that is, may see them. What is ordered to be done before the people, when it is the subject of the sense, not of hearing, but of sight, cannot be done before them unless those of them who are properly placed for that purpose can see it. It was contended that "before the people" meant nothing more than "in the church;" to guard against an arterior and secret consecration of the elements. But if the words "before the people" were absent, the manual acts, and the rest of the service, could not be performed elsewhere than in the church, and in that sense coram populo, nor could the sacrament be distributed except in the place and at the time of its consecration: and this argument would, therefore, reduce to silence the words "before the pelple," which are an emphatic part of the declaration of the purpose for which the preparatory acts are to be done. That declaration applies not to the services as a whole, nor to the consecration of the elements as a whole, but to the manual acts, separately and specifically. There is, therefore, in the opinion of their Lordships, a rule sufficiently intelligible to be derived from the directions which are contained in the Rubric as to the acts which are to be performed. The minister is to order the elements "standing before the table:" words which, whether the table stands " altarwise" along the east wall, or in the body of the church or chancel, would be fully satisfied by his standing on the north side and looking towards the south; but which also, in the opinion of their Lordships, as the tables are now usually, and in their opinion lawfully, placed, authorise him to do those acts standing on the west side and looking towards the east. Beyond this and after this there is no specific direction that, during this prayer, he is to stand on the west side, or that he is to stand on the north side. He must, in the opinion of their Lordships, stand so that he may, in good faith, enable the communicants present, or the bulk of them, being properly placed, to see, if they wish it, the breaking of the bread, and the performance of the other manual acts mentioned. He must not interpose his body so as intentionally to defeat the object of the Rubric and to prevent this result. It may be difficult in particular cases to say exactly whether this rule has been complied with; but where there is good faith the difficulty ought not to be a serious one; and it is, in the opinion of their Lordships, clear that a protection was in this respect intended to be thrown around the body of the communicants, which ought to be secured to them by an observ. ance of the plain intent of the Rubric. In applying these principles to the present case, their Lordships find that some difficulty has arisen from the circumstances under which the evidence was taken. The charge against the appellant was a twofold one; both that he had stood at the middle of the west side with his back to the people, and that the people could not see him break the bread or take the cup in his hand. The witness Nicholson undoubtedly states that, at the service of which he speaks, while sitting in the nave, he could not see the appellant perform the manual acts; and the witness Bevan gives evidence to the same effect. But with regard to Nicholson, he explains, as their Lordships understand his evidence, that, whether persons could see what the appellant was doing would depend on whether they were sitting immediately behind him or were sitting on one

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side or the other; and with regard to Bevan, he states that, what would have prevented a man who sat at the side from seeing what the appellant did, was, that he had on a chasuble, "which is a sort of cloak which spreads his body out." When the appellant himself was examined, he does not appear to have been asked any question on the subject; and the inference which their Lordships draw from the whole examination is, that inasmuch as at that time it was understood to be the law, founded on the decision in Hebbert v. Purchas, that the standing on the west side of the table was, of itself and without more, unlawful, neither party thought it important to carry the evidence with any precision beyond this point, the respondents thinking they had established their case, and the appellant not being prepared to dispute the fact of the position in which he stood. Their Lordships are not prepared to hold that a penal charge is established against the appellant merely by the proof that he stood while saying the Prayer of Consecration at the west side of the Communion Table, without further evidence that the people could not, in the sense in which their Lordships have used the words, see him break the bread or take the cup into his hand, and they will therefore recommend that an alteration should be made in the decree in this respect. Their Lordships, before leaving this part of the case, think it right to observe that they do not consider the judgment in the case of Martin v. Mackonochie to have any material bearing on the question now before them. The decision in that case was that the priest must stand during the Prayer of Consecration, and not kneel during a part of it. The correctness of that decision has not been, and, as their Lordships think, cannot be, questioned. Nothing is more clear throughout the Rubrics of the Communion office than that when the priest is intended to kneel, an express provision is made on the subject. The conclusion, however, in Martin v. Mackonochie, is expressed, perhaps, more broadly than was necessary for the decision. What was obviously meant was that the posture of standing was to be continued throughout the whole of the prayer. Nothing was or could be decided as to the place in which the priest was to stand, for that question was not raised, and was not in any manner argued, in the case. Their Lordships will now proceed to the charge as to wafer or waferbread. The charge as to this is "that the appellant used in the Communion Service and administration wafer-bread or wafers, to wit, bread or flour made in the form of circular wafers instead of bread such as is usual to be eaten." And this is traversed by the appellant. It appears that the allegation is in the same form as that used in the Purchas case; but in that case the defendant did not appear, and no criticism seems to have taken place as to the form of the allegation or its sufficiency. It is probable that the allegation was meant to raise the question as to the legality of the wafer, as distinguished from bread of the kind "usual to be eaten," and there are certainly some indications that the appellant and his counsel so understood, and meant to meet, the charge. A different view has, however, been taken by the counsel for the appellant on this appeal, and they have maintained that there is no averment that the wafer, as distinguished from bread ordinarily eaten, was used. They contend that the charge goes to the shape, and not to the composition, of the sub

