the situation, thought that there was not as yet any ground for shortening the recess.

Parliament reassembled as arranged on February 13. The King's Speech opened with a reference to the Conference held at the beginning of the year at Paris, and stated that the Government, while unable either to concur or participate in the French operation, were acting in such a way as not to add to the difficulties of their Allies. The Speech further expressed regret at the refusal of the Turks to sign the treaty drawn up at Lausanne, coupled with the hope that on more mature reflection they might still consent to do so. It further referred with satisfaction to the prospective settlement of the United States debt, and with concern to the unemployment problem, and promised legislation on housing and rent restriction.

The debate on the Address, as usual, was desultory, and included in both Houses congratulations to the King and Queen on two happy events which had recently taken place the birth of a grandchild and the engagement of the Duke of York. But the question of the Ruhr occupied the lion's share of attention. Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, who, as leader of the Opposition, spoke first after the opener and seconder in the House of Commons, in view of the intention of the Labour Party to move a special amendment on the matter, referred to it only in somewhat general terms, devoting more attention to unemployment and housing. It was noticeable that ministerial cheers greeted a remark of his that one course open to this country (a course which needless to say the Labour Party did not advocate) was to support France whole-heartedly. He hinted that British interests were being sacrificed to ambitions which Britain did not share, but instead of criticising the Government contented himself with asking a number of searching questions concerning their relations with France. Mr. Asquith, who followed, was more outspoken. Confining himself to the paragraph in the King's Speech which dealt with the Ruhr, he characterised the statement of British policy contained in it as a confession of the impotence of Europe, and in particular of the Allies, to arrive at a liquidation and final settlement of the problem of reparations. He was not satisfied with the Government's policy as outlined in the Speech. He thought they ought not to content themselves with silent and passive standing by, and he proposed that this country should press both upon France and Germany the urgent necessity of allowing the matter in all its aspects to be dealt with by the League of Nations.

The Premier replied immediately in a speech which was virtually an apologia for the Government's attitude. He gave a detailed account of the proposals which England had put forward at the recent Conference, and stated the reasons why France had rejected them. The chief of these was, he felt, the French fear that Germany might in ten or fifteen years be able to pay off the 2,500,000,000l. required of her and then be in as

strong a position as before the war. It became evident in the course of the Conference that France was determined to try her plan, and though they might have said to France, "If you do that, it is the end of the Entente," he did not think that would have been wise. They still had their troops on the Rhine, though he did not know whether it would be possible for them to remain there long. He thought it would be a pity to put an end to the Entente. It was no good for him to appeal to the League of Nations if he was certain that France would have nothing to do with it, and he was certain that that would be her attitude. It might be that in a few months' time they would look upon such a step as possible, and then, in his view, would be the time to make the attempt. Since they could not prevent the French action, they would lose and not gain by making a breach with France, but he still had a hope that something might happen which would make it possible for them to intervene usefully.

In the House of Lords Viscount Grey spoke rather as a supporter than a critic of the Government, in regard to its dealings both with France and with Turkey. He recognised their difficulties and hoped they would succeed to the utmost possible limit. Like the Government itself, he held that cooperation between France and Britain was essential to restore peace and make Europe safe, but at the same time he thought that the action of France in the Ruhr, from an economic and financial point of view, was not only not wise, but would in the end be disastrous. Regarding the security of France, he said he was driven back more and more to the League of Nations as the only means of a permanent solution. The peril of a new war could only be averted if nations would rise to some higher and better conception of international relations and future security.

Lord Curzon, in replying on behalf of the Government, said that the fact of his having had to spend nearly four months out of the last twelve on the Continent was significant, and showed that the affairs of this country were inextricably interwoven with those of the Continent, and that a policy of isolation was impossible. He had sought at Lausanne to maintain the unity and solidarity of the Allies, and he had no doubt that the Turks there had been greatly impressed by the united front presented by the Allies, though to his regret they had not yet signed the Treaty. He repeated that in regard to French action in the Ruhr the Government's attitude was one of "benevolent neutrality," and denied that an offer of intervention at that juncture could serve any good purpose.

The next day Mr. Clynes moved the Labour amendment, which, after referring to unemployment, "regretted the absence in the Address of any indication of policy upon affairs in Europe and the Near East which might check the progress in economic ruin of Europe." He said the Labour Party was convinced

that foreign policy was largely the cause of the industrial dislocation and economic breakdown from which they were suffering. He thought the Prime Minister, in the matter of the French occupation of the Ruhr, had retreated too soon and himself showed a great deal of fear. He hoped the Government would clearly say that it could not approve of interference with the natural development of any nation. His party rejected the monstrous doctrine that Germany must be prevented from becoming strong enough to pay her way.

A striking contribution to the debate was made by Mr. Philip Snowden, who detailed the deprivations to which Germany had been subjected, while France, he suggested, was possibly the richest country in the world at this moment, not excepting America. The action of France was not only cruel and oppressive, but contrary to the Treaty of Versailles, for on a strict interpretation of that document no one Power was justified in taking independent action. We must, he said, be one thing or the other in the crisis. Our neutrality was in effect active co-operation with the French. Had we no interest in stopping France from completing the ruin of Europe and the ultimate ruin of herself? Had the Government no policy but that of putting no difficulties in the way of our Ally? The matter should be referred to a world conference. If France would not submit, she would become morally isolated. This was a moral question, concluded Mr. Snowden, and unless economics were based on moral principles, they would never succeed.

