GROOMBRIDGE and SONS LIMITED, Panyer-alley, Paternoster-row. Ct. High Court.
Amount per pound, 1d. First and final. Payable Nov. 11 or any subsequent
day (except Saturday), between 11 and 2, at office of Off. Rec. 33, Carey-st.
WEST END CLUBS COMPANY LIMITED, Cornhill. Ct. High Court. Amount per pound,
5d. First and final. Payable Nov. 11 or any subsequent day (except Saturday),
between 11 and 2, at office of Off. Rec. 33, Carey-st.

NOTICE OF APPOINTMENT OF LIQUIDATOR.
GAZETTE, Nov. 5.

TREBOTH BRICK COMPANY LIMITED, Swansea. Ct. Swansea. Liquidator, Edwin
William Carlyle, 2, Worcester-pl, Swansea. Appointment, Oct. 18.

BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS.

BIRTHS.

AUSTEN-CARTMEL.-On the 30th ult.. at 14, Onslow-grdns, S.W., the wife of James Austen-Cartmel, Barrister-at-law, of a son.

COULSON.-On the 31st ult., at Guildford, the wife of Harry Coulson, Solicitor, of

a son.

GENT. On the 28th ult., at Rolandseck, Kingston, the wife of John Gent, Barristerat-law, of a son.

GREGSON-ELLIS.-On the 3rd inst., at 12, Manson-pl, Queen's-gato, the wife of Charles Gregson-Ellis, Barrister-at-law, of a son.

LEWIS. On the 27th ult., at the Red Lodge, Old Woking, Surrey, the wife of Angus Scott Lewis, Barrister-at-law, of a son.

MARRIAGES.

HEARN-DARTER.-On the 28th ult., at St. Peter's, Eaton-sq, Alfred Booth Hearn,
Solicitor, of London and Chatham, younger son of A. J. Hearn, of Chatham, to
Jessie Florence, only daughter of William Silver Darter, of Myrtle House,
Gardens, Cape Town. and 32, Chapel-st, Belgrave-sq, S W.
LANE-TREVOR.-At St. Michael and All Angels', Colombo, Ceylon, William Alexander,
youngest son of the late Lieut.-Col. Henry Lane, D.L., J.P.. of Broadoak,
Bexhill, Sussex. to Adela Christina, daughter of the late Col. Gordon Trevor,
Bombay Staff Corps, and granddaughter of Mrs. Hamilton, of Sunningdale,
Silver-hill, St. Leonards-on-Sea.

LEFROY-CAMPBELL.-On the 23rd ult., at Larne and Inver Parish Church, Charles Edward Lefroy, son of the late Mr. Justice Lefroy, Carriglass Manor co. Dublin, to Miss Alice Constance Campbell, daughter of the late Colin Campbell, Esq., Colgrain, Dumbartonshire, and stepdaughter of Col. Doran, Lurganbrae, Brookeborongh, co. Fermanagh.

LOVELL GRAYDON.-On the 31st ult., at St. Mary Abbot's, Kensington, Sidney John' son of the late Samuel Lovell, to Kathleen E. Caroline, daughter of the late Alexander Howison Graydon, Barrister-at-law, Dublin. NEVILLE-ROLFE-COLT.-On the 30th ult,, at Christ Church, Lancaster Gate, Charles William Neville-Rolfe, of Heacham, Norfolk, to Maude Isabelle, daugater of the late G N. Colt, Barrister-at-law. SWIFT-WILKINSON.-On the 30th ult., at St. Paul's Church, Southsea, Francis Manners Shewring, only child of the late Rev. James Showring Swift, B.A.. Vicar of Thorpe-Arnold, and grandson of the late George Norman, J. P., D.L., of Goadby Hall, Leicestershire, to Florence Georgiana Frances Eleanor, elder daughter of Robert Wilkinson, Barrister-at-law, of the South-Eastern Circuit, and granddaughter of the late Coulson Bell Pitman, Esq., of H. M. 16th Lancers, and of Oulton Hall. Aylsham, Norfolk TAHOURDIN-DICKENSON.-On the 29th ult., at St. Margaret's, Westminster. Graham Tubourdin, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-law, to Edith, eldest daughter of J. E. Dickenson, of Nottingham.

