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which merely allege general public inconvenience, without stating that one individual or class of individuals is placed at undue disadvantage as compared with others (a). As to what amounts to undue partiality or prejudice, see the cases undernoted (b).

c. 55.

For the further protection of persons engaged on or using rail- 5 and 6 Vict. ways as passengers or otherwise, certain special enactments have been made. By the 5 and 6 Vict. c. 55, ss. 17 and 18, provision is made for the detention and punishment of persons employed on a railway, and guilty of drunkenness and other misconduct; and of persons impeding or obstructing the officers of the company in the discharge of their duty, or trespassing on and refusing to quit the line (sec. 16). Several other enactments have been passed relative to these matters, but they do not appear to extend to Scotland.

In order more effectually to ensure that railway companies shall fulfil the purposes in respect of which they have received their statutory powers and privileges, they are required to make certain returns to the Board of Trade and other public officials as follows:Every railway company must, when required, make such returns to the Board of Trade, as they may direct, of the aggregate traffic in passengers, in cattle, and in goods; of all accidents attended with personal injuries, and of all tolls, rates, and charges levied on the traffic, under heavy penalties (c). They must also give notice to the Board of accidents of the kind mentioned above within fortyeight hours after their occurrence (d). And the Board may likewise order any railway company to make a special return of all serious accidents occurring on their line, whether attended with personal injury or not, in such form as they may require (e). Every railway company must make up an annual abstract of the total receipts. and expenditure of all sums levied under the Act, with a statement of the balance duly audited; and, if required, they must transmit a

(a) See Attorney-General v. Great Nor. Ra. Co., 29 Law Jour. (Chan.) 794; Hozier v. Caledonian Ra. Co., 1855, 17 D. 302.

(b) Caterham Co. v. Brighton Ra. Co., 1 C. B. (N. S.) 410; Harris v. Cockermouth Ra. Co., 3 C. B. (N. S.) 693; Nicholson v. Great West. Ra. Co., 5 C. B. (N. S.) 366; Gorton v. Bristol Ra. Co., 6 C. B. (N. S.)

639; Beadell v. East. Counties Ra.
Co., 2 C. B. (N. S.) 509; Marriott v.
London and South-West. Ra. Co., 1
C. B. (N.S.) 499; Baxendale v. Great
West. Ra. Co., 14 C. B. (N. S.) 1, and
16 ibid. 137.

(c) 3 and 4 Vict. c. 97, s. 4.
(d) 5 and 6 Vict. c. 55, s. 7.
(e) Ibid. s. 8.

Powers of
Trade.

Board of

Lines of
Telegraph.

copy of this document free of charge to the sheriff-clerks of the counties through which the line passes (a). And as the Lords of the Treasury are empowered to revise the scale of tolls, or purchase up certain railways at the end of twenty-one years from the date of their special acts, such railways are required to keep certain accounts relative to the expenditure and receipts during the last three years of the said term, and to transmit them half-yearly to the said Lords (b).

Every railway company is required to permit the Board of Trade to lay down on their lands a line of electric telegraph for her Majesty's service, subject to such remuneration as may be agreed on or settled by arbitration. The telegraph may also be used by the company. If a telegraph has been established along the line by the company, or by other persons for their own use, it is burdened with a prior right for the service of her Majesty, and must be open for the service of all persons alike, subject to reasonable regulations and charges (c).

(a) 8 and 9 Vict. c. 33, s. 100.
(b) 7 and 8 Vict. c. 85, s. 5.
(c) 7 and 8 Vict. c. 85, s. 13. See
further upon this subject, 26 and 27
Vict. c. 112. As to the powers of
private telegraph companies to inter-

fere with the solum of a railway, or to go under or over it, see South-East. Ra. Co. v. European and American Elec. Teleg. Co., 9 Ex. 363; AttorneyGen. v. United Kingdom Elec. Teleg. Co., 30 Beav. 287.

BOOK IV.

JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY.

of Book IV.

It is proposed in this Book to pass in review the legal remedies Subject-matter available to associations formed for the purposes of gain, their members, and the public, in their mutual relations; to examine the powers of partners, managers, directors, etc., to represent and bind their firms or companies in such proceedings as partake of a judicial or quasi judicial character; and to consider the rules of evidence in so far as applicable to such associations.

