which now happily prevails among the clergy of this country would be destroyed or subverted." In this view we entirely concur, and it is materially confirmed by the fact that the uniformity on which Dr. Lushington congratulated his hearers has unhappily ceased to exist. If the construction contended for by the bishop should prevail, looking at the wide differences of opinion prevailing among the clergy in reference to rites and ceremonies, it might well be that in a short time uniformity in the realm might disappear, and diocesan uniformity take its place, which again would be liable to vary with each succeeding ordinary. Whereas, if the law is to be enforced, any doubtful or disputed question of doctrine or ritual may be brought to the test of legal decision, if necessary by the appellate tribunal in the last resort. This being, in our opinion, the construction to be put on the Act of 1840, the question already adverted to presents itself, whether this statute has not been virtually abrogated by the Act of 1874, commonly called the Public Worship Regnlation Act, the two statutes being in pari materiâ, and apparently inconsistent with one another. That the two statutes are in pari materiâ as regards offences relating to ritual is clear. Both were passed for the purpose of establishing a new method of proceeding in the trial of offences committed by clergymen in substitution for the previously existing procedure; the only difference in this respect being that, while the earlier Act refers to "any offence against the laws ecclesiastical" committed by any clerk in holy orders, the later statute enumerates the particular offences to which it is applicable-viz., "firstly, where any alteration in, or addition to, the fabrics, ornaments, or fur niture of a church without lawful authority, or any desecration forbidden by law, has been introduced into it; secondly, where the incumbent has within the preceding twelve months used or permitted to be used in a church or burial-ground any unlawful ornament of the minister of the church, or neglected to use any prescribed ornament or vesture; or, thirdly, where the incumbent has failed to observe, or to cause to be observed, the directions contained in the Book of Common Prayer relating to the performance, in such church or burial-ground, of the services, rites, and ceremonies ordered by the said book, or has made, or permitted to be made, any unlawful addition to, alteration of, or omission from such services, rites, and ceremonies." It is, therefore, plain that, so far as relates to offences committed in the observance of the established ritual, both statutes apply to the offences which form the subject-matter of the complaint in the present instance. If the enactments of the two statutes are inconsistent, the rule would apply that where two statutes are in pari materiâ, and their enactments cannot stand together, the later statute shall prevail, as being the later exponent of the legislative will. Now when we turn to the later statute we find an entirely new and different system and scheme of proceeding. Though the charge is still to be addressed to the bishop in the form of a representation, it can no longer, unless when it is preferred by the archdeacon or a churchwarden, be made by a single individual, whether a parishioner or not, but requires the concurrence of three parishioners, or, in case of cathedral or collegiate churches, of three inhabitants of the diocese. The commission of inquiry, which was at once the creation and the

[Q.B. Div.

distinctive feature of the Act of 1840, is entirely superseded, while an absolute discretion is given to the bishop, who is required to further the suit in the manner prescribed by the Act, "unless he shall be of opinion, after considering the whole circumstances of the case, that proceedings should not be taken on the representation;" in which case he is to state in writing the reasons for his opinion, which statement is to be deposited in the registry of the diocese, apparently without any ulterior consequences, thus making the bishop the sole judge and arbiter whether the suit shall proceed, not merely with reference to the nature of the offence charged, or the facts on which the charge may be founded, but enabling him to take into account collateral circumstances, in themselves affording no answer to the accusation, or satisfaction to the parishioners complaining that the public worship is conducted otherwise than according to the ritual of the Church as by law established. It seems at first sight difficult to conceive, in the face of so entire a change in the system of proceeding, that the Legislature can have intended that the two statutes should stand together and the two modes of proceeding remain equally open to parties desirous of prosecuting such a suit, or that while three parishioners are needed under the later Act to set the bishop in motion, who then has an arbitrary discretion to determine whether the snit shali proceed or not, under the earlier Act it shall still remain open to a single individual, whether parishioner or not, to compel the bishop, however unwilling, to put the statutory process in motion. We should therefore have been disposed to hold, with reference to the rule just referred to, that the earlier statute was virtually repealed, and, consequently, that it was not open to the complainant to insist on its application in the present instance. But we are met by the positive enactment contained in the 5th section of the later statute, "that nothing in this Act contained, except as herein expressly provided, shall be construed to affect or repeal any jurisdiction which may now be in force for the due administration of ecclesiastical law." Now, not only was the jurisdiction given by the Church Discipline Act in force when the Public Worship Act passed, but, with the exception of the appellate jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in ecclesiastical suits, to which this saving provision can scarcely have been intended to apply, it was the only jurisdiction in penal matters then in force. And the 18th section of the later statute is conclusive, for it expressly provides that where sentence has been pronounced against an incumbent for an offence under the Act of 3 & 4 Vict. c. 86, he shall not be proceeded against under this Act, and where any judgment has been so pronounced under this Act, he shall not be liable to be proceeded against under the former statute, thereby conclusively indicating that an offence within the Public Worship Act may still be proceeded against under the earlier statute. This apparently conflicting legislation may, however, be reconciled. The purpose and effect of it appears to be this: The proceeding by commission and the cumbrous procedure by articles in a formal suit being deemed too dilatory in cases of flagrant ritualistic excesses, a more expeditious mode of proceeding and a simpler procedure were made available, subject, however, to more rigorous conditions. If the more expeditious process of the

