The Lord Chief Justice, on the 24th ult., presided over a meeting of the Judges of the Queen's Bench Division in his private room at the Law Courts, when nearly all the judges were in attendance. Among the business transacted was the selection of the election petition judges for the next twelve months, the appointment of judges for the winter circuits, and the settling of the rota of judges. The meeting, which was a strictly private one. lasted nearly two hours. Probate and matrimonial causes set down for trial will be taken as under: undefended matrimonial causes, after motions on each Monday during the sittings; special jury causes begun on Tuesday will be continued until Saturday, Nov. 23; common jury causes, Tuesday, Nov. 26, to Saturday, Dec. 7, inclusive; probate and defended matrimonial causes for hearing before the court itself on Dec. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21. "Silk and Stuff" in the Pall Mall Gazette furnishes the following comparative table of causes in the courts : Queen's Bench Chancery Probate and Divorce Divisional Courts Appeal Courts 120 119 2127 1651 1585 Grand total (as given by one authority) Ten years have elapsed since the Lovat peerage case, which attracted so much attention both in England and Scotland, was concluded by report of the House of Lords adverse to Mr. John Fraser of Carnarvon, who claims to be entitled to the Lovat estates, with the rent-roll of £40,000 a year. Mr. Fraser, it is said, is now in possession of additional evidence which is deemed by his legal advisers to be of the most important character, and a petition is about to be presented with a view of obtaining a rehearing of the claim in the House of Lords. A committee has been formed for the purpose of presenting a testimonial to Col. Cecil Russell, in recognition, by members of the Bar, of his long connection with the Inns of Court Rifle Volunteers. Col. Russell joined the corps on its formation in 1859, and he has held the command since April 1884, which post he resigned in June last. Among the committee formed in furtherance of this object are Lord Justice Kay, Mr. Justice Chitty, Mr. Justice Grantham, Mr. Justice Romer, Sir Edward Clarke, Q.C., Sir Robert Reid, Q.C., Sir Frank Lockwood, Q.C., and most of the leading Chancery Queen's Counsel. The Attorney-General (Sir Richard Webster) is chairman of the committee. The Birmingham Daily Post is informed that the Official Receiver, in accordance with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, has furnished the Board of Trade with an exhaustive report dealing with the bankruptcy of Messrs. New, Prance, and Garrard, the firm of solicitors, at Evesham, who failed last year with liabilities approaching a quarter of a million, and with comparatively insignificant assets. The report, which dealt mainly with the bankrupts' conduct in relation to their business transactions, was laid by the Board of Trade before the Director of Public Prosecutions, who, having regard to the present state of the law, does not see his way to institute proceedings of a criminal nature. Miss Christabel Rose Coleridge, granddaughter of the poet, tells in the Sunday Magazine an amusing story about the late Lord Chief Justice, which has the merit of being perfectly true. One day a paterfamilias was showing his son round Westminster Abbey. They had got to Poets' Corner, and the boy was gazing at S. T. C.'s bust. "Father," he exclaimed, after looking at it for some time, "who was Coleridge?" It was a puzzling question, and the father stroked his chin with his thumb and first finger two or three times in deep thought. At length, ashamed, as it were, of his own forgetfulness, he replied, "Coleridge. Ah, yes: Coleridge, my boy, he was a judge! At the meeting of the London County Council on Oct. 25 the committee reported that there had been nineteen applications for licences for stage plays, and 243 for music and dancing. Before the Council proceeded to deal with the applications Mr. Charles Ford (solicitor) raised a preliminary question as to what was being done to procure power to administer the oath to witnesses, also why there was no uniformity in the recommendations as to promenades and the sale of drink in auditoriums, and why the shorthand notes of all the cases before the committee had not been printed. Mr. Fardell, on behalf of the committee, said he entirely agreed that there should be power to administer oaths, and had done all he could to procure an amendment of the law in that direction. The Joint Finance and Officers and Clerks Committees of the Corporation have recently considered an application by Mr. H. Homewood Crawford, the City Solicitor, for a review of the duties and emoluments of his office. Mr. Crawford was elected in 1885, on the death of Sir Thomas Nelson, at a salary of £1500, which was increased to £2000 in 1889, on the understanding that it included all emoluments. His predecessor's salary was £2000, with other emoluments averaging close upon £600 a year. Reviewing the arduous and very responsible duties with which the City Solicitor has been intrusted since his salary was last under consideration, more especially in regard to the various important questions affecting the local government of the metropolis which have occupied public attention during the last few years, and bearing in mind the general increase which has taken place in the business of the solicitor's department, the committees are unanimously of opinion that the valuable service he has rendered and is rendering entitles him to a substantial addition to his official income. Having regard, therefore, to the conscientious, able, and assiduous manner in which he devotes himself to the business of his department, they unanimously recommend that his salary be increased from £2000 to £2500, to be the maximum salary of his office while in his tenure, and to include not merely the literal duties of his position, but every service the Corporation may require at his hands. On Thursday last week, according to custom on the first day of term, a special session of the Central Criminal Court was held at the Sessions-house, in the Old Bailey, for the purpose of fixing the dates of the sittings of the Court in the ensuing legal year. The judges present were Mr. Justice Grantham, Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams, Mr. Justice Bruce, and Mr. Justice Kennedy, and they were met by the Lord Mayor, Alderman Sir Stuart Knill, and Mr. Alderman Faudel Phillips. Mr. H. K. Avory, the clerk of the court, announced that the following days had been appointed for the commencement of the sessions for the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court, viz.: Nov. 18, Dec. 9, Jan. 13, 1896, Feb. 3, Feb. 24, March 