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In our last issue we felt it our duty to call attention not only to the want of uniformity in the notices required to be given by articled clerks in reference to the respective examinations which have to be undergone prior to admission on the rolls, but also to the conflicting decisions arrived at by the masters at Judges' Chambers in matters

relating to such notices. A question of probably greater importance is that of the right of articled clerks to hold offices, or be engaged in other employment of any kind during articles, which was lately considered by the newly-appointed Lord Chief Justice in the case of Ex parte Greville, reported in our issue of the 29th ultimo, page 70. It certainly does seem a great hardship that articled clerks should practically be debarred during the continuance of their articles of clerk. ship from filling offices which, while they in no way interfere with their duties under articles, would often be a source to them of profit, not only in a pecuniary but also in an educational We believe the rule of the examiners to be not to object to articled clerks holding offices which are honorary in their nature, and the duties of which are performed after office hours. Whilst we do not pretend to quarrel with the decisions lately arrived at by the Court of Common Pleas at the instigation of the Incorporated Law Society upon the construction of sect. 10 of 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, yet we are decidedly of opinion that the statutory provision in question should be relaxed, for we are confident that at times, and that not unfrequently, it works with actual detriment to the best interests of those who will in future represent the Profession.

sense.

It may not be generally known that the office of Queen's coroner and attorney, formerly held by a barrister-at-law, and which properly should be held by a solicitor, is now filled by a non-professional gentleman. The office of coroner of the Queen's household and of the Verge, is now, and has been for many years, held by a solicitor.

We are glad to find that there are some solicitors who appreciate the labours of the Incorporated Law Society. We have received a letter from a solicitor at Leeds, taking exception to our criticisms upon that body, in which he says:-" It is quite true that the Incorporated Law Society is not a very active law reformer, but it does good work, and the value of that work should be fairly recog nized." We are quite prepared to adopt the expression of opinion of our correspondent. That the work undertaken by the council is good and beneficial, as far as it goes, we do not for one moment dispute; on the contrary, we are as prepared as anyone can be to recognise to the utmost the gratuitous labour of the council in the interests of the solicitor branch of the Profession. Having said so much in order to remove any misunderstanding that may possibly exist, it is but just to add that the majority of solicitors feel that there is important work undone, the charge of which might well be committed to the care of committees of the council, each appointed for special purposes. The abuse of the privileges of the Profession by unqualified persons, the unsatisfactory relations of the two branches of the Pro

tion of the amalgamation of the two principa
societies; if not, we hope that those members who
feel the importance of the question will take the
necessary steps prescribed by the new bye-laws to
bring the matter before the society at an early
date. It would be very beneficial if some arrange-
ment could be made with the Government by
which the payment of the annual certificate duty
should qualify for membership of the society.

THE delay in publishing the names of gentlemen
who passed the final examination last term is
occasioned by the fact that the list has not yet
been issued by the Incorporated Law Society,
which we believe is owing to the great pressure
put on the entire staff in the office of the society
cates, the duplicate declarations necessary to
in consequence of the issuing of the annual certifi-
obtain which are unfortunately only carried into
the office by the great majority of solicitors just
in time to pay the duty at Somerset House before
the 16th inst. We hope, however, to be able to
publish the list in our next issue.

A SOLICITOR at Uxbridge writes us as follows:-
"I often think that the LAW TIMES would be doing
a good practical work by publishing in its columns
the various appointments connected with the law
for which attorneys and solicitors are eligible, in
whose gifts are these several offices, and as near
as may be the stipend in each case." We can
only say that if we can satisfy ourselves that it
would be of interest to the Profession we will
gladly undertake to execute the suggestion of our
correspondent; at present, however, we are in
some doubt as to its utility.

WE are very glad to notice that the Legal Edu-
cation Association, a deputation of the members
of which have waited on the Lord Chancellor
are not to be lulled into inaction, either by the loss
of much valuable support, or by the recent mea-
sure of the Inns of Court; on the contrary,
we learn from the Honorary Secretary of the
association (Mr. J. V. Longbourne), that they
which has characterised their work in the past.
will continue their labours with the same energy
Our wish for their continued success is we are
confident, shared in by the great bulk of the Pro-
fession.

spurious notices which purport to be issued from
WE have lately had forwarded to us certain
County Courts, from which we find that these are
not only issued by debt collectors and all kinds of
agents, but even by ordinary tradesmen, for the
purpose of obtaining payment of their debts,
their origin as a rule to law stationers, some of
and we are sorry to say that we believe they owe
them in Chancery-lane, of whom a great variety
can be purchased. This is a question, perhaps, of
greater importance to the administration of justice
although in many cases they are merely reproduc-
in the country than to the Profession, for
tions of statutory provisions long since repealed,
yet they occasion much alarm to certain classes of
the community who are unable to distinguish
between these spurious documents and the actual
process of the County Courts, the judges of which
ought to have power in certain of such cases to
inflict a fine as for contempt of court.

So far as we are aware the council of the Incor-
porated Law Society have not, at present, in any
society, of the power given them by the new
way availed themselves, in the interests of the
bye-law, by virtue of which they may elect, as
extraordinary members of the council, any
member of the society (not exceeding ten),
who, at the time of their election, shall
society established in any place in the United
hold the office of president of any other law
Kingdom, except the metropolis, for like or kin-
dred purposes. We believe that the power and
influence both of the council and the society
would be augmented by proceeding to these elec.
tions; and members of local law Societies will do
well to bear in mind, in electing their presidents,
that they are (we hope) likely to be elected to the
office of extraordinary members of the council.
We wait, with interest, for the determination of
the council upon this subject, and we hope that
action has been already taken in the matter.

fession as well inter se, as in connection with the
public, the organization of the Profession, the
amalgamation of the society with the Metropo-
litan and Provincial Law Association, the forma-
tion of local law societies as branches of the
society, indeed, the adoption, in this respect, of
Mr. Marshall's scheme for organization, the estab-
lishing a system by which periodical meetings of
the members of the society, if not of solicitors
generally, could be held in London and the pro-
vinces for the consideration of all questions of
interest to or concerning the welfare of solicitors,
-all these matters require attention, and to those
who would urge that the Incorporated Law
Society, by its council, does all that can fairly be DURING the present sittings in the Rolls Court,
expected, must be reminded of the existence of the the Master of the Rolls, addressing the counsel
Metropolitan and Provincial Law Association, and present, said that when a judgment was given
36 local law societies, all without any connection against one of the parties in a suit referring to a
with the chief society, and of an effort now being small matter of property, &c., that side generally
made to establish the "Legal Practitioners' petitioned to be "allowed costs." Now, whilst
Society," which we believe is receiving much admitting that, in some exceptional instances,
support throughout the country. This state of costs should be allowed to the losing side, he says
things speaks for itself, and requires no further that ought not to be made the rule, but rather
comment from us. We hope to hear that the the exception. It was contrary to all principle
Council have determined upon calling a meeting of and notions of justice that the party who had
the members of the Society, to consider the ques-received the benefit of the judgment should not

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be allowed his costs rather than the "losing"
one. Various applications to allow costs to the
defeated side had frequently been made to him;
but whatever the practice obtaining in other
courts he, for his part, would take care that, as
a rule, he would cause the side which lost the
suit to pay its own costs.
We quite concur in
Sir George Jessel's opinion and hope that when
the Judicature Act is in full operation the posi-
tion of parties to a suit as regards costs will be
more clearly defined, especially for the better
guidance of solicitors.

THE following solicitors have been elected to the
office of mayor for the ensuing year: Mr. G. T.
Picton Jones, Pwllheli, Carnarvonshire, fifth time;
Mr. J. Parry Jones, Denbigh, N. Wales, third
time. This makes in all fifteen solicitors elected to
the above office for 1873-4, so far as we have been
able to ascertain at present.

