Exch. of Pleas, that the time had not been properly enlarged, the en 1835. BENWELL v. HINXMAN, largement on the 30th of May not having been confirmed by the Court or a Baron, and the orders of Mr. Baron Bolland were not indorsed by the arbitrator. He cited Mason v. Wallis (a). [Parke, B.-In that case no judge's order was obtained by consent, which makes all the difference. The consent of the parties to the enlargement of the time by the orders amounted to a fresh agreement. They might have agreed to another order of reference, and this is the same in effect.] Secondly, there are two objections on the face of the award :-first, the award is not final. The arbitrator imposes a condition on the defendants. He finds that a sum of money is due and owing to the plaintiffs, and directs that it shall be paid on or before a parti cular day, and if it be paid by that day, all proceedings are to cease. He has thus made the payment on that day conditional to the termination of the proceedings, which renders the award not final. [Parke, B.-The arbitrator finds a sum to be due from the defendant, and directs it to be paid on or before a particular day. If he had stopped there, there would have been an end of the question by determining the sum due. The only question then is, was the latter part of the sentence intended to add any quali fication? Looking to the whole of the context, it is clear that the arbitrator did not intend that his award should be conditional on the money being paid on the particular day. I think there is no doubt that the award is final.] Then, secondly, the arbitrator has exceeded his authority in giving day of payment to the 20th of January, and has thereby rendered the whole of the award invalid. PARKE, B.-There is no doubt that the arbitrator had no authority to give day of payment. So far he has ex (a) 10 B. & Cr. 107; 5 Man. & Ry. 85. ceeded his authority, and so far the award is invalid, but Exch. of Pleas, it is valid for the rest. 1835. BENWELL HINXMAN. Rule refused. BOLLAND, B., and GURNEY, B., concurred. PRICE v. DAY. IN this case Channell applied for a rule to shew cause why the defendant should not be discharged out of custody, and a bail-bond given by the defendant on a former arrest should not be delivered up to be cancelled, on the ground of irregularity in the arrest. It appeared, from the affidavits in support of the application, that the defendant had been first arrested on the The 24th of January; but the defendant's attorney having given the plaintiff's attorney notice that there was an irregularity in the proceedings, the plaintiff discontinued the action, and taxed and paid the defendant his costs. plaintiff afterwards sued out a fresh writ, upon which the defendant was arrested. It appeared that on the execution of the first writ, the defendant's attorney had given the sheriff an undertaking to procure a bail-bond; and the sheriff, having had no notice of the discontinuance of the first action, said he was bound to detain the defendant on both writs. Channell, in support of the application, submitted that there had been in this case a double arrest, because it was the duty of the plaintiff A party having been arrested, his attorney discovered an irregularity in the proceedings, and gave the plaintiff notice of it, where upon he disco tinued the action, and the defendant's cordingly taxed and paid. The plaintiff after costs were ac wards sued out upon which the a second writ, defendant was arrested. On the exec the execution of the first writ, the defendant's attorney gave the sheriff an undertaking to procure a bail bond, and the had no notice from the plaintiff of the dis sheriff having continuance, said he must detain the defendant on both writs. On a motion to discharge the defendant out of custody :— Held, that it was unnecessary to give the sheriff notice of the discontinuance; and it not appearing that the defendant had sustained any damage, the Court refused the application. Exch. of Pleas, to have instructed the sheriff that the first action had 1835. PRICE บ. DAY. been discontinued, in order that the sheriff might give up the undertaking. The plaintiff having omitted to do so, the sheriff now detains the defendant on both writs; and when he was arrested on the second writ, he was constructively in the sheriff's custody on the first writ. PARKE, B.-You mean to contend that the first action was not properly discontinued until the sheriff had notice of the discontinuance. We have inquired from the officers of the Court, and we find that that is unnecessary. If you had shewn that you had sustained any inconvenience resulting from the supposed continuance of the first writ, the Court might have relieved you: but we think you have not shewn that you have sustained any damage. The rest of the Court concurred. END OF HILARY TERM. Rule refused. AN INDEX TO THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. Se PLEADING. ACCOUNT STATED. 1. The assignees of an insolvent 2. A bill of indictment for a nui- ACCOUNT STATED. an agreement was come to, and the See BILLS AND NOTES, 1, 2, 3, 4. 1. Semble, that the proprietor of a newspaper, convicted and fined for the publication of a libel in the paper, inserted without his knowledge and consent by the editor, cannot recover against the editor the damages sustained by such conviction. Colburn v. Patmore, 73 2. A local turnpike act enacted that all monies, &c. should be vested in the trustees, to be applied in the order and manner following:-First, in paying costs, charges, &c. in obtaining the act, &c. &c.; in the second place, in defraying the expenses of erecting or providing turnpikes, tollhouses, and other buildings, and repairing the same, and of erecting and making necessary and convenient bridges, &c., and of repairing the road, &c., and otherwise executing the purposes, &c., of the act; and, lastly, in paying the interest and reducing the principal of the money subscribed, &c. &c. In 1823, the plaintiff contracted with the trustees to build a toll-house, which he accordingly completed in 1824. In 1829, the trustees had a meeting, and verbally ordered that money should be raised, and the tradesmen paid-Held, that the right of action accrued when the work was done, and not when the trustees were in funds; and that the Statute of Limitations was a bar, notwithstanding the order in 1829. Emery v. Day, 245 ACTION ON THE CASE. Where not maintainable. 1. A. being indebted to B., B. sued out bailable process, which he de livered to the sheriff to execute, and the sheriff arrested A. whilst he was attending a trial as a witness under a subpoena:-Held, that an action on the case was not maintainable by A. against B. for procuring A. to be illegally arrested, it not being shewn that B. had any knowledge that A. was attending as a witness when he delivered the writ to the sheriff to be executed. Stokes v. White, 223 2. A defendant's attorney requested a plaintiff's attorney to forbear charging the defendant in execution until next term, and falsely represented to the plaintiff's attorney that he bad the authority of the defendant to consent that he should not be charged in execution until the next term; and the defendant's attorney gave a consent in writing to that effect, which omitted to state that the proceedings were stayed at the request of the defendant, according to the rule Hil. 26 & 27 Geo. 3. The plaintiff's attorney forbore to charge the defendant in execution until the next term, and the defendant was discharged for want of having been so charged, on the ground that the consent did not state that the proceedings were stayed at the request of the defendant. In an action brought by the plaintiff against the defendant's attorney for the false representation, as having occasioned the damage:Held, that the action was not maintainable. Hewitt v. Melton, 232 |