A third is poring over a register of figures in a fashion which suggests that he is endeavoring to find Easter by means of the Sunday letter; as a matter of fact, he is considering the force of the wind as shown by the last half-dozen shots. After a minute or so of whispered consultation, a report is heard and a puff of smoke seen somewhere among the feet of the group which we have described, and the spectator then learns that the real performer, he whose name will appear in the morrow's paper with the whole glory of success or disgrace of failure attached to it, is the one whose prostrate figure surrounded by counselors has hitherto escaped his notice. No doubt in a great competition, such as the queen's prize or the Elcho Shield, when the end is near and the struggle runs close, excitement becomes intense and contagious. But that is because

"That needs must be a mighty minute

When a crowd has but one soul within it."

The interest is that of a contested election rather than of an athletic contest. There is no outward and visible mark of individual skill. Except by the marking on the target there is nothing to tell the lookeron whether he is watching the efforts of a queen's prize winner or a man who has struggled out of the second class.

Another drawback to the popularity of rifle-shooting has been that by far the most attractive form of it, long-range shooting, has been hitherto attended with considerable initial expense. A good longrange rifle with its appurtenances costs at least twenty-five pounds, and a young man thinks twice before he invests that sum in a pursuit in which his interest and his capacity are as yet virtually untried. The substitution of the Lee-Metford for the Martini may do not a little to obviate this. It will put an arm of precision adapted to long ranges in the hands of every one who shoots at all. What will be its effect in the competitions at present open to match rifles-that is to say, to rifles fitted with aperture-sights and movable wind-gauges-it is not very easy to foresee. On the one hand, the cost of fitting a Lee-Metford with these appliances will be but small. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the Lee-Metford, even with its ordinary military sights, will perhaps diminish the desire for a more exact weapon.

Unhappily there is a serious set-off to the advantage which rifleshooting will derive from the new service arm. As is well known, the extra distance traveled by the Lee-Metford bullet, albeit not more than three hundred yards, has already led to the condemnation of many ranges as unsafe. It is possible that a partial remedy may be found in the adoption of a bullet with more " stopping power" than that now in use: for the same quality which will make it more effective, its tendency to become deformed or to break up on striking an object, will obviously lessen the tendency to ricochet. And it is to be observed that it is really only from ricochets that danger is to be expected. Misses over

the target can be intercepted by a sufficiently high butt: the chance of a rifle being let off pointed high in the air is simply one of a number of contingencies, all of which imply either some fault in the construction of the rifle or gross carelessness on the part of the shooter. No range can guard against such accidents: the superiority of a range which guards against one per cent. of them as against one which makes no provision is not worth considering.

One measure that has been suggested is the use of a reduced charge. We will not say that the remedy is worse than the disease, but we certainly do say that it would be but a feeble palliative for a thoroughly unsatisfactory state of affairs. It is scarcely possible to overrate the evils which might result from the existence of two sets of ammunition of widely different force, " practice" ammunition and "service" ammunition. Imagine a battalion going into action without a single man knowing the sighting of his rifle with the full charge. Imagine the panic if a rumor got about that two or three regiments had by mischance had the "practice" ammunition served out to them. Let it be supposed that by a large expenditure of government money safe ranges are found for the regular forces. What would be the fate of the great volunteer competitions at Bisley when one-half of the force were trained on safe ranges with "service" ammunition, while the other half had only been allowed "practice" ammunition? And be it remembered that anything which lowers the standard of volunteer shooting at Bisley will in all likelihood carry with it a lowering of the standard of shooting throughout the whole of our forces. Those members of the regular service who have formed the Army Eight Club, and have hereby done much to raise the standard of military shooting, would, we are sure, be the first to acknowledge the value of the lessons learnt at Wimbledon and Bisley, and the stimulus which the shooting there has given to their efforts. The annual match between the different branches of the service has acted in the same way.

If ranges cannot be found, and the reduced charge must be employed as a means of utilizing those already in existence, it is at least not too much to ask that it should be only used by tyros from whom wild shots may be expected. Allow at least every man who has shot into the first class to use the full charge; then at the worst there would be in every corps a certain number of men who know the sighting for the full charge.

Want of ranges and want of officers seem to be the two difficulties under which the volunteer corps, especially in country districts, now labor. The leisured and landed classes can do something to supply both wants, and there are few services by which they can more certainly and more effectively secure the gratitude of their countrymen. "A MARKSMAN."