WE are pleased to notice that in the case of The Corporation of Dover against the South-Eastern and The London, Chatham, and Dover Railway Companies, before the lately appointed railway commissioners, the town clerk of Dover was represented by his London agent. We hope solicitors will see the necessity of availing themselves of the audience before this tribunal to which they are entitled.

THE following law lectures and classes are appointed for the ensuing week in the Hall of the Incorporated Law Society ;-Monday, class Common Law, 4.30 to 6 o'clock p.m; Tuesday, ditto, 4.30 to 6 p.m.; Wednesday, ditto, 4.30 to 6 p.m.; Friday, lecture, Conveyancing, 6 to 7 o'clock. This concludes the lectures and classes for Common Law for the present year. Those in equity do not commence until the 10th April in next year. Students are not admitted after lectures have commenced.

WE are sorry to notice from correspondence which has lately appeared in one of the daily papers that a considerable doubt has been thrown or counsel instructed by them, to appear on upon what we believe to be the right of solicitors, behalf of seamen, or ship's passengers and their relatives, and shippers and underwriters, before Courts of Inquiry held by direction of the Board of Trade, under Part 8 of the Merchant question we gather that these courts are not unShipping Act 1854. From the correspondence in frequently in the habit of deciding that upon these inquiries the crew of a ship, and others interested (with the exception of the owners) have no locus standi before them. We know of no and we are confirmed in our opinion by the terms sufficient reason for the adoption of this course, of a letter written by direction of the Board of Trade upon the subject, and which forms part of the correspondence to which we refer, in which tion of the Board of Trade is to give seamen and the following observation appears: "The inclina ships' passengers, and others, the same privileges as are given to the shipowners." A rule to the contrary would be wholly unjust, and we hope that we shall not in future hear the right of solicitors so to appear questioned by any of the courts in question.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION OF ACTION-ACTION ALLEGING FOR-DECLARATION-NECESSITY OF DETERMINATION OF PROCEEDINGS IN PLAINTIFF'S FAVOUR.-A declaration for maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause procuring the arrest and detention of a vessel in a County Court suit for necessaries, "until the prosaid arrest and detention were determined, and ceedings in the said court in the matter of the the said ship released," is good, without an express averment that the proceedings were determined in favour of the plaintiff. Per Blackburn and Archibald, JJ., dissentiente Quain, J.: (Redway v. MacAndrew and another, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 421. Q. B.)

WILL
ESTATE

ILLITERATE PERSON INDEFINITE CHARGE OF GROSS SUM-FEE-OLD LAW.-A testator, who died in 1806, by his will gave two freehold houses to one of his sons without any words of limitation, subject to legacies and annuities, with a gift over, in case of aliena tion or death without issue, to his brothers and sisters, nominatim also subject to the legacies and annuities, and with a direction also to pay sums of £4 to each of certain grandchildren as they attain the age of twenty-three: Held, that on James's death without issue, and without barring any estate tail he might have had, the brothers and sisters took as joint tenants, and as the gift was coupled with a direction to pay several gross sums, their estates would in a case coming under the old law, be enlarged to a fee simple: (Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 416. M.R.)

ARTICLED CLERK-SERVICE UNDER ARTICLES -ABSENT ABROAD FOR ONE YEAR ON ACCOUNT OF ILLNESS-6 & 7 VICT. c. 23 ss. 12, 14.-An articled clerk having been absent from work during eleven months of his articles on account of ill-health, and with the consent of his employer, the court refused to admit him as an attorney: (Ex parte Moses, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 420. Q. B.) PRACTICE-TAXATION OF COSTS-SEPARATE ANSWERS FILED BY SAME SOLICITOR-DISCRETION OF TAXING MASTER-ORDER 40, R. 12.Whether the costs of separate answers filed by the same solicitors should be allowed on taxation or not is a matter entirely in the discretion of the taxing master: (Beattie v. Lord Ebury, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 419. V.C. B.)

PRACTICE-SUBSTITUTION OF DEFENDANTSMISDESCRIPTION COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACT 1852-SECT. 222 (15 & 16 VICT. c. 76.)-Where an action had been brought in error against the clerk of a local board of health, the court allowed the name of the local board of health to be substituted in all proceedings for that of the clerk: (Lord Bolingbroke v. Townsend, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 430. C. P.)

excess, the section was applicable. Held also, that the judge need not specifically direct as to what points the master is to examine the defendant, but that a general direction is sufficient: (Peyton V. Harting, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 478. C. P.)

JUDICIAL SEPARATION-CUSTODY OF CHIL

DREN GIVEN TO THE WIFE.-Where the parties had been judicially separated at the suit of the wife and the custody of the children had been given to her, the court allowed a third party (the paternal grandfather) to intervene to show cause why the custody of the children should no longer be committed to her: (Goderich v. Goderich, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 465. Div.)

COURT OF PASSAGE-NEW TRIAL-MOTION IN SUPERIOR COURT FOR-JUDGE'S NOTES.-A copy of the notes taken by the judge at the trial of a cause in the Passage Court of Liverpool is not needed in order to support a motion in a Superior Court for a new trial; and such motion may, according to the established practice, be made by counsel who did not appear in the court below: (Bridge v. Daine, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 477. C. P.)

TRADE-MARK.-INJUNCTION.-An English adCONTRACT FOR SALE OF CHATTELS-BREACH-jective, merely describing the quality of a manuSUIT FOR INJUNCTION-DEMURRER.-A court of factured article, will not be protected by the equity will not grant an injunction to restrain the court as a trade-mark. Therefore, when the breach of a contract for the sale of chattels where plaintiff, who dealt in malt liquors in London, specific performance of the contract would not be sold stout which was subjected by him to a enforced. A. entered into a contract with B. by particular treatment, under the name of Nourishwhich B. agreed to sell to him the whole of the ing London Stout: Held, that he was not entitled get of coal of a specified seam in a colliery belong to an injunction restraining the defendant from ing to B. during a period of five years at a certain selling stout under the name of Nourishing price. On a bill by A. to restrain B. from selling Stout: (Raggett v. Findlater, 29 L. T. Rep. N.S. the coal to other parties: Held that A. was not 448. V. C. M.) entitled to any relief in equity: (Fothergill v. Rowland, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 414. M.R.) EXECUTORS OMISSION TO PROVIDE FOR LEGACY-RESISTANCE TO LEGATEE'S CLAIM LIABILITY OF REPRESENTATIVES OF DECEASED EXECUTOR-COSTS.-Three executors allowed an investment of £500 to remain (under a power in the will) upon an insufficient security. One died. The legatee claimed the legacy. The surviving executors opposed her claim on an administration summons. They gave no notice to the executor of the deceased executor of the proceedings Held, that the estate of the deceased executor was not liable to pay the costs of such proceedings: (Paull v. Mortimer, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 418. M. R.)

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ARTICLED CLERK-STAMP WITHIN SIX MONTHS -MISTAKE OF LAW-RECKONING OF SERVICE6 & 7 VICT. c. 73, ss. 819.-An attorney's articled clerk applied to stamp his articles within six months of their execution, being misled by the words of the Stamp Act 1870, s. 43, but the Inland Revenue refused to affix the stamp except upon payment of a penalty. The clerk subsequently paid the penalty, together with the duty, but in consequence of his mistake in the law, he was prevented from enrolling his articles within the time required. The court allowed his service to be reckoned from the date of the articles, instead of from the day of filing the affidavit required with the enrolment, under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 23, ss. 8 and 9: (Ex parte Hayward, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 422. Q. B.)

BILL OF REVIVOR-TIME FOR ENROLMENT ELAPSED-NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF- -DEMURRER-15 & 16 VicT. c. 86, s. 52-CONS. ORD. 23, R. 28.-A bill was dismissed on appeal in Dec. 1867. No steps were taken until Nov. 1872, when an order nisi for enrolment was granted, notwithstanding the time for enrolment had expired. One of the defendants died in Dec. 1872. On the 16th Jan. 1873 the court ordered an enrolment, subject to the plaintiff presenting his petition to the House of Lords within a given time. It was then ascertained that by the death of another defendant in 1870, the suit had become abated, and the Registrar refused to draw up the order. The common order to revive having been refused, the plaintiff filed a bill of revivor, to which the executors of one of the deceased defendants demurred. Held, that the court had a discretion to grant a decree for revivor after the time for enrolment had expired, and would exercise it, except under special and extraordinary circumstances of neglect or delay: (Patch v. Holland, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S., 419. V.C. H.)

