an action for breach of promise of marriage against one Ruffe, and retained the defendant to conduct it. That action was tried at Warwick, on the 12th of July, 1864, and a verdict was obtained for 3007., on which judgment was signed on the 27th of July. The plaintiff gave no formal instructions to the defendant to continue to act as her attorney in enforcing the judgment; but immediately after the trial she directed him not to compromise the matter, and said that she would not shew Ruffe any clemency; she afterwards repeated the same instructions. The defendant, however, having reason to believe that Ruffe was in insolvent circumstances, and having with some difficulty obtained from Ruffe's brother the promise of 1007. for a compromise of the action, he on the 16th of August agreed to a compromise on these terms, and received the 1007. In this he acted apparently with the consent of the mother and brother-in-law of the plaintiff, with whom he principally communicated in the business relating to the action. But the plaintiff repudiated the arrangement, and refused to sign the satisfactionpiece, and now brought this action. The defendant's counsel claimed a nonsuit, on the ground that if the defendant had authority to settle, there was no cause of action; and that if he had not, the plaintiff was not bound by the compromise. The case was left to the jury, who found that the defendant entered into the arrangement contrary to the plaintiff's directions, and gave a verdict for 507., if the plaintiff could still enforce her judgment against Ruffe, and for 3007. (giving credit for the 1007. received) if she could not enforce it. A rule having been obtained, pursuant to leave reserved, to enter a nonsuit, or for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of evidence, and that the damages were excessive, Powell, QC., and G. Browne, shewed cause. There was clearly a cause of action; the defendant has acted contrary to his client's instructions, and this alone would entitle the plaintiff to nominal damages: Fray v. Voules. (1) But the damages ought to be substantial, for the injury suffered is real. Even supposing the plaintiff was not bound by the compromise entered into on her behalf, the jury have found that there was a loss of 50%. caused by the neglect to enforce execution. But, in fact, she was bound; the defendant was undoubtedly acting as her attorney in the negotiations with Ruffe and his brother, and no notice of any limitation of his authority was given to those with whom he was dealing. As attorney he had power to enter into a compromise on his client's behalf, and the plaintiff cannot, therefore, now enforce her judgment: Chown v. Parrott (2); Prestwich v. Poley (3); Lush Pr. 256, 3rd ed.; Vin. Ab. tit. Attorney (P.) pl. 6, 7, 8.. Here again the jury have found as a fact, that the loss suffered by the plaintiff was (giving credit for the 1007. received) 300l., or the full amount of the verdict, and this finding the Court will not disturb. Huddleston, Q.C., and Macnamara, in support of the rule. It is an error to say that the defendant acted as the plaintiff's attorney in effecting the compromise. The retainer ceases at judgment. After that time the attorney cannot represent the client without a new authority, Macbeath v. Ellis (4); the client may, without any order to change attorneys, sue out execution by a different attorney from the one who has conducted the cause, Tipping v. Johnson (5); the attorney cannot sue out execution against his client's wish, Barker v. St. Quintin (6); his authority is not sufficient to entitle the sheriff to release the defendant from custody, Savory v. Chapman (7); nor can he release the debt or damages after judgment, 1 Roll. Abr. 291, tit. Attorney (M), pl. 2. The cases cited on the other side have, therefore, no application, because in both the compromise was made by the attorney in the course of the cause, and (1) 1 E. & E.839; 28 L. J. (Q.B.) 232. (2) 14 C. B. (N.S.) 74; 32 L. J. (C.P.) 197. (3) 18 C. B. (N.S.) 806; 34 L. J. (C.P.) 189. (4) 4 Bing. 578. (7) 11 A. & E. 829. 1867 BUTLER v. KNIGHT. before judgment. The case of Bevins v. Hulme (1) is apparently opposed to the present contention, but the opinion of Parke, B., there expressed (2), is not supported by the authorities cited, and the decision was only that the declaration was bad for not averring the money to have been received by the defendant on his original retainer as attorney in the suit. The defendant's view is confirmed by Rule 80, Hilary Term, 1853, which requires the satisfaction-piece to be signed by the party himself: see Chitty, pp. 88, 722, 12th ed. But further, this rule of law must be taken to have been known to Ruffe, so as to give him notice that the defendant's authority was limited; it was not, therefore, necessary for the plaintiff to give him express notice, and she will not be bound as having held out the defendant as empowered to make. the compromise. The compromise, then, is not binding on the plaintiff, and she has suffered no injury, but can now enforce her judgment; and it seems, according to the opinion of Wightman, J., in Harrington v. Binns (3), that in such a case, where there is no damage, there is no cause of action. But supposing the plaintiff to have suffered some damage, the verdict is clearly excessive, for there is no reason to suppose that the whole amount could have been recovered. KELLY, C.B. There can be no doubt that in effecting this compromise the defendant acted optimâ fide. Whether or not he was right in his estimate of the degree of Ruffe's solvency and responsibility was a question for the jury, but he believed that he was doing the best in his power for his client. It is contended that no action is maintainable, but on what grounds I am at a loss to understand. Whatever may have been the legal extent of the defendant's authority, he was undoubtedly acting as the plaintiff's attorney; and it does not lie in his mouth to say that the relation of attorney and client did not subsist between them. If it did, and if in the course of it he did any act affecting that client's interests, and directly contrary to her instructions, it is impossible to say that he is not liable. The action then is clearly maintainable. The question of damages next arises. The defendant contends (1) 15 M. & W. 88. (2) 15 M. & W. at p. 96. (3) 3 F. & F. 942. |