Statement of case.

which they considered that the corporation they were about to form should operate. (Laws of 1881, chap. 485; Van Denburgh v. Village of Greenbush, 68 N. Y. 1, 4.) The demand. upon the city through the comptroller is sufficient if any demand was, in fact, essential before instituting proceedings. (In re S. R. T. Co., 16 Abb. N. C. 158; Bunge v. Koope, 48 N. Y. 228.) The supplementary act of 1881 was a distinct recognition and ratification of the existence and organization of the corporation of the Metropolitan Transit Company. (In re N. Y., L. & W. R. R. Co., 99 N. Y. 18.) The power given by the act incorporating petitioner to construct and operate an elevated railroad in New York city removes the matter from the exercise of any discretion by the court. (N. Y. C. Co. v. Mayor, etc., 104 N. Y. 1; In re P. P. & C. I. R. R. Co., 67 id. 371-376.) It is immaterial whether the board of engineers located a portion of any route in parts of streets not authorized by law, or in streets occupied by the Manhattan Elevated. (In re Kings Co., 105 N. Y. 98; People v. N. Y. R. R. Co., 45 Barb. 573; Waterbury v. D. D. Co., Id. 388.)

George Hoadley and Albert Reynaud for appellant. A corporation does not lose its life by any wrong-doing, or nondoing, until judicially deprived of it by proceedings therefor. (Day v. O. R. R. Co., 107 N. Y. 129; In re N. Y. El. R. R. Co., 70 id. 337-338; In re Kings Co. El. R. R. Co., 105 id. 119; Denike v. N. Y. Cement Co., 80 id. 599; In re Steam Transit Co., 78 id. 529; People v. Walker, 17 id. 502; People v.. Manhattan, 9 Wend. 380; Bk. of Niagara v. Johnson, 8 id. 654; B. & A. R. R. Co. v. Carey, 26 id. 75; In re B. W. & N. R. R. Co., 72 id. 245; B. S. T. Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 78 id. 524; L. G. R. R. Co. v. Rainey, 7 Cold. [Tenn.] 432; State v. F. N. II. T. Co. 15 N. H. 165; Bk. of Gallipolis v. Trimble, 6 B. Mon. [Ky.] 601; Grand Gulf Bk. v. Archer, 8 S. & M. [Miss.] 151; Pearce v. Olney, 20 Conn 557; Receivers v. Renick, 15 Ohio, 322; Boston Glass Co. v. Langdon, 24 Pick. 52; Comm. v. U. F.

Statement of case.

Ins. Co., 5 Mass. 230; Baker v. Backus, 32 Ill. 79; Atchafalaya Bk. v. Dawson, 13 La. 497; Cahill v. Kalamazoo Ins. Co., 2 Day [Mich.] 124; N. J. S. R. R. Co. v. L. B. Co., 39 N. J. L. 35; Day v. Stetson, 8 Me. 372; C. C. Co. v. R. R. Co., 4 Gill. & J. 1; Bk. of Missouri v. Merchants Bk., 10 Mo. 123; Gilman v. Greenpoint Sugar Co., 4 Lans. 482; Trustees Vermont Soc. v. Hills, 6 Cow. 23; Kishacoquillas v. McConaby, 16 S. & R. [Pa.] 140; Mackall v. C. C. Co., 94 U. S. 308; Robinson v. London Hospital, 21 Eng. L. & E. 371; V. R. R. Co. v. V. R. R. Co., 34 Vt. 32; C. R. R. Co. v. Bailey, 24 id. 465; State v. Fagin, 22 La. Ann. 545; Crump v. U. S. Co., 7 Gratt. 352; Chester Glass Co. v. Dewey, 16 Mass. 102; Whipple v. Christian, 80 N Y. 526; In re Curser, 89 id. 401; In re D. & H. C. Co., 69 id. 209; Vandenburg v. Village of Greenbush, 66 id. 1; People v. Palmer, 52 id. 83; In re Central Park, 50 id. 493; Village of Gloversville v. Howell, 70 id. 287; People v. Quigg, 59 id. 83; In re Evergreens, 47 id. 216; Baird v. Mayor, etc., 95 N. Y. 567; Ex. Pet. Co. v. Lacey, 63 id. 426; Dewey v. Central Mfg. Co., 42 Mich. 399; Isham v. Bennington Co., 19 Vt. 230; Nichols v. Bertram, 3 Pick. 342; Felt v. Felt, 19 Wis. 193; State v. Goetz, 32 id. 363.) The recognition and reaffirmation of the company's rights in the act of 1881 was a waiver of any cause of forfeiture. (In re N. Y. El. R. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 338; People v. Manhattan Co., 9 Wend. 398; People v. F. P. R., 27 Barb. 460; C. C. R. R. Co. v. Twenty-third St. R. R. Co., 54 How. Pr. 186; People v. Phanix Bk., 24 Wend. 431; State v. F. N. H. T. Co., 15 N. H. 162; Atty.-Gen. v. P. R. R. Co., 16 id. 470; C. C. Co. v. B. R. R. Co., 4 G. & J. 127; Atchafalaya Bk. v. Dawson, 13 La. 497; Lumpkin v. Jones, 1 Ga. 30; Commonwealth v. U. Ins. Co., 5 Mass. 30; L. G. R. Co. v. Rainey, 7 Cold. [Tenn.] 420; State v. N. O. Gas Co., 2 Rob. 529; People v. Oakland Bk., 1 Doug. [Mich.] 282; Atty.-Gen. v. D. R. R. Co., 27 N. J. Eq. 1; Atty.-Gen. v. Eastlake, 11 Hare, 228; Atty.-Gen. v. Christ's Hospital, 3 M.