PRACTICE-ADMINISTRATION SUIT-WANT OF PARTIES-DEMURRER ORE TENUS-COSTS.-An objection to a bill for the administration of the real estate only of a testator, and without the joinder of his legal personal representative, is valid, though not raised by the answer, and may be taken by way of demurrer ore tenus at the hearing. Where such an objection is plain on the face of the bill, it is not the duty of the defendant to give notice to the plaintiff that he will avail himself of it, and he will be entitled to the costs of the day: (Rowsell v. Morris, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 446. M. R.)

MATRIMONIAL SUIT ALIMONY PENDENTE LITE. The parties in a matrimonal suit had been living separate under a deed by which the wife received an allowance of £40 a year, when the husband instituted a suit for divorce on the ground of his wife's adultery. The wife petitioned for alimony pendente lite. The court, however, though it was shown that the husband's faculties had increased since the deed of separation, refused to make any order for alimony. Held, on appeal to the Full Court, that the Judge Ordinary was right in making no order, as no change had been shown in the status of the wife: (Powell v. Powell and Jones, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 466. Div.) PLEADINGS-EXCEPTIONS-SCANDAL-COSTS. -In cross suits between husband and wife, with reference to certain leaseholds the separate property of the wife, the husband set up an agreement made on the marriage, that in consideration of advances by him to pay the debts of his wife's first husband, she would concur with him in selling the leaseholds to recoup him; and in answer ferred against her a charge of adultery. On exto interrogatories by the wife, the husband preceptions to such answer for scandal: Held, on the authority of Christie v. Christie (28 L. T. Rep. N. S. 807; L. Rep. 8 Ch. 42), that the exceptions must be allowed, and everything with reference to the adultery struck out, with costs: (Pearse v. Pearse; Pearse v. Perase, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 453. V.C. H.).

TENDER BY PUBLIC CONTRACT-GOOD CONSIDERATION-UNILATERAL CONTRACT.-The de

fendant tendered to supply the plaintiffs with certain goods at a fixed price, or with any of them that the plaintiffs should order. After the plaintiffs had given some orders, the price of the goods rose, and the defendant refused to supply them, on the ground that the contract was unilateral, there being no consideration for the defendant's promise to supply the goods, and there was no obligation on the plaintiffs to give the order: Held, that the tender of the defendant to supply what goods were ordered, coupled with the plaintiffs' order, was a sufficient consideration to bind the defendant: (Great Northern Railway Company v. Witham, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 471. C.P.) STATUTE OF FRAUDS (27 CAR. 2, c. 3), SECT. 4 AGREEMENT TO PAY FOR MAINTENANCE OF BASTARD CHILDREN-AMENDMENT OF CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IN DECLARATION AT TRIAL. -The plaintiff, a feme sole, being the mother of five children by the defendant, ranging from five up to fourteen years of age at the time of the promise after mentioned, the defendant, in consideration that the plaintiff would, at his request, take and continue to take the sole charge and support of the said children, and provide for their mainten

PRACTICE-INTERROGATORIES-INSUFFICIENT ANSWER-ORAL EXAMINATION BEFORE MASTER. -The 53rd section of the Common Law Procedare Act 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 125) directs that in case of omission, without just cause, to answer sufficiently written interrogatories, the judge may direct an oral examination of the interrogated-PAROL party as to such points as he may direct before the master. A defendant having answered the interrogatories in a voluminous manner, intro. ducing many additional and irrelevant topics to those contained in the interrogatories, the judge made an order directing the defendant to appear and answer orally before the master. Held, that where the answers contained such an amount of irrelevant matter as to amount to an impertinent

ance and education, promised the plaintiff, by parol, that he would pay her an annuity or sum of £300 per annum, by quarterly payments of £75 each, so long as she should continue to do so. Not being satisfied with the way in which the children were being brought up by the plaintiff, the defendant discontinued the payment of the annuity, whereupon the plaintiff brought this action against him to recover the arrears of the annuity due to her. The declaration claimed only £600 for two years' instalments, but it was proved at the trial that arrears were due for two years and a half, and, thereupon, the learned judge amended the claim in the declaration by increasing it to £750, for the Court of Exchequer (Kelly, C.B., and Bramwhich sum the plaintiff had a verdict. Held, by well and Pigott, BB.)-First, on the authority of Wells v. Horton (4 Bing. 41; 5 L. J. 41, C. P.) and Souch v. Strawbridge (2 C. B. 808; 15 L. J., N. S., 170, C. P.), that this agreement was not one which was "not to be performed within the space of fore, that it need not be in writing under sect. 4 one year from the making thereof," and, thereof the Statute of Frauds, and the plaintiff's

action was maintainable thereon. Bramwell and

Pigott, BB., were of opinion (Kelly, C.B., forbearing to express an opinion on the point) that the agreement was determinable at any time, at the will of either party, upon reasonable notice. Secondly, that under sect. 222 of the C. L. P. Act 1852, the learned judge at the trial had full power to amend the claim for damages in the declaration, the understatement of them being a "defect" within the words and meaning of that section. (Knowlman v. Bluett, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 462. Ex.)

LIBEL-DECLARATION-UNSUPPORTED INNUENDOS.-Declaration in libel, first count on the following words: "We are requested to state that the Honorary Secretary of the T. Defence Fund is not and never was a captain in the Royal Artillery, as he has been erroneously described." Innuendo, that the plaintiff was an impostor, and had falsely and fraudulently represented himself to be a captain in the Royal Artillery. Second count: "the gentleman in question was a paymaster in the Royal Artillery, and as such received in due course the honorary rank of captain in the army, which is so stated in his commission. His name appears under the head of paymasters on half pay in this month's Army List. He is certainly not entitled to hold a command as an artillery officer." Innuendo, that the plaintiff was an impostor, and had falsely and in the artillery. At the trial it appeared that the maliciously represented himself to be a captain plaintiff had been a paymaster in the Royal Artillery, that he held a commission as honorary captain in the army, and was addressed and generally known as captain. He became honorary secretary to a fund, and in respect of his connection therewith, and his name being attached with the addition "Captain," R.A., to certain advertisements, the alleged libels were published in the defendants' newspapers. On these facts the plaintiff was nonsuited. Held, that the nonsuit was right; as the words alleged to be libellous did not prima facie support the innuendos, there was no evidence to go to the jury of circumstances rendering the statements charged capable of bearing the meaning imputed to them: (Hunt v. Goodlake, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 472. C.P.)

Correspondence.

OUR INVADERS.-We have received the following letter from a solicitor upon the subject of the notices issued by "The United Kingdom Mercantile Offices, Legal Department," and which we have often printed in these columns :"My impression is that the document, a specimen of which I enclose you, has already been exposed in your paper; but having within a short space of time had two of them brought to my office, I think it right to call your attention again to it, as the audacity of the authors seems rather to increase with publicity than otherwise, and it should be as widely and generally cautioned against as possible. In one case a poor woman with a sick husband and a large family came to me in the greatest fear and distress, and it was some time before I could satisfy myself and her that there was no actual process whatever in force against her. The client' of the office was a small tradesman, whose experience told him that a very small order would be obtained through the County Court, and who had no doubt found that the awe-inspiring threats of the United Kingdom Mercantile Offices' were, in many cases, more efficacious. EDMUND H. CHEESE."

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hours, without contravening section 10 of 23 & 24 | Vict. c. 127. The case having occurred to me, I wrote last week to the secretary of the Incorporated Law Society, asking his opinion, and received the following answer :

2nd Dec., 1873.