Public Worship Act, in which preliminary inquiry is dispensed with, is invoked, the stricter conditions of the Act as to the number of the complainants and their subjection to the absolute discretion of the Bishop must be complied with. But it still remains open to a party who is willing to adopt the more elaborate process to claim under the former Act the remedy which it affords. All that remains to be considered is whether, the writ of mandamus being a discretionary writ, we should, in the exercise of the discretion which we are undoubtedly at liberty to exercise, decline to issue the writ in this in stance. We cannot but be sensible of the apparent incongruity which is involved in the interference of a temporal court between a bishop and one of his clergy, in a matter of ecclesiastical discipline. But it must be remembered that there is a third element in the case which must not be lost sight of. In these questions of doctrine or ritual the laity are interested, and deeply interested, as well as the clergy. As an institution endowed and maintained by the State, the Church exists for the benefit of the laity. It is the right of the latter, being members of the Church, to take part, under the ministration of the clergy, in the public worship, as well as to have the benefit of the various rites and services of the Church, according to the ritual of the Church as by law ascertained and established. One of their most sacred and valued rights is infringed when they are driven to abandon their churches by the introduction of a ritual which is not that of the Church, and which appears to them to be an advance towards a religion which is not that of the Reformation. It is unnecessary to express any opinion as to the decision which was come to in this respect by this court in the case of Reg. v. Bishop of Chichester, further than that, as it must be taken to be clear that prior to the passing of the Church Discipline Act a stranger would have had no difficulty in obtaining permission to promote the office of the judge in such a suit, as one of the public, in a matter of so much coucern to the community as the maintenance of the public worship of the Church as by law established, if the case of a stranger applying for a mandamus should again occur, we might think it necessary to reconsider the mat.er before we should be prepared to follow the precedent set in that case. But in this case we have no such difficulty as there presented itself. We have here a parishioner, who, as such, has an undoubted right to have the services of the Church performed in the church of the parish to which he belongs, according to the law of the Church as established by the rubric, the canons, and the Acts of Uniformity, complaining that by reason of unlawful practices introduced into the Communion service, his religious sense is SO offended that he cannot conscientiousty take part in the administration of the Sacrament and demanding inquiry. There cannot be a doubt that a person so circumstanced would, prior to the Church Discip ine Act, have been admitted to prosecute as of right, or that his application to promote the office of the judge, the bona fides and substantial character of his complaint not being open to doubt, would have been granted as matter of course. We are of opinion that under such circumstances we have no alternative but to

[C.P. Div.