stance. Their Lordships are of opinion that this objection must prevail. The charge, in their opinion, is consistent with the possibility of it having been the fact that bread "such as is usual to be eaten," but circular, and having such a degree of thinness as might justify its being termed wafers, was what was used. And if this is what was used, their Lordships do not think it could be pronounced illegal. As, however, the question of the construction of the rubric has been raised on this appeal, as it was in the Purchas case, their Lordships think it right to express their opinion upon it, at the same time that they give the appellant the benefit of the ambiguity which exists in the form of the charge. It is to be observed that the rubric does not in any part of it use the term "wafer." The words are "bread "—" bread such as is usual to be eaten," and "the best and purest wheat bread that conveniently may be gotten." Their Lordships have no doubt that a wafer, in the sense in which the word is usually employed, that is, as denoting a composition of flour and water rolled very thin and unleavened, is not "bread such as is usual to be eaten," or "the best and purest wheat bread that conveniently may be gotten." The only question on the construction of the rubric is that raised upon the words "it shall suffice." There is no doubt that in mary cases these words, standing alone, and unexplained by a context, would be quite con. sistent with something different from, larger or smaller, more or less numerous, more or less costly, than what is mentioned, being supplied. Here, however, the sentence commences with the introduction: "To take away all occasion of dissension and superstition, which any person hath or might have concerning the bread, it shall suffice," &c. These words seem to their Lordships to make it necessary that that which is to take away the occasion of dissension and superstition should be something definite, exact, and different from what had caused the dissension and superstition. If not, the occasion of dissension remains, and the superstition may recur. suffice," it must be as here described. What is substantially different will not "suffice." The rubric, which orders that the bread and wine shall be provided by the curate and churchwardens at the charges of the parish, seems to contemplate ordinary bread as the only material to be used, and the 20th canon is still more precise in the same direction. The former rubric (of 1552, 1559, and 1604) had said, "It shall suffice that the bread be such as is usually to be eaten at the table with other meats, but the best and purest wheat bread that conveniently may be gotten." Queen Elizabeth's injunction of 1559 on the same subject (in its form mandatory, and acted upon for many years afterwards), was issued when this rubric had the force of law, and must be understood in a sense consistent with, and not contradictory to it. That injunction distinguishes between (1 Card. Doc. Ann. 202) "the sacramental bread" and "the usual bread and water, heretofore named singing cakes, which served for the use of the private mass;" directing the former to be "made and formed plain, without any figure thereupon, and of the same fineness and fashion round" as the latter, but "to be somewhat bigger in compass and thickness." The form, and not the substance, is here regulated. To order the use of the substance properly called "wafer," which was