DEAR SIR,-I do not think you could hold the appointment referred to in your letter of the 29th ult., and receive a salary for so doing, without vitiating your service. The examiners have no objection to a clerk holding an honorary office the duties of which are performed after office hours.-I am, dear Sir, yours faithfully, E. W. WILLIAMSON, Secretary. You should, however, refer to the case of Re Greville. I may add that the appointment referred to in Mr. Williamson's letter necessitates my attendance on Sunday and Wednesday evenings only, so that whether I receive a salary or not, the service is the same, and the two cases ought, at any rate, to bear precisely similar relation to me as anARTICLED CLERK.

[Re Greville was reported in our issue of the 29th ult., page 70.-ED. SOLS.' DEPT.]

To Correspondents.

AN OCCASIONAL READER.-If the half of a term expires in Hilary Term next, he can present himself for examination up to and including the following Trinity Term, after which he could only do so by special leave (2) and if A. goes up for intermediate examination, and is unsuccessful, he is entitled, in the absence of any direction to the contrary, to present himself for examination in the following term, subject to the necessary notice. We cannot fully answer the query without the exact date of the articles.-[ED. SOL.'s DEPT.]

UNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE BANK OF ENGLAND.

[Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, and which will be paid to the persons respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three months, unless other claimants sooner appear.] CLARK (Geo. Thos.) and BRUCE (Henry Austin), both of 13, King's Arms-yard, Moorgate-street, Esqs. £25 Red Sea and India Telegraph Annuity, claimant said Geo. Thos. Clark.

WHITE (Thos.) and PRICE (Geo. Wm.), 57, Mark-lane, merchants. £1 per annum Red Sea and India Telegraph annuity, claimant said Thos. White, the survivor.

CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. LAST DAY OF PROOF.

ALLEN (Wm.), Sutton, Chester, farmer. Dec. 81; Wm. H. Linaker, solicitor, Runcorn. Jan. 7; M. R., at eleven o'clock. ANDREWS (John), Modbury, Devon, Esq. Jan. 10; J. H. Square, solicitor, Kingsbridge, Devon. Jan. 24; M.R., at twelve o'clock.

BAKER (Edward), 3, Cross-street, Chapel-street, Stockwell, Surrey, carpenter. Dec 20; Gresham and Son, solicitors, 24, Basinghall-street, London. Jan. 9; V.C. H., at one o'clock. BEW (John), Warwick, grocer. Dec. 22; Wm. B. Sanderson, solicitor, Warwick. Jan. 7; M. R., at eleven o'clock. BRADFORD (Martha), 183, Beresford-street, and 13, Floodterrace, Walworth, Surrey. Dec. 24; Win. Lewis, solicitor, 7. Wilmington-square, Middlesex. Jan. 14; V.C. B., at twelve o'clock.

BREWITT (Thos.), Rayleigh, Essex, Esq.

Jan. 16; E. P. De Gex, solicitor, 4, Raymond-buildings, Gray's-inn, Middlesex. Feb. 6: M. R., at twelve o'clock. BULL (Benjamin) Harlow, Essex, farmer. Jan. 1; John W. Windas, solicitor, Epping. Jan. 15; M. R. at eleven o'clock.

CLARKE (Jos.), Ramsey, Essex, farmer. Jan. 1: H. S. Goody, solicitor, North-hill, Colchester. Jan. 15; M. R. at eleven o'clock.

COOPER (Aun E.), formerly of Holbridge-place, near Woking, Surrey, late of 6, Warrior-square-terrace, St. Leonard's-on-Sea, widow. Dec. 31; J. Burgin, solicitor, 8, John-street, Bedford-row, Middlesex, Jan. 19, V.C. M., at twelve o'clock. DAVIS S ephen T.), Kingston-upon-Hull, manure manufacturer. Jan. 3; Roberts and Leak, solicitors, Kingstonapon-Hull, Jan. 9, V.C. M., at twelve o'clock."

BULL (Jas.), formerly of Kingsdown, Bristol, late of St Clair Villa, Lower Redland-road, Clifton, first clerk in H. M's Customs at the port of Bristol. Jan. 15; O'Donoghue and Co., solicitors, 1, St. Stephen's-street, Bristol.

DAVIS, otherwise CARTWRIGHT (Mary A.), 25, Welbeck. street, Cavendish-square, Middlesex, spinster. Dec. 21; Chauntrell and Pollock, solicitors, 63, Lincoln's Inn-fields, Middlesex. ELLICE (Russell, Lombard street, London and Brickendonbury, Herts, banker. Jan. 31; R. Dixon, solicitor, 5, Finsbury-square, London.

HADDAN (Thos. H.), New-square. Lincoln's-inn. and North grove, Highgate, Middlesex, barrister-at-law. Jan. 15; Western and Sons, solicitors, 7, Great James-streeet, Bedford-row, Middlesex. KIRK (John), late of Richmond Lodge, co. Down, linen merchant, lately trading at Belfast. co. Antrim and Keady, co. Armagh, and in New York, U. S. A. March 1; Wm. M. Kirk, 12, Bedford-street, Belfast. KIRTLEY (Matthew). Derby, engineer. Jan. 24; Beale and Co., solicitors, 28, Great George-street, Westminster. LOCK (Hannah), Easton, Southampton, widow. Dec. 31; F. Bowker, solicitor, 23, St. Peter's-street, Winchester. LODWICK (General Peter, 68A, Westbourne-terrace, Middlesex, and general in her Majesty's Indian Army. Jan. 15; Western and Sons, solicitors, 7, Great James-street, Bedford-row. London.

MEARA (Charlotte C.), 9. Royal-crescent, Cheltenham, spinster. Jan. 20; Ticehurst and Sons, solicitors, Essexplace, Cheltenham. MILLS (William), Ivy Cottage, 347, Albany-road, Camberwell, Surrey, gentleman. Jan. 14; H. F. and E. Chester,

solicitors. 86, Newington Butts, London, S. E. NEDHAM (Susannah S.), Leicester, spinster. March 2; Dalton and Salasbury, solicitors, Leicester.

stones were then 5in. thick. The footway on this. side of the square was formed by the flagstones and curbstones over the cellars of the houses. The flagstones having been worn down by the traffic over them to the thickness of only 2in. became dangerous and required repair. The magistrate determined that it would not be just that the respondents should be at the expense of supplying a roof to the appellant's cellar, nor that the appellant should be at the expense of paving the footway in front of his house; he therefore directed that each should pay half the expense of repair. Held, upon a case stated, that under the circumstances the respondents were liable for the whole expense: (Hamilton v. St. George, Hanover-square. 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 428. Q.B.)

LARCENY BY BAILEE (P. 467). The prisoner was employed by the prosecutor to fetch coals. from C. Before each journey the prosecutor made up to the prisoner £24, out of which he was to pay for the coals, keep 23s. for himself, and if the price of the coal, with the 23s., did not amount to £24, to keep the balance in hand to the credit of the next journey. It was the prisoner's duty to

ROWBOTTOM (Wm.), late of 1, Elizabeth-mews, England-pay for the coal as he obtained it with the money lane, Haverstock-hill, Middlesex, formerly of 21, and 4, Westmoreland-street, Marylebone, Middlesex, coachman. Jan. 22; S. J. Robinson, solicitor, 53, Gresham-house, Old Broad-street, London. WALLIS (Frances, otherwise Fanny), formerly of 4, Brunswick-villas, New-road, Harmersmith, Middlesex, late of Hill Villa, Melton-road, Woodbridge, Suffolk, widow. Dec. 13; O. Richards, solicitor, 16, Warwick-street, Regent-street, Middlesex. WATES (Edward), 15. Harmer-street, Milton-next-Gravesend, Kent, solicitor. Jan. 31; Hooke and Street, solicitors, 27, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Middlesex. WEST (John M.), Duke of Sussex, 18, Pierrepoint-row, Islington, Middlesex, licensed victualler. Dec. 31; Nash and Co., solicitors, 2. Suffolk-lane, Cannon-street, London. WHITING (Rev. Jas.), Vicar of Royston, Herts. Jan. 17; A. M. White, solici_or, Colchester.