on the ground that the complaint was frivolous and vexatious, or that it had been prompted by sinister or unworthy motives. Under such cir cumstances we should have felt ourselves justified in refusing the writ; but nothing of the kind exists here. It is admitted that there has been such a substantial departure by the incumbent from the established ritual as amounts to an offence against the ecclesiastical law. It is not denied that the practices complained of were such as might give offence to the religious conscience of a member of the Established Church, and deter him from partaking in the service of the Communion when thus administered. The refusal of the commission by the bishop was founded, not on the nature of the complaint, or the claim of the applicant to redress, but on collateral and extraneous circumstances which do not alter or affect the offence, but are founded on considerations of expediency, or such as have reference to the person of the party against whom the application is made. Now, not only do we think that, on the construction of the statute, the bishop had no discretion in this matter, but we are further of opinion that the purpose of this legislation being to maintain uniformity of doc trine and ritual, and it being the right of the parishioners to have the services of the church performed according to the law of the Church, even if the bishop had discretionary authority in such a case, he ought, having here a judicial, or, at all events, a quasi-judicial duty to discharge, to have used it to allow an inquiry to take place. We do not think, therefore, that we should be justified as matter of discretion in withholding the writ. But it was suggested that the Public Worship Act having made the concurrence of three parishioners necessary to found a complaint to the bishop, we ought not, in the exercise of our discretion, to give effect by mandamus to the complaint of one. But the obvious answer is that if the Legislature had intended that any change in this respect should be made in the Church Discipline Act, which it advisedly keeps alive, it could have introduced such a provision in the later Act. If it was incumbent on the bishop to entertain the complaint on the application of a single parishioner-and we think he had no discretion in the matter-it cannot be open to us as a matter of discretion to withhold the redress which the applicant seeks at our hands. The rule for a mandamus to the bishop to i sue a commission, or send the case at once to the Court of Arches by letters of request, must therefore be made absolute. Judgment for applicant.

Solicitors for applicant, Moore and Currey. Solicitors for Mr. Carter, Brooks, Tanner, and Jenkins.

COMMON PLEAS DIVISION.

Nov. 19 and 20, 1878.

(Before Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., GROVE and LINDLEY,

JJ.)

LEONARD v. ALLOWAYS. (a)

APPEAL FROM REVISING BARRISTER.

Parliament-County vote-Late notice of claimPower of overseers to waive irregularity—6 Vict. c. 18, 88. 4, 5, 37, 40.

if the bishop had declined to grant a commission

(a) Reported by A. H. BITTLESTON, Esq, Barrister-at-Law.

shall on or before the 20th July give notice of claim to the overseers. By sect. 5, "the overseers shall, on or before the last day of July in every year, make out a list of all persons who, before the 20th day of July then next preceding, shall have claimed as aforesaid." A claim was delivered to the overseers on the 25th July; the overseers inserted the name of the person claiming in a list of voters which they published on the 29th of the same month.

Held, that the overseers had power to waive the irregularity, and that the list prepared by them was conclusive as to the claim having been duly made.

Davies v. Hopkins (3 C. B. N. S. 376; 30 L. T. 152) followed.

APPEAL from the decision of the revising barrister for the county of Gloucester.

At the revision of the list of voters for the parish of Stapleton, the appellant objected to the name of the respondent being inserted in the list.

The following facts were established by the evidence: That the claim of the respondent to be inserted in the said list of voters for the parish of Stapleton was not delivered or sent to the overseers of the said parish until after the 20th July last, but was delivered to the said overseers on the 25th July last. That the said overseers published the said claim on the 29th July last. That the respondent attended at the said court and duly proved his qualification.

Ten other persons delivered claims to be inserted in the said list under similar circumstances, and such claims were published by the said overseers on the said 29th July, and they also attended at the said court and duly proved their qualifications.

The revising barrister decided that the names of the respondent and of the said ten other persons should be inserted in the said list.

If the court should be of opinion that the decision was wrong, the register of voters for the western division of the county of Gloucester is to be amended by erasing therefrom the names of the respondent and of the said ten other persons.

C. Bowen for the appellant-By 6 Vict. c. 18, sect. 4, every person desiring to make a claim to vote "shall, on or before the said 20th of July, deliver or send to the said overseers a notice signed by him of his claim, according to the form of notice," &c. And by sect. 5, "the overseers of the poor of every parish and township respectively shall on or before the last day of July in every year make out, according to the form numbered (3) in the said schedule (A.), an alphabetical list of all persons who on or before the 20th of July then next preceding shall have claimed as aforesaid, and in every such list," &c. By sect. 40, "where the name of any person inserted in any list of voters shall have been objected to by the overseers, or by any other persons, and such other person," &c., the "revising barrister shall then require it to be proved that the person so objected to was entitled on the last day of July then next preceding to have his name inserted in the list of voters in respect of the qualification described in such list, and in case the same," &c [Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-Davies v. Hopkins (3 C. B. N. S. 376; 30 L. T. Rep. 152) in principle governs this case.] It is submitted that that case was wrongly decided.