"To

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not "bread such as is usual to be eaten at the table" would have been directly contradictory to the rubric; and this cannot be supposed to have been intended. There was evidently dissension" on this subject, and some diversity of practice, in the reign of Elizabeth. It appears from passages in the fourth book of the "Ecclesiastical Polity (1 Hooker's Works by Keble, 6th edition, pp. 449-451,) published in 1594, that Hooker considered the use, either of leavened or of unleavened bread, to be at that time lawful. But the point was one as to which controversy then existed, and had given occasion to strife. In 1580, Chaderton, bishop of Chester, acting as commissioner in Lancashire, under the Crown, applied to the Privy Council for instructions as to "two special points worthy of reformation;" one of which was "for the Lord's Supper, with wafers, or with common bread ?" The Lords of the Council replied (26th July, 1580) that they thought both points ought to be referred to the consideration of Parliament; adding, "In the meantime, for the appeasing of such division and bitterness as doth and may arise of the use of both these kinds of bread, we think it meet, that in such parishes as do use the common bread, and in others that embrace the wafer, they be severally continued as they are at this present. Until which time, also, your Lordship is to be careful, according to your good discretion, to persuade and procure a quietness amongst such as shall strive for the public maintaining either of the one or the other." (Peck's Desiderata Curiosa, p. 91). In a later letter, the Bishop recurred to the same question, and was thus answered (21st Aug. 1580), by Lord Burghley and Sir Francis Walsingham: Concerning the last point of your letter, contained in a postscript, whereby appeareth that some are troubled about the substance of the communion bread, it were good to teach them that are weak in conscience, in esteeming of the wafer bread, not to make difference. But, if their weakness continue, it were not amiss, in our opinions, charitable to tolerate them, as children with milk. Which we refer to your Lordship's better consideration." (Ibid., p. 94). In 1584, Bishop Overton, of Lichfield, issued an injunction to the clergy of his diocese: "That the ordinance of the Book of Common Prayer be from henceforth observed in this, that the bread delivered to the communicants be such as is usual to be eaten at the table with other meats, yet of the purest and finest wheat; and no other bread to be used by the minister, nor to be provided for by the churchwardens and parishioners, than such finest common bread.' (Appendix to 2nd Report of Rit. Comm., p. 430.) The 20th Canon of 1603-4, already mentioned, seems to have proceeded on the same view of the law; and, after the passing of that canon, the usual form of inquiry in the Visitation Articles of Bishops and Archdeacons (e.g., Archbishop Bancroft in 1605, Bishop Babington, of Worcester, in 1607; and Bishop Andrewes in 1619), was whether the churchwardens always supplied, for the Holy Communion, "fine white bread." The same form of inquiry continued to be generally used after the rubric had been altered, upon the Revision of 1662, so as to express its purpose to be, "to take away all occasion of dissension," as well as of "superstition" (which alone had been previously mentioned). The same motive had been expressed in the rubric of King

Edward's first Prayer Book, "for avoiding all matters and occasion of dissension" ("superstition "not being then added); when the opposite course was taken, of requiring unleavened bread, of a certain form and fashion, to be everywhere and always used. The practice of using fine wheat bread such as is usual to be eaten, and not cake or wafer, appears to have been universal throughout the Church of England from the alteration of the rubric in 1662, till 1840, or later. Their Lordships think that if it had been averred and proved that the wafer, properly so called, had been used by the appellant, it would have been illegal, but as the averment and proof is insufficient, they will advise an alteration of the decree in this respect. There remains to be considered the charge as to the crucifix. As to this the allegation is, that the appellant unlawfuily set up and placed upon the top of the screen separating the chancel from the body or nave of the church, a crucifix and twenty-four metal candlesticks, with candles which were lighted on either side of the crucifix. This charge was accompanied by two other charges, in respect of which the appellant has been admonished to abstain from the acts complained of, and to this part of the monition he has submitted. One of these charges was for having formed and accompanied a procession from the chancel, down the north aisle and up the nave back to the chancel again, on the occasion of public service, those taking part in the procession at one time falling upon their knees, and remaining kneeling for some time. The other charge was the setting up, attached to the walls of the church, representations of figures, in coloured relief of plastic material, purporting to represent scenes of our Lord's passion, and forming what are commonly called stations of the cross and passion, such as are often used in Roman Catholic churches. The learned judge, whose decision is under appeal, thus describes the screen and crucifix: "There is a screen of open ironwork some 9ft. high stretching across the church at the entrance to the chancel; the middle portion of this screen rises to a peak, and is surmounted by a crucifix or figure of our Saviour on the Cross in full relief and about 18in. long-this is the crucifix com. plained of. The screen of course, from its position, directly faces the congregation, and the sculptured or moulded figure of our Lord is turned towards them. There is, further, a row of candles at distances of nearly a foot apart all along the top of the screen, which is continued up the central and rising portion of it, the last candles coming close up to the crucifix on either side, so that when the candles are lighted for the evening service, I should presume that the crucifix would stand in a full light." For the erection of this screen at the entrance of the chancel, in the form in which it is now found there, and surmounted by the crucifix in question, their Lordships think it clear that no faculty has been obtained. There is, indeed, a faculty, dated the 23rd of Aug. 1870, authorising the building of “a dwarf wall with screen thereon of light ironwork between the chancel and the nave; and this faculty appears to have been granted with reference to a ground plan annexed to the petition for the faculty; which ground plan specifies the place where this screen of light ironwork was to be erected. But no further information was given to the ordinary of the character of the structure, much less of the crucifix by which

