LIMITED RIGHTS OF WAY.

Ir being now so much the practice of Parliament to grant to public undertakings large powers of taking lands, it is obviously of importance, in the first place, to see that proper reservations of the rights of owners and occupiers of adjacent lands and property are inserted in the particular Acts of Parliament; and, secondly, that the rights so reserved are not curtailed or annihilated. The dangers which attend the user of land so taken are pointed out by the case of the United Land Company v. The Great Eastern Railway Company (29 L. L. Rep. N. S. 498). The railway company, requiring certain Crown lands for the purposes of a railway, entered into an agreement with the Royal Commissioners to make two level crossings upon the railway for the more convenient enjoyment of the adjacent lands of her Majesty. The plaintiff company became the purchasers of some of these lands, and it was in respect of a right claimed by them to have a way over the level crossings to the buildings erected on such lands that the bill was filed.

The contention on the part of the defendant company was, that inasmuch as at the time the level crossings were made, the adjoining land was only mud and marsh land, the level crossings could only be used for the purpose to which land in that state was applicable. On the other side, it was said that building being a purpose to which the land might be properly applied, convenient communications for the residents in buildings so erected were necessarily reserved. The railway company urged the great inconvenience which would be entailed by all the residents having a right to cross the railway. It will be seen that this raises very neatly a question of law of much practical importance.

Let us consider, first, the elementary proposition with regard to rights of way. It is perfectly clear that there may be grants of limited rights of way; and limited rights of way may be acquired by user. For example, a way may be granted for agricultural purposes only (Reynolds v. Edwardes, Willes, 282), or for the carriage of coals only (Iveson v. Moore, 3 Ld. Raym. 291). And evidence of an user of a road with horses, carts, and carriages, for certain purposes, does not necessarily prove a right of road for all purposes, but the extent of the right is a question for the jury under all the circumstances. If the way is confined to a particular purpose, the jury ought not to extend it; but if it is proved to have been used for a variety of purposes, the jury may be warranted in finding a way for all. Among other authorities for these propositions are Hawkins v. Carbines (27 L. J. 44, Ex.), and Allan v. Gomme (11 Ad. & Ell. 759.) There is a recent case which follows out the principles of these decisions. In Williams v. James (16 L. T. Rep. N. S. 664; L. Rep. 2 C. P. 577), a right of way for carting hay was disputed, on the ground of excess in using it for carting hay which had not been grown on the dominant tenement. Mr. Justice Willes there said: "In the case of proving a right by prescription, the user of the right is the only evidence. In the case of a grant the language of the instrument can be referred to, and it is of course for the court to construe that language; and in the absence of any clear indication of the intention of the parties, the maxim that a grant must be construed most strongly against the grantor must be applied. . . . The land in this case was a field in the country, and apparently only used for rustic purposes. . . . I quite agree with the argument that the right of way can only be used for the field in its ordinary use as a field. ... The use must be the reasonable use for the purposes of the land in the condition in which it was while the user took place." And his Lordship took occasion to remark as to the extent of the right, that it could not be used for a manufactory built upon the field. Now it is clear that the right claimed in the United Land Company v. Great Eastern Railway Company was a right in respect of a use of the land not existing at the time of the reservation. The land was marsh land; but because it was marsh, was all convenience of access to be cut off by the railway if the land was utilised? The Vice-Chancellor (Malins) said: "The use and enjoyment of land means the use and enjoyment of it in any manner that subsequent events may render expedient." This strikes us as a very wide doctrine, and taken generally as applied to rights acquired by prescription, it would undoubtedly be too wide; but in this case the defendant company's Act of Parliament bound them to make and construct such convenient communications across, over, or under their railway, as might be necessary "for the convenient enjoyment and occupation of the lands." And it was with reference to this that the Vice-Chancellor added to the above remarks: "Nothing can, in my opinion, be more narrow than the attempt to put upon the language of this Act of Parliament the construction that, because the land was used in a particular manner at that time (1847), it must necessarily be used in the same manner for all future time, or actually be blocked out from all communication with the outer world."

The "use and enjoyment of land" is a large expression. There is no restriction here, and on the authority of Henning v. Burnett (8 Ex. 197), and Williams v. James (sup.), it would seem clear that where the nature of the use and enjoyment of land is not specified, it cannot be implied that the land shall not be used for any purpose but that for which it is adapted when the right is acquired. Suppose, for example, coal or clay were discovered under the surface, could they not be worked in exercise of the "enjoyment" of the land? The circumstance in the case under notice of the land

being taken by a railway company, furnishes a strong argument in favour of an affirmative answer to this question, for although a certain amount of private inconvenience is looked upon as allowable to secure a public benefit, it is also clear that more inconvenience and loss must not be inflicted upon the landowner than is absolutely necessary. To use the language of the Vice-Chancellor : "He is to have as much enjoyment, and as free use of his land after the railway is constructed as he had before, so far as the exercise of those rights does not interfere with the rights of the railway company and the rights of the public in running over those lands upon the railway."

