Our analysis of this charge is, that the paper propounded as a will cannot be set aside for alleged misrepresentations, unless it appear from the evidence that such representations were proved to be false; that they were made in bad faith, and for the purpose of procuring the paper propounded as a will. Standing alone, the latter clause in this charge would, we think, be error, and subject to the criticism made upon it. The issue actually presented was, that the representations were false, with whatever view or purpose they may have been made; and if they had the effect of procuring the will, whether they were made with that object or not, it would be quite immaterial, if they were false and they had the effect of procuring the paper propounded as a will; whether made for that purpose or not, the will should have been set aside; but taken in connection with other parts of the charge, especially those portions hereinbefore set out, we are unable to conclude that the charge contravened or modified this view, or that the language of the court admits of such restricted signification as has been attributed to it.

We think it altogether probable that the jury could not have been misled or confused by the use of the terms employed, and induced to believe that the said representations must have been made with the design to procure the will. Indeed, they were expressly charged, at the request of caveators' counsel, "if they believed from the evidence that David Dickson made this will under the impression that Amanda was his natural child, and if that will, or so much thereof as relates to Amanda and her children, was induced solely by that belief, and they further believe from the evidence that Amanda was not his child, then they would be authorized to set aside and declare void so much of said will as relates to Amanda and her children." This and other charges given would seem to render the exception to the portion of the charge in question nugatory and groundless. Besides, there is no allegation in this motion for new trial that the finding of the jury upon this point was contrary to evidence. All objections to the verdict on this ground seem to have been waived; and had they not been so waived, we are satisfied, from the overwhelming preponderance of the testimony, that Amanda was the natural child of David Dickson, and he could not have acted under any mistake as to that fact in the execution of his will; there is hardly a suspicion raised in the proof that Amanda's chiluren were not the sons of Eu

banks. So this ground of the motion does not appear, as a whole, or as to its separate parts, to rest upon any solid foundation. It is barely possible, though not at all probable, that Amanda may have been the child of another than David Dickson. There is scarcely a possibility that her children could have bad any father other than Eubanks.

3. The remaining ground of the motion for new trial to be considered is as to the influence exerted over David Dickson by Amanda or her mother, and which induced him to make this will. Apart from the representations as to the paternity of Amanda and that of her children, we are unable to ascertain that any effort was made by either of these parties or others to exert any influence over the testator, nor is it made clear that he was subject to such influence, or that his will was so weak and his purpose so infirm as to justify the belief that either could have been controlled or overcome in that manner. 4. As to the remaining grounds of the motion for new trial, we feel satisfied that they are destitute of any such merit as would authorize us in interposing to set aside this will. Indeed, we cannot say that there was error, either in selecting the jury from the panel of the grand jury, or in drawing and summoning that panel, or in the reception or rejection of testimony, etc., or in the assignments of error to the various charges as given or refused of which complaint was made, or in the rules laid down for judging of the credibility of certain witnesses who testified in the case, or lastly, in refusing to hold Turner and Middlebrooks, two of the jurors who tried the case, to he biased or prejudiced. They do not appear to have been operated on by outside and improper influences, and for that reason to have been incompetent and disqualified to sit as jurymen.

From aught that appears to the contrary, the trial was fair, and under our view of the law, would not probably result differently upon another hearing. We repeat that we are satisfied that if any error existed at all in the various rulings and charges of the court, it was immaterial.

Judgment affirmed.

CONTRACTS ARE PRESUMED TO BE FAIR, and not unlawful, or against public policy: Giddings v. Steele, 28 Tex. 733; 91 Am. Dec. 336.

ILLICIT COHABITATION AS CONSIDERATION FOR CONTRACT: See the note to Ayer v. Wilson, 12 Am. Dec. 676, 677.

MISREPRESENTATIONS NOT PRODUCING DIRECT EFFECT of influencing bequest to party will not vitiate will: Taylor v. Kelly, 31 Ala. 59; 68 Am. Dec. 150.

MCNAUGHT V. ANDERSON.

[78 GEORGIA, 499.]

PROPERTY PAID FOR BY WIFE'S EARNINGS, WHEN NOT LIABLE FOR HUSBAND'S DEBTS. If a husband consent that his wife may take boarders into the family, and agree that she shall have the gross proceeds for application on a contract made by him with a third person for the purchase of real estate, and if the money so acquired by her be thus applied, the money is hers, and not his, her right to it being founded on a meritorious consideration; and if, on completing the payment, she take a conveyance of such real estate to herself, her title will prevail against a creditor of her husband who gave credit after the property was paid for, although the conveyance be of later date than the giving of such credit, it not appearing that the credit was given upon the faith of the specifio property, or that the debtor was in possession as apparent owner when the debt was created.

CLAIM. A fieri facias in favor of McNaught and Scrutchin against Langford and Anderson was levied on certain real estate, and Anderson's wife interposed her claim. The evidence on her part tended to show that the land in controversy was bought from one Walker, the claimant's husband conducting the negotiations, and taking a bond for a deed in his own name. At the time of the purchase, it was agreed between them that when the payment was made the deed should be made to her. Her husband consented that she should keep boarders, and agreed that she should have the money arising therefrom. He did not assist her in paying for the property. She paid for the property as she had money, and the deed was made to her, dated January, 1884. The note of the defendants upon which the judgment under which the execution issued was dated April 12, 1883. The jury found for the claimant.