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it was to be surmounted. Technically, therefore, it must be held that, in the absence of a proper faculty, the crucifix was unlawfully set up and retained. If, however, their Lordships were of opinion that the case was one in which, under all the circumstances, the ordinary, on the application for a faculty, ought to grant, or might properly grant, a faculty, they might probably have thought it right, before pronouncing any judgment, to have given an opportunity to the appellant to apply for a faculty. Their Lordships, however, are of opinion that, under the circumstances of this case, the ordinary ought not to grant a faculty for the crucifix. The learned judge refers to two cases, decided by this tribunal, which have a material bearing upon the present question. The first of these was the case of Liddell v. Westerton (Moore's Special Report). In this case, as the learned judge states, the court had to pronounce upon the legality of a cross set up in the appellant's church. And it was decided that, although before the reformation the symbol of the cross had no doubt been put to superstitious uses, “yet that crosses, when used as mere emblems of the Christian faith, and not as objects of superstitious reverence, may still lawfully be erected as architectural decorations," and that the wooden cross erected in that particular case was to be considered a mere architectural ornament." The court determined nothing directly as to the legality of a crucifix, but was at great pains throughout the judgment to point out that crosses were to be distinguished from crucifixes, saying that "there was a wide difference between the cross and images of saints, and even, though in a less degree, between a cross and a crucifix," the former of which, they said, had been "used as a symbol of Christianity two or three centuries before either crucifixes or images were introduced." The other case is that of Philpott v. Boyd (L. Rep. 6 P. C. 435). As to this case, the learned judge states that this tribunal, in justifying the erection of the Exeter rerodos, adhered entirely and very distinctly to the position taken up in the previous case, and pronounced that erection lawful, though it included many sculptured images, on the express ground "that it had been set up for the purpose of decoration only," declaring that it was "not in danger of being abused," and that “it was not suggested that any superstitions reverence has been, or is likely to be, paid to any of the figures upon it." The learned judge then proceeds to consider whether it would be right to conclude that the crucifix in the present case was set up for the purposes of decoration only; whether it is in danger of being abused, and whether it could be suggested that superstitious reverence had been, or was likely to be, paid to it. The learned judge states that the crucifix, as formerly set up in our churches, had a special history of its own. He refers to the rood ordinarily found before the reformation in the parish churches of this country, which was, in fact, a crucifix with images at the base, erected on a structure called the rood loft, traversing the church at the entrance to the chancel, and occupying a position not otherwise than analogous to that which the iron screen does in the present case. He refers to the evidence as to the preservation of the crucifixes or roods during the reign of Queen Mary, and of their destruction, as monuments of idolatry and supersti

tion, in the reign of Elizabeth. He takes notice of a letter of Bishop Sandys in 1561 in the Zurich Letters, first series, p. 73, in which he states: "We had not long since a controversy respecting images. The Queen's Majesty considered it not contrary to the Word of God, nay, rather for the advantage of the Church, that the image of Christ crucified, together with Mary and John, should be placed, as heretofore, in some conspicuous part of the church, where they might more readily be seen by the people. Some of us thought far otherwise, and more especially as all images of every kind were at our last visitation not only taken down, but also burnt, and that too, by public authority, and because the ignorant and superstitious multitude are in the habit of paying adoration to this idol above all others." The learned judge arrives at the conclusion that the crucifix so placed formed an ordinary feature in the parish churches before the Reformation, and that it cannot be doubted that it did so, not as a mere architectural ornament, but as an object of reverence and adoration. He further points out that the worship of it was enjoined in the Sarum Missal, in which the order of service for Palm Sunday ends with the adoration of the rood by the celebrant and choir before passing into the chancel. And to this reference might be added one to the order for the Communion according to the Hereford use, in which there is a prayer with this introduction, "Postea sacerdos adorans crucifixum dicat." Proceeding then on these considerations, and dealing with a Church in which was found not merely an illuminated crucifix, but also those stations of the cross and other acts in the conduct of the services, the illegality of which the appellant does not challenge in his appeal, the judge continues thus: "It is no doubt easy to say, what proof is there of danger of idolatry now? What facts are there to point to a probability of 'abuse'? But when the Court is dealing with a well-known sacred object-an object enjoined and put up by authority in all churches of England before the Reformation, in a particular part of the church and for the particular purpose of 'adoration-when the Court finds that the same object, both in the church and out of it, is still worshipped by those who adhere to the unreformed Romish faith, and when it is told that, now, after a lapse of 300 years, it is suddenly proposed to set up again this same object in the same part of the church as an architectural ornament only, it is hard not to distrust the uses to which it may come to be put, or escape the apprehension that what begins in 'decoration' may end in 'idolatry.' If this apprehension is a just and reasonable one, then there exists that likelihood and danger of 'superstitious reverence' which the Privy Council in Philpotts v. Boyd pronounced to be fatal to the lawfulness of all images and figures set up in a church." In these observations of the learned judge their Lordships concur; and they select them as the grounds of his decision which commend themselves to their judgment. They are prepared, under the circumstances of this case, to affirm the decision directing the removal of the crucifix, while at the same time they desire to say that they think it important to maintain, as to representations of sacred persons and objects in a church, the liberty established in Philpotts v. Boyd subject to the power and duty of the ordinary so to exercise his judicial discretion in granting or refusing faculties, as to guard against things likely