WATTS-NEWTON.-On the 31st ult.. at St. Peter's Church, Brighton, Walter Richard Burgoyne Watts, of Hayes, Middlesex, and 77. Gresham-st. London, Solicitor, to, Clara Augusta Newton. youngest daughter of the late A. R. Newton, H.E.I.C.S. and Mrs. Elizabeth Newton, late of 85, Lordship-park, Stoke Newington.

DEATHS.

BROWNE. On the 1st inst., at 21, Fellows-rd, Hampstead, N. W., Charles Browne, F.S.A. late of Lincoln's-inn, Barrister-at-law.

BURKE. On the 27th ult., at 15, Manor-ter, Highbury Park, N., John Burke, of the firm of John Burke and Son, Chartered Accountants, 32, Theobald's-rd, Gray'sinn, W.C.. aged 68. DOBINSON.-On the 2nd inst., at Stanwix, Carlisle. Henry Dobinson, Solicitor, J.P. for the county of Cumberland and the city of Carlisle. in his 74th year. GOSSET.-On the 29th ult., after a short illness. at 43. Courtfield-rd, South Kensington, Augusta, widow of ths late Major Arthur Gosset, Royal Horse Artillery, of Eltham House. J.P., and D.L. for Kent, in her S5th year. KEY.-On the 3rd inst., at 45, Campden House-rd, Kensington, Thomas Key, Barrister-at-law, of Lincoln's-inn, aged 62.

MEE. On the 30th ult., at Brentwood, Essex, Thomas Mee, Solicitor, of 1, Great Winchester-st, E.C., in his 67th year.

MORGAN -On the 29th ult., at her residence, Cae Synna Môn, Carnarvon, in her S0th
year, Agnes, relict of the late John Morgan, J P.. D.L., and daughter of the late
William Turner, Esq., af Parkia, Carnarvonshire.
O'CALLAGHAN.-On the 29th ult.. at Ballinahinch, Tulla, co. Clare, Charles George
Martin O'Callaghan, J.P., D.L., late Captain 7th Dragoon and King's Dragoon
Guards. aged 73.
O'CALLAGHAN.-On the 1st inst., at her residence, Atherstone Lawn, Cheltenham,
Mary, widow of the late Isaac Stoney O'Callaghan, Barrister-at-law, Dublin.
RADCLIFFE.-On the 28th ult., at his residence, Inglewood, Waterloo, Liverpool, in
the 71st year of his age, Reginald Radcliffe, Solicitor.
WILBERFORCE.-On the 31st ult., at 61, Belgrave-rd. Fannie, the beloved wife of
Edward Wilberforce, Master of the Supreme Court.

STAMMERERS of all ages, and parents of stammering children, should read a book written by a gentleman who cured himself after suffering nearly forty years. Post free, 13 stamps, from Mr. B. BEASLEY, Brampton Park, Huntingdon, or SHERWOOD, Willesden-lane, Brondesbury, London. --[ADVT.]

BENTLEY'S

to be satisfied whilst the bulk of the Profession sit idle, and the limited number of causes awaiting trial, entered before the Long Vacation, have every prospect of going over the Christmas holidays.

SUITORS must go where the Courts sit regularly. Consequently the business of the County Courts increases while that of the High Court declines. Not only so, but the County Courts, by the regularity and unfailing certainty of their sittings, are able to transact their own proper business and also to dispose of a very large number of causes remitted from the High Court.

THE business remitted from the High Court to the County Courts in 1894 was as follows:-Causes, 1541; interpleader proceedings, 269; total, 1810. In addition to this the County Courts have disposed of 533 actions brought under the Employers' Liability Act 1880.

