enumerate what he considered the mistakes made by France in her reparations policy. The first was her refusal to accept the proposal of the Bankers' Committee in the previous year to take the necessary steps for procuring an advance for reparations provided the situation were cleared up. The second was the rejection of the Balfour note with its very generous offer. The third was the rejection of the suggestions of Sir R. Horne for putting the finances of Germany in order. The fourth was the refusal to listen to the very generous and liberal proposal of Mr. Bonar Law; and the crown of these blunders was the invasion of the Ruhr. It was difficult to believe that the securing of reparations was the only object of the French action, and this was what added to the gravity of the situation. If they were friends of France-and he thought they were-they would try to extricate her from this enterprise before it became too late.

In connexion with this speech it was remarked in Press comment and communications as somewhat extraordinary that no subsequent speaker in the debate called attention to Mr. Lloyd George's inaccuracy in stating that the figure of 11,500,000,0007. had never been presented to Germany, the fact being that this figure had been definitely fixed as the amount of the Allied claims in March, 1921.

The amendment was supported by Mr. A. Henderson on behalf of the Labour Party and Sir J. Simon on behalf of the Independent Liberals. Replying on behalf of the Government Mr. Bonar Law said that the view dwelt upon by supporters of the amendment, that French action in the Ruhr was bad and could only have bad results, was the view of the Government also. But the conclusion the Government had come to and acted on was that neither their own interests nor the interest of the peace of the world would be helped by their taking up an attitude antagonistic to France. He reminded Mr. Lloyd George that he himself two years previously had proposed an ultimatum to Germany threatening that the Ruhr would be occupied (at this point a voice interposed amid general laughter "bluff!"). It was no use laying the blame on M. Poincaré alone, as he undoubtedly had both the French Chambers behind him. To bring in the League of Nations at this point would probably only have the effect of making France-and perhaps Belgium and Italy also-hostile to the League, and so weakening the influence of the League or all that was left of it. He was surprised by the reference in the amendment to America. Where did hon. members get their evidence of the willingness of the United States to come in? Everything which they had said had gone directly counter to such an idea. Hughes had said he had no doubt that distinguished Americans would be willing to serve on a Commission. But distinguished Americans were not the same thing as the American GovernIt was their old friend, the Commission of Bankers,

which had tried before and which the French Government would not permit to examine the question. He would impress on the House that it was no use passing these pious resolutions, or appealing to the League of Nations when they knew that nothing effective could come of it, and all it would do would be to irritate their Ally. The amendment was defeated by 305 to 196.

While this debate was going on in the House of Commons, four Scottish Labour members of Parliament-Messrs. John Wheatley, James Maxton, David Kirkwood, and Campbell Stephen-had been making a tour of inspection in the Ruhr to study conditions there, and immediately on their return they published an account of their impressions. They drew a comparison between housing conditions in the Ruhr and in the West of Scotland, greatly to the disadvantage of the latter. They declared the motive of the French occupation to be a desire to unite the Ruhr coalfield with the Lorraine iron-field. They said that England had a deep interest in preventing this, and was regarded by France not as an Ally, or even neutral, but as a friendly rival, and therefore there was no hope of Britain being accepted as a mediator between France and Germany. They suggested as the only way out of the difficulty that France, Germany, Britain, Belgium, and Italy should internationalise the Ruhr coalfield.

The Executive of the Labour Party was far from being in accord with the views of the four Scottish members, and in order to prevent misunderstanding drafted a manifesto of some length to express the policy of the party on the Ruhr question. It was fully expected that the manifesto would be issued immediately after the party meeting on February 27, but at the meeting differences of opinion revealed themselves, and the matter was referred back to the Executive Committee. The manifesto never saw the light, and the Labour party continued to expound its policy through the medium of Parliamentary

debates.

The next debate on the Ruhr was as a matter of fact initiated by the Labour Party on March 6, when Mr. Ramsay Macdonald brought forward a motion urging the Government to invite the Chambers of France and Belgium to appoint representative committees in order to exchange information and views with a similar committee appointed by the House of Commons regarding the occupation of the Ruhr in relation to the problems of security and reparations. He said that he and his colleagues were convinced that until public opinion had been moulded in the countries concerned Governmental interference would be of very doubtful benefit. The public in each country was uncertain and unhappy, and anxious to understand the public opinion of other countries. But there was no means of conference or of exchange of opinion, and it was the machinery for this that he desired to create. Lord Robert Cecil criticised the

proposal as insufficient to deal with the situation. He gave it as his belief that the working of Foreign Affairs Committees in other countries was disastrous, and said that for the purpose of exciting public opinion there could be no instrument comparable to the League of Nations. Mr. Bonar Law pointed out that the Leader of the Opposition had said in effect that there was no use in the Government attempting to do anything unless there was a public opinion behind it. This, he said, was the basis of the policy which so far had been followed by the Government. He regarded the amendment as even of less practical value than those which had preceded it on the same subject, and asked the House to reject it by a large majority. As a matter of fact it was talked out without a division.

On February 20, in continuation of the debate on the Address, Mr. G. Lambert moved an amendment "that there should be an immediate and drastic curtailment of British responsibilities in Mesopotamia. He said that in the three years following on the Armistice the expenditure on Mesopotamia had been 147,500,000l. and there were now new estimates for 11,476,000l. He blamed Mr. Churchill very largely for the disappointing results of British policy, and denied that King Feisul was as acceptable to the people as Mr. Churchill had represented, or that the elections in Mesopotamia were any index of feeling in the country. He hoped the House would not ratify the Treaty with King Feisul, by which England would be required to defend Mesopotamia against armed aggression by any other power. The money wasted in that part of the world if kept at home would fructify in the pockets of the taxpayers.