[CT. OF APP.

to be abused for purposes of superstition. On the whole, therefore, their Lordships will humbly recommend Her Majesty to affirm the decree of the Court of Arches, except as regards the position of the minister and the use of wafer-bread or wafers; and as to these excepted matters they will humbly advise Her Majesty that inasmuch as it is not established to their satisfaction that the appellant, while saying the Prayer of Consecration, so stood that the people could not see him break the bread or take the cup into his hand, as alleged in the representation; and, inasmuch as it is not alleged or proved that what was used by him in the administration of the Holy Communion was other than bread such as is usual to be eaten, the decree of the Court of Arches should be in these respects reversed. And they will further humbly advise her Majesty that in respect of the charges as to which the decree is reversed, the costs in the Court of Arches should be paid by the respondents to the appellant; and further that there should be no costs of this Appeal.

Solicitors for the appellants, Brooks, Jenkins, and Co.

Solicitors for the respondents, Moore and Curry.

Supreme Court of Judicature.

COURT OF APPEAL.

Monday, May 7, 1877. RUMSEY V. NICHOLL. (a)

Pleading Ejectment from rectory house and glebe -Demurrer.

A statement of claim alleged that in 1864 the plaintiff was presented, instituted, and inducted to the rectory and living of L., and in Jan. 1867 he obtained leave from the patron to exchange livings with some clergyman to be approved by the patron; that the patron approved of one P., incumbent of the living of C. (with whom the plaintiff was negotiating), and promised to do all things necessary to carry out the proposed exchange with P.; and to carry out the exchange the plaintiff executed a deed of resignation of his living of L., and delivered it to the registrar of the Bishop of the Diocese; that before delivering the deed the plaintiff, with the knowledge and assent of the patron, had obtained the permission of the bishop to exchange livings with P., and that at the time of delivering the deed the plaintiff explained fully to the registrar his object and intention in executing and delivering it, and the registrar, on behalf of the bishop, accepted it for that purpose only; and that at the time of the execution and delivery the bishop, the registrar, and the patron well knew that the deed was executed and delivered by the plaintiff in reliance on and in consideration of the promise made by the patron, and with full intention on the part of the plaintiff that if the exchange should not be carried out the deed of resignation was to be void to all intents, &c.

The statement also alleged that the patron did not fulfil his promise, &c., or do what was necessary (a) Reported by W APPLETON, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

Held (affirming, but on different grounds, the judqment of Denman, J. in the Common Pleas Division), that the statement of claim was bad, as it did not sufficiently allege that the registrar accepted the plaintiff's deed of resignation subject to the condition that the deed was to be void if the exchange of livings was not effected.

In an action of ejectment the plaintiff's statement of claim was as follows:

1. In the year 1864 the plaintiff was presented, instituted, and inducted to the rectory and living of Llandough, in the county of Glamorgan, and entered into possession of the rectory house, glebe lands, and profits of the said rectory and living, and continued therein until dispossessed as hereinafter mentioned.

2. In or about the month of January 1867, the plaintiff requested permission from C. R. Mansel Talbot, the patron of the said living of Llandough aforesaid, to exchange livings with some clergymen to be approved by the said patron.

