NORTH LONDON RAILWAY COMPANY V. OF WORKS. v. METROPOLI TAN BOARD OF WORKS. Thus far I have referred only to the Act itself. But it is quite legitimate to draw inferences from other statutes of an analogous character. It is observable, that in the Railways Clauses Act (sect. 16), the powers given are subject to making METROPOLIfull satisfaction "in manner herein, and in the special Act and TAN BOARD any Act incorporated therewith, provided; " but in the 135th section of this Act there are no words of the kind. It is simply— making compensation; " and when I look at other Acts in pari materiâ I find the very same clause. There are exactly similar powers in the old Sewers Act and the Public Health Act; so that these large powers, instead of being of a new character, are just such as have been in existence for a long time, and have been sanctioned by a great mass of legislation on kindred subjects. When to this is added the circumstance, that to limit these powers as the plaintiffs contend that they ought to be limited, would paralyse entirely the district boards and vestries, and would impede the action of the Metropolitan Board, it is clear that the effect of the 135th section cannot be reduced in the manner contended for. The key to the statute may be found within itself, and is afforded by the express limitation of the compulsory powers of purchase, by which the district boards and vestries are excluded; and if anything more were wanted it would be supplied by the 2nd section of the Amendment Act, which applies the very power which is said to be so excessive to the most valuable kind of property-namely, that which exists on the banks of the Thames. As to the point raised in Winter's case, that unnecessary damage was being done, I must place confidence in the evidence of the engineer, who states that this is not the case. IN RE THOMPSON'S SETTLED ESTATES. GREEN v. THOMPSON. (Johnson, 418-424; S. C. 5 Jur. N. S. 1343.) It was competent to a purchaser, under the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act, 1856, to object, at any time before completion, that the order for sale was in excess of the jurisdiction of the Court (1). The Court had jurisdiction to order a sale under the Act, notwithstanding the existence of powers under which the proposed sale might be effected. THIS was an adjourned summons to consider the objections of a purchaser to the title of certain property sold under a decree (1) This Act (with amending Acts passed in 1858, 1864, 1874, and 1876) has been repealed and replaced by the Settled Estates Act, 1877 (40 & 41 Viet. c. 18), which has in turn been rendered practically almost obsolete by the Settled Land Act, 1882, and cases 1859. July 30. WCOD, V.-C. [ 418 ] In re SETTLED [ *419 ] in the above cause, and also under the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act. By a marriage settlement of June 26, 1792, certain real estates were conveyed, after the decease of Henry Thompson and his wife, to the use of the children of the marriage, as Mr. and Mrs. Thompson or the survivor should appoint, and in default of appointment to the use of the children as tenants in common in tail, with cross-remainders; and the settlement contained a power of sale and reinvestment, and power to expend certain personalty in the purchase of real estate to be settled to the same uses. The lands in question became subject to the trusts of the settlement of 1792, by being purchased under the lastmentioned power in the year 1806. There were five children of the marriage, Esther Thompson, who became the wife of Andrew Green, Pearson Thompson, Sarah Ann Thompson, who became the wife of Edward Armitage, Elizabeth Thompson, who became the wife of J. L. Armitage, and Henry Teshmaker Thompson. One fifth of the settled property was appointed to Esther Thompson in fee, with a proviso that the appointment should not affect the power of sale in the settlement of 1792; and by the marriage settlement of Esther Thompson, dated October 3rd, 1815, the appointed share was settled on certain trusts, with a power of sale in the trustees *of the settlement. Mr. and Mrs. Green were both dead, and the share comprised in their settlement had vested under the provisions thereof in their three sons in fee. A second fifth of the property comprised in the settlement of 1792 was appointed to Pearson Thompson in fee, with the like proviso as in the former appointment; and by his marriage settlement the same was resettled, with a power of sale in the trustees. A third fifth of the property was appointed to Sarah Ann Thompson in fee; and by her marriage settlement, dated 8th December, 1819, was resettled, with a power of sale in the trustees. A fourth share was appointed to the uses of the marriage settlement of Elizabeth Thompson, which contained a power of sale in the trustees. The remaining fifth was unappointed. Of this, one fifth part devolved on Henry Teshmaker Thompson in tail; who barred the entail, and died, having by his will devised the share to the first and other sons of Andrew Green in tail; and the share those Acts, are now made good by the (1882) 21 Ch. D. 41, 51 L. J. Ch. 671, 46 L. T. 755, and see the cases referred to in the note to Grey v. Jenkins in 122 R. R., p. 132.