Statement of case.

& K. 344; Atty.-Gen. v. Beverly, 6 De G. & M. 268; Strong v. Stebbins, 5 Cow. 210; Myers v. Foster, 6 id. 569; Harris v. White, 81 N. Y. 544; In re Kings Co. El. R. R. Co., 105 id. 99; Standen v. Univ. of Oxford, W. Jones. 17; McFarland v. State Bank, 4 Ark. 410; Felt v. Felt, 19 Wis. 193; Bishop on Written Laws, 126; Hawkins v. Mayor, etc., 64 N. Y. 18; In re Curser, 89 id. 401; State v. Bacon Co., 41 Mo. 453; Bishop on Written Laws, 152-156; Thames v. Hall, 3 C. P. 415; Gregory's Case, 6 Co. 19; Ex parte Smith, 40 Cal. 914; Rounds v. Waymart, 31 Smith [Penn.] 395; Brown v. Comrs., 9 Harris [Penn.] 37; Covington v. E. St. Louis, 75 Ill. 548; M. R. R. Co. v. State, 20 Ala. 573; Beriden v. Barbin, 13 La. Ann. 498; Ellis v. Batts, 26 Tex. 703; Luke v. State, 5 Fla. 185; 44 Conn. 105.) The act of 1881 was constitutional. (In re N. Y. E. R. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 338; In re Gilbert El. R. R. Co., Id. 369; People v. B. F., etc., R. R. Co., 89 id. 86; Gilbert El. R. R. Co. v. Anderson, 3 Abb. N. C. 455; In re Kings County El. R. R. Co., 105 N. Y. 99.) If the board's first act should be deemed incomplete and ineffectual, the legislature had a clear right to direct its completion. (Palmer v. Yates, 3 Sandf. 151; Delafield v. Ill., 26 Wend. 26; McLean v. Drew, 4 Bing. 722; Williams v. Town of Duanesburg, 66 N. Y. 137; People v. Mitchell, 35 id. 551; Town of Duanesburg v. Jenkins, 57 id. 177; Rogers v. Stevens, 86 id. 625.) The function of the board was purely administrative, and a grant of fresh power was simply one of administration; and if the administration authorized was purely of a right previously existing, it was clearly no grant whatsoever of a new and original right to lay tracks. (In re N. Y. El. R. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 338, 343; Gilbert El. R. R. Co. v. Anderson, 3 Abb. N. C. 454.) Every presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature. Every intendment is in favor of its validity, and every doubt must be solved to sustain it. To doubt is to affirm it. (In re Gilbert E. R. R. Co., 70 N. Y. SICKELS-VOL. LXVI.

75

Statement of case.

367; People v. Briggs, 50 id. 553; People v. Supervisors, 17 id. 235; Weismer v. Village of Douglas, 64 id. 91; People v. Kelly, 76 id. 489; People v. Comstock, 78 id. 361; Kerrigan v. Force, 68 id. 385.) The board's action in laying out the routes was competent and within its powers. (McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 601; People v. Suprs. of Greene Co., 13 Abb. N. C. 421.)