Mr. Ramsay Macdonald summed up the case for the Labour Party. He said the amendment had been moved for two reasons. It was to declare that European political uncertainty was having a direct bearing on the economic condition of the peoples, and it was to emphasise the view that international exchange was essential for the well-being of each State. It might have to be confessed that nothing practical could be done, but for the purpose of turning over a new leaf benevolent neutrality neither helped us, nor our Ally, nor the world. Nations, he declared, had to make up their minds in times of crisis, and having done that they should allow their will to operate, and not be lacking in the courage to execute it. The desire of the Labour Party was candidly to break with the policy of the past-not indeed in any senseless, ramshackle, revived Palmerstonian sense, though he was not sure they might not do a little better than they were doing if they had a certain amount of the spirit of Palmerston in these days. He predicted that the amendment, rejected to-day, would later on become the foundation of the policy which a wise Government of this country would pursue.

Mr. Baldwin (Chancellor of the Exchequer) replied on behalf of the Government. He agreed with the two axioms that had been laid down in the course of the debate-that the state of

Europe had a direct bearing on the economic conditions of this country, and that international exchanges were essential to our economic prosperity. But the difference was that in the view of the other side they ought to have an immediate breach with France, whereas the Government did not think this an opportune moment. (These words, uttered in a slight inadvertence, set the Opposition agog with the idea that possibly they indicated a change of attitude on the part of the Government, but it turned out that Mr. Baldwin did not mean them to be pressed.) Desiring above all things as they did the peace and settlement of Europe, they believed, so far as they could see at present, that they were more likely to attain these ends by maintaining their friendship with their old Ally in the hope and belief that the time would come when their services as mediator and helper might be possible and might be effective.

The amendment was defeated by 277 votes to 180.

Before the subject could be again raised in Parliament, the neutrality of Britain in the Cologne area was put to a somewhat severe test. On February 14 a French delegation, headed by M. Le Troquer, Minister of Public Works, came to London with the object, as it was supposed, of asking permission for the transport of Ruhr coal and coke to France through the NorthWest sector of the British zone. It turned out that what the French really asked for was something far more comprehensive, namely, that the entire railway system in the British zone should be controlled by French troops. The negotiations lasted a couple of days, and when the French delegates returned to Paris nothing had been finally decided. There could be no question of the Government acceding to the whole of the French request; and in some quarters the request itself was looked on as a subtle move on the part of the French to get the British out of the Cologne area. For various reasons the Government was averse from this step; and in the end it commissioned General Godley, the commander of the British troops in Cologne, to make some arrangement which would provide the French with reasonable facilities for transport without compromising British neutrality. The French were finally satisfied with an arrangement by which a small strip of railway in the North-West sector of the zone, which was never used by the British, was handed over to them, and on the rest of the system they were granted the same facilities of transport as they had enjoyed before invading the Ruhr. Thus the Government remained true to its intention of putting no positive hindrance in the way of its Ally, while yet not actively assisting her. same policy was exemplified in the action of the British representatives on the Reparations and Rhineland Commissions in abstaining from voting on all motions ratifying France's actions.

The

On February 19, the question of the Ruhr was again discussed in the House of Commons on an amendment to the Address moved by Mr. H. A. L. Fisher in the name of both wings of the

Liberal Party, to the effect that securities against aggression should be sought by international guarantees under the League of Nations, which should be invited to appoint a committee of experts to report upon Germany's capacity to pay, and that the British representative on the Council of the League should urge that the United States be invited to appoint experts to serve on the Commission. Mr. Fisher said that though there had already been a division on the question, nothing should mask the fact that an overwhelming majority of the House, and he believed also of the nation, supported the Government in its decision not to be associated with the French enterprise in the Ruhr. At the same time there was not indeed universal agreement, but a large measure of agreement in every quarter of the House upon the necessity of preserving, if it could be preserved, a good understanding and cordial co-operation with France. In the interests of the Entente he was desirous of seeing the Government take some action. The proposal which he made was one which he believed would be practicable and would not prejudice the future, and was compatible with the economic restoration of Europe and the growth of a better feeling between the French and German peoples.

Lord Robert Cecil caused some surprise by stating that he was not prepared to vote for the amendment. He admitted that he agreed broadly with the policy suggested by the amendment, and that he would go even further and say that the question would have to be settled ultimately by the League of Nations or some such world conference as the mover had suggested. But he was not prepared to say that the Government should here and now take this action, and he saw no reason for want of confidence in the Government in regard to this matter. Lord R. Cecil's speech was adversely commented on in many quarters as inconsistent with his professions of devotion to the League of Nations, but he to some extent removed the impression thus created by signing an open letter published in The Times a few days later calling on the Government to utilise the machinery of the League as soon as possible.

The chief feature of the debate was a vehement attack on the French policy by Mr. Lloyd George. He said that there was nothing in the reparations situation which demanded such a violent step as France had taken. Their interpretation of the Versailles Treaty was at fault. The figure which had been mentioned by Mr. Snowden of 11,500,000,000l. had never been presented to Germany. The Treaty of Versailles had no figures; it merely provided that Germany should pay damages of certain categories. In 1921 the damage was assessed at 6,600,000,000. That figure was not the claim, but the figure of damage. The only claim presented to Germany for payment was in respect of 2,500,000,000. The remainder had never been claimed, and there was no serious intention that it should be claimed. Mr. Lloyd George then proceeded to

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