WISEMAN (Jas.), Heathfield-terrace, Halifax, York, gentleman. Jan. 15; Wavell and Co., solicitors, 26, Georgestreet, Halifax.

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NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. RAPE-CONSENT-IDIOT.-Upon the trial of an indictment for rape upon an idiot girl, the proper direction to the jury is that if they are satisfied that the girl was in such a state of idiotcy as to be incapable of expressing either consent or dissent, and that the prisoner had connection with her without her consent, it is their duty to find him guilty. The two cases of Reg. v. Fletcher are not adverse to one another. The principle is Regency-square, Brighton, Sussex, Esq. Feb. 2; C. R. properly laid down in the first case, and the second case was only a decision to the effect that there was not that requisite testimony of want of assent to justify leaving the case to a jury: (Reg. Barratt, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 409. C. Cas. R.)

FISCHER Peter J., White Swan, Upper Norwood, Surrey. innkeeper. Jan. 1; G. Crafter, solicitor, 81, Blackfriarsroad, Surrey. Jan. 12; V.C. H., at one o'clock. GOODRICH Ermingarde), 10, Royal crescent, Brighton, Sussex, widow. Dec. 31; Jos. Burgin, solicitor, s, Johnstreet, Bedford-row, London. Jan. 19; V.C. M. at twelve o'clock. HOOPER (Geo. H.), Bloomsbury-square, Middlesex, and

Rivington, solicitor, 1, Fenchurch-buildings, Fenchurchstreet, London. Feb. 9; V.C. B., at twelve o'clock. MAPPIN (Wm., Sheffield, provision dealer. Jan. 6; C. F. W. Wilson, solicitor, Sheffield. Jan. 20; M. R., at twelve o'clock.

MCCABE (Esther J.), formerly of 14, Southwick-crescent, Hyde-park, Middlesex, late of Ticehurst, Sussex. spinster. Jan. 12; S. Potter, solic tor, 36, King-s reet, Cheapside, London. Jan. 26; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock.

ROBINSON (Margaret), Priory-street, Micklegate, York, Widow. Dec. al: G. M. Watson, solicitor, Stockton-uponROSE William B., 1, Howick-place, Westminster, Middlesex. barrister-at-law. Dec. 31; J. Brewer, solicitor, 6. Victoria-street, Westminster. Jan. 10; M. R., at eleven o'clock. SPRY (Richard), 97, Curtain-road, Shoreditch, Middlesex, easy chair and conch manufacturer. Dec. 15: Pritchard and Englefield, solicitors, Painter's Hall, Little Trinitylane, London. Dec. 22; V.C. B., at twelve o'clock. TIZARD (John), Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, Dorset, solicitor, and late a partner in the firm of Eldridge, Pope, and Co. brewers, Dorchester. Dec. 17; H. T. George, solicitor, Weymouth, Jan. 12; M. R., at 11 o'clock. WARD (William), Elim Cottage, Hatherley-road, Cheltenham, house agent. Jan. 10; Robert Wh eler, solicitor, Cheltenham, Jan. 22; V. C. M., at 12 o'clock. WILLIS (Harriet, Cheltenham, spinster. Jan. 10; Henry Kinneir, solicitor, Swindon, Jan. 22, V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.

Tees. Jan. 8; M. R., at eleven o'clock.

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POOR LAW-ORDER OF REMOVAL-IRREMOVABILITY UNEMANCIPATED CHILD.-The the Irremovability Act, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, s. 1, amended proviso in 11 & 12 Vict. c. 111, s. 1, to applies to all children who have not become emancipated, whether living with or apart from their parents. A girl of nineteen, who had been two years in domestic service, and dependent on herself, in the respondents' union, became chargeable; she had no settlement but that of her widowed mother, which was in the appellants' The mother had for years lived in and been chargeable to her place of settlement. Held, that the order of removal of this girl to her mother's place of settlement was good: (St. Olave's Union v. St. George's Union, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 426. Q. B.)

union.

received from the prosecutor; and the prosecutor did not know but that he did so, but provided he was supplied with the coal, and not required to pay more than the proper price for it, it was immaterial to the prosecutor in what manner tho prisoner paid for it. On the 20th March the prisoner had a balance of £3 in hand, and the prosecutor gave him £21 to make up £24 for the next journey. The prisoner did not buy any coal, but fraudulently appropriated it: Held, that a conviction of the prisoner for larceny of the £21 as a bailee was right: (Reg. v. Aden, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 467. C. Cas. R.)

LARCENY-RECEIVING-ACCESSORY IN SECOND DEGREE.-An indictment charged S. with stealing 188. 6d., and C. with receiving the same. The facts were: S. was a barman at a refreshment bar, and C. went up to the bar, called for refreshments, and put down a florin. S. served C., took up the florin, and took from his employer's till some money, and gave C. as his change 188. 6d., which C. put in his pocket and went away with. On leaving the place he took some silver from his pocket, and was counting it when he was arrested. On entering the bar signs of recognition took place between S. and C., and C. was present when S. took the money from the till. The jury convicted S. of stealing and C. of receiving. Held, that this was evidence which the judge ought to have left to the jury as reasonable evidence upon which C. might have been convicted as a principal in the second degree; and that therefore the conviction for receiving could not be sustained: (Reg. v. Coggins, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 469. C. Cas. R.)

EXCISE-CARRIAGE USED SOLELY FOR CONVEYANCE OF Goons IN TRADE OR HUSBANDRY. -By the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 14, s. 18, a duty is im posed upon carriages having a certain number of wheels and being of a certain weight; and by sect. 19, sub-section (6), it is enacted that the term "carriage means and includes any vehicle drawn by a horse or mule "except a waggon, cart, or other vehicle used solely for the conveyance of husbandry." The defendants were the proprietors any goods or burden in the course of trade or of a travelling equestrian circus, and it was their course of business to give a daily parade through the towns which they visit. On the day laid in the information there was the usual parade in Bishop Auckland, and amongst other carriages in the procession there were three drawn by horses; one conveyed the band, consisting of eight performers; two others conveyed four persons each, and the persons in one of these were dressed in a gaudy attire and carried flags. These three carriages were used also for carrying portions of the place, and at the time before mentioned there were luggage and property of the circus from place to clothes belonging to the circus in the back locker of the band carriage, and also the music and musical instruments of the circus, and also in the and brackets: Held, that these three carriages other carriages there were some loose deal boxes sub-section of sect. 19 as carriages "used solely were not within the exemption specified in the 6th for the conveyance of any goods or burden in the course of trade or husbaudry," and that they required to be licensed: (Speak v. Powell, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 434. Ex.)

THE LICENSING ACT 1872, SECTION 12. AT the Stamford Borough Petty Sessions, on the 29th November last, the following case came be

fore the Bench:--

METROPOLIS LOCAL MANAGEMENT-REPAIR OF ROOF OF CELLAR-PAVEMENT OF FOOTWAY. -The appellant was summoned under the Metropolitan Management Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), s. 226, to pay for the repair of his cellar In Saint George's-square, in the borough of which the respondents had done under sect. 102 of Stamford, is a building owned by the Marquis of that Act. front of the appellant's house and the other building, in consideration of a rent, is let by his The magistrate found in fact that in Exeter, and known as the Assembly-rooms. This houses situated on the north side of Eaton-square lordship to a Mr. Langley, who, for certain pay. were cellars covered by flagstones resting on the ments, lets it from time to time to persons apply. walls of the cellars. Those cellars were so formed ing to use it for balls, lectures, operas, concerts, when the square was built in 1830, and the flag-meetings, and similar purposes.

case.

