so vested in them (viz. the further security of the annuity, and the protection of her separate estate) being now accomplished. Trustees could not refuse compliance with the directions of a cestui que trust, who had obtained an absolute interest. Mr. James, Q.C., and Mr. F. S. Williams, for the trustees of the daughter's settlement, supported the same contention. Mr. Willcock, Q.C., and Mr. W. D. Lewis, for the trustees of the will, submitted that they ought not to be compelled to part with the legal estate in the premises. By the 31st section of the Fines and Recoveries Abolition Act, they were the protectors of the settlement effected by the will, and as such, by the 36th section of the Act, were exempt from all control and interference on the part of a court of equity, so far as regarded their power of consent; and any attempt to control them would be void. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: You are only trustees for this lady's life, and she says, clothe my equitable interest with the legal estate. * * Mr. Giffard, Q.C., in reply. VICE-CHANCELLOR SIR W. PAGE WOOD: Judgment reserved. I am satisfied that the plaintiff, Mrs. Buttanshaw, is entitled to a conveyance of the legal estate in the lands vested in the trustees during her life. I have examined the Act since yesterday, and it is clear to me that bare trustees, who, under the 31st section, are *protectors of a settlement, can insist on retaining the legal estate only so long as the purposes of the trust exist-that is, so long as, according to the rules of this Court, they are required to be trustees. The section was obviously intended to meet the case of a settlement where there are contingent remainders, which the trustees were intended to protect. Here there are no such contingent remainders. The legal estate vested in the trustees does not extend beyond the life of the tenant for life, or in any way affect the remainders over in tail, which are limitations of the legal estate. The case is simply that of four trustees appointed by the testator to take care of his daughter's interest while under coverture, and without any other direction as to the legal estate vested in them for that purpose; for I observe that the leasing powers are wholly independent of that estate. The lady is now discoverte and sui juris, and, being so, expresses her desire that her interest should not be encumbered by this expensive. machinery of trustees any longer; and it seems to me that she is entitled to have the legal estate in question conveyed to her. The trustees must be ordered to convey the legal estate in all the lands to the plaintiff, Ann Buttanshaw, during her life. The second question, namely, whether the plaintiffs were entitled to call for a transfer of the securities, stood over to be discussed, if necessary, when the minutes had been prepared ; and the cause now came on to be spoken to upon the minutes. [THE VICE-CHANCELLOR made the following declaration:] Declare that the plaintiff Ann Buttanshaw is entitled to all moneys and securities remaining subject to the trusts of the will, and to any land to be purchased therewith, for her life, free from any trust or interest in the defendants, the trustees. And upon a proper deed being executed by the plaintiffs, Ann Buttanshaw and Mary Ann Poynder, let all securities be transferred by the trustees according to the effect of the deed to be so executed. But no such transfer to be made until one month after service of this order upon the persons entitled in remainder. Liberty for the parties so served, and any other parties, to apply. BUTTAN. SHAW v. MARTIN. March 12. [95] BRISTOW v. WHITMORE. The master of a ship held entitled to a lien upon the freight in respect of expenses and liabilities incurred by him abroad in supplying provisions, and putting up fittings, required by certain special charter-parties concluded by him abroad on behalf of the owner who adopted and claimed the benefit of the charter-parties. [Reversed by Lord CHELMSFORD, L. C., on appeal, as reported in 4 De G. & J. 325, but the decision of the LORD CHANCELLOR was in turn reversed on appeal to the House of Lords, as reported in 9 H. L. C. 391, and the decision of the VICE-CHANCELLOR was thus restored. But see now the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, s. 167.-O. A. S.] IN RE TWEEDALE'S SETTLEMENT (1). Although, according to the law of Scotland, a wife has no equity (1) As to cases falling within the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, see the note to Martin v. Foster in 109 1858. May 4, 27. 1859. March 5. WOOD, V.-C. [109] In re TWEEDALE'S SETTLE MENT. [110] the dividends of which were ordered to be paid during her infancy or until further order to her uncle for her benefit. Subsequently Grace, being still under age, intermarried with the petitioner Henderson, who was domiciled in Scotland. After she had attained twenty-one, she joined her husband in presenting a petition for payment of the fund in Court to her husband absolutely. Upon the petition coming on to be heard, the VICE-CHANCELLOR took notice, that, according to the recent decisions, the effect of the payment of the money into Court during the infancy of the lady was to make her a ward of Court: In re Hodges' Settlement (1); and required an explanation of the circumstances under which she had been married without the consent of the Court, directing the petition to stand over for this purpose. An affidavit was then filed, by which the parties deposed that they were both domiciled by birth in Scotland, and that, at the time of their marriage they were ignorant of the law, as stated by the VICE-CHANCELLOR, and had no intention of acting disrespectfully towards the Court. Mr. Cole, in support of the petition: The parties being domiciled in Scotland, where a wife has no equity to a settlement, the Court will order payment of the fund to the husband absolutely: M'Cormick v. Garnett (2). THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: Is this a question of equity to a settlement, or of the course to be adopted by the Court in reference to one of its own wards? Can that course be affected by the circumstance of the ward being domiciled in Scotland? In Johnstone