T

HE Treaty of Versailles that formally ended the World War was an imperfect instrument. None would have admitted this more readily than its framers. Few of its decisions were unchallenged. Many were the targets of bitter criticism. Most were the result of compromise. With all its defects, however, the treaty represented the best thought and effort of the allied statesmen. The world's long agony was over and the nations turned from the destructive energies of war to the constructive processes of peace.

The treaty was ratified by Great Britain, July 31; by Italy, Oct. 7; by France, Oct. 13, and by Japan, Oct. 27. It was submitted to the United States Senate by President Wilson July 10, and after a long and exhaustive debate, which will be referred to later, was rejected by that body, Nov. 19. The German National Assembly ratified the treaty July 9 by a vote of 208 to 115; 99 Deputies refraining from voting. As only the ratification of three of the major allied and associated nations was required in addition to that of Germany, the treaty became a valid instrument, though many months were to elapse before the formal exchange of ratification should put all its clauses into effect.

Signed on the same day as the Treaty of Versailles, but only made public four days later, were treaties between the United States and France, and between

France and Great Britain, by the terms of which the two powers agreed to come to the aid of France if any unprovoked act of aggression were committed against her by Germany. It was provided that the treaties should be submitted to the council of the League of Nations, which would decide whether to recognize them as engagements in conformity with the League covenant; it was also agreed that the Franco-American Treaty should be submitted to the United States Senate and the French Parliament for approval. The alliance had been suggested by France, who felt that adequate protection against a revived and revengeful Germany had not been accorded her by the main treaty. The supplementary pact referred to Articles 42 and 43 of the Versailles Treaty, which forbade Germany to establish any fortification or maintain any military forces on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn fifty kilometres to the east of the same river; and the binding clause was as follows:

"In case these stipulations should not assure immediately to France appropriate security and protection, the United States of America shall be bound to come immediately to her aid in case of any unprovoked act of aggression directed against her by Germany."

The agreement between England and France was the same in tenor, with the additional provision that the treaty im

posed no obligation upon any dominion of the British Empire, unless and until the Parliament of such dominion should approve it.

In England the pact met with little criticism. Nor was any pronounced opposition evoked in the United States. The President formally presented it to the Senate July 29, 1919, and the Judiciary Committee, to whom it was referred, reported later that there was nothing in the pact which was in conflict with the Constitution. The controversy over the League of Nations, however, prevented any action being taken upon the French treaty.

Following the signing of the Treaty of Versailles came the problem of its enforcement. To carry out this successfully it was necessary that there should be good faith on the part of the vanquished and unity of will and purpose on the part of the victors. Neither of these conditions existed to the extent required.

Germany had signed under duress. She had sought the hegemony of Europe, and, having failed, was not willing to pay the price. Her "punic faith" had been demonstrated many times during the war; it was to be evidenced again in the period that followed. Nullification of the treaty was her first aim; modification her second. thing else failed she sought refuge in a sullen non possumus.

When every

On the other hand, the members of the Entente had lost something of the unity that had been forged in the heat and stress of war. The pressure of a common danger had been removed, and diverging national aims began again to clamor for recognition. England was intent on recovering her lost trade, and tended insensibly toward resuming her "splendid isolation." France was concerned with indemnity and security.

Italy felt deeply the non-recognition of her claim to Fiume, and was engrossed with grave domestic problems. Japan was bent upon strengthening her primacy in the Orient. The United States, by its failure to ratify the treaty, was debarred from taking part in its enforcement. The task that lay before the allied nations was calculated to test their wisdom and statesmanship to the utmost.

GERMAN DEVELOPMENTS

The gloom and bitterness in Germany that had prevailed since the armistice were accentuated by the signing of the treaty. The papers that announced the news were bordered with black, and had such headlines as "Germany's Fate Sealed" and "Peace with Annihilation." Fierce diatribes were launched against all concerned in framing the treaty, and attacks upon President Wilson were especially venomous. It was freely predicted that the Versailles pact would prove a mere scrap of paper. Revenge was hinted at, and in some quarters advocated. Sunday, July 6, was set aside as a day of national mouring. Germany's cup of humiliation was being drained to the dregs.

After the first outburst had subsided the Government faced the inevitable, and ratified the treaty July 9. The new Constitution, the full text of which will be found in this volume, was finally approved by the National Assembly at Weimar on July 31, and was promulgated by President Ebert Aug. 13. The preamble declared that "the German people, united in its branches and inspired by the will to renew and strengthen its realm in freedom and justice, to further inner and outer peace and social advance, has voted this Constitution." The document is divided into two parts"The Composition and Ties of the Empire" and "The Basic Rights and Duties

of the Germans." In the first part the German Empire is declared to be a republican State, sovereignty being vested in the people. The generally recognized rules of international law are held as binding on the State. The President is to be elected every seven years. Elections to the National Assembly are to occur every four years. The Chancellor's position is virtually that of a Vice President, he and the rest of the Cabinet being appointed by the President. The second part declares that all Germans shall be equal before the law, and all men and women shall have basically the same rights. Provision is made for a second chamber, somewhat analogous to the American Senate; a Supreme Court, a budget system and other legislative machinery necessary to the functioning of the Government. It is declared that no State Church exists, and that religion has no bearing on citizenship. Immediately after the promulgation of the Constitution President Ebert appointed Premier Bauer as Chancellor, and issued a decree that all members of the defense forces should take the oath under the Constitution.

While the new charter was being debated and adopted controversy was provoked by the disclosures of Erzberger, the "stormy petrel" of German politics. He alleged that negotiations for peace had been initiated through the Vatican by the French and British Governments in August, 1917, and that only the ineptitude of the then German Government, headed by Michaelis, in neglecting or rebuffing the overtures had prevented Germany from securing an advantageous peace. The statement drew a denial from Alexandre Ribot, who at the time mentioned was Premier and Foreign Minister of France. Its repercussion in Germany was immediate. It loosed a flood of angry protests and recriminations

from which each political party sought to draw advantage. Bauer, Ludendorff, von Tirpitz, Hindenburg, Michaelis, von Bernstorff and von Bethmann Hollweg took part in the strife, which resolved itself into an attempt by the military party to throw the odium for the prolongation of the war upon the civil authorities, while the latter retorted in kind. Much of the responsibility was placed by both sides on the former Kaiser. The controversy subsided after a while, to revive with greater virulence later on in the Reichstag inquiry into the conduct of the war. To the world at large, surfeited with strife, the proceedings had only an academic interest, and the net result of the exculpations and accusations in this post-mortem analysis was a deepening of the conviction of Germany's guilt in bringing on the war.

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The attempt to extradite the ex-Kaiser for trial before an allied tribunal ended in failure. Two difficulties stood in the way-the lack of a charge recognizable by international law, and the reluctance of Holland to surrender a fugitive who had sought asylum in her borders. The Allies sought to surmount the former by charging a supreme offense against international morality," a charge that, in addition to its novelty and vagueness, had the drawback that always attaches to post facto proceedings. Two letters were addressed to Holland couched in persuasive terms, but carrying a hint of coercion if that should become necessary. Holland's replies were polite but firm. She refused to surrender the ex-Emperor, alleging the impossibility of departing from her customs and traditions in affording shelter to those charged with political offenses. She offered, however, to provide additional guards to prevent the royal exile from escaping to Germany or engaging in intrigues that might again prove a menace to the world.