THE CASTLE OF SAN JUAN DE ULLOA AND THE TOPSY-TURVYISTS.

CARELESS reading and hasty generalization are apt to turn things topsy-turvy in the mind, thus presenting a reversed view misleading and false.

A very good illustration of this is found in the assertions and opinions of some of the writers on the Mexican War, regarding the condition of the castle of San Juan de Ulloa and the manner of its reduction by our forces. Thus, for instance, we are told by some that San Juan in 1847 was in no better condition of defense than in 1838, and that half a dozen of the wooden frigates of that day could have taken it by direct bombardment; a painful feeling of failure and disappointment following our omission of this cheap victory. Yes, truly, we should feel humiliated, indeed, were fancies facts; but, since facts will not turn into fancies, in accord with the vagaries of ignorance or prejudice, we really have no whining disappointment to stroke down nor any sobbing regret to coddle.

In 1846, as well known, upon the breaking out of war with Mexico, our fleet-all wooden vessels and but two of them steamerswas before San Juan. Of course popular expectation looked for an immediate bombardment by the ships, but it never came. Not, however, because the officers of the navy avoided such action willingly, but because, as will be shown by me, they were forced so to do by prohibitory circumstances.

Such being the case, and our government fully understanding and appreciating it, the whole matter of a mere naval attack was dropped by the Department and by those naval officers fully aware of the existing conditions, the combined movement of army and navy being decided on, which was carried out, and resulted, as well known, in the speedy capture of both castle and city.

But although the well informed had regretfully resigned a purely naval attack, there were still some persons who-through misconception or blinding zeal having advocated a purely naval attack-could not bring themselves to its abandonment, but, like the proverbial "man convinced against his will," were "of the same opinion still.”

That these malecontents grumbled is not surprising; but in their

day these murmurings were known to be but the mere grumblings of the discontented, a class then embracing even Farragut, our future great admiral; for this officer, then but a commander in rank, dazzled by the vision of glory to be gained by the capture of San Juan, and basing his plans for action on the circumstances of the past, was so blinded by his zeal that he took no heed of and refused to acknowledge the changed condition of the time, stubbornly maintaining that the castle had not been strengthened since 1838, and even asserting that the officers then in command-Conner, Perry, and Scott-were all deceived as to the truth when they declared that it had been strengthened. How thoroughly Commander Farragut deceived himself in this matter is shown, I think, by this paper, while his own journal reveals the secret of his self-deception,—namely, mortification and chagrin at being slighted by both his commander-in-chief-Perryand the Department, and also from having incurred the displeasure of the Secretary of the Navy.1 (Farragut's journal, quoted in his " Life," by L. Farragut, pp. 158-164.) Fortunately for us, as well as for Farragut, he did not have his over-zealous way, but was preserved for a great and glorious future.

However, time passes on, and the popular historians of the following generations, in the pleasant, easy manner of their kind, skimming the surface of the past and thus collecting its froth, coming across these grumblings, parade them forth as sage opinion and well-founded fact. Thus we are gravely told that San Juan was not greatly strengthened after its capture by the French in 1838, and that during our war it could have been taken by Commodore Conner's squadron. In direct refutation of these vagaries I give the following positive assertions and facts as to the strength of San Juan de Ulloa after 1838, and just before the commencement of our war, and during the same, in 1846 and 1847, with evidence that it was then, indeed, a strong place. But, in advance, let us see what its condition was in 1838 when taken by the French.

Although there were then found one hundred and eighty-seven guns of all kinds within the castle, a large portion were but for land defense, while of the rest-the remainder of the one hundred and eighty-seven-we are left in doubt as to the number mounted. But this is of no consequence, for it matters not, even if that number had reached a thousand; because, instead of sinking the French ships at once by concentrated fire as they came up in range, the Mexicans allowed them to pass on over the points of concentration and into berths where but nineteen guns in all could be brought to bear upon them.2

1 Either this or the alternative, that through inconsecutive quotations Farragut's sayings have been misplaced and confused so that the true meaning is lost.

2 There is a special reason for this slackness, to wit: the Mexican government was so averse to the war that it gave positive orders not to fire a shot until fired upon by the French.