If a County Court judge is ill, he gets a deputy. If a High Court judge is similarly placed, he shuts his court and goes home. Again and again we have pointed out that in no other department of the State is such a catastrophe allowed to occur. It must soon suggest itself to somebody that, if one or two judges can be regularly absent from illness, the High Court is overmanned. Either it is overmanned or business is neglected. There is no escape from the dilemma.

AT the Guildhall banquet, on Lord Mayor's day, the LORD CHIEF JUSTICE referred to the permanent place and continuity of the judges, and to the criticism to which they are exposed. To this criticism they are, his Lordship said, perforce silent listeners, and he begged critics to bring to their task adequate knowledge. Probably Lord RUSSELL'S audience had not in their minds any recent criticism to which these remarks were directed. We question very much whether some means should not be devised whereby attacks upon judges, either as individuals or as members of the Bench, could be answered. In these days of absolute fearlessness of comment and discussion of everybody it is dangerous for any class to remain silent when assailed upon anything like public matters. A judge cannot, we agree, enter the arena of newspaper controversy, and, severed as they are from politics, and precluded from using either House of Parliament in their vindication, judges are at a disadvantage. No after-dinner admonition, however, will keep critics in order, and matters of impeachment must be made plain to the public somehow, or the Bench must suffer in possibly intolerable silence.

THE Incorporated Law Society, which has already done, and is doing, much for the solicitors, would certainly be able to exercise even greater influence if its membership corresponded more nearly with that of the whole body of English solicitors. It is always unfortunate when the question is asked by any considerable number of non-members of a professional association, What is the good of it? Still more regrettable is it to find a member of twenty years' standing inquiring whether the time is not come for withdrawing from the society. The correspondent, "A Twenty Years' Member," whose letter we published last week, suggests some points that well deserve consideration at the hands of the council. He describes the big building in Chancery-lane as an unmitigated barrack, and instances the various drawbacks which a country solicitor who betakes himself to the institute is constrained to notice. All this is regrettable. The aim should be to popularise the establishment in all its departments, and that cannot be

done if matters of detail, small in themselves, but important

in the aggregate, are disregarded.

BEFORE the Companies Acts Amendment Bill is finally moulded it would be well to consider whether something cannot be done to give English investors in Transvaal companies a more secure legal position than they at present occupy. Many companies are floated in the City without passing through the preliminary steps of registration at Somerset House. The shares in such concerns are freely dealt in on the Stock Exchange, but investors are very much at the mercy of unknown directors, who have their headquarters at Johannesburg. Such directors conduct operations in London through the medium of some other company or individuals, acting as agents, but possessing no control over the undertaking. The consequence is, that meetings are held, resolutions passed, and reconstructions organised in the Transvaal without affording any opportunity to English shareholders to exercise their proprietary rights. The number and enormous aggregate capital of South African mining companies having a footing, in fact, nearly all their shareholders, in England must render any question as to their legal position of great importance.

WRITING of the privilege of sanctuary in "The Law's Lumber Room" (a reprint of articles from the National Observer), the author, Mr. FRANCIS WATT, draws attention to the curiously close neighbourhood of law and lawlessness which was brought about under that ancient system. The precincts of Whitefriars gave shelter, and immunity from the Law's vengeance, to the greatest scoundrels of the kingdom. This region of Alsatia closely bordered the Temple on the east. Ram-alley (now Mitre-court) and Salisbury-court (now Salisbury-square) afforded the chief approaches to this haunt of bullies and blackguards. Probably, says Mr. WATT, all between Fleet-street and the river which was not the Temple held of the lawless republic. The sheriff, with the posse comitatus, was never anxious to penetrate this dangerous district. Yet, close at hand, in the Temple itself peace-abiding students were diligently delving in the sober field of law. Gray's-inn also had its borderland of ruffianism, for Fullwood's, or Fuller's-rents, held the same geographical relation to that famous school of law as Alsatia to the Temple. The statute 21 Jac. 1, c. 28, s. 7, made a legal end of the right of sanctuary. But the legal end was not the actual end, and not until the reign of GEORGE I. was the law's process made to run effectually in the robbers' nests, which parodied the Scriptural cities of refuge.