66

Against such contention it was suggested by the clerk to the justices that "public place," as used in the 12th section, might possibly have to be taken ejusdem generis, with highway;" and that although the Assembly-room might, when the meeting was held, be "a place of public resort," it was not clear to him that it was then a public place. The notes to Paterson's Intoxicating Liquor (Licensing) Act 1872, p. 12, Oke's Synopsis, 11 edit., vol. 1, p. 727 and 729, notes 442 and 444, Oke's Licensing Act, and Ex parte Freestone (25 L. J. 121, M. C.), (where Reg. v. Holmes is mentioned and commented upon); Hirst v. Molesbury (40 L. J. 76, M. C.), and the Vagrant Act Amendment Act 1868, were mentioned. The Bench adjourned the case to the next petty ses. sion, directing the clerk to take counsel's opinion

in the meantime.

The following opinion of Mr. C. G. Merewether upon the above facts was received at the adjourned meeting

MARITIME LAW.

SPECIMENS OF A CODE OF MARINE
INSURANCE LAW.

By F. O. CRUMP, Barrister-at-Law.
(Continued from page 90.)
DEVIATION AND CHANGE OF VOYAGE.
Definitions.

Deviation-Voluntary departure without necessity-or a departure, through gross ignorance, or the part of the captain(a)-from the usual course of the voyage insured; or delay in commencing and prosecuting the voyage for purposes alien to the objects of the adventure.

(a) Phynn v. Royal Exchange Company, 7 T. Rep 505.

Change of Voyage-Where either before or afte sailing the assured abandons the thought of pro ceeding to the port of destination originally prescribed by the policy, and sails for another. Woolridge v. Boydell, Dougl. 16 (a).

Intention to Deviate.

A mere intention to deviate does not discharge
the insurer.
Kewly v. Ryan, 2 H. Bl. 363; Thelusson v. Fergusson
1 Dougl. 361.
Test of Deviation.

If the risk be altered there is a deviation.
If the risk be enhanced there is a deviation.
And if the risk be altered without being
enhanced there is a deviation.

Arn. 1st edit. 312; Phillips, sect. 983; Company o
African Merchants v. British and Foreign Marine
Insurance Company, 28 L. T. Rep. N. S. 233.
The Loss.

The loss need not have been in any way what-
connected with the deviation.

Effect of Deviation. Deviation determines the liability of the underwriter from the time of leaving the track of the specified voyage:

Marshall Ins. 139; Hare v. Travis, 7 B. & C. p. 14. Effect of Change of Voyage. If the determination to change the voyage be formed before the risk attaches, the policy is void ab initio. If not formed until after sailing the underwriter is discharged from all losses which may occur subsequently to its being formed: Way v. Modigliani, 2 T. Rep. 30. WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFY DEVIATION. Deviation may be justified1. By usage.

On the 26th November 1873, these Assembly-kind. Mr. H. G. Lake, chairman of the Licensed rooms were let to certain persons connected with Victuallers' Protection Association, presided over a temperance society known as the "Good the conference, which was fairly well attended, Templars.", A meeting at these Assembly-rooms some of the members, he said, having come from was called by handbill, and to this meeting the distant parts of the country. The simple object, public were admitted free of charge. A person he said, was to discuss amendments of the Act of named Thomas Pollard attended the meeting, and 1872. Mr. John James Homer, the treasurer, there, whilst drunk, was guilty of riotous conduct. explained the objects of the Bill in question, Pollard was summoned before the justices under which, he said, were few and simple, the cardinal the second part of section 12 of the Licensing point being the question of hours. He thought Act 1872, and at the hearing the question arose the late Home Secretary made a mistake in as to whether or not the Assembly-rooms were, ignoring an uniform system and substituting an during the time such meeting was held, a public elastic principle. That had created, he said, illplace. feeling and heart-burning throughout the trade. In support of the contention that the rooms He explained that they proposed by the Bill about were a public place when such meeting was held, to be brought before Parliament to repeal the Sewell v. Taylor (29 L. J., 50, M. C.), and Reg. 24th, 26th, and 36th sections of the Licensing Act. v. Holmes (22 L. J., N. S., 122, M. C.; 1 Dear. All the provincial societies had been asked to send C. C. 207), were cited, and particular stress laid delegates to the meeting. To the question Were upon the judgment of Lord Campbell in the last their societies favourable to an uniform system of closing? seventy-seven of the large provincial cities and towns replied in the affirmative, including, among others, Scarborough, Dewsbury, Maidstone, Burton-upon-Trent, Hull, Stockport, Lincoln, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Sunderland, North and South Shields, Dublin, Belfast, and many more. The result was that seventy-seven in all answered favourably as to the question of hours. In London alone, he said, of the answers (3329 in number) received, 2874 were in favour of twelve o'clock and 455 in favour of 12 30, being a majority in favour of closing at twelve o'clock of 2419. Mr. Childs, solicitor to the Licensed Victuallers' Protection Association, stated how the Bill sought to amend the Licensing Act of 1872. The proposed alterations had reference chiefly to the times of closing, and those were left blank in the Bill. Mr. Sharman, the secretary, read an explana-ever tory letter as to how the Bill proposed to deal with existing grievances, from the Queen's counsel by whom it had been drawn, adding that he was a member of Parliament as well as a Queen's counsel, "I am of opinion that the Assembly-rooms were but that he did not at present wish his name to not during the time of the meeting a public place be mentioned. A principal part of the proposed within the Licensing Act, sect. 12, and agree with alterations of the existing Act was the manner the distinction pointed out by the clerk to the of dealing with "the bona fide traveller." Mr. justices. Looking at the words employed by the Winterbotham, a leading member of the trade, Legislature, and the juxtaposition of highway, it who contended that uniformity as to hours was the appears to me that the place contemplated is one mainspring of all their action, moved that in the to which the public have a right to go, and where opinion of that conference the hours of opening they have a right to be, such as an open or en- within the City of London and its liberties, and closed market, a church, or arcade, in a highway. within the Metropolitan Police district, should be That the courts still put a strict construction on from five a.m. to twelve p.m. on week days, and on similar words is shown by Tinson's caso, reported Sundays from one to three and from six to eleven in 39 L. J. 129, M. C. The words in the Vagrant o'clock. He commented on what the called the Act, upon which the decisions relied upon were gross injustice to the trade of granting excep given, are different-viz., "any place of public tional licences, and said, speaking on behalf of resort;" and the amending Act of 1868 contains the whole trade, that they hated a drunken man words which fortify me in the view taken here. as much as any other member of the community. Sect. 3 enacts that any person playing in (a) any The motion was seconded by Mr. Wetenhall, who open or public place, or (b) in any place to which dwelt on the disposition which had existed during the public have, or are permitted to have, access, the last twenty years to shorten the hours of is liable to certain penalties. It is perfectly clear labour, and, that being so, he submitted the that the framers of that clause did not suppose licensed victuallers should not array themselves that the phrase (a) included such a case as the against public opinion on that subject. He also present. CHARLES G. MEREWETHER. contended, amid cheers, that twelve o'clock should "11, King's Bench-walk, Dec. 2, 1873." be the hour of closing both in town and country, The justices, acting upon such opinion, dis- and that if they went for that hour in the Metropolis the country people would also ask for an uniformity of hours. Mr. Edwards, secretary of the National League, objected to the introduction of a THE LICENSING LAWS. Bill by the trade itself. Mr. Graystone, of York, ON Wednesday a conference of licensed vic. supporting the motion, thought they were much tuallers, convened by their Protection Society, indebted to the London trade for only asking for was held at the London Tavern, to consider, in twelve o'clock, and he was of opinion thut all accordance with the course pursued by them on the large town should be on the same footing with previous occasions, matters affecting the interests the metropolis as to closing at twelve o'clock. of their trade which are about to be brought Mr. Winterbotham explained that there was before the Legislature. The immediate object of not the slightest objection on the part of the the meeting was to consider a Bill which they London trade to include the country as to the have had prepared by a Queen's Counsel, for hour of closing. Mr. Cleaver also advocated one smending the Licensing Act of 1872. In antici- hour for closing for the whole country, and he pation of the meeting, the trade, in their several deprecated on this occasion the provincial towns societies, had been invited to consider whether being "left out in the cold." It was denied by they were favourable to an uniform system of several members of the conference that there was 4. A forced interposition of an intermediate voyage does not discharge the underwriter if the opening and closing public houses all over the any such intention. The motion of Mr. Winter-specified terminus ad quem is still kept in view: country from 5 a.m. to 12 p.m. on week days, and botham was supported by Mr. Thurston, who on Sundays to open at 12.30, close at 3, re-open at stated that they had received 3329 adhesions from 5 or 6, and close at 11 p.m. They had also been the trade in the metropolis in favour of one uniasked, among other questions, to consider if they form nour of closing-namely, twelve o'clock. were favourable to grocers being placed in all After some further discussion, in which some of respects upon the same footing as licensed vic- the provincial delegates took part, it was moved taallers in reference to police supervision, hours, and as an amendment by Mr. Knowles that half-past magisterial control. It was stated that 75 licensed twelve at night be the uniform hour of closing on victuallers' associations in various parts of the week days. In the result the motion of Mr. Wincountry were represented at the meeting-a larger terbotham was carried by a large majority, and it number of societies, it was said, than were ever was afterwards agreed to appoint a committee to