Elihu Root and Thomas P. Wickes for respondent. When an order is such that it may be denied by the lower court solely in the exercise of its discretion, this court will not review its determination, unless it appears in the order itself that the decision in the court below was, in fact, not based upon the exercise of that discretion. (Clarke v Lourie, 82 N. Y. 508; Brooks v. M. N. C. & Co., 93 id. 647; Fisher v. Gould, 81 id. 228; Nat. Park Bk. v. Whitmore, 104 id. 297; F. L. & T. Co. v. B. & M. Tel. Co., 109 id. 344; In re Kings Co. El. R. R. Co., 105 id. 106; N. Y. Cable Co. v. Mayor, etc., 104 id. 13.) When a charter is given to a corporation to lay its tracks over a certain route, an attempt to lay its tracks over any other route is unauthorized and void. (People v. II. R. R. R. Co., 2 Abb. Pr. [N. S.] 249; Negus v. City of Brooklyn, 10 Abb. N. C. 180; People v N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 26 How. Pr. 44; C. D. & V. R. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 9 W. Rep. 493; Comm. v. E. R. R. Co., 27 Penn. St. 339; 67 Am. Dec. 471; Dist. of Col. v. B. & P. R. R. Co., 114 U. S. 453; Mayor, etc., v. Broadway R. R. Co., 97 N. Y. 281; D. & H. C. Co. v. N. Y. E. R. R. Co., 9 Paige, 323; Mason v. B. C. & N. R. R. Co., 35 Barb. 373, 381.) The petitioner's right to exercise its corporate powers has wholly ceased by reason of non-use and delay. (In re B. W. & N. R. R. Co., 72 N. Y. 245; In re Kings Co. El. R. R. Co., 105 id. 97.) The Metropolitan Transit Company has no power to make the present application, nor has this court the power to grant the same, for the reason that chapter 636 of the Laws of 1881 is violative of section 18 of article 3 of the Constitution of the state of New

Statement of case.

York. (In re B W. & N. R. R. Co., 75 N. Y. 335; Farnham v. Benedict, 107 id. 177; In re N. Y. D. R. Co., 42 Hun, 621; 11 St. Rep. 753.) Chapter 636 of the Laws of 1881, under which the petitioner claims in part to be organized, and under which it claims to have duly taken certain proceedings in pursuance of the power and authority alleged to have been conferred upon it by said act, is violative of section 16 of article 3 of the Constitution of the state of New York. (People ex rel. McConville v. Hills, 35 N. Y. 499; Gaskin v. Meek, 42 id. 186; People v. Suprs. of Chautauqua, 43 id. 10; Huber v. People, 49 id. 132; In re Assessments, etc., 60 id. 398; City of Watertown v. Fairbanks, 65 id. 588; In re El. R. R. Co., 70 id. 327; In re Sackett St., 74 id. 95; In re Blodgett, 89 id. 392; In re Paul, 94 id. 497; Tingue v. Vil. of Port Chester, 101 id. 294.) The act of 1881 could not, under the constitutional amendments of 1875, confer upon the engineers any new power to locate a railroad in a street. (B. W. & N. Case, 75 N. Y. 335; Farnham v. Benedict, 107 id. 159.) The Transit Company had not, under the act of 1872 or under the statutes of the state, power to take the streets under the general laws of the state. (Lahr v. Met. El. R. R. Co., 104 N. Y. 268; Mills on Eminent Domain [2d ed., 1888] $46; In re Buffalo, 68 N. Y. 167–171; P. P. & C. I. R. R. Co. v. Williamson, 91 id. 552-561; Ex parte Manhattan Co., 22 Wend. 633; Mayor, etc., v. B., etc., R. R. Co., 97 N. Y. 275; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659–666; Charles River Bridge Case, 11 Pet. 496, 504, 505.) Because the Transit Company does not intend in good faith to build its main line, it has no right to use the streets of the city for its so-called branches. (People v. A. & V. R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 261, 267; Laws of 1850, chap. 140, § 14; Cable Co. v. Mayor, etc, 104 N. Y. 1; Goelet v. Met. Transit Co., 48 Hun, 520; Works v. J. R. R. Co., 5 McLean, 425, 431.) The board of engineers created by section 4 of the act of 1872, had no power delegated to them to appropriate any streets of the city of New York for the branches which they were authorized to locate. (Laws of 1850, chap. 224; Laws of 1872, chap. 834: 2 id.