23, April 20, May 18, June 22, July 20, Sept. 8, and Oct. 19. The special session was closed with the customary proclamation. In Mr. Justice Chitty's court on the first day of the sittings, notice of motion having been served for that day and no one appearing in court on behalf of the applicant, counsel for the respondent asked before motions were exhausted that the motion should be deemed to be abandoned, and be dismissed with costs. Mr. Justice Chitty said that the proper time for a respondent to ask for such an order was not before, but as soon as, the seal was closed. It had sometimes occurred that whilst the respondent was asking for the motion to be treated as abandoned the applicant had come into court and moved. In the present instance the motion, moreover, could be saved until the next motion day, the usual practice being that all motions could be saved until the motion day next after that mentioned in the notice of motion. At Liverpool, on Tuesday, Mr. Hopwood, Q.C., the Recorder, well known as favouring short sentences, said that in the march of time a brutality practised in the name of law had dropped, and the result had answered the expectations of those who advocated the change. A very remarkable reduction had been witnessed in the sentences of the quarter sessions and court of summary jurisdiction in Lancashire and Cheshire, and also of the assizes. Yet the foundations of society remained unimpaired. Much more might be done. The care of every judge or justice should be how it might be possible to keep an offender from going to prison at all, and not how long he should be kept there. About ferocious ruffians there was little difficulty in deciding, though violence and ferocity should not be paralleled in the sentence; but as to everyday offences of pilfering and stealing, which were often the result of wretched poverty, hunger, and misery, it was a disgrace to society that the punishment of these should furnish the vast majority of convicts with the cruellest of sentences. At the autumn meeting of the National Temperance Federation at Manchester, on Wednesday week, under the presidency of Mr. W. S. Caine, the following memorial, addressed to the Home Secretary, was adopted :"That your memorialists regard the Inebriates Acts of 1879 and 1888 as utterly inadequate, and consider that no measure which deals simply with the treatment, accommodation, or punishment of habitual drunkards, and which ignores the responsibility of those who sell them intoxicants, can prove effectual, or deserves to be considered statesmanlike. Your memorialists are confirmed in this opinion by the success which has attended the prohibition of habitual drunkards being served in the Colonies, and by the recommendation of the Scotch Committee on Inebriates that such a prohibition should be enacted in this kingdom. Your memorialists therefore pray that you will use your influence to secure the introduction of a clause in any Bill dealing with the treatment of inebriates which shall prohibit licensed persons under suitable penalties from harbouring or serving them after receipt of descriptive police notices." Thursday last week being the first day of Michaelmas Sittings, a service, which has now become almost an institution amongst Catholic members of both branches of the Profession, was held at the old church of Saints Anselm and Cecilia. There was a large attendance, and the Votive Mass, at which the Rev. Father Fitzgerald officiated, was interspersed with good music. Mr. H. H. Lawless began the service with Behrend's violin solo "Andante Religioso." Mr. J. H. Callan followed with Mozart's "Ave Verum" in splendid tenor voice, and the choir sang a Veni Creator. During the collection Mr. Callan sang Gounod's "Ave Maria" to an organ and violin obligato by Mr. C. W. Le Jeune and Mr. Lawless. The service was continued by the solo "O Salutaris" by Weiss, in which Mr. F. Hague's strong bass voice showed at its best. Mr. Lawless played another solo (by B. Tours), and whilst the congregation, which included many notable lawyers, were leaving the church, the organist, Mr. C. W. Le Jeune, performed the grand and spirited processional by Batiste on the fine old organ. The prizes gained by the students of the Metropolitan School of Shorthand during the past year in the various examinations of the Society of Arts, the London Phonetic Writers' Association, and the verbatim reporting competition of the school were distributed on Tuesday evening by Sir Richard Webster. Mr. J. R. Diggle presided. Speaking of the importance of a knowledge of shorthand amongst the modern acquirements of a commercial or professional man, Sir Richard Webster said that the late Solicitor-General, Sir Edward Clarke, and his present colleague, Sir Robert Finlay, found that the knowledge of shorthand which they possessed gave them great assistance in the conduct of their cases, and he greatly regretted that in his youth the importance of acquiring such a knowledge had not been impressed upon him with such force as to induce him to learn and practise the art. The service which shorthand was the means of rendering to the whole legal procedure of the country could not be over-rated, and in the preservation of the priceless oratory of statesmen and in other departments of life its benefits were incalculable. The Inns of Court Michaelmas Law Term begins this year on a Saturday, i.e., to-day. Some comment has been made and overheard about beginning a term on the last day of the week. As a matter of fact, the beginning and the ending of the law terms are clearly fixed by statute, and the authorities of the various Inns have no option in the matter. By 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 70, amended by 1 Will. 4, c. 3, the terms are settled as follows: There is nothing to prevent any term beginning on a Sunday, but a term must not end on a Sunday; when what would otherwise be the last day is a Sunday the concluding day is the following Monday. With this reservation, Hilary Term begins the 11th Jan. and ends the 31st Jan.; Michaelmas Term begins the 2nd Nov. and ends the 25th Nov. Easter Term begins the 15th April and ands the 8th May; but if this term contains one or more of the following daysGood Friday, its Saturday, Easter Monday, Easter Tuesday-then for each such day one day of business (skipping Sunday) shall be added on to and shall form part of the term, beginning to count those days of busiuess from the 8th May exclusive. Trinity Term begins the 22nd May and ends the 12th June; but when Easter Term is prolonged, as above, then the beginning and the ending of Trinity Term are deferred for an equal number of days of business. That is the sum and substance of the statutory regulations, but if the Inns of Court, or any individual Inn, choose to neglect these rigid prescriptions, there does not seem to be any penalty for such irregularity. As a rule, however, the "dinner-eating bred barrister clings closely to the ancient traditions and customs of his hospitium. Lord Macnaghten was presented on Tuesday evening with the honorary freedom of the borough of Portsmouth, in recognition of his services as honorary arbitrator in winding-up the affairs of the Portsea Island Building Society. The Mayor (Alderman Thomas King) presided over a full attendance of the council and the public. He was supported by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Morris, and the members of Parliament for the borough and South Hants. The Mayor, in presenting Lord Macnaghten with a copy of the resolution conveying the freedom, inclosed in a casket of handsome design, said that since the failure of the society in December 1891, with liabilities exceeding £800,000 and assets £435,000, Lord Macnaghten had undertaken the arbitration on the one condition that he was not to receive any fee for what he did. The result had been that one dividend of 2s. and three of 18. had been paid, while another one was due in December. Lord Macnaghten, in returning thanks, said there was not one of his colleagues who would not have done as much as he had been able to do, and probably more, for the sufferers by the failure of the society. A vote of thanks to the Load Chancellor for his presence was briefly acknowledged. Subsequently the Mayor entertained the chief guests and members of the council at a banquet. Among those present were the Parliamentary counsel for the building society, Mr. Pembroke Stephens, Q.C. and Mr. Frederick Clifford, Q.C., the latter of whom drafted the Bill which was passed by the Duke of Richmond's Committee, and which afterwards became law, giving to Lord Macnaghten his very wide powers as arbitrator. The Lord Chancellor, in responding to the toast of "The Houses of Parliament," said, though there were two Houses, they constituted one Parliament, and what was the good of one Parliament unless it could provide extraordinary remedies for extraordinary calamities? The case of the Portsea Island Building Society was a striking instanee of what could be done in this direction. Mr. Swift MacNeill, Q.C., M.P., in a letter to the Daily Chronicle on the Ray Lankester case, says: "It may interest the public to be reminded that Sir A. Cockburn, who was for many years Chief Justice of England, had, when holding the great office of Attorney-General for England, a police experience very analogous to that of Mr. Ray Lankester, the scene being laid in Piccadilly. It is thus described by the late Mr. Serjeant Ballantine: Mr. Knox' (a police magistrate),' writes the Serjeant,' fully shared the opinion I have expressed as to the necessity of great caution in dealing with police testimony. I will now relate an amusing adventure of my own which bears upon the subject. One night late-it might be early morning-I was in Piccadilly, and, attracted by a gathering of people, I came upon a policeman struggling with a drunken powerful woman. She had either fallen or been thrown down, and he had fallen upon her. There were expressions of indignation being uttered by the persons around, and a row seemed imminent. I touched the officer lightly upon the shoulder, saying, "Why do you not spring your rattle ? You will hurt the woman.' He jumped up, and, seizing me by the collar, said, "I take you into custody for obstructing me in the execution of my duty." I remained perfectly passive, and in the meanwhile another constable had come up and seized the woman, whom he was handling very roughly. At this moment Sir Alexander Cockburn, who was returning from the House of Commous, appeared upon the scene, and seeing a woman, as he thought, ill-used, remonstrated in indignant language with the officer, upon which the constable who had hold of her stretched out his other arm-whether reaching Sir Alexander or not I could not see and said, "I arrest you also." "Arrest me! "exclaimed the astonished Attorney-General. "What for?" "Oh!" said my captor, "for many things. You are well known to the police." I cannot surmise what might have become of us. Possibly we should have spent the night in company with the very objectionable friend on whose behalf we had interfered. Some people, however, fortunately recognised us, and we were released. I took the numbers of the officers, and being determined to see the end of the affair, went next morning to the court where the charge ought to have been made, and heard that the woman had effected her escape, which, considering I had left her in charge of half a dozen officers, and that she was very drunk, was a remarkable feat of prowess. With the concurrence of Sir Alexander Cockburn I wrote a full account to Mr. Mayne (the head of the Metropolitan Police), and after a day or two received an answer from some subordinate, treating my letter with great coolness, and saying that if I had any complaint to make I might go before a magistrate. To this communication I replied by a private note to the Commissioner to the effect that I should select my own mode of venti lating the matter. A very courteous reply, promising thorough inquiry, resulted from this step. I never heard anything more about it, and, am sorry to say, was not patriotic enough to take any further trouble about the matter.' NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS NOT YET REPORTED. BY OUR REPORTERS IN THE SEVERAL COURTS. COURT OF APPEAL. Damages-Breach of Warranty-Remoteness of Damage-Injury to Third Person.-The plaintiffs, who were stevedores, undertook to discharge a cargo from a ship for the defendant, the shipowner. The defendant promised to provide all necessary and proper derricks, cranes, chains, winches, and other gearing, reasonably fit for the purpose of discharging the cargo. The defendant supplied a chain which was so defective that it broke whilst being used in discharging the cargo, whereby a workman in the employ of the plaintiffs was injured. The workman thereupon sued the plaintiffs under sects. 1 and 2 of the Employers' Liability Act 1880 (43 & 44 Vict. c. 42), basing his claim upon the defective condition of the chain which he alleged the plaintiffs could with reasonable care have discovered. The plaintiffs did not contest that action, and paid the workman £125. This action was brought by the plaintiffs against the defendant to recover that sum of £125 as damages for breach of his warranty. It was admitted that the settlement by the plaintiffs of the action brought by the workman was reasonable and proper; that the plaintiffs might by the exercise of reasonable care have discovered the defect in the chain; and that there had been a breach by the defendant of his warranty that the chain should be reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was supplied. At the trial before Charles, J., without a jury, the learned judge held that, "the damage done to the workman, for which he could recover from the plaintiffs only by showing want of care in them, might nevertheless be regarded as the natural consequence of the defendant's breach of contract; or, in other words, a consequence which might reasonably be supposed to have been within the contemplation of the parties; and he gave judgment for the plaintiffs for £125. The defendant appealed. Held (affirming the judgment of Charles, J.), that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover from the defendant, as damages for his breach of warranty, the amount which they had paid to their workman. : [Mowbray v. Merryweather. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Kay and Rigby, L.JJ. Oct. 29. Counsel for the appellant, Tindal Atkinson, Q.C. and H. Gawan Taylor; for the respondents, Robson, Q.C. and Meynell. Solicitors for the appellant, Turnbull, Tilly, and Co., for Turnbull and Tilly, West Hartlepool; for the respondents, Baker, Lees, and Postlethwaite, for Higson Simpson, West Hartlepool.] Metage on Grain (Port of London) Act 1872-Duty on Grain brought into Port of London-Brought "for Sale"-35 & 36 Vict. c. c. ss. 2 and 4.By the Metage on Grain (Port of London) Act 1872 it is provided that "the corporation may demand and receive in respect of all grain brought into the port of London 'for sale' a duty at the rate of threesixteenths of a penny per hundredweight" (sect. 4); and sect. 2 enacts that Grain' means corn, pulse, and seeds, except the following seeds when brought into the port of London in sacks or bags (that is to say), linseed, rape seed, millet seed, canary seed, cotton seed, poppy seed, teel seed, niger seed, ginghetty seed, and sesame seed." The plaintiff, as chamberlain of the corporation of London, sued the defendants for the amount of duty upon certain grain brought by them into the port of London. The action was brought in the Mayor's Court, and, by a special verdict, it was found that the defendants had brought the grain into the port of London; that part of it had been ground by them into meal and sold in that state; that the rest had been crushed and mixed with other ingredients and sold as horse food; and that the grain had been brought into the port of London for the purpose of being so dealt with. Upon those findings, judgment was entered for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal. Held (dismissing the appeal), that the grain had not been brought into the port of London "for sale" within the meaning of the statute, and that duty was not payable in respect thereof. [Cotton v. Vogan and Co. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Kay and Oct. 29.-Counsel: for the appellant, Sir E. Clarke, Rigby, L.JJ. Q.C. and Danckwerts; for the respondents, Joseph Walton, Q.C. and Gray. Solicitors: for the appellant, Henry Homewood Crawford; for the respondents, Wansey, Bowen, and Co.] Practice-Parties-Joinder of Defendants-Nuisance caused by Acts of two Persons-Order XVI., r. 4.-The plaintiff was a lessee of a shop, the premises on one side of which were used as a general receiving office for the Great Western Railway Company, and the premises on the other side as a similar office for the Midland Railway Company, and he commenced an action in the Queen's Bench Division, making both the companies defendants, and alleging that the defendant companies permitted a large number of vans to assemble on the highway in front of his premises, with their tailboards projecting over the footway, and great quantities of parcels, &c., to be conveyed across the footway to and from the vans and their respective premises, and that each of the defendant companies frequently caused or permitted access to the plaintiff's premises to be blocked by its vans and carts at the same time that access to such premises was blocked by vans and carts on the other side of his premises by the other defendant company in a similar manner, and that by their respective combined acts the defendants thus prevented all access to the plaintiff's premises by vehicle or cycle, and also caused special inconvenience and peril to the plaintiff and his servants and customers on the footway; and he claimed damages and an injunction. It was conceded that neither company was acting in combination with the other. Held (Rigby, L.J. dissenting), that the defendants were separate, and not joint tort-feasors; and, therefore, the plaintiff ought not to be allowed to sue them jointly. Decision of Day, J. affirmed. Smurthwaite v. Hannay (71 L. T. Rep. 157; (1894) A. C. 494) followed. Lambton v. Mellish (71 L. T. Rep. 385; (1894) 3 Ch. 163) and Thorpe v. Brumfitt (L. Rep. 8 Ch. App. 650) distinguished. [Sadler v. The Great Western Railway Company and the Midland Railway Company. Ct. of App.: Smith and Rigby, L.JJ. Oct. 25.— Counsel for the plaintiff, Dickens, Q.C. and Chester Jones; for the Great Western Railway Company, the Hon. A. Lyttleton. Solicitors: Kennedy, Hughes, and Kennedy; R. R. Nelson.] HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.-CHANCERY DIVISION. Charity Trust Deed-Scholarship-Refusal of Trustees to elect Candidate obtaining the highest Marks. A trust deed provided that the trustees should stand possessed of £1000 for the support of a scholarship in connection with a certain school, and subject to certain rules. One of the rules provided that on any avoidance of the scholarship (except as in the 8th rule mentioned), the scholarship should be awarded to the pupil leaving the school, and going to such college as provided by the rules, "who should pass the best examination in subjects to be determined upon from time to time by the examiner or examiners for the scholarship." The 8th rule contained provisions to the effect that, in case of a vacancy occurring by death or otherwise within the period of three years for which the elected pupil would normally hold the scholarship, then (under given circumstances) the next highest boy at the last examination "who was duly qualified to hold the scholarship should succeed thereto, but if there should be no such boy," other provisions were made. The plaintiff and another boy competed for the scholarship in 1894, and the plaintiff obtained the highest number of marks, and claimed the scholarship. The examiner reported that he was unable to detect any marked difference between the candidates, that neither candidate was deserving of quite so valuable a scholarship, and he suggested dividing it between them. Not having heen elected, the plaintiff brought an action for a declaration that he was entitled to the enjoyment of the scholarship, subject to performing the conditions contained in the trust deed. Held, that the action failed on the ground that no boy was entitled to the scholarship, unless the examiner considered he had passed a satisfactory examination in the subjects selected. [Rooke v. Dawson. Ch. Div.: Romer, J. Oct. 29.