THE American (Annual) Digest for 1895 consists of no less than 2724 pages, although it gives only short abstracts of the opinions of the American Courts.

UNDER the Improvement of Land Act 1864, where the owner of land charged under the Act, or under any similar Act, is desirous of selling or disposing of part of such land, the Land Commissioners can, under sect. 68, with the owner's consent, release from such charge any part of the land, but in every case with due notice to the grantee or assignee of the charge. Under the Settled Land Act 1882, sect. 5, a tenant for life, on a sale, exchange, or partition, can, with the incumbrancer's consent, charge an incumbrance on any other part of the settled land. By a wide use of the term "incumbrance," the tenant for life could thus shift an improvement charge when he is selling any part of the land charged and settled. Mr. Justice KEKEWICH has held, in Earl of Stafford v. Maples (noted ante, p. 33), that it was not intended to overrule the provisions of the Improvement of Land Act by the Settled Land Act, so that the consent of the Board of Agriculture, in whom the powers of the Land Commissioners are now vested, must be obtained to the shifting of the charge. The powers of the Settled Land Acts are so wide, and their aim so far-reaching, that, if

there were likely to be many cases on this subject, it would be well to take the opinion of the Court of Appeal with reference to this point.

POLITICAL JUDGES.

THE Lord Chief Justice, in responding to the toast of the Judicial Bench at the Guildhall on Saturday evening, let fall an observation of immense significance, plainly intimating that in his opinion vacancies on the Bench both arise and are filled up with regard to political considerations.

The Lord Chief Justice responded, and said there was a mysterious, if not inexplicable, connection between a change in Government and the occurrence of vacancies on the Judicial Bench. He would, therefore, not be surprised if before this time next year, either on the nomination of the Lord Chancellor or the Prime Minister, he were relieved of his present position as the youngest in standing of the judges.

The practice at which the Lord Chancellor has hinted is of recent origin. Lord Lyndhurst was made Chief Baron of the Exchequer in 1831 upon the recommendation of his political rival, Lord Brougham, who then held the Great Seal. Lord Campbell, when Lord Chancellor, appointed Colin Blackburne to be a judge of the Queen's Bench, although he was of opposite politics and only known to the Chancellor by his professional reputation. And on the 3rd July 1865 the Attorney-General stated in the House of Commons that Lord Chancellor Westbury had exercised his judicial patronage without regard to the interests of party, and that he had selected a political opponent, Mr. Montague Smith, a Conservative member of the House of Commons, to fill the last vacancy upon the Judicial Bench.

THE CONVERSION OF WASTING SECURITIES. THE decision of Mr. Justice North last week, in Re Pitcairn (W. N., Nov. 9, 1895), is an interesting illustration of one of the two great classes of exceptions to the rule in Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth (7 Ves. 137 (a), that, where personal estate is given in terms amounting to a general residuary bequest, to be enjoyed by persons in succession, a court of equity will, in the absence of evidence (which it rests, by the way, with the person disputing the application of the rule to supply-Macdonald v. Irvine, 8 Ch. Div. 101) to the contrary, assume that it was the intention of the testator that his legatees should enjoy the same thing in succession, and, as the only means of giving effect to such intention, direct the conversion into permanent investments of a recognised character of all such parts of the estate as are wasting or reversionary, and also all such other existing investments as are not of the recognised character and are consequently deemed to be insecure. Although identified with Howe v. Earl Dartmouth, this rule had, before its enunciation by Lord Eldon in that case, for many years been acted upon by the Court of Chancery, and all that Lord Eldon did in the case in question was to formulate it and apply it to a very simple set of circumstances. The testator had left all his personal and landed estates to his eldest sister, Lady Anne Conolly, for her life, and then to B. The devise of the landed estates was necessarily specific, and the question was whether the combination of the personal and landed estates in the devise imposed upon the personal estate such a quasi-specific character as to exclude the operation of the rule. Lord Eldon held that it did not, and the justice of the decision is apparent. "The property bequeathed," said Lord Justice Baggallay in commenting upon this case in Macdonald v. Irvine (ubi sup.), at p. 113, 66 was but once described. The same thing was to be enjoyed by the tenant for life and by the reversioner, and by conversion alone could this be effected." Considerable difficulties have, however, subsequently arisen in regard to the degree of evidence of contrary intention that will exclude the operation of the rule, and two classes of exceptions to it have come to be recognised :