Here, as in other branches of our subject, it will be found that the English courts have decided many questions which have not yet been raised in this country; and it comes to be a matter of important consideration for the Scottish lawyer, how far he is safe in taking such decisions as precedents. As a general rule, it may be laid down, that when an English decision proceeds on equitable grounds, and does not contravene any characteristic technicality of Scottish law, it may form a valuable precedent; but that when it is based on a mere English technicality, and can be traced to no equitable principle, it will be more likely to mislead than assist. In order to apply this rule, it is obviously necessary that the principles which appear to regulate this branch of partnership law in the two legal systems should be ascertained as clearly as possible, so that the equitable may be separated from the technical, and the

Differences

between

Scotch and

English law.

Purposes contemplated in both systems.

Inadequacy of the English system for unincorporated associations.

In corporations, rules of both systems very similar.

English rules as to unincor

end in view from the mode of procedure. For this purpose the following observations may be found useful.

It is very obvious, that the ultimate success of all associations formed for the purposes of gain must ultimately come to depend in a great measure on the facilities which the law affords for having the rights and obligations of the association, in relation to its members and strangers, determined and enforced by the public tribunals; and that any unnecessary obstructions to the freedom of judicial action must tend greatly to embarrass, if not entirely to defeat, the successful development of such resources as the society may possess. But, on the other hand, it must be observed, that unless some effectual means were taken to ascertain the will of the association, as contradistinguished from that of some of its members, when its name is used in judicial proceedings, the interest of the association itself, of its members, and of the public, might often be seriously compromised. By the act of a minority, or even of a single member, the company might be involved in a litigation from which nothing but loss could result; and claims unquestionably well founded might be abandoned or compromised from private and corrupt motives.

Both of these considerations appear to have been in contemplation of law, when the English and Scottish systems of judicial procedure assumed their existing forms; but it cannot be concealed, that while the English system has proved, in cases of unincorporated associations, so utterly inadequate to meet the requirements of commerce, that the interference of the Legislature by the Registration Acts became indispensable; the principles adopted in Scotland were in themselves so correct in theory, and so easily made available in practice, that, in so far as concerned judicial procedure, these pieces of legislation were apparently uncalled for.

In so far as regards corporations, the rules in both systems are very similar, if not identical; and as they will be afterwards fully considered, any notice of them at present is unnecessary. The great points of difference between the two systems are to be found in the case of unincorporated associations, and to them therefore we shall now briefly refer.

In England, since the law does not recognise a quasi person in an unincorporated society, the company rights and claims are con

panies.

sidered to be the joint rights and claims of the individual partners, porated comand its debts and obligations to be their joint and several debts and obligations. In suing or defending, therefore, the names of all the partners must appear as plaintiffs or defendants. It is held, however, that every partner is entitled to use the names of all his copartners for this purpose, and, in cases of urgency at least, without obtaining their consent. But, on the other hand, any one or more of their number may refuse or withdraw his name; and this will in most cases be fatal to the action or defence. The general effect of this rule is to ensure that judicial action shall not be taken in the company name, unless such a step be truly in accordance with the intentions and will of all its members; but, on the other hand, its just claims are liable to be defeated through the obstinacy of a single partner, a result which a court of equity will not always agree to remedy. The bad consequences of this rule are still more strikingly illustrated when claims arise between the company and its own members. In such circumstances, as all the partners cannot be made plaintiffs or defendants, the common law affords no remedy, and a court of equity will in general only interfere on condition of dissolution (a).

releases.

A release being a deed under seal, one partner cannot bind the Rules as to others by executing such a deed without express authority also under seal. But the salutary check afforded by this technical principle is often neutralized by the operation of another. For though a release does not bind the other partners, it binds the partner who grants it; and as an action for a company claim can only be raised and prosecuted in name of all the partners, the action will fall by plea in abatement, whenever a release even by one partner has been granted, either before it is raised or while it is yet in dependence (b). The mischievous consequences of this technical rule were probably not foreseen when it was first applied in questions of partnership; but it has now become so fixed, that one great purpose in passing the Registration Acts was to neutralize its effects.

compromise.

The English courts have not, however, extended the operation Reference and of the principle here mentioned to cases which appear to be strictly analogous. Thus, it is held that one partner cannot bind the

(a) Lindley 384 and 408.

(b) Lindley 226, 234. Sometimes

the Court will avoid the release on
clear proof of fraud. Ibid.

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