In answer to questions Sir Samuel Hoare, the Minister for Air, denied emphatically that there had been any bombing by aeroplanes for the collection of taxes, though, as Mr. Lambert stated, this had been asserted by a newspaper which supported the Government. The amendment was warmly supported by Mr. Asquith. He said they had gone to Mesopotamia in the first instance as part of a military operation; also in the hope of rescuing what had once been one of the most fertile and historically interesting quarters of the globe from the domination of Ottoman rule. After the successful campaign of General Maude they had given pledges to free the population from Ottoman rule, and to do everything in their power to establish an autonomous Arab State. They had carried out those pledges. But they had made many mistakes. The first, which was a very disastrous one, was to set up in Mesopotamia an Anglo-Indian Administration. It was done in good faith, but it led to what was called a rebellion, because the Arabs did not welcome it. He did not know if even now the British public realised what the adventure had cost. Already 150,000,000l. of British money had been sunk in the country without any visible material result, and with a large loss of precious lives. A worse investment of British money had in their time never been made. Three years

To

ago he had urged the policy of withdrawal and the concentration of their troops at Basra. He thought if that policy had been adopted, they would have saved certainly 50,000,000. He believed he was expressing the opinion not only of his own party but of the vast majority of people in the country in saying that they were not prepared to give any commitments of any kind to the future of Mesopotamia. Mesopotamia was a geographical expression, a country without a boundary. make an effective and defended line would entail an enormous and disproportionate expenditure both in men and money. The oil supply was hypothetical, and was not a thing on which any sane Government would ask the people to spend a single halfpenny. There were no British interests in Mesopotamia. Whatever interests they had in that part of the world, they could adequately safeguard without making themselves responsible for a single acre of Mesopotamian territory.

The Prime Minister in replying said he was in agreement with a good deal that Mr. Asquith had said. But Mr. Asquith had not suggested that there should be an immediate evacuation. That was the difficulty. They had had the subject discussed by a Cabinet Committee, and it was not so simple as one would think. Whatever the reasons which induced them to go to Mesopotamia, the fact that they had been there for six or seven years must bring in its train certain obligations which no country would desire to get out of without the goodwill of the people they were leaving. Further, this question was bound up with the Turkish Treaty. There was no doubt that to come to a decision before the Treaty was signed at Lausanne would be a very unwise procedure. If they had to go, every one would say that the right way was by negotiation, and that could only happen after the Treaty had been made. At present they were seriously considering the subject with an open mind; what their ultimate decision would be he could not at that stage say, but he would like the House to lay to heart one statement of Mr. Asquith. If ever this country had been engaged in an operation which was not directed towards getting oil or anything of the kind, but which was entirely unselfish from this country's point of view, their being in Mesopotamia was in that category. The amendment was defeated by 273 votes to 167.

One further amendment was moved to the Address by Mr. W. Adamson, on behalf of the Labour Party, regretting that no reference had been made to the institution of a thorough inquiry by a Select Committee to consider what action was necessary to secure a full discharge of the country's obligations with regard to war pensions. After some discussion, in which the Ministry of Pensions was criticised as being too eager to effect economies and too bureaucratic in its methods, the amendment was defeated by 307 votes to 176, and the Address was then agreed to.

A few days later, on February 26, Lord Curzon, as guest at an Aldwych Club luncheon, defended the foreign policy of the

Government. He reiterated his opinion that it was not possible that any nation or Government or people would in the long run reject a Treaty so generous and considerate in its terms as that which they had offered to Turkey. Speaking of England's imperial responsibilities, he said that flag-wagging for the mere sake of showing the Union Jack had long ceased to have any attraction even for the British race. But he confessed he was rather shocked when sometimes he took up his papers in the morning, and read almost piteous appeals to the British people to withdraw from everywhere-from the Rhine, from Constantinople, from the Straits, Jerusalem, and Bagdad. He had not any personal sympathy for the policy of universal skedaddle. Withdrawal was an expedient, sometimes a wise and necessary expedient, but it was not a policy. He remembered many cases in which, in deference to popular clamour, they had withdrawnfrom Egypt, the Sudan, the Transvaal, and parts of the NorthWest Frontier of India, and with what results? After the lapse of only a few years, at the expense of untold blood and treasure, they had to go back again. He did not want to repeat that experience. There were places from which they ought to withdraw and might have to withdraw, but he would like to be cautious about withdrawing, and to be certain that he was not making a mistake by doing so. It was sometimes better to stay a little longer than to go too soon.

While Parliament was discussing the Address the Government was greatly exercised in its mind over the question of housing (with which was inseparably connected that of rent control), on which it had pledged itself to bring in a Bill. This question was also a burning one with the local authorities, and in January a Conference of local authorities in the North of England had been held in Manchester in order to devise a solution of the problem. On January 25 a deputation of members of this Conference, headed by the Lord Mayor of Manchester, interviewed the Minister of Health, Sir A. GriffithBoscawen, along with a deputation from the Council of Municipal Corporations, to urge on him the necessity of granting a fresh Government subsidy for house building. The two bodies were not in entire agreement, as the former asked for a minimum contribution from the State of 61. per house per annum, and in addition half the annual loss if the loss should be more than 121., whereas the latter were content with 67. in all cases. Minister of Health thought that the suggestions submitted would impose upon the State a much larger liability than the Government had contemplated, but he decided that officers of the Ministry of Health should go into the question in conjunction with representatives of the local authorities who had met in conference in Manchester the previous week and of the Association of Municipal Corporations.

The

Four days before Parliament met (Feb. 10) the Departmental Committee on the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest