the house of the testator, adapted to personal use and convenience, such as books, pictures, provisions, watches, plate, carriages, domestic animals, and the like, but not including money, stocks, securities, or evidences of debt."

In Johnson v. Goss, 128 Mass. 433, where the bequest was as follows: "I give to my wife all my personal property, my household effects, horses, carriages, life insurance, etc.,"-the court held that this general term, "all my personal property," was not used in its ordinary sense, that the language did not purport to bequeath the residuum of the testator's property, and construing it in connection with the words immediately following, "my household effects," etc., that the testator's purpose was to describe property of the same kind, and that he used the adjective "personal" as descriptive of chattels of personal use and convenience, not including stocks, securities, or other productive property.

In Benton v. Benton, 63 N. H. 289, 56 Am. Rep. 512, the bequest was as follows: "I give my wife every article of household furniture, books, etc., and every other article of personal property in and about said homestead, or wherever found belonging to my estate"; and under it the widow and the residuary legatees both claimed the bank shares, notes, and cash on hand. The court held that the words, "every other article of personal property," were limited to the same class of things as those enumerated, and did not include the bank stock, notes, and cash claimed by the widow.

Were there no residuary clause in this will, the words in question might and probably would be construed to pass this property to the plaintiff, for the reason that courts are always disposed to give the broadest meaning practicable to the words of a bequest when it is necessary to do so in order to prevent intestacy. The same is true when words of a general signification are found in the residuary clause itself, and for the same reason. Jarman, in commenting upon cases which indicate the disposition of judges of the present day to adhere to the rule which gives to words of a compreheusive import their full extent of operation, remarks, however, "that in all the preceding cases there was no other bequest capable of operating on the general residue of the testator's personal estate, if the clause in question did not. Where there is such a bequest it supplies an argument of no inconsiderable weight in favor of the restricted construction which is then recommended by the

anxiety always felt to give to a will such a construction as will render every part of it sensible, consistent, and effective."

Many of the cases cited by the plaintiff's counsel are upon the construction of residuary clauses in wills. Such is the case of Parker v. Marchant, 20 Eng. Ch. 290, where it was held that the words "goods, chattels, and effects," after an enumeration of various articles, carried the residue of the testator's property. The vice-chancellor, in considering the point whether by these words the testator had disposed of the general residue of his personal estate or had so far died intestate, said: "This turns upon the meaning to be attributed to the words, 'goods, chattels, and effects,' having regard to the position in which they are found in the will, and having regard also to the whole contents of the will." Such also is the case of Brown v. Cogswell, 5 Allen, 556.

The will under consideration contains a residuary clause. After the bequest to her uncle the testatrix gave all the residue of her estate, except two small legacies, to the Mary Fletcher Hospital.

Upon these well-recognized rules of construction, we hold that the words "goods and chattels," in the connection in which they are found, should be construed as having only a restricted and limited signification, and as not including said Manwell notes and cash on hand; that they are further restricted in their meaning by the word "personal," which indicates, when considered in its relations to the words "household furniture," that the testatrix intended by the words in question to bequeath only other articles of the same kind, belonging to the house, "savoring of the locality," adapted and pertaining to her personal use. This view is sustained by the fact that no definite amount of money and notes was kept at the house. It often varied with varying circumstances, and the notes and money were carried away and brought back as the testatrix had occasion to go from or return to her home, and were being removed when she died.

To give these words the broad meaning claimed for them by the plaintiff would be to invest them with power by which they might have defeated what seems to have been the main purpose of the will, namely, the endowment of said hospital; for, at times, nearly the entire personal estate of the testatrix was in her house.

In the view we have taken of this case, the testimony of the plaintiff, received by the court below, was wholly immaterial.

The result is, the judgment of that court is affirmed, and certified to the probate court.

WILL GIVING TO WIDOW "all my personal property which she may think proper," and directing that the rest of said property shall be sold, was held not to pass money in testator's possession, nor choses in action: German v. German, 27 Pa. St. 116; 67 Am. Dec. 451, and note. So in Benton v. Benton, 63 N. H. 289, 56 Am. Rep. 512, a bequest of "all of the household furniture on the homestead, including piano, books, etc., and every article of personal property in and about the premises," was held not to pass money or choses in action.

CLARK V. SNOW.

[60 VERMONT, 205.]

RECOVERY MAY BE HAD IN ACTION AT LAW ON LOST NOTE payable to order, but not negotiated, although it is not shown to have been destroyed.

ASSUMPSIT. The opinion states the case.

Pitkin and Huse, for the plaintiff.

John G. Wing, for the defendant.

ROYCE, C. J. The referee finds, among other facts, that the note on which plaintiff claims to recover in this action was lost, that it had never been negotiated, and that it has never been paid. The note was payable to the order of J. W. Clark, was lost soon after its execution, and a copy of it was made and was proved before the referee. The note was not shown to have been destroyed.