-Counsel: for the plaintiff, Hopkinson, Q.C. and Wurtzburg; for the defendants, Birrell, Q.C. and Micklem. Solicitors: for the plaintiff, Rooke and Sons; for the defendants, Pennington and Son.] Company-Alteration of Memorandum of Association-ConfirmationAdding Words to Resolution-Companies (Memorandum of Association) Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 62), s. 1 (5).—This was a petition by Spiers and Pond Limited for an order confirming a resolution which they had passed to alter their memorandum of association, by adding the words "to carry on general stores and to contract for the execution of work and the rendering of services of all kinds." The original memorandum of association enabled the company to acquire and carry on the business formerly carried on by Messrs. Spiers and Pond, to extend and modify it, and to carry on a number of businesses supposed to be ancillary to such a business. Sect. 1 (5) of the Companies (Memorandum of Association) Act 1890, under which the petition was presented, provides that "the court may confirm either wholly or in part any such alteration as aforesaid, with respect to the objects of the company, if it appears that the alteration is required in order to enable the company (among other things) to carry on some business or businesses which, under existing circumstances, may conveniently or advantageously be combined with the business of the company." There was evidence that the business of a general store could be advantageously carried on in combination with the businesses already carried on by the company. Held, that the proposed words standing by themselves would give the company much wider powers than were justified by the Act; but that, under the power given by the Act to confirm the resolution in part, the court had jurisdiction to add limiting words. The resolution was confirmed with the addition of the words "incidental thereto." [Re Spiers and Pond Limited. Ch. Div.: North, J. Oct. 26.— Counsel: Vernon Smith, Q.C. and Theobald. Solicitors: Linklater, Addison, and Co.] Practice-Administration-Real Estate-Apportionment of Costs.-C., by her will, specifically devised three freehold houses to trustees to the use that her sister might receive an annuity of £100 for her life, and, subject thereto, directed that the three houses should form part of her residuary estate. She devised her leasehold and the residue of her real estate upon trust for sale, and directed her trustees out of the proceeds of sale to pay her debts, funeral and testamentary expenses, and legacies, and if the proceeds of her real and leasehold property (except the three houses aforesaid) should be insufficient for that purpose, she directed that the deficiency should be payable out of her personal estate, and, after giving her personal property other than chattels real to trustees upon trust to pay certain charitable legacies, the testatrix gave all her residuary estate to her two trustees absolutely as tenants in common. The testatrix by a letter attempted to create a secret trust of the three houses in favour of a charity. The devise therefore failed. An action was brought for the administration of the testatrix's real and personal estate, and inquiries were directed who was her heir-at-law. The action now came on for further consideration, and the only question raised was whether the real estate should bear any part of the costs. Held, that the cases of Patching v. Barnett (45 L. T. Rep. 292; 51 L. J. 74, Ch.) and Re Middleton (46 L. T. Rep. 359; 19 Ch. Div. 552) establish a general rule that any increase of costs in an administration action caused by dealing with real estate must be borne by the real estate, and that the direction to pay testamentary expenses out of a particular fund did not take this case out of the general rule. [Re Copland; Mitchell v. Baine. Ch. Div.: North, J. Oct. 26.Counsel: Vernon Smith, Q.C. and Kenyon Parker; Ingle Joyce; Swinfen Eady, Q.C.; H. Greenwood; Boome; Dibdin. Solicitors: T. F. Adshead; Solicitor to the Treasury; R. H. Bentley; A. Slater; Clayton, Son, and Fargus.] Revenue-Probate Duty-Option to purchase Property given in Partnership Articles-Death of Owner of Property who was also Senior PartnerProperty purchased from Trustees of Will under New Contract between them and the surviving Partners-No Conversion at Death of Owner. -A father, who was about to enter into partnership with his two sons, demised the buildings and property, which was partly freehold and partly leasehold, in and upon which his business was carried on, to his two sons for a term of twenty-one years at a certain rent and subject to certain covenants; and the partnership articles contained a declaration that the sons were trustees of the lease for the firm, and also contained an option enabling the firm to purchase the buildings and property at a certain price to be exercised within six months from the death of the father. Subsequently a deed was executed between the father and sons, which altered the price fixed by the partnership articles, but, subject to that alteration, confirmed the option to purchase given by them. The father then died, leaving a will by which he provided that the period of six months within which the option to purchase given by the articles must have been exercised, should be extended to three years. The firm did not exercise the option to purchase within six months from the father's death given by the partnership articles; but after the expiration of that period they purchased the property from the trustees of the father's will under a contract made between them and the trustees, which provided that part of the purchase money should remain on mortgage of the property. Held, on an originating summons taken out for the determination of the question whether probate duty was payable in respect of the property, that no probate duty was payable thereon, since the purchase was not effected under the option to purchase given by the partnership articles, in which case the property might have been regarded as converted into personalty at the date of the father's death, but was effected under a contract between the trustees of his will and the firm, made after his death, and therefore remained unconverted at the date of his death. [Re Goodall; Goodall v. Goodall. Counsel: Upjohn; Vernon Smith, Solicitors: Morley, Shirreff, and Co.; Ch. Div.: North, J. Oct. 28.Q.C. and Vaughan Hawkins. Solicitor to the Inland Revenue.] QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Building Contract-Before passing of Act-Building Structure or Work -Exemption-London Building Act 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 213), 8. 