This is no doubt an exceptional case, for the Vice-Chancellor declined to regard the railway as a servient tenement; but it, revertheless, serves usefully to illustrate the general principles of our law.

THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUCATION.

It must be a source of gratification to everyone interested in the study and practice of the law, that there are among the eminent members of the Profession a number of men who, feeling the utter inefficiency of the present system of legal education, are determined to do their utmost to carry a wise measure of reform. When the Legal Education Association was established under the presidency of Sir ROUNDELL PALMER, it became apparent that the subject of legal education was one which could no longer be trifled with; but unhappily, owing to the opposition of the present MASTER of the ROLLS, and the want of knowledge on the part of lay members, the resolutions brought forward in the House of Commons by Sir ROUNDELL PALMER were not carried. The elevation of the President of the Association to the woolsack raised another impediment to the progress of the movement, and the larger reform contained in the provisions of the Judicature Bill presented a still more formidable obstacle to the attainment of the objects of the Association. Fortunately, however, the LORD CHANCELLOR was good enough, whilst resigning the presidency of the association, to express his unabated interest in its aims, but his Lordship at the same time added to the burden of the Judicature Bill by bringing forward the Land Transfer Bill, and his hands thus became so full as to allow little hope to be entertained that he could find time to embody the resolutions which he introduced into the House of Commons in a Bill. By great good luck the Judicature Bill was carried; the Land Transfer Bill alone remains as a rival to the Bill for the Reform of Legal Education yet to be framed. Under these circumstances it became highly desirable that the Legal Education Association should ascertain.what are the present views of the LORD CHANCELLOR, and what the prospect of carrying a Bill through Parliament. Hence the deputation which waited upon Lord SELBORNE on Friday in last week.

The result of that deputation may be very shortly stated. In the first place, it was said very plainly that what the Inns of Court have done in improving the education of barristers is not satisfactory. It is not in itself efficient, it is confined to the four Inns of Court, and at any time any one of the Inns may retire from the scheme and may call students in any way that it thinks proper. We have over and over again expressed the opinion that the divided and frequently conflicting interests of the Inns of Court unfit them to form an efficient governing body of a great profession. If they govern at all they do not govern well, and it was too much to expect that when abruptly aroused from the lethargy which is traditionary, the Inns should fashion a wise and liberal scheme of legal education. And as a fact it was found impossible to secure combined action; each Inn appointed their respective tutors and professors, and in a fit of zealous enthusiasm, Gray's Inn, at a moment when its very existence was threatened, owing to a slow but sure process of exhaustion, founded tempting scholarships. But the emptiness and absurdity of these spasmodic efforts was in the mind of every member of the Legal Education Association, and the impression was conveyed by Mr. AMPHLETT to the LORD CHANCELLOR. What did he propose in substitution? He proposed that which has been the scheme of the Association from its commencement-the establishment of a General School of Law, to which members of the Inns of Court, articled clerks, and the public should be admitted to study law. There is obviously no possible reason why a high order of education should be reserved for barristers. It is in every way desirable that a knowledge of law should be widely diffused—not a knowledge of practice and procedure, but a knowledge of broad general principles. It is now universally admitted that the study of law is as good a mental discipline as the study of mathematics, and there is certainly no reason why in the university or school articled clerks should not share to any extent they please in the advantages offered to students for the Bar. The Americans appear to entertain a somewhat exaggerated estimate of the importance of legal study, but it is an error on the right side. A correspondent of an American contemporary considers the study of the law inferior only to the highest-theology. He writes: "The subject of comparative scientific jurisprudence is, in itself, not merely the pursuit of themes of the most transcendent interest and importance, but in many aspects furnish the key to

the inner secrets of history, while enlarging our respect for the world in general, with the knowledge of the moral unity of mankind. It gives significance to facts in the history of other lands, without which all is mysterious and oftentimes unaccountable. It increases our reverence for the triumphs of human thought, as it makes known the fact that the great and good of all ages have contributed some ray to the noonday glory of our enlightened age. It enlarges the cosmopolitan spirit, for we soon discern that to foreign jurists and civilians we owe most of the scientific statement of jurisprudence. And again, it increases our respect for heroism and moral dignity; for it is true that most of the grandest principles have been born of mighty struggles, and the champions of great principles have often been the scorned and persecuted of their own day. Giants of moral power contemplating the truths of God are contemplated, rearing the science of liberty and just and equal law, often amidst the gloom of tyranny, superstition, and persecution. Indeed, there is but one theme higher than this, it is theology, and the science of religion."