Anstie, for the respondent, was not called upon. MAG. CAS. VOL. XI.

[C.P. DIV.

Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-I am of opinion that the judgment of the revising barrister was right, and should be affirmed. What may be the power of the court to reverse its own decision I decline to say, because the decision on which I base my judgment is, in my opinion, a right decision. In the present case the objection raised against the claimant is that he did not claim within the day specified in the sects. 4 and 5, and the counsel for the appellant has argued that the claimant must be one who makes a claim within the provisions of the Act, for that if the claimant does not follow the provisions of the Act, he is not a claimant within the meaning of the Act, and consequently has no right to be on the list. No doubt, on the words of sect. 5 there is plenty of ground on which to found such an argument, and, if that section stood alone, there would be considerable force in the argument; but there are other sections, especially sects. 37 and 40, which throw light on that section by showing, first, what the revising barrister has to do when the claimant is not on the list and is objected to; and, secondly, what he has to do when the claimant is on the list and is objected to. Sect. 37 deals with the case of a claimant who is omitted from the list. There the revising barrister is ordered to call on the claimant to show that he is rectus in curiâ, and that before he is entitled to be placed on the list he has fulfilled all the conditions of the various Acts of Parliament; the revising barrister has, in the words of the section, to see "that such person gave due notice of such his claim to the said overseers," words which are omitted in sect. 40. But when we come to look at sect. 40 and see what is ordered to be done when persons are on the list and are objected to, then all that we find the revising barrister is entitled to require is proof that the claimant was entitled on the 31st July then next preceding in respect of his qualification described in such list to have his name inserted in the list. Changing the collocation of the words, that is the sense of the section. This appears to me to be a strong argument to show that the duty of making the claim and the power of the overseers are correlative, and that the overseers are only concerned with the directions of sect. 5. Such being my opinion with regard to these sections, I find that in Davies v. Hopkins (ubi sup), a case in which all these sections were before the court, the same conclusions were come to, and I have therefore merely to say that I think Davies v. Hopkins was perfectly well decided, and, on the authority of that case and the construction there placed on the Act, I am of opinion that the decision of the revising barrister was right, and should be affirmed.

GROVE, J.-I am also of opinion that the judgment of the revising barrister must be affirmed, and base my judgment on Davies v. Hopkins (ubi sup.). That case is admitted to be identical in principle with the present. I was struck with the argument of the appellant's counsel founded on sect. 5 of the Act; and I am not prepared to say that I should have decided against his contention without hearing counsel on the other side if it were not for the decision in Davies v. Hopkins. The strength of the argument is lessened by sects. 37 and 40, which seem to point to the 31st of July as the date to which the revising barrister has to look when considering the qualification of the claimant, and on which the public are in3 S

formed of the names of the persons on the list and the claimants. But the argument has not satisfied me, on any view of these sections, that Davies v. Hopkins (ubi sup.) was wrongly decided, and I gather from Hadfield's case (L. Rep. 8 C. P. 306), that we must be satisfied the previous decision was clearly and manifestly wrong before we reverse it. I am of opinion, therefore, that the decision of the revising barrister was right.

LINDLEY, J.-I am of the same opinion. The claim ought to have been sent in before the 20th July, instead of which it was sent in on the 25th July. This was wrong, and the claimant not having claimed in time had no right to be on the list; so far the case is clear. The question then arises, had the overseers power to receive the claim though not sent in in time? Davies v. Hopkins (ubi sup.) decides that they had, and on a careful review of the sections of the Act, and especially sect. 37, I agree with the conclusions there arrived at, and I am of opinion that, though the claimant had no right to be on the list, yet that his sending in the claim late was an irregularity which the overseers had power to waive.

Decision affirmed with costs. Solicitors for the appellant, Ellis, Munday, and Co., agents for Vizard and Co., Dursley.

Solicitors for the respondent, Jerdein, agent for Carter, Newnham.

Tuesday, Nov. 20, 1878.

(Before Lord COLERIDGE, C.J. and GROVE and LINDLEY, JJ.)

SMITH V. WOOLSTON. (a)

APPEAL FROM REVISING BARRISTER.