1. Where there are words in their natural and literal sense importing use or enjoyment of the property in the state in which the testator left it at his death: (per Lord Justice Thesiger, in Macdonald v. Irvine (ubi sup.) at p. 122.) Thus the rule has been held to be excluded where a testator before creating reversionary interests gave to his wife "the interests, Second Sheet.

"

rents, dividends, annual produce and profits, use and enjoyment of all my estate whatsoever, real and personal: " (Pickering v. Pickering, 4 My. & Cr. 289); or "all and every part of my property in every shape, and without any reserve, in whatever manner it is situated : (Collins v. Collins, 2 My. & K. 703.) In Macdonald v. Irvine (ubi sup.), however, which belongs to this category, the rule was held (Lord Justice Baggallay dissenting), to apply under the following circumstances: A testator by his will, after giving certain specific legacies, gave the residue of his estate, which consisted at his death (inter alia) of Egyptian bonds called Khedive bonds, and household furniture, to his nephew. After the date of the will he married, and subsequently made a codicil by which he gave to his wife for her life "all the income, dividends, and annual proceeds of his entire estate, and postponed the payment of all legacies and the distribution of all estates vested in him, or over which he had any power of disposition until after her decease," and subject thereto revived and confirmed the will. The Court held that what the testator had done was first to make his wife tenant for life of his entire (i.e. whole) estate; and secondly, to provide that the estate was to be paramount to any gift, however specific or clear. In connection with this case it should be noted that the will, per se, could not afford any evidence or indication of intention as to how the property was to be enjoyed between the tenant for life and the person entitled to it afterwards, because there was no tenancy for life at the time in the testator's contemplation.

court

2. Where there were directions contained in the will as to the conversion of the property inconsistent with conversion by the on the testator's death per Lord Justice Thesiger in Macdonald v. Irvine (ubi sup., at p. 122). Alcock v. Sloper (2 My. & K. 703), and Harris v. Poyner (Ib. 699), are illustrations of this exception of too special a character to be set out in detail here, but a few typical cases may be taken. In Brown v. Gellatly (2 Ch. Div. 751) a testator, a shipowner, directed his executors to convert his personal estate when and as they saw fit, and in particular (a) to sail his ships for the benefit of his estate, (b) to invest his residuary estate at their discretion, or allow it to remain in certain specified shares and securities. After the testator's death his ships made considerable earnings, and these large sums were invested both in authorised and unauthorised investments. It was held by Lord Justice Cairns that the direction as to the ships was only a provision for their cautious conversion, and that consequently the tenants for life were not entitled to their earnings as income, but only to 4 per cent. on the value of the ships at the testator's death; that, as regards the authorised securities, the tenants for life were entitled to the income, but that, as regards the unauthorised securities, the rights of the parties must be regulated as if they had been converted at the earliest possible moment. It will be observed, therefore, that the rule in Howe v. Earl Dartmouth was excluded in the case of the authorised securities and applied in the other two cases. The operation of the rule was held to be excluded in Gray v. Siggers (15 Ch. Div. 74) by an express power given to the trustees to retain the property in specie, and in Re Chancellor (26 Ch. Div. 42) by an express direction that the profits were to be treated as income. In the case before Mr. Justice North above mentioned and Re Pitcairn, the application of the rule was held to be excluded by a discretionary power of sale given by the will to the trustees. This appears to come distinctly within the ratio decidendi of the cases above noted in connection with the second class of exceptions to the rule.

