signed it on December 18. The British and French delegates signed as plenipotentiaries, but the Spanish delegates made the reservation that the Convention should be accepted by the Government at Madrid.

The chief new provisions of the Convention were the appointment of a Mendub, a kind of Pasha, for the administration of the natives, and a Committee of Control and an International Legislative Assembly for the general government of the zone, which was declared permanently neutral. These provisions rendered obsolete ipso facto the capitulations. The Committee of Control was to consist of the eight consular officers of the Powers signatory to the Act of Algeciras, and the International Assembly of 17 European members, including 4 French, 4 Spanish, 3 British, and 9 native, viz., 6 Moslems and 3 Jews. France was anxious that the whole of the 9 native members should be appointed by the Mendub. As this official was the representative of the Sultan who was entirely under French influence, this would have meant that the native members were practically French nominees, so that half the votes in the Assembly would belong to France. The Spanish delegates objected to this arrangement, and in deference to their wishes, France consented that the Spanish consul should nominate one Arab and one Jew among the native members. Both France and Spain further obtained the right of conveying troops through the port of Tangier. The Convention was to be in force for twelve years.

The Convention leaves room for international bickerings, but from the point of view of good government it is a great improvement on the Capitulations, and if accepted by Spain and Italy may be expected to remove the chief obstacles to the commercial revival of Tangier.

EGYPT.

The constitutional position which had shown noticeable signs of improvement towards the end of the previous year made a marked advance during the earlier half of the year 1923. For a few months the terms of the Constitution remained unsettled, the principal nominal difficulty centring round the relations between Egypt and the Sudan. The real stumbling block was, however, the desire of the King to retain for himself greater powers than the framers of the Constitution were willing to grant. All differences were, however, arranged before the end of April. The Constitutional Party as distinguished from the Absolutists gained practically every point contested, although certain concessions which had no real effect on the questions of principle were granted. By this instrument Egypt became a constitutional monarchy with a Government responsible to Parliament. The clauses regarding the Sudan that had been introduced into the draft constitution, to which the British

T

Government objected, were deleted, and the status of this country remained a subject for discussion between the two Governments. The settlement was hailed with general satisfaction and enthusiasm, and representatives of all parties hastened to express their congratulations. The only exception was that of the Wafd, Zaghloul Pasha's adherents, the party of intransigents to whom any settlement was abhorrent, but the effect of their objections was insignificant. This satisfactory result was, however, not attained without a further constitutional crisis. At the opening of the year the Government was in the hands of Tewfik Pasha Nessim, the mouthpiece of the autocratic policy of the Sultan, and at the same time the nominee of the Zaghloulist extremists. This Government fell in February. Considerable difficulty was encountered in forming a successor and a month passed before Yehia Pasha, a former Cabinet Minister but a non-party man, accepted office. Before this or any other Cabinet could be formed it was found necessary to secure the removal from the Sultan's service of Hassan Bey Nasha't, who had close relations with the Wafd and at the same time considerable influence at Court. During the interregnum the Wafd got into further trouble with the short lived British military Governorate at Cairo. The issue by them of a manifesto in the midst of the Cabinet crisis led to the warning of six leaders, the arrest of other prominent agitators, and the closing of Zaghloul's house which was their headquarters. The arrests led to some minor demonstrations which were, however, of little consequence. But shortly afterwards there was a renewal of bomb throwing, within one week three bombs being thrown at parties of British soldiers. The six Wafd leaders who had been warned were thereupon arrested. This event marked the end of the period of political crime and stringency in Egyptian affairs.

A new Constitutional Government was formed. Zaghloul Pasha was released on grounds of ill-health within ten days; the military governorship of Cairo was suppressed; the Constitution was adopted; the imprisoned and deported members of the Wafd were released. Finally, at the beginning of July, British Martial Law under which Egypt had been controlled since the beginning of November, 1914, was withdrawn, an indemnity act being adopted simultaneously.

Zaghloul did not return to Egypt until the middle of September. His reception was hearty but fell far short of that of two years earlier. It seemed that recent events had diminished his influence, and now that the Egyptians had the responsibility for their own government they had less attention to give to political extremists. Zaghloul seems to have attributed his reception to the moderation or at any rate quietness that he had recently displayed, and within a few days of his arrival in Egypt he returned to his earlier practice of violent denunciations. Even before Zaghloul's return the Government found it neces

sary to warn some of his followers of the probable consequences if they continued their violent fulminations. The target of Zaghloul's attacks were the Constitution and the British Government. The grant of independence he denounced as a sham, a cover for some nefarious British design. These outbursts took place during the election campaign in the first stage of which the Zaghloulists gained a signal victory, 90 per cent. of the secondary electors returned being supporters of that statesman. A very large proportion of the voters, however, abstained from voting altogether. The final stage of the elections was not concluded before the end of the year, but it is probable that when they take place Zaghloul Pasha and his party will be in control of the Parliament.

CHAPTER X.

AMERICA: THE UNITED STATES-CANADA-ARGENTINA-BRAZIL— CENTRAL AMERICA-CHILE-COLOMBIA-CUBA-MEXICO-PERU

-URUGUAY-OTHER REPUBLICS.

THE UNITED STATES.