v. Beattie (3) it was held, that, the infant being a ward of Court, guardians should be appointed by this Court, notwithstanding guardians had already been appointed in Scotland. This lady being a ward of Court, am I not bound, before parting with her property, to see that she is properly provided for? Mr. Cole: This is personal property, which follows the person, though locally situate in England. The Court cannot apply to foreigners a system of law to which they are strangers, and will not allow the accidental circumstance of the trustee having paid the fund into this Court, instead of paying it into the Court of Session in Scotland, to affect the rights of the parties. [He cited also Gambier v. Gambier (4).J (1) 112 R. R. 119 (3 K. & J. 219). (3) 59 R. R. 23 (10 Cl. & Fin. 42). (4) 40 R. R. 136 (7 Sim. 263). VICE-CHANCELLOR SIR W. PAGE WOOD: I do not think that the question in this case is as it was *put in argument—namely, whether I am not to adopt the law of the domicil of the parties in dealing with the personal property of a married lady. Upon that question I should have felt no doubt whatever. As long ago as a case reported in Anstruther the COURT, in administering an intestate's estate, ordered the whole of a wife's share to be paid to her husband in conformity with the law of the country in which they were domiciled (1). If the present case, therefore, had stood there, and if the young lady had never been a ward of Court, I should have had no hesitation in adopting the law of the domicil of the parties as determining their rights. Nor do I entertain any doubt as to the question of what appeared at first to be a contempt of Court. The petitioners might well be ignorant of the recent decisions which have established that the payment into Court, under the Trustee Relief Act, of a fund in which an infant is interested has the effect of making the infant a ward of Court. As to that I required an affidavit that the parties were not aware of the consequences of their conduct, and a satisfactory affidavit has been filed accordingly. The only difficulty of the case is occasioned by the circumstance that when the marriage was solemnised the lady was a ward of Court, and the real question that is raised is, whether this Court is to neglect its ward merely because she has a foreign domicil. That question arose in the case of Johnstone v. Beattie, and the House of Lords held that such a course would be improper, and that guardians should be appointed in this country, notwithstanding tutors and curators had been previously appointed *in Scotland. In this case, the lady, being a ward of this Court, and this Court having the power over her property, I ought to take care, before I part with it, that proper provision has been made for her. Otherwise, persons domiciled in countries where a wife has no equity to a settlement out of her personal property, might marry any wards of this Court, and claim the absolute dominion over their property. The question is, not what the law of the domicil of the parties gives to the husband, but what the Court will require to be done for the benefit of its ward. I have thought it right to make these general observations as to the course I should adopt in ordinary cases, and where the property in question is considerable. But in the present case, the fund in question does not exceed 600l.; and if the lady's (1) Sawer v. Shute, 1 Anstr. 63. In re TWEEDALE'S SETTLE MENT. [ *111 ] [ *112] In re TWEEDALE'S SETTLE MENT. 1859. March 14. WOOD, V.-C. [112] [ *113] [ 114 ] uncle, to whom the dividends have hitherto been ordered to be paid, can make an affidavit, that, in his judgment, it is not expedient that the fund should be settled upon her, I shall not object to its being paid over to the husband. IN RE ASHWELL'S WILL (1). An annuity bequeathed out of personalty is not within the 42nd section of the Statute of Limitations (3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27). Payment of arrears of such annuities ordered as against residuary legatees, after thirty-seven years of defective payments, the residuary personal estate remaining still unapplied. But, interest on such arrears refused on the ground of laches. MARY ASHWELL, by her will and codicil, in 1811, bequeathed to Joseph Watts, since deceased, an annuity of 201., and to the petitioner, Sophia Lidiard, an annuity of *107.; and she bequeathed the residue of her estate to trustees, upon trust for certain charities. The testatrix died in 1812, and the clear residue of her estate was invested in the purchase of 600l. Navy Five per cent. stock, which was afterwards subjected to successive reductions, and was now represented by 6301. New Three per cents. Since the year 1822, the dividends of the stock had not been sufficient to answer the annuities; but the annuitants had received, to the present time, such a proportion of the annuities bequeathed to them as the dividends for the time being allowed. The fund having been paid into Court under the Act for the Relief of Trustees, a petition was now presented by the widow and administratrix of Joseph Watts and by Sophia Lidiard, praying that they might respectively be declared entitled to receive out of the corpus of the trust fund all the arrears of the annuities bequeathed by the testatrix, with interest on such arrears at four per cent., and for an account, and payment accordingly. It was stated that the annuitants had never been apprised of their rights by the trustees, but were led to believe that the payments they received were all to which they were entitled. Mr. Nelson, for the petitioners, claimed all the arrears since 1822 (thirty-seven years), together with interest, as prayed, citing Cox v. Dolman (2), and Snow v. Booth (3). Mr. W. R. Ellis, for the (1) As to the difference between arrears of an annuity charged on land, Hughes v. Coles (1884) 27 Ch. D. 231, 53 L. J. Ch. 1047, 51 L. T. 226, and arrears of an annuity charged on personal estate, In re Bannerman's Estate, charities, contended, first, that Bannerman v. Young (1882) 21 Ch. D. 104, 51 L. J. Ch. 449. See and compare those two cases with this decision. -O. A. S. (2) 95 R. R. 241 (2 D. M. & G. 592). (3) 114 R. R. 34 (8 D. M. & G. 69). |