WHAT IS A "CHARITY"?

FEW terms have been found more difficult to define than the one which forms the heading of this article. Upon several occasions an attempt has been made to do so, but of late these attempts have been abandoned, and the rule laid down that the method to employ in order to determine whether a gift is or is not a charity" is to turn to the preamble of 43 Eliz. c. 4. It should be remembered that, although the Act in question has been formally repealed, amongst several others, by the Charitable Uses and Mortmain Act 1888, the preamble is still alive by reason of the provisions of sect. 13, sub-sect. (2). This sub-section states that "Whereas in divers enactments and documents reference is made to charities within the meaning of the said Act references to such charities shall be construed as references to charities within the meaning of the said preamble." The statute of Elizabeth sets out a long enumeration of what may be regarded as charities, but, as Lord Chancellor Cranworth has observed (1 D. & J. 79), "the objects there enumerated are not to be taken

as the only objects of charity, but are given as instances." They are far too numerous to quote at length. Suffice it to say that they embrace benefits for the sick, poor, orphans, and prisoners, help for young workmen and girls about to marry, funds for repair of bridges and havens, for schools and scholarships, the provision of houses of correction, and aids in ease of taxes. It will be seen that the list is exceedingly comprehensive, and as charities analogous to those specified are held to be included amongst them, and, again, this rule is carried further so as to embrace charities akin to those thus included, it may be thought difficult to devise any benevolent scheme the objects of which would not be charitable. There have, however, been two or three recent cases in which the courts have had some little difficulty in determining upon which side of the line the gifts were to fall. Re Nottage; Jones v. Palmer (72 L. T. Rep. 795) came before Mr. Justice Kekewich in May last, and there it was held that a sum of £2000, out of the income of which a cup should be purchased annually for the most successful yacht of the season over 19-rating, was not a charitable gift. This decision was affirmed on appeal (73 L. T. Rep. 269; (1895) 2 Ch. 649). As against this Mr. Justice Romer held, in Re Lord Stratheden and Campbell (1894) 3 Ch. 265), that a gift by will for the benefit of a volunteer corps was a charitable bequest. The report does not state on what grounds his Lordship so held, but the decision is arrived at in the middle of the case, and quoted as a remark from the Bench. A very important case is one decided by Mr. Justice Chitty, on the 23rd July (Re Foveaux, 73 L. T. Rep. 202; (1895) 2 Ch. 501), whereby societies for the total suppression and abolition of vivisection are held within the legal definition of the term "charity." The great point of interest in the case is, that it fills up the blank left in the decision of Obert v. Barrow (56 L. T. Rep. 786; 35 Ch. Div. 472). In that case a society for the prevention of cruelty to animals was held to be charitable, but quære, whether one intended to suppress a practice which under certain restrictions is legalised, would be within the same category. It has been suggested that the law would be self-stultifying were it to support a society whose object is to change the law. Mr. Justice Chitty has, however, taken the bull by the horns, and held that it is as much a charitable object to suppress vivisection as to prevent cruelty to animals. Such cases as these, and perhaps the cases of Re Nottage and Re Lord Stratheden and Campbell in particular, seem to call for some brief consideration of what are the constituent elements of a charity. The subject was discussed by the House of Lords at great length in Commissioners, &c., v. Pemsel (65 L. T. Rep. 621; (1891) A. C. 531). The