Samuel Barnett, Jr., for the plaintiff in error.

Candler, Thomson, and Candler, for the defendant.

BLECKLEY, C. J. 1. The legal unity of husband and wife has, in Georgia, for most purposes, been dissolved, and a legal duality established. A wife is a wife, and not a husband, as she was formerly. Legislative chemistry has analyzed the conjugal unit, and it is no longer treated as an element, but as a compound. A husband can make a gift to his own wife, although she lives in the house with him and attends to her household duties, as easily as he can make a present to his neighbor's wife. This puts her on an equality with other ladies, and looks like progress. Under the new order of things, when he induces her to enter into the business of keeping

boarders, and promises to let her have all the proceeds, he is allowed to keep his promise if she keeps the boarders. It would seem that the law ought to tolerate him in being faithful to his word in such a matter, even though he has pledged it only to his wife; and we think it does. If a husband consent that his wife may take boarders into the family, and that she shall have the gross proceeds for application on a contract which he has made with a third person for the purchase of real estate, and if money so acquired by the wife be thus applied, the money is hers, and not his, her right to it being founded on a meritorious consideration; and if, on completing payment, the wife take a conveyance of the premises to herself from such third person, her title will prevail against a creditor of her husband who gave credit after the property was paid for, though the conveyance to her be of later date than the giving of such credit, it not appearing that the credit was given upon the faith of the specific property, or that the debtor was in possession as apparent owner when the debt was created.

2. The above ruling controls the case upon its substantial merits, and if any errors were committed upon the trial, they were of minor importance, and not material to the result. Judgment affirmed.

HUSBAND MAY CONSENT THAT HIS WIFE'S EARNINGS shall belong to her. self: McLemore v. Pinkston, 31 Ala. 266; 68 Am. Dec. 167; though it has been held that a husband cannot give her earnings to his wife as against his creditors: Cramer v. Reford, 17 N. J. Eq. 367; 90 Am. Dec. 594.

BOGGESS v. Lowrey.

[78 GEORGIA, 539.]

SUFFICIENT DESCRIPTION OF LAND NOT VITIATED BY ERRONEOUS ADDITION. - Where land is correctly described in a levy by metes and bounds, and by mentioning the adjacent and surrounding landed proprietors, but in giving the number of the district a mistake is made, the sheriff will not be enjoined from executing the process on that ground, the land being capable of ready identification notwithstanding such mistake.

BILL in equity. The injunction asked was refused. The opinion states the case.

Austin and Merrell, Cobb and Merrell, Cobb and Juhan, and R. L. Richards, for the plaintiff in error.

Gordon and Brown, for the defendants.

HALL, J. This was an application made to enjoin the proceedings under a levy and sale, where a portion of the lot of land in controversy was described, not only by number and district, but by metes and bounds, and by mentioning the adjacent and surrounding landed proprietors. It was shown that there was a mistake as to the district where the land lay, and that was the only mistake in the levy or attachment. The number was right, the portion of the lot from which it was taken was right, and the boundaries were also correctly set forth, and the court held that that was an error or misdescription which did not avoid the levy, and that notwithstanding its existence, the land might be readily identified; and for these reasons he would not enjoin the sheriff from proceeding to execute the process. This case falls directly within the principle of Rogers v. Rogers, 78 Ga. 688; and also Harris v. Hull, 70 Id. 831. Falsa demonstratio non nocet.

Judgment affirmed.

DESCRIPTION WHICH MAY BE RENDERED CERTAIN IS SUFFICIENT: Nixon v. Porter, 34 Miss. 697; 69 Am. Dec. 408; Pursley v. Hayes, 22 Iowa, 11; 92 Am. Dec. 350. If deed contains any description whatever, it is good in so far as it goes: Nelson v. Brodhack, 44 Mo. 596; 100 Am. Dec. 328.

RICKS V. BROYLES.

[78 GEORGIA, 610.]

RECEIVER, WHEN LIABLE FOR LOSS OF MONEY IN HIS CUSTODY. - When money is in the hands of a receiver at the place of final custody, and he has no further duty in respect to it except to preserve it, it is already in court, and he cannot part with his custody of it by depositing it in bank, save at his own risk, without some order, leave, or direction authorizing him so to do.

COURT OF EQUITY IN GEORGIA HAS NO OFFICIAL BANKER, and no bank but its receiver.

GENERAL DEPOSIT OF MONEY IN BANK BY RECEIVER IS LOAN, and transforms the fund into a chose in action.

RULE against Broyles, as receiver, requiring him to report to the court the amount in his hands, and to show cause why he should not pay to Ricks the amount due on two mortgage fieri facias held by him. The receiver answered that he had deposited the money which he had received in the bank of John H. James, in his name as receiver, making the deposit separate from his individual account; that the bank was, at the time he made the deposit, generally regarded as good, sol