3. The said patron granted the permission requested as aforesaid, and the plaintiff thereupon entered into negotiations with one Robert Pinckney, who was then the incumbent of the living of Chilfrome, in the county of Dorset, and the plair tiff subsequently submitted the name of Pinckney to the patron in terms of the arrangements aforesaid. The said patron, after making personal inquiries and satisfying himself by the said inquiries of the suitability of Pinckney, approved of the proposed exchange of livings and promised that he would do all things necessary on his part to enable the plaintiff and Pinckney to carry out an exchange of their living as aforesaid.

4. Relying on the said promise, and for the purpose of carrying out the said exchange, the plaintiff executed a deed of resignation of the living of Llandough, and delivered the same into the hands of the registrar of the Bishop of Llandaff. Before executing and delivering the said deed of resignation, the plaintiff had, with the sanction and to the knowledge of C. R. Mansel Talbot, the patron aforesaid, requested and obtained from the bishop permission to exchange livings with Pinckney; and at the time of executing and delivering the deed, the plaintiff explained fully and explicitly to the registrar aforesaid his intention and the object which he had in view in executing and delivering the said deed, and the registrar on behalf of the bishop aforesaid accepted the said deed to hold for that purpose only. And at the time of executing and delivering the said deed, and before and after such execution and delivery, the said bishop, and the said registrar, and the said patron, knew well that the deed was executed and delivered as aforesaid, by the plaintiff in reliance on and in consideration of the promise made by the patron in paragraph 3 mentioned, and with full intention on MAG. CAS.-VOL. XI.

[CT. OF APP.

the part of the plaintiff that if the said exchange as aforesaid should happen not to be carried out, the said deed of resignation was to be held and become null and void to all intents and purposes whatsoever, and the plaintiff should have full liberty to remain in, or, if need were, re-enter on the possession and enjoyment of his living aforesaid.

5. Notwithstanding the premises the said C. R. Mansel Talbot, the patron aforesaid, would not and did not falfil his part of the agreement in paragraph 3 mentioned, and did not and would not present Pinckney, or do what was necessary on his part to carry out and effectuate the exchange of livings proposed between the plaintiff and Pinchney, but falsely claiming and pretending to have obtained an absolute legal right to dispose of the plaintiff's said living by the resignation executed and delivered as aforesaid, and in violation of his promise and agreement aforesaid, and not regarding the plaintiff's remonstrance claimed right to present, and did upon such false claim present his nephew, the defendant, to the plaintiff's said living at Llandough.

6. The defendant, in full knowledge of all the premises, and despite the remonstrances of the plaintiff, accepted the said presentation, and pretending right therefrom, broke and entered the rectory house and glebe lands and living of Llandough aforesaid, and expelled the plaintiff from his possession thereof, and took and received to his own use all the issues and profits, and the beneficial use and occupation of the said rectory house, glebe lands, and rectory and living of Llandough aforesaid, and has continued ever since to keep the plaintiff ejected as aforesaid; whereby the plaintiff during all that time has lost and been deprived of the beneficial use and occupation of the said rectory house, glebe lands, and rectory, and living as aforesaid, and of all the issues and profits thereof. And, though the defendant has been repeatedly desired and required to vacate and yield up possession of the rectory house, glebe land, rectory, and living aforesaid, and the issues and profits thereof, he still continues to keep possession of the said rectory house, glebe lands, rectory, and living aforesaid, and to keep the plaintiff ejected therefrom, and to convert to his own use the issues and profits thereof, to the plaintiff's great loss and injury. The plaintiff claims possession of the rectory house and glebe lands aforesaid, and 40001. for mesne profits from November, 1867, until such possession shall be given.

Demurrer on the ground that the statement of claim shows that the plaintiff is not entitled to the living, and that the defendant is.

The demurrer was argued before Denman, J. in the Common Pleas Division, and judgment was given for the defendant with costs.

The case in the Common Pleas Division is reported ante, Vol. X., p. 524; 36 L. T. Rep. N. S. 252.

The plaintiff appealed.

McClymont, for plaintiff.-The deed of registration was delivered as an escrow, and the statement of claim sufficiently alleges that it was. Until an exchange is effected by the presentation, institution, and induction of both parties to it, the whole proceeding is void. Here the deed is void, and the defendant a wrongdoer in entering upon the plaintiff's rectory and living. He cited

G