difficulty there was to decide whether a gift for the benefit of the Moravian Missionary Establishment among Heathen Nations was, or was not, a charitable purpose, and by a majority of four to two the question was answered in the affirmative. Numerous other cases are also in existence which throw light upon the subject, but they are too many and too lengthy to set out here. In the first place, it must be premised that the popular definition of a charity " is even more vague than the legal and technical definition. Some people regard a charity as solely relating to the relief of physical need, and they illustrate their meaning by the common expression-a charity ball, or concert, or bazaar. Other people understand the term as embracing almost every concrete expression of material or moral benevolence to men or animals. Were the former view to be regarded as correct, then the Shipwrecked Mariners Society or the Lifeboat Institution, which assist paupers and millionaires alike in moments of peril, would not be a "charity." On the other hand, if the second view be upheld, the fund which exists to provide the Benchers at one of the Inns of Court with oysters could hardly fail to be included as a "charity." The same remark might also apply to the Press Band, which plays on the Thames Embankment. Passing from the popular to the technical view, it is clear that many judges are of opinion that the line of demarcation is a very narrow one, and that the first-named and very limited definition is the true criterion of a "charity." Lord Esher, M.R. has said, with reference to the Moravian Heathen Mission (Pemsel case): "You may desire to convert the richest people, and very often do. If you desire to convert them to your religious opinions, whatever they may be, not on account of their poverty, but because you think it is desirable that their religious views should be like yours, that does not come within this canon. A religious object is not necessarily a charitable object within the sense that I have put it." Lord Halsbury quoted these words with approval, regarding the relief of poverty to be the essence of charity." Lord Bramwell considered the mission in question as undoubtedly benevolent, but not "charitable." His view was, that if the good intent was to bring it within the definition of " charity,' then "those who provided the faggots and racks which were used as instruments of conversion in times gone by were equally charitable."" He continues: "I think a charitable purpose is where assistance is given to the bringing up, feeding, clothing, lodging, and education of those who from poverty, or comparative poverty, stand in need of such assistance.” The late Lord Coleridge took much the same line when the case came before the Divisional Court. In Scotland the Court of Session have held that, in construing an Act which applies to the whole kingdom (in this case a Revenue Act), "charity" is to be defined in its popular and ordinary signification, and not according to technical rules which obtain in one part of the country and not in another. They then proceeded to hold that "charity had only one sense, the relief of poverty": (Baird's Trustees v. The Lord Advocate, 15 Sess. Cas., 4th series, 682.) These views, however, were criticised at length (as was said before) in the Pemsel case, and the result of the judgments of Lords Watson, Herschell, Macnaghten, and Morris, is to settle that" charity" is not restricted to the relief of poverty, but that religious purposes are, in spite of Lord Adam's opinion in Baird's case, also included. Lord Macnaghten, in the course of an elaborate judgment, thus lays down the legal meaning of the term: "Charity, in its legal sense, comprises four principal provisions-trusts for the relief of poverty, trusts for the advancement of education, trusts for the advancement of

66

religion, and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the preceding heads."