—O, A. S. was now vested in an infant tenant in tail. The will contained no power of sale. Two other shares of the unappointed fifth were vested, the one in Mrs. E. Armitage in tail, and the other in the eldest son of Mrs. Green, an infant, in tail. The entail of the share of Mrs. J. L. Armitage was barred, and the property resettled by deed of February 11th, 1856, subject to an absolute power of appointment in the husband and wife. The entail of the share of Pearson Thompson was also barred, and his interest was mortgaged, with a power of sale. A sale of the whole property having been directed by the decree, the fifth appointed to Pearson Thompson was sold under the power in his marriage settlement. A petition was presented under the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act for the sale of the remaining four undivided fifths of the property subject to the settlement of 1792, and an order for sale was made on the 11th of December, 1858, in the cause, and in the matter of the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act, and in the matter of the settled estates derived under the settlement of 1792. The purchaser of part of the property under this sale objected to the title, that the order for sale was beyond the jurisdiction of the Court; and the matter was now adjourned into Court. Mr. Amphlett, Q.C., and Mr. Hobhouse, for the purchaser. [The objections raised by them are sufficiently dealt with in the judgment of the VICE-CHANCEllor.] Mr. Willcock, Q.C., and Mr. Giffard, Q.C., for the plaintiffs. VICE-CHANCELLOR SIR W. PAGE WOOD: I do not see how I can avoid allowing this objection. I do not think that the title of the petition and advertisements would be insufficient, provided it could be shown that the whole property was comprised in sub-settlements. The order of 15th November, 1856, says, that the petition must be presented in the matter of the property, not in the matter of the particular settlement. I apprehend, therefore, that it would not be right to consider the petition erroneous merely because the property had been emancipated from the settlement of 1792, and subsequently comprised in sub-settlements, which are referred to in the petition. The object of the title is to indicate the property to be sold. The entirety of the property was comprised in the settlement of 1792, and the petition deals only with four undivided fifths. At the time when the petition was presented, one of these four fifths was not settled in any shape, having become vested in three persons in fee simple. This fifth therefore was not within In re THOMPSON'S SETTLED ESTATES. [ *420 ] [421] [ 422 ] In re THOMPSON S SETTLED ESTATES. [423] 1 *424 ] the provisions of the Act at all. Then there is another share, a twenty-fifth, which is not in settlement at all, though it is mortgaged with a power of sale. The residue of the four-fifths is in settlement by virtue of the sub-settlements which I have referred to. The order for sale under the Settled Estates Act goes to the whole of the four-fifths, and was clearly wrong so far as it directed a sale of property which was not under settlement at all. But it is said, that the purchaser has no right to raise any question as to the propriety or regularity of the order. I should be very sorry to hold that any person interested in the matter was precluded from informing the Court of any error into which it may have fallen. The powers given by the Act are very large, and my present impression is, that if the purchaser once got a conveyance his title would be good. But there is the more reason on that account for the Court to take care that no improper conveyance is made. The words of the section which gives a conclusive effect to a sale under the Act are "after the completion of the sale," and not "after the date of the order for sale." If, in the interval between the order and the completion of the sale, a purchaser comes and points out to the Court an error in the proceedings, the Court is surely bound to hear him. The principle, fieri non opportuit factum valet, may apply when the sale is completed; but when a purchaser, before the act is done, shows that it ought not to be done, it cannot be said that the Court is to disregard the suggestion merely because the purchaser would get a good title if the conveyance were once completed. Where an estate is partly settled and partly unsettled, to mix the whole up together, and tell the purchaser he must take his title to the unsettled portion from trustees, with such covenants only as they would be bound to give, is a wrong which the Court ought not to inflict, although the Legislature may have said, that a sale once completed shall not be questioned on the ground of defect of jurisdiction. These considerations afford an answer to the objection, that the purchaser would get a good title under the order as it stands, and has, therefore, no locus standi to object. One point raised by the purchaser was, that the Act does not apply to any settlement which contains a power of sale. I see nothing to lead to this conclusion. A sale under the Act may, in many cases, be preferable to a sale under the power which may be contained in a settlement. By sect. 26, the Court is precluded from exercising the powers of the Act where the settlement contains an express declaration or a manifestation of intention that they shall not be *exercised. The insertion of a In re SETTLED power is not, in my opinion, indicative of any such intention. JOHNSON v. LORD HARROWBY. [Reversed on appeal, as reported in 1 D. F. & J. 183, under the title of Johnstone v. Harrowby.] JONES v. PEPPERCORNE (1). (Johnson, 430-446; S. C. 28 L. J. Ch. 158; 5 Jur. N. S. 140; 7 W. R. 103.) Stockbrokers advancing to bankers, their customers, a specific loan upon specific securities, have thereon not only a special lien in respect of the loan, but also a general lien in respect of whatever else may be due to them from the bankers on account of their general business transactions; the rule in such cases being, that the general lien is not excluded by a special contract, unless the special contract be inconsistent with it. And the circumstance that the securities, though treated by the bankers as their own, belonged, in fact, to third parties, if not known to the brokers when making the advance, does not affect their right to a general lien. PREVIOUSLY to the month of May, 1854, the plaintiffs, being the owners of 588 Dutch bonds for 1,000 guilders each, at 21 (1) In re London and Globe Finance Corporation [1902] 2 Ch. 416, 71 L. J. Ch. 893, 8 L. T. 49. The lien does not extend to the contents boxes merely deposited for convenience and safe custody: Leese v. Martin (1873) L. R. 17 Eq. 224, 43 R.R.-VOL. CXXIII. L. J. Ch. 193, 29 L. T. 742; nor does it 12 1859. June 15, 16. 1858. Nov. 12, 13. Dec. 3. WOOD, V.-C. [430] |