The only question that arises for our consideration is, whether the plaintiff's remedy is at law, or whether he must go to equity.

It is said that "the mere loss of an instrument will not be sufficient to give equity jurisdiction, but the party must show that he has no remedy or no sufficient remedy at law." The loss "must obstruct the right of the plaintiff at law, or leave him exposed to undue peril in the future assertion of such rights": Bispham's Principles of Equity, sec. 177. The main object of the equitable jurisdiction seems to be that a recovery may be had, and at the same time the defendant may be indemnified against any possible liability growing out of the subsequent discovery of the lost instrument: Id.

We have already held that an action at law may be main

tained, and is the proper action on a lost note not negotiable or not negotiated: Lazell v. Lazell, 12 Vt. 443; 36 Am. Dec. 352; Hopkins v. Adams, 20 Vt. 407; Hough v. Barton, 20 Id. 455.

In Lazell v. Lazell, supra, it was decided that to defeat an action at law on a note, the defendant must show affirmatively that the note was negotiable, and had been actually negotiated, or that it was payable to bearer, so as to pass by delivery. In Hopkins v. Adams, supra, the grounds of the equitable jurisdiction were exhaustively considered by Judge Redfield in the opinion, where he says that in the case of promissory notes "not negotiable, or not negotiated, where the loser may sue at law, the principal ground of the jurisdiction must be the necessity of discovery, and the accident by which that which the parties have constituted their contract has become incapable of performing its destined office."

It remains only to consider whether the recent decision in Adams v. Edmunds, 55 Vt. 352, is in conflict with the principle announced in the former decisions, and ought to govern this case. The note there was payable to bearer, and a note so payable, as remarked in Lazell v. Lazell, supra, passes by delivery. The consequence is, that any finder might demand payment, and against such liability to an unknown finder the maker should be indemnified. But the maker is subjected to no such risk in the case of a lost note payable to order and not negotiated; for if ever found, it cannot be negotiated by any one; not by the payee, for he has been paid; nor by a third party, for that would presuppose the commission of a forgery, which the law will not presume.

Another consideration to be borne in mind in this connection is, that the note in suit, being on demand, and the statutory period of sixty days (Rev. Laws, sec. 2013) having long since expired, is overdue, and any one into whose hands it might come, by finding or otherwise, would hold it subject to all the infirmities of such paper. He would take only the rights of his assignor, and could not be a bona fide purchaser. We cannot see how the defendant will be subjected to any risk by the payment of this note, and so do not consider him. entitled to indemnity; and as no other objection is urged to the law jurisdiction, we must hold that the action is well brought.

No question was made as to the plaintiff's right to recover on the item of book-account proved before the referee.

So that the judgment of the county court for plaintiff to recover both items named in the report, with interest on the same, and costs, is affirmed.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT, IF LOST, CANNOT BE RECOVERED ON AT LAW; the only remedy is in chancery: Fells Point Sav. Inst. v. Weedon, 18 Md. 320; 81 Am. Dec. 603; Moses v. Trice, 21 Gratt. 556; 8 Am. Rep. 609. But see the notes to Edwards v. McKee, 13 Am. Dec. 480, and Blade v. Noland, 27 Id. 128, 129, where the subject of actions on lost notes is fully discussed. In Lazell v. Lazell, 12 Vt. 443, 36 Am. Dec. 352, it is held that a lost note not negotiable, or not transferred if negotiable, is recoverable upon at law.

HUBBARD AND WIFE v. MANWELL.

[60 VERMONT, 235.]

RULE FOR DISTRIBUTION OF ALLUVIAL ACCRETION FORMED ON LANDS BORDERING ON UNNavigable River, owned by coterminous proprietors, is to extend the side lines of each owner to the nearest river bank, giving to each that part of the accretion formed in front of his own land. TRESPASS on the freehold. The deed from Lyman and wife to Ballou, referred to in the opinion, was the deed through which the female plaintiff derived her title, through various intermediate conveyances, and the description in that deed was as follows: "Beginning at a stake standing on the bank of Onion (now Winooski) River, being the northeasterly or up-river corner of that part of said lot No. 30, which was heretofore owned by David Russell and Stephen Russell; thence south . . . ; thence north 59 deg. 30 min.; east 26 chains to the bank of Onion River; thence down said river, by the bank thereof, to the place of beginning, containing 14% acres." The opinion will be understood by reference to the following diagram on the opposite page. Other facts are stated in the opinion.

....

Hard and Cushman, for the defendant.

Wales and Wales, for the plaintiffs.

ROYCE, C. J. This was an action of trespass quare clausum, in which the plaintiffs claim to recover for an entry upon land claimed by the female plaintiff, and the taking and carrying away timber growing thereon. The case was referred, and was heard upon the report made. The referee found that the parties were the owners of two tracts of land in Burlington, lying upon the bank of Winooski River. The plaintiffs'