212. -Case stated by the metropolitan magistrate sitting at Greenwich. Shortly before the passing of the London Building Act 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 213) the respondent entered into a contract to build a number of houses on certain land within the county of London. These houses were not all to be built immediately, but a certain number of them were to be erected each year up to 1897, when the contract would be completely carried out. By a clause in the contract the houses to be erected were to satisfy the provisions of the Metropolitan Building Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 122) and any other Act in force or to come in force during the execution of the contract. It was not denied that the contract had been bona fide in its inception, and that there had been no intention to evade the London Building Act 1894. During the present year the respondent had begun the erection of houses in pursuance of the contract. These houses were in accordance with the provisions of the Acts relating to building in force immediately previous to the passing of the London Building Act 1894, but not in accordance with the provisions of that Act. The appellant took out a summons against the respondent for failing to observe these provisions. The magistrate dismissed the summons on the ground that the building contract having been entered into before the passing of the Act, was exempted from its operation by sect. 212. It was now contended, on the part of the appellant, that the exemption contained in sect. 212 extended only to contracts for the carrying out of specific building structures or work, and not to contracts such as this, which was really a contract for the development of a building estate, and which might conceivably extend over any number of years. For the respondent it was contended that the exemption was general, and, if it had been intended that the Act should apply to any contracts entered into before the passing of the Act, some provision similar to that contained in sect. 110 of the Metropolitan Building Act 1885 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 122) would have been introduced. Held, that the magistrate's decision was right, and that, had the Legislature intended the exemption contained in sect. 212 of the London Building Act to apply only to contracts for the erection of L specific buildings, an express reservation to that effect would have been inserted in the clause. [Jenner v. Oldham. Q. B. Div.: Cave and Day, JJ. Oct. 26.Counsel for the appellant, Cripps, Q.C. and Daldy; for the respondent, Jelf, Q.C. and Grain. Solicitors: for the appellant, W. A. Blaxland; for the respondent, Watson, Son, and Room.] False Trade Description—" Le Dansk, French Factory"-Country where Goods were made-Merchandise Marks Act 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 28), ss. 2 and 3.-This was an appeal by special case from the decision of a metropolitan magistrate convicting the appellant on a summons for having margarine in his possession for sale to which a false trade description was affixed contrary to the provisions of sects. 2 and 3 of the Merchandise Marks Act 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 28). The appellant was manager of a shop, the owner of which lived abroad, in which margarine of the description known in the trade as "Le Dansk" was sold. The margarine was not exposed to the view of customers, but when sold was handed to the customer in cardboard boxes bearing in large letters the words "Le Dansk, French Factory," and in letters a quarter of an inch square "Margarine." About the shop were many empty cardboard boxes with the words "Le Dansk, French Factory," and some tin boxes with the words " Le Dansk, Paris," and on the front of the shop was a large signboard with the words "Le Dansk” (“Le Dansk " is, it seems, intended to mean "the Danish "). The respondent bought two pounds of "Le Dansk," which was handed to him in one of the boxes before mentioned, when it would seem he was told that it was margarine. At the hearing of the summons it was contended for the respondent that the name "Le Dansk" was a false trade description as to the material of which the goods were composed within sect. 3, subsect. 1 (d) of the Merchandise Marks Act 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 28), and that the words "Le Dansk, French Factory were a false trade description as to the place or country in which the said goods were made or produced within sect. 3, sub-sect. 1 (b) of the same Act. Evidence was given showing that ninety per cent. of the substance was produced in a factory at Paris, called the "Le Dansk" factory, that the substance on leaving that factory was called oleomargarine, that afterwards it was taken to a factory at Southampton called the "French Factory," when ten per cent. of English milk and Danish butter was added, after which it became what was known in the trade and sold to the public under the name "Le Dansk." The magistrate held that the name "Le Dansk" and "Le Dansk, French Factory" were false trade descriptions within both sub-sect. 1 (b) and sub-sect. 1 (d). Held, that the appeal should be dismissed, as, whether or not the name was a false trade description within sub-sect. 1 (d), it certainly amounted to a false trade description within sub-sect. 1 (b), as the final process which made the goods "Le Dansk" took place not in France, as the name suggested, but at Southampton. [Bischop v. Toler. Q. B. Div.: Lord Russell, C.J. and Cave, J. Oct. 25.-Counsel: for the appellant, Bonsey; for the respondent, Fletcher Moulton, Q.C. and Morton Smith. Solicitors: for the appellant, Neve and Beck; for the respondent, C. Urquhart Fisher.] Margarine Refreshment House-" Selling by retail" "Exposed for Sale"-Margarine Act 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 29), s. 6.