missed the case.

represented at any previous conference of the consider the clauses of the proposed Bill.

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2. By licence in the policy.

3. When made to save life [not property].

4. When forced upon the assured by vis major. 5. When the control of the ship is taken out of the hands of the assured.

6. In extraordinary emergencies to repair.
7. When necessary to avoid disaster.
8. In repelling hostile attacks.

1. Usage must be precise, clear, and wellestablished:

Arn. 4th edit. 427; Cormack v. Gladstone, 11 East, 347; Salisbury v. Townson, Millar Ins. 418.

2. The licence given by the policy must be observed with the most scrupulous and literal exactness:

Elliott v. Wilson, 7 Brown's P. C. 459.

Liberty to "touch and stay" is construed according to the character of the voyege and the object which the parties had in view:

Arn. 4th edit. 435.

There being a liberty to touch and stay, it is no deviation to trade unless by so doing the risk is materially varied:

Arn. 4th edit. 446.

A general liberty to touch at a port or at ports for the purposes of the voyage: without specifying them will justify touching only

3 Kent, Comm. 3rd edit. 315; Ph. s. 1607. 3. Deviation to save life is obviously justifiable on principles of humanity: (Ph. s. 1027.) Deviation to save property only is fatal: (Ibid.)

Driscol v. Passmore, 1 Bos. & Pull. 200; Bottomley v. Bovill, 5 B. & C. 210; Vallejo v. Wheeler, Cowp 143. NOTE.-The force may be physical or moral, or exist in a state of circumstances leaving the captain no alternative: (Arn. 4th edit. 466.)

6.

When in consequence of disaster the vessel not only justified in quitting the course and seekcannot safely pursue the voyage, the master is ing the most convenient and suitable port for repairs and supplies, or on account of other exigencies of the voyage, but it is his duty to seek such port:

Ph s. 1018, et seq.; Motteur v. Lond. Ass. Co. 1 Atk. Ch. 545; Petty v. Royal Ex. Ass. Co. 1 Burr. 341. But if the ship was inadequately fitted out in the first instance, departing from the voyage to repair the deficiency is a deviation:

Forshaw v. Chabert, 3 B. & B. 158; Raine v. Bell, 9 East, 195; Thomas v. Royal Ex. Ass. Co 1 Price, 195. 7. The ship may go out of its course, or delay to avoid disaster, to join convoy, or to gain intelligence, ex. gr., as to a rumoured blockade of the port of destination.

And deviation which would be justifiable under a policy against the perils of

the sea generally, is not a deviation under a policy or any other unavoidable accidents preventing the
against one or some only of such perils:
Phillips, sect. 1025.

NOTE.-There has been some doubt whether deviation to avoid an excepted peril is justifiable (see the cases of O'Reilly v. Royal Exch. Ass. Co., 4 Campb. 236, and O'Reilly v. Gonne, Ib. 247), but Phillips (s. 1025) is of opinion that it is. Arnould was of a different opinion (1st edit. 407), but his view has not been adopted by his editor. But if the voyage is given up and another entirely distinct one undertaken on account of a peril not insured against, the risk thereupon ceases.

8. The deviation must be strictly confined to the purposes of self-defence. The engagament begun in self-defence may, however, be prosecuted to capture, but if a desire be evinced to profit by the capture of prizes, and the direct course of the voyage be thus departed from, there will be a de

viation:

230.

Jolly v. Walker, 2 Park Ins. 630. See other cases Arn. 4th edit. 459. Haven v. Holland, 2 Mason's Rep. The Voyage. The voyage, a deviation from which discharges the underwriter, is the sailing from one port to another with all practicable safe and convenient expedition :

Phillips, sect. 981.

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"At and from" and " to ard from." The insurance being "at and from," and " to or "from" port or ports, the question of deviation is one of construction upon the particular policy. Arn, 4th edit., 432, 433, citing Bragg v. Anderson, 4 Taunt. 229; Lambert v. Liddiard, 5 Taunt. 480; 1 Marsh Rep. 149; Ashley v. Pratt, 16 M. & W. 471; 1 Ex. Ch. 257; 17 L. J. 135. Ex.; Harrower v. Hutchinson, L. Rep. 4 Q. B. 523; 5 Q. B. 584, 589; Brown v. Taylor, 4 A. & E. 241.

A vessel or other interest being insured "at and from" a port, the assured may, by manifesting an intention while in port to adopt another destination, avoid the policy.

And if she sails from the port for another destination, the result is the same, even though the course of the voyage for some distance is similar in both cases. Phillips, sect. 992; Tasker v. Cunningham, 1 Bligh,

p. 100.

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that the freighters could require the ship to go to some discharging place not in the regular course of navigation, and only accessible at rare intervals. Then it appears that Brunswick Wharf is a regular place, and is selected, and the ship is to go there. It is a tidal harbour, and in all tidal harbours a ship is liable to be delayed by the state of the tide. If such a misfortune happens it is in the regular course of navigation. The ship here, when she lay on the mud-bank, was not as near to Brunswick Wharf as she could safely get, and that the event shows; for in the ordinary and regular course of navigation she might and did safely get to Brunswick Wharf, and then discharge her cargo."