Parliament-County vote-Description of qualifying property-Power of amendment-6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, s. 40-28 & 29 Vict. c. 36, s. 6. A revising barrister has power to amend the description of a voter's qualifying property by striking out such portions of it as he has parted with, and, if what remains is of sufficient qualifying value to confer the franchise, the voter is entitled to remain on the list.

APPEAL from the decision of the revising barrister for the Northern Division of the county of Northampton.

The case stated was as follows:

At the revision of the list of voters for the parish of Wellingborough, the respondent duly objected to the name of the appellant being retained on the list. The objection was grounded on the third column of the register, and the objection related to the nature of the interest of the appellant in the qualifying property. The name of the appellant was on the list of voters for the parish of Wellingborough.

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all the plots mentioned as above in the fourth column, except plot 476, and that plot 476, which he retained, was freehold land, and of sufficient qualifying value to confer the franchise. The revising barrister was of opinion that the freehold land mentioned in the third column was not the freehold land now possessed by the appellant, and that he had no power to amend the fourth column, as requested by the appellant, by striking out the plots which he had parted with as aforesaid. The revising barrister, therefore, held that the appellant was not entitled to be retained as stated upon the list of voters, and expunged his name from the list of voters. If such decision was correct, such list as revised was to remain without alteration; if such decision was incorrect, the name of the appellant, with his address and particulars of his qualification, was to be added to the revised list of voters for the parish of Wellingborough, in the northern division of the county of Northampton.

Gibbons for the appellant.-The notice of objec tion was to the third column, where the nature of the qualification is described as freehold, which is admitted to be correct. But, before the revising barrister, an objection was taken to the fourth column, which was not objected to in the notice, that the appellant had parted with fourteen plots out of the fifteen therein mentioned, although the remaining plot was sufficient to qualify him. The revising barrister was wrong to expunge the name from the list on that ground. He had power to amend the description by striking out the surplus plots:

Bendle v. Watson, L. Rep. 7 C. P. 163; 25 L. T. Rep.
N. S. 806;

Registration Act, 6 Vict. c. 18, sect. 40. (a) [He was stopped by the Court.]

Horace Smith for the respondent.-First, where the objection is to the third column, both it and the fourth column must be looked at to ascertain the voter's right to be on the register (Hitchins v. Brown, 2 C. B. 25); and in Howitt v. Stephens (5 C. B. N. S. 30, 39; 32 L. T. Rep. 162), which was a case of an objection to the third column. Byles, J. says, "I read the third and

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(a) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, sect. 40, is, as far as is material, as follows: That the revising barrister shall correct any mistake which shall be proved to him to have been made in any list, and shall expunge the name of every person whose qualification, as stated in any list, shall be insufficient in law to entitle such person to vote, and also the name of every person who shall be proved to him to be dead; and wherever the christian name, or the place of abode, or the nature of the qualification, or the local or other description of the property of any person who shall be included in any such list, and the name of the occupying tenant thereof, shall be wholly omitted in any case where the same is by this Act directed to be specified therein, or of any person whose name is included in any such list, or his place of abode, or the nature or description of his qualifications, shall, in the judgment of the revising barrister, be insufficiently described for the purpose of being identified, such barrister shall expunge the name of every such person from such list, unless the matter or matters so omitted or insufficiently described be supplied to the satisfaction of such barrister before he shall have completed the revision of such list, in which case he shall then and there insert the same in such list. Provided always that, whether any person shall be objected to or not, no evidence shall be given of any other qualification than that which is described in the list of voters or claim, as the case may be, nor shall the barrister be at liberty to change the description of the qualification as it appears in the list, except for the purpose of more clearly and accurately defining the same, and where,” &c.

fourth columns together." Second'y, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, sect. 4, enacts that the overseers shall every year publish a notice requiring all persons entitled to vote in respect of any property within the parish who shall not be upon the register, and also all who " being upon such register shall not retain the same qualification . ... as described in such register, and who are desirous to have their names inserted in the register about to be made," to give to the overseers notice in writing of their claim. The appellant had parted with the greater portion of his land, and did not "retain the same qualification as described" in the register, and should therefore have made a new claim :

Burton v. Gery, 5 C. B. 7.

[Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-Had the appellant parted with only one plot, could the amendment not have been made?] No; he ought to make a fresh claim, that attention may be called to the diminution of his property, and, if it be insufficient, objection may be made. Otherwise one whose actual qualification was doubtful might, by causing it to seem sufficient on the register, prevent valid objection being taken. Williams, J., in Burton v. Gery (ubi sup.), says: The qualification on the list which has stood the test of public inquiry and investigation having ceased on the voters ceasing to occupy the land, upon principle as well as upon the plain natural meaning of the words of the Act, the new occupation required a new claim."

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Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-In this case I am not quite certain whether the objection which appears on the case as having been taken before the revising barrister was the objection which has been argued before us. The revising barrister says that the objection was grounded on the third column of the register, and related to the nature of the interest of the said Henry Smith in the qualifying property." But the third column is "freehold land," and the objection to the nature of the interest would seem to have been, therefore, that the land was not freehold, but copyhold, or some estate other than freehold. If so, that objection entirely fails, the barrister himself saying that the nature of the interest is rightly described as freehold. I am strongly of opinion that it is not the duty of a revising barrister, if one objection is pointed out by notice, to allow another objection to be taken before him; because the voter may come prepared to meet the one objection, and then be surprised by another for which he is not prepared. But it appears that the real objection was not to the tenancy, but to the description of the qualification in the fourth column; the description there specifies fifteen plots on the Victoria estate, and in fact fourteen of them had been sold. One remained in the voter's possession, and that one was sufficient to confer the right to vote. The revising barrister was asked to amend the fourth column by striking out the numbers of the plots sold. He considered that he had no power, but, if his decision was wrong, he thinks that the list should be so amended. We are, therefore, to determine whether the revising barrister had power to make the amendment asked for, and I am of opinion that he had. This is not a case where tricks have been played on the register, as Mr. Horace Smith, in his very able argument, suggested might sometimes happen. If there were any reason to suppose that the voter had put a qua'ifi

[C.P. Div.

cation of nine-tenths on the register, when he possessed only one-tenth, and then an objection having been taken, he asked that the correction should be made, and those circumstances were brought to the barrister's notice, I should think it very doubtful whether he ought to exercise the power of amendment. But this case is admitted to be perfectly bonâ fide. I think it is difficult to draw a precise line as to the cases in which the power of amendment should be exercised; but I am of opinion that it should have been in this case. When, in the course of the argument, I put the case of one only of these plots having been sold, Mr. Horace Smith, in order to be logical, was forced to say that the revising barrister could equally not have struck out the one. It is, as I have said, extremely difficult to draw the line within which the power of amendment ought to be exercised, but I think that where no fraud exists, and where the person objected to retains property sufficient to entitle him to a vote, that then anything inserted in the fourth column beyond what he actually possesses may be struck out as surplusage. I am of opinion that the amendment asked for was within the power of the revising barrister, and should have been made. This decision must therefore be reversed.

GROVE, J.-I am of the same opinion. The case finds that "the objection was grounded on the third column of the register, and the objection related to the nature of the interest of the appellant in the qualifying property." My attention has just been called to 28 & 29 Vict. c. 36, s. 6, which provides that no notice of objection given under the provisions of the 7th section of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, "shall be valid unless the ground or grounds of objection be specifically stated therein; and this provision shall be deemed to be sufflciently satisfied by naming the column or columns of the list on which the objector grounds his objection; provided always, that if the objection be grounded on the third column, then it shall be necessary to state in the notice whether the objection relates to the nature of the voter's interest in the qualifying property, or to the value of the qualifying property, or to both; and each of such last-mentioned grounds of objection shall be deemed a separate ground of objection, as well as any objection grounded on any one of the other columns." There seems, therefore, to have been no valid notice of objection in this case. Then as to whether the case falls within sect. 40 of 6 & 7, Vict. c. 18. In Bendle v. Watson (ubi sup.), Willes, J. says: "It is impossible to say this is a description of another qualification; it is an insufficient description of the claimant's qualification, not a description of another qualification; it is the old description, which at one time was true. Then, as respects the exception, 'except for more clearly and accurately defining the same,' the same test applies; it would be a true description to a person who had left the street several years back, and a false one to a person who only knew the new state of things. Then, as to the words 'change the description of the qualification,' there, I think, 'qualification' must mean the nature of the qualification-e. g., freenold-while the object of a number is to individualise, and perhaps, in that sense, describe. I think that throughout, the word 'his' governs the meaning, and as the qualification is the same, and the description one which might in one sense be