—This was an appeal by special case from the decision of a metropolitan magistrate dismissing a summons under sect. 6 of the Margarine Act 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 29). The respondent kept various refreshment-rooms in London, in which among other things sold were bread with butter spread upon it and haddock with pieces of butter to be used as a condiment with the fish. Haddock and butter were sold at the same price as haddock without butter. It was admitted that the butter supplied in the refreshment-rooms was not pure butter, but a mixture of butter and other substances coming within the definition of margarine in sect. 3 of the Act. The large lump of butter from which that supplied to customers was taken was exposed to the view of the customers and was not marked "margarine in the manner prescribed by sect. 6 of the Act; but notices were placed on the walls of the refreshment-rooms to the effect that the butter used was pure butter mixed with margarine. The appellant went to one of the respondent's refreshment-rooms, and having ordered dry bread and coffee asked to be supplied separately with three pence worth of butter. The respondent's manager refused to serve him, and informed him that the butter was not sold to be taken away, but solely to be consumed on the premises along with other food. The appellant subsequently took out a summons against the respondent for having margarine exposed for sale by retail not marked "margarine," and for selling margarine by retail without delivering the same to the purchaser in or with a paper wrapper on which was printed the word margarine as required by sect. 6 of the Margarine Act 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 29). The magistrate dismissed the summons. Held, that the dismissal was right. Held further, that the provisions of sect. 6 as to delivery of a paper wrapper marked "margarine did not apply to a sale by retail of margarine as a condiment with other food to be consumed on the premises; and that "exposed for sale by retail" meant exposed for such kind of sale by retail as would under the Act require the margarine sold to be delivered in a paper wrapper marked 66 margarine" or in a packet marked "margarine.' 66 [Moore v. Pearce's Dining and Refreshment Rooms Limited. Q. B. Div. Lord Russell, C.J. and Cave, J. Oct. 25.-Counsel: for the appellant, Dickens, Q.C. and Morton Smith; for the respondent, Ogle. Solicitors: for the appellant, C. Urquhart Fisher; for the respondent, Thomas Charles.] Margarine-Selling by Retail-Paper Wrapper--Margarine Act 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 29), s. 6.--This was an appeal by special case from the decision of a metropolitan magistrate dismissing a summons under sect. 6 of the Margarine Act 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 29). The respondent was the wife of the manager of a shop in which was sold margarine by retail. The large pieces of margarine from which that sold was taken were not exposed to the view of customers coming into the shop. About the shop, however, were many empty cardboard boxes, on which were stamped the words "Le Dansk" in large letters. When margarine was sold it was put into one of these boxes, and a ribbon of paper was put round the box to keep it closed, and partly over this ribbon and partly over the box was stamped the word "margarine" in letters a quarter of an inch square. The appellant bought margarine from the respondent. It was put into one of the boxes before mentioned with a ribbon of paper round it. The box was then wrapped up in an outer covering of paper, not having the word "margarine" printed upon it. In this state it was handed to the appellant. It was not clear whether the outer covering of paper was put on by the respondent in the usual way of business, or at the request of the appellant; but the Court inclined to the view that the probability was it was put on at the appellant's request. Afterwards the appellant took out a summons against the respondent for selling margarine by retail without delivering the same in or with a paper wrapper on which was printed in capital letters not less than a quarter of an inch square margarine," contrary to the provisions of sect. 6 of the Margarine Act 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 29). The respondent relied on Jones v. Jones (58 J. P. 653). The magistrate dismissed the summons. Held, that appeal should be dismissed. Per Lord Chief Justice: The box and paper ribbon constituted a paper wrapper within sect. 6. Per Cave, J. Paper wrapper within sect. 6 means outer wrapper, but, as the outer wrapper in the present case was probably put over the box at the request of the appellant, in order to trap the respondent into an offence within the section, if any offence was committed, the penalty imposed should have been merely nominal. Appeal therefore should be dismissed, but without costs. : [Toler v. Mrs. Bischop. Q. B. Div. : Lord Russell, C.J. and Cave, J. Oct. 25.-Counsel: for the appellant, Fletcher Moulton, Q.C. and Morton Smith; for the respondent, Bonsey. Solicitors: for the appellant, C. Urquhart Fisher; for the respondent, Neve and Beck.] OUR LITERARY COLUMN. THE JUDGE WHO CONDEMNED THE KING. THE recent revival of the question whether the mummified head of Oliver Cromwell it still amongst us raises two considerations of interest to lawyers, no matter in what light they may view the character and career of the Protector. In the first place, the subject suggests an attractive problem of circumstantial evidence; in the second, it recalls the fact that the same post mortem indignity, of which Mr. Frederic Harrison writes so eloquently, was extended to Judge John Bradshaw, president of the tribunal which tried and condemned King Charles. Bradshaw throughout his forensic career was a zealous partisan of the Parliamentarians. He studied law at Gray's-inn, and being called to the Bar obtained much chamber practice through the influence of his political friends. In 1646 that influence was strong enough to obtain for him the office of Joint Commissioner of the Great Seal. Next he secured promotion to the office of Chief Justice of Chester. By that time he had amply proved the iron mould of his character, and when the trial of the King was determined upon, there was very little hesitation about getting him to fill the post of president of the court, and very little hesitation on his part before he accepted it. Had he refused subsequent rewards for his services he might have been more likely to obtain credit with posterity for conscientious action. Still it is a fact that his subsequent conduct earned for him Cromwell's cordial dislike, and he was even deprived of his chief justiceship. He survived the Protector, however, and found a place in the Council; not only so, but he was elected president, and would probably have been appointed Commissioner of the Great Seal, but for his failing health. Bradshaw died in 1659. They gave him an imposing funeral, and his body was laid to rest in Westminster Abbey not far from that of the greater man whose purpose he had served. It was only a year later that the House of Commons ordered the bodies of Cromwell, Bradshaw, and Ireton to be taken from their tombs to Tyburn, and there hanged in their