loading and unloading." There was also this
clause: "This charter to be in force for as many
voyages as the vessel can make in two years, to
commence from the date of the first cargo being
unloaded." It was proved by the captain that
there were several usual loading places in the
Bilbao River between its mouth and the town of
Bilbao, of which three are San Nicholas, Zoroso,
and Oliviaga, the last being the highest up the
river. The ship arrived at the port on the 1st
Feb., and on the 7th the captain received orders
from the merchant's agents, Messrs. Ybarra, to
go to San Nicholas to take in cargo. The captain
Now the charter-party in the
took his vessel to San Nicholas on Sunday, the
9th, and on the 10th, at 6 a.m., he was ready to above case is on all fours with the charter-party
The ship was therefore bound to
take in his cargo, but he was prevented by the before me.
harbour-master from putting his vessel along. go to San Nicholas on the first voyage, and to
side Messrs. Ybarra's wharf, which forms part of a Zoroso on the second voyage, and the lay-hours
large quay or set of wharves by the river side where would not commence until the ship had arrived
he had been accustomed to receive his cargo, but at those places respectively, and was ready to
he could have taken the cargo where the vessel then receive cargo. Now, I think it clear that she had
was lying. The loading of the vessel was finished at performed her duty on the first occasion when she
3 p.m. on the 15th, so that there was a delay had arrived at San Nicholas, though she was pre-
of fifty-seven hours beyond the stipulated lay- vented by the harbour master from coming into
hours, if the time be computed from the time the loading berth of Messrs. Ybarra. In Brown
when the vessel was at San Nicholas ready to v. Johnson (10 M. & W. 331) the ship was ordered
load, but a delay of twenty-four hours only if the to Hull, and the usual place of discharge was the
time be computed from the time when the vessel dock; and it was held that the lay-days com-
was allowed to go into berth. Upon the second menced from the time of the vessel's coming into
occasion the vessel went light to Bilbao on the dock, though she could not get to a place of
2nd March, and on the 3rd the captain gave unloading until two days after, owing to the full
notice, at 11 a.m., that his vessel was ready, but state of the docks. This case has been followed
that time was to count from 2 p.m. The ship was by other cases, and the last reported case which I
then at St. Nicholas, and the captain received can find (and which is the more closely applicable,
orders at 1 p.m. (when he was at the town of as it is for demurrage in loading) is Tapscott v.
Bilbao) to go to Zoroso. Bilbao is about three Balfour (L. Rep. 8, C. P. 46). In that case it was
and a half miles from San Nicholas, and as the stipulated that the ship should proceed to any
tide had begun to flow when he received his Liverpool or Birkenhead dock as ordered by the
orders, and as it would take three hours for the freighter, and there load in the customary manner
ship to get her steam up, the captain stated that a cargo of coals. The ship was ordered into the
he was unable to get to Zoroso until the following Wellington Dock, where coals are most usually
tide. He therefore claimed the lay hours to com- loaded from tips, of which there are only two, and
mence from 2 p.m. on the 3rd, whilst the defen- by the dock regulations no coal agent is permitted
dants contended that the time did not begin to to have more than three vessels in the dock at a
run till he had got to Zoroso, seventeen hours time. The plaintiff's ship was ready to go int
later. The defendants admitted their liability for the dock on the 3rd July, but was not allowed to
four hours on the second occasion, and for twenty-enter, because the coal agents employed by the
four hours on the first, and they paid £30 into defendants had three ships already in the dock,
court for the demurrage. Mr. Ingledew appeared and two others in turn to get in. She got into
for the owners, and Mr. Ensor for the merchants. dock on the 11th July, but could not get under
The only points in dispute were-from what time, the tips for some time owing to the number of
under the circumstances, was the time to run? vessels in turn to go under before her. It was
In Brereton v. Chapman (7 Bing. 559), it was held held that the lay-days did not commenee when the
that the lay-days allowed by a charter party for a ship was ready to enter the dock, as contended by
ship's discharge are to be reckoned from the the plaintiffs, nor at the time when she got under
time of her arrival at the usual place of dis- the tips, as contended by the defendents, but at
charge, and not at the port merely, though she the time when she got into dock. From this case
should for the purposes of navigation discharge I think it follows that the plaintiff's ship was
some of her cargo at the entrance of the ready, under the terms of this charter, when she
was at San Nicholas, the appointed loading place,
port before arriving at the usual place of dis-
charge. But Parker v. Winlow (7 E. & B. 942) and that the merchant was answerable for, or
appears to me to lay down the law involved in the rather not excused by, the refusal of the harbour
consideration of this case. That was an action master to allow the ship to go to the particular
for delay in unloading. By the charter the vessel, wharf or part of the wharf where the Messrs.
when loaded, was to proceed to Plymouth, not Ybarra usually load their cargoes. With respect
higher than Tor Point or New Passage, or so near to the second voyage, the case of Parker v. Winlow
thereto as she might safely get, and deliver the appears to me to show conclusively that the ship-
same, &c. The ship arrived in the port of Ply- owner must answer for his inability to go up to
mouth, and anchored in the Tamar on the 21st Zoroso sooner, by reason of the state of the tide.
June, and the merchant ordered the ship to the I consider that he received his orders to go there
Brunswick Wharf to discharge. The port of in a reasonable time after the freighter knew that
his ship was ready. I will therefore give the
Tamar, in which, besides the harbour of Ply- plaintiffs a decree for £61, that is, for fifty-seven
mouth and Devonport, there are several usual hours on the first voyage, and for four hours on
landing places, one of which is the Brunswick the second.
Wharf, below Tor Point and New Passage.
In order to reach Brunswick Wharf it is neces-
to cross a mud-bank in the Tamar.
sary
the time when the order to discharge was given
the tides were neap, and the vessel drew too much
water to be able to pass the bank even at high
water during those tides. The captain requested
the merchant to send lighters to take part of the
cargo out, so as to enable him to cross the bank,
but they did not do so. The vessel proceeded
towards the Brunswick Wharf, and grounded
on the mud-bank, where she lay till the high
tides, when she got to the Brunswick Wharf,
and notice was given that she was there ready to
discharge on the 2nd July. The plaintiff's counsel
contended that the lay-days commenced on notice
of the arrival of the ship in the Tamar on the
22nd June, in which case there were nine days'
demurrage. The court decided against the claim.
Crompton, J., in his judgment, says: "I think
that the lay-days commenced just as they would
have done if the charter-party had expressed
from the first that the vessel was to proceed tc
Brunswick Wharf, or so near thereto as she could
safely get. The ship is to go to Plymouth, a
tidal harbour. For the security of the shipowners
two points are named, and the vessel is not to be
required to go higher than those; but below those
points she is to go to some discharging place. I
take it that place is to be selected by those who
are to discharge her, with this restriction in their
choice-that it is to be one of the regular usual
discharging places in the port. I do not think

But convoy being lost by delay, there is a de- Plymouth includes the tidal estuary of the

viation.

Williams v. Shee, 3 Camp, 469.

CARDIFF COUNTY COURT.
Thursday, Nov. 20.

(Before J. M. HERBERT, Esq., Judge.) WILSON V. THE DOWLAIS IRON COMPANY. Admiralty-Demurrage-Lay hours-Stipulations in charter-party.

HIS HONOUR delivered the following judgment: This is a suit in Admiralty under the County Courts Admiralty Amendment Act, upon a claim arising out of an agreement made in relation to the hire of a ship, being, in fact, a claim for demurrage in loading the plaintiff's ship Campanil on two several occasions. By a charter-party of the 12th May 1871, the defendant chartered the plaintiff's vessel, and it was agreed that the ship should proceed (after completion at Greenock, and having liberty to take cargoes on the way there) to Bilbao, not higher than Oliviaga, or so near thereto as she might safely get, and there load in the customary manner from the agents of the freighter a full and complete cargo of iron ore; and being so loaded should therewith proceed to Cardiff, &c. There was the following clause: "seventy-two running hours, Sundays excepted, are to be allowed the said merchants, if the ship is not sooner despatched, for loading, and to be discharged as fast as the vessel can deliver, time to commence from the time the vessel is ready to load and unload, and all hours on demurrage over and above the said lay-days, at the rate of 20s. per hour, except in case of hands striking work, or frosts, or floods,

At

MERCANTILE LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. MARINE INSURANCE-INSURABLE INTERESTOPEN POLICY-RIGHT OF CONSIGNEES TO INSURE. The plaintiffs, who are cotton brokers and agents in London, were, in the course of their business, in the habit of receiving consignments of cotton from Bell and Co., of Bombay, and other correspondents abroad, the plaintiffs making advances by acceptances ag inst the consignments. The bills of exchange were usually negotiated in India, and sent to the plaintiffs with the bills of lading attached, who accepted the same against delivery of the shipping documents. The plaintiffs usually insured the cotton thus consigned to them from Bombay with the defendants, by means of an open floating policy for £5000 on cotton, lost or not lost, from Bombay to London, in ship or ships, and the insurances were expressed to be made "as well in their own names as for and in the name or names of all and every person and persons to whom the same doth, may, and shall appertain in part or in all." Bell and Co., having advised the plaintiffs of a shipment of cotton, drew upon the plaintiffs for £3000, at six month's sight, at the same time requesting the plaintiffs to insure the cotton. The bill of exchange was negotiated by a bank in India, and the plaintiffs accepted it on its arrival in London against the delivery of the shipping documents. The plain

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