Another point in which Mr. Justice Chitty's recent decision is of importance is, that it shows that an institution may be charitable even though a large proportion of the community may regard its objects as harmful. This view was taken by Lord Herschell in the Pemsel case, and although Mr. Justice Chitty does not say so, it was doubtless in his mind. Moreover, it does not follow (unless the distinction below is a true one) several cases in which gifts for securing alterations in the law have been held not to be "charities." Habershon v. Vardon (4 De G. & Sm. 467) was a case of a gift towards "the political restoration of the Jews to Jerusalem," and was declared uncharitable (in the technical sense) and unfriendly to a foreign country. Looking to the present feeling with regard to Armenia, may not this be regarded as a decision that no testator can safely bequeath money to expedite its political amelioration? Other cases can be cited which show that funds to assist poachers or for the publication of a book prejudicially affecting France are not charities. These gifts are indirectly aiming at securing a change of view on the part of the Legislatures of the countries affected. Mr. Justice Chitty has held, in this case of Re Foveaux that, although societies desiring to totally suppress vivisection are operating against the existing laws, they are nevertheless charitable, and as much entitled to favourable consideration as societies for prevention of cruelty to animals whose objects are to support the law. The distinction above mentioned is suggested by Mr. Tyssen in his book on charities, and it is that gifts toward the alteration of the law may be good if given to existing institutions. Mr. Justice Chitty, however, says nothing about this, but he goes on the broad ground that anti-vivisection, although perhaps near the border line, comes within the legal definition of "charity." He was fortified in his opinion by the view taken by Wood, V.C., in Marsh v. Means (3 Jur. N. S. 790). There it was held, Semble, that prevention of cruelty to animals was a good charitable purpose, even though there was no express intent to thereby improve the morality of man. It might be added that this case was also remarkable for the peroration of counsel appearing for next of kin desirous of altogether upsetting the gift in dispute. He said, “If it was to be executed cy-près, the intention being to benefit worn-out horses, donkeys, &c., the nearest approach to a literal carrying out of such an intention would be to give it to the testator's next of kin." Even this argumentum ad homines failed to convince Wood, V.C.

What then are the necessary ingredients of a valid legal charity? The benefit must be public (Pemsel case, Foveaux case, and Nottage case), but may be local: (Foveaux case.) Absence of this criterion upset a gift to Sisters, whose objects were to benefit only their own souls by religious observances: (Cocks v. Manners, L. Rep. 12 Eq. 574.) It also invalidated gifts to a library supported by its subscribers, to a mechanics' institute, a private museum, a harmonic society, and many others. The object of the charity need not necessarily be permanent, for if its objects fail the court acts cy-près: (Attorney-General v. Lawes, 8 Hare, 32.) The benefit may be for rich and poor, Lord Macnaghten holding (at p. 583 of Pemsel's case), that this is a thing which " every charity that deserves the name must do either directly or indirectly." The benefit may extend beyond relief of physical need to aids to intellectual and moral culture: (Id. p. 561.) The moral view of expediency or inexpediency is not regarded by the court, which adopts a neutral attitude and looks to the intention. Says Lord Herschell (at p. 573 of Pemsel's case): "A purpose may be regarded by common understanding as a charitable purpose

even

though opinions differ widely as to its expediency or utility." See also Mr. Justice Chitty's judgment in Re Foveaux. There is also the view as to public policy, illustrated by the gift for Jewish political restoration, and the gift for poachers. Reverting, for a moment only, to the Nottage case, Mr. Justice Kekewich's refusal to consider a cup for a yacht race as charitable was based on the absence of public benefit. Mr. Justice Romer's ground for decision in Lord Stratheden's case is not quite obvious, owing to the insufficient report; and the result in Re Foveaux went on the moral basis. In conclusion, the House of Lords in Pemsel's case and the general trend of judicial opinion seem substantially to support, and slightly to add to, the definition of "charity" as held in Jones v. Williams (Amb. 651), viz., “a gift to a general public use which extends to the poor as well as to the rich."

WE have spoken, in what has gone before, of the ownership of soil and the right of passage thereon from place to place. Let us now consider the peculiar branch of the law which relates to the sea, to the rivers and the streams, and to the diverse waters of every kind which cover the earth; and herein we shall discourse also of the ships that sail upon these waters and the fish that swim in them. For obvious reasons entirely new considerations arise upon all sorts of questions, when we pass from land to water; and we are not therefore surprised to find that a special set of laws is applied accordingly. Where will you find these laws ? We shall forthwith endeavour to set out the information required for an answer to this question, in the shortest space that the enormous dimension of the matters therein included will permit, by referring at once to the various statutes and cases which seem to us to be of the greatest importance in this field of inquiry, and to the chief treatises written by those learned in the law within the several subdivisions into which our subject falls.

The statutes to which we wish to call attention to-day on the general