coffins. The order was promptly and brutally carried out; nay, it was exceeded, for the corpses were removed from their coffins, and then was fulfilled the barbarous and horrible programme which Evelyn describes as follows: "On this day (ob, the stupendous and inscrutable judgment of God!) have the carcases of those arch rebels, Cromwell, Bradshaw (the judge who condemned His Majestie), and Ireton (son-in-law to the usurper), been dragged out of their superb tombs in Westminster among the kings to Tyburne, and hang'd on the gallows there from nine in the morning till six at night, and then buried under that fatal and ignominious monument in a deepe pitt." It must be added that the heads were hacked off, taken to Westminster, and exposed in public after the revolting fashion of those turbulent times. Bradshaw's head occupied the middle position. One writer declares that the heads were still exhibited on the roof of Westminster Hall twenty years afterwards. Since then, at intervals, all sorts of stories have been told about the Protector's head, which had been embalmed immediately after death; but Bradshaw's head, which probably had not been embalmed, is heard of no more. The skull may still be in the possession of someone who is unaware of the history of the relic; but, of course, in the nature of things, if there was no embalming there could never be the same controversy about the identity, or any attempt to weld the links of evidence together in the same fashion that is now being renewed with respect to the cranium of Oliver Cromwell. THE OPENING OF THE LAW COURTS. [With apologies to the shade of Longfellow.] Were thrown open by their Lordships, Queen of England, India's Empress ? Of the substance called electro. Through the Great Hall of the Law Courts, All their robes were lined with ermine; And others of the Queen's Bench judges, Of signification doubtful. Glowed with health their smooth shorn faces, Or beside the foaming Danube, Theirs to see the Strand of London, And that funny person, Lockwood. Many others of the Q.C.'s Followed in the slow procession, Through the Great Hall of the Law Courts, There a crowd of many hundreds ; There were modest maid and matron, Cavaliers in close attendance, Many of the junior counsel Who had waited long for clients, Not engaged in any cases. Some of them, more lucky members, Then the judges, and the Q.C.'s, And the weary waiting juniors, And the maids and stately matrons, With their cavaliers attending, LAW LIBRARY. Legal Medicine.—We have received two medical works which bear upon the law-the one entitled A System of Legal Medicine, by Dr. Allan McLane Hamilton and Mr. Laurence Godkin, of the New York Bar (New York: E. B. Treat. London: The Rebman Publishing Company, Adam-street, Strand); and the other a seventh edition of Guy and Ferrier's Principles of Forensic Medicine (Henry Renshaw, 356, Strand). This new edition of the well-known treatise is revised by Dr. William R. Smith, who is also a barrister. The American work is evidently the production of two acute minds, one medical and the other legal, directing very advanced knowledge to the problems presented by the combination of law and medicine. Mr. Godkin writes an excellent introduction dealing with modes of trial involving medical inquiries and the subject of expert evidence. He tells us that at Leeds the medical men refuse to give evidence in a case until they have seen the medical men on the other side, the result being that medical men in that city are rarely cross-examined, and frequently called on one side only. This is certainly a very desirable state of things, for it is easy enough for even a clumsy cross-examiner to create a conflict, or apparent conflict, of expert testimony in the witness-box, and any such conflict is always a deplorable exhibition complicating the work of judge and jury. In these two bulky volumes the jurist will find discussed fully and with authority the various questions which are at present causing excitement in the scientific world. The work is illustrated with great skill, and an excellent index makes reference a matter of facility. Outlines of Legal History. By ARCHER M. WHITE, Barristerat-Law. London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co. Limited. MR. White is known as a successful student and an equally successful" Coach for the law examinations. In the work as an instructor he has found the need, now that Legal History is included in the curriculum of the Inns of Court, for some work in the nature of an elementary sketch, giving sufficient information for a student's purposes, but introductory only to a fuller study of this large subject. Within a small volume he compresses a vast amount of information. Here we find the various phases of our legal system described historically in the most condensed form, and to the student such a volume must prove of almost essential importance. We could not interest the general reader in its contents, which are devoid of the romance of history, but as a class book we give it our cordial commendation. NEW EDITION. Sir Walter Phillimore, with the assistance of Mr. C. F. Jemmett, has prepared a second edition of Sir Robert Phillimore's Ecclesiastical Law of the Church of England (Sweet and Maxwell Limited; Stevens and Sons Limited). It is satisfactory to reflect that the greater peace prevailing between the sections within the Church have taken away much of their practical importance from many decisions to be found cited in these two handsome volumes. Historically, however, they have to be treated with great care and every respect. Between 1873 and 1893 the lawyers were busy construing the Rubrics, and those interested in the study will find the cases fully dealt with by the editors of this standard work. Here also is to be found all the law relating to the marriage of divorced persons, the discipline of the clergy, and the property of the Church. To test the sufficiency of the revision, we have turned to parts of these volumes where new statutes and new cases have been incorporated, and in every instance without disappointment. Originally compiled with the laborious care which characterised all the work, judicial and literary, of the late Sir Robert Phillimore, similar zeal in the editors was necessary to the reputation of a second edition. It is impossible to examine it without being struck by its comprehensiveness and elaborate accuracy. Indeed, it develops all the common vices of text-book writing, setting forth in minute detail all the material provisions of statutes and the facts and portions of judgments in many decided cases. No complaint can be made of this as things are, but when a School of Law teaches the science of law, and the science of text-writing is dealt |