SOCIAL phenomena were decidedly ebullient in the United States during 1923, and political affairs were rather on the sluggish side. While news of the 1918 Armistice had unquestionably penetrated, by 1923, into every section of the country, that very considerable potential energy which the Allies had desperately drawn into the World War, continued to explode from time to time into kinetic energy. The year opened, for example, with a big parade of American Legion veterans in Los Angeles, carrying through the streets before the local opera house banners reading: "We Are Not Unreasonable, Only Patriotic: Gadski Shall Not Sing_To-night," and "Real American Money For Real American People: Gadski Shall Not Sing. The prima

donna, although not unaccustomed herself to moments of heady wilfulness, was apparently dumbfounded at this outburst and readily agreed not to sing, out of respect for the nationalism which she had unwittingly evoked. Farther north, the Pacific University near Portland, Oregon, launched a "campaign" to raise 50,000 dollars for an "American Legion Chair of American History and Patriotism," while throughout the East various State legislatures devoted themselves to the promotion of Bills for combing out of the schools all history text-books which failed to give an adequate account of American motives and American achievements. A typical Bill was the one introduced into the New York legislature, barring from the schools every text-book that "ignores, omits, discounts or in any manner belittles, ridicules, falsifies, distorts, questions, doubts or denies the events

leading up to the Declaration of American Independence or connected with the American Revolution." This measure failed to pass chiefly because the State educational authorities insisted that they themselves could be safely trusted with the character of the text-books used and that such a sweeping prohibition as the one proposed would raise endless controversies. Still, the Bill was, broadly, in harmony with the excessive nationalism which had been aroused by the Great War.

It says a good deal, therefore, for President Harding's personal hold on the country, that he was able, despite this tendency, to bring through to successful conclusion the negotiations for the funding of the British debt. This debt, according to the Secretary of the Treasury, amounted at the close of 1922 to 4,135,818,358 dollars for principal and 611,044,201 dollars for interest-a total of 4,746,862,559 dollars. It fell all too neatly into that old political category in America known as "twisting the lion's tail," but the President had surprisingly little trouble in convincing the country that the settlement reached was, in the language of the American Debt Funding Commission, "fair and just to both Governments" and that "its prompt adoption would be a most important contribution to international stability."

To appreciate the President's achievement in this matter, it should be remembered that Congress had passed a law in 1922 stipulating that the various war debts were to be funded, under the direction of a special Commission headed by the Secretary of the Treasury, with a maturity period limited to twenty-five years and an interest rate of 4 per cent. The agreement finally reached provided for the issue by the British Government to the American Government of bonds covering the full amount and running for sixty-two years; the interest for the first ten years was to be 3 per cent., and for the remainder of that period 3 per cent. [see Public Documents in this Volume]. These negotiations which occupied some three weeks beginning January 9, 1923-took place in Washington; those participating were the five members of the American Debt Funding Commission and, for the British, Mr. Baldwin (then Chancellor of the Exchequer) and Mr. Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England. At the conclusion Mr. Harding sent a special message to Congress pressing for the ratification of the agreement which had been reached. He said: "This settlement means far more than the mere funding and ultimate discharge of the largest international loan ever contracted. It is a recommitment of the English-speaking world to the validity of contract; it is, in effect, a plight against war and war expenditures. . . . The failure of the British to keep their pledge would have spread political and economic discouragement throughout the world, and general repudiation would have likely followed in its wake. But here is kept faith-willingly kept, be it recorded—and a covenant of peace as effective as if joint British

and American opposition to war were expressly agreed upon. It is a covenant of peace and recuperation, of respect and cooperation."

That the settlement greatly enhanced British prestige throughout the United States-and throughout the world-is beyond dispute. The American Press reflected general agreement that the British Government had demonstrated its solvency and good faith-in marked contrast with others. For the most part the American public was quite unaware of the severe criticism of the settlement voiced by certain English newspapers; in the States it was popularly considered a fair "fiftyfifty" settlement. It passed the House of Representatives on February 9 by a vote of 291 to 44, and the Senate on February 16 by a vote of 70 to 13. After the House had agreed on February 22 to certain small amendments inserted by the Senate, the Bill was signed by President Harding on February 28. It was to be, as things turned out, the only solid achievement of the year for the administration.

Throughout the year there was something like a running debate between those who wished the country to cancel all the war debts and those who wished the Government to press the other Allies, notably France, for some sort of settlement.1 One group argued that the debts were in any event uncollectable, that their payment to the United States would be economically disastrous, and that to continue to insist upon payment was to prolong and worsen the European debacle and prevent the economic recovery of the whole world. This view captured the American Bankers' Association at their annual meeting in the summer; its new President, Walter N. Head of Omaha, began at once a movement to have the member banks educate their respective communities as to the merits of a cancellation policy "in exchange for a guarantee of peace in Europe." On the other hand, most of the senators and congressmen who spent their summer holidays in Europe came back rather anti-French and more or less determined to make France "pay up" or suffer such consequences in loss of financial prestige and fiscal stability as might follow. At the close of the year 1923 this policy, rather than that of cancellation, seemed the stronger and the more likely to dominate.

On the whole, the drift away from Europe continued steadily

1 According to the report made to Congress by the American Debt Funding Commission, October 20, 1922, France owed the United States at that time 3,917,326,000 dollars and Italy 1,973,880,000 dollars. Neither France, Italy, Belgium, nor Estonia had proposed any payments; Czechoslovakia had agreed on the amount but had made no payments; Hungary had promised full payments; negotiations were then under way with Latvia, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. The Commission said it had not, for various reasons, been in touch with Armenia, Austria, Greece, Liberia, Nicaragua, or the Russian States. Payment by Austria of principal and interest amounting to 27,664,065 dollars, had been, by Act of Congress, postponed for twenty years from April 6, 1922. Cuba had liquidated her war debt to the United States in full, while Great Britain and Finland, alone of the European Allies, had arranged a settlement or were about to,