To recur, however, to the practical question-What said the LORD CHANCELLOR? He reminded the deputation that he still had the Land Transfer Bill to carry through Parliament; but, nevertheless, he expressed a hope of being able at an early date to introduce a measure to the notice of his colleagues. Whether they will approve and adopt it, or any similar measure, of course his Lordship was unable to say. But, as an individual, he declared his sympathy with the association, and_promised to draft a scheme which he proposed to submit to the Inns of Court, the Incorporated Law Society, and the Metropolitan and Provincial Law Association. In this measure he will not confine himseif to the subject of legal education, but will deal also with the constitution of the Inns of Court. This we hail as a wise extension of the original scheme. There is no argument in favour of retaining the Inns of Court in their antiquated and practically useless form. A great profession needs no traditionary respectability of its so-called governing body to secure to it vitality and honour, and if the vast revenues of the Inns of Court were applied to education and to scholarships-which might give a few students annually the opportunities of earning a means of support during their first year or two at the Bar-instead of dinners and beadles, the Profession would feel the benefit of the change. The Inns of Court have done some good work; they still are useful in a limited degree. Their Benchers ought gladly to welcome a reform which makes them thoroughly efficient for all practical purposes of the Profession, or blots them out for ever.

THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE ACT 1873. (Continued from p. 68.)

PART V. OFFICERS AND OFFICES-PART VI. JURISDICTION OF INFERIOR COURTS-PART VII. MISCELLANEOUS.

THE remaining parts of the Act require but cursory notice, as they are mostly general provisions for carrying into effect the enactments of the earlier sections.

The officers of all courts whose jurisdiction is by the Act transferred to the High Court or the Court of Appeal are to be attached to the High Court, and to continue to discharge the same or similar duties as they have hitherto discharged. The officers of Courts of Common Pleas, at Lancaster, and the Pleas, at Durham, are to continue to perform the same duties as heretofore, and their duties and fees will be regulated by rules of court. The personal officers of the Judges are to remain the same as they now are so far as regards the Judges of the High Court; the ordinary Judges of the Court of Appeal will be entitled to one clerk. The clerks' salaries, however, are reduced by the Act. Compensation to any officer of any court whose jurisdiction is abolished or transferred is provided for by the Act. The status of officers if in doubt is to be determined by rules of court provided that such rules do not alter the office, rank, salary, or pension of the officer, or require him to perform duties not analogous to those he has hitherto performed. Any person now empowered to administer oaths in any court whose jurisdiction is transferred will be a commissioner to administer oaths in the High Court or the Court of Appeal. The appointment of official referees is provided for: (sect. 83.) Their qualifications and the tenure of their offices is to be determined by the Lord Chancellor with the concurrence of the presidents of divisions, and with the sanction of the Treasury. Future offices are to be regulated by the same authority, and such officers as are required to perform special duties with respect either to the Supreme Court generally or with respect to the High Court or the Court of Appeal, or one of the divisions, or any particular judge or judges, may by the same authority be attached as required. The appointment of officers assigned to perform duties with respect to the Supreme Court generally, or attached to the High Court of Appeal, and of all commissioners to take oaths, will rest with the Lord Chancellor. This would include all masters, official referees, clerks, and other persons not attached to any particular division. All divisional officers are to be appointed by the respective presidents of the divisions, except in the case of the Chancery division, where it is provided that the Master of the Rolls shall appoint all officers attached to the Chancery division who have hitherto been ap

pointed by him. Officers attached to any Judge are to be appointed by that Judge. Officers of the Supreme Court, except those attached to the person of a Judge and removable by him at pleasure, may be removed by the person appointing, with the approval of the Lord Chancellor. Salaries are to be settled by the Treasury with the concurrence of the Chancellor. No officer attached to the person of a Judge will be entitled to a pension unless entitled otherwise than by the Act, but other officers appointed under the Act, and whose whole time is devoted to the duties of their office, are to be considered as in the permanent Civil Service, and as entitled to Civil Service pensions. Patronage not provided for in the Act, if incident to the office of any existing Judge, shall continue to be exercised on him during the continuance of his office, and will be exercised on his death or resignation as may be directed under Her Majesty's sign/manual. Attorneys, solicitors, and proctors practising in the courts which by the Act become part of the Supreme Court will be, on the Act coming into operation, called solicitors of the Supreme Court, and will, so far as possible, have the same rights and be subject to the same obligations as they now are. Persons who now are entitled to be admitted to practise in any of the above capacities will, under the Act, be entitled to be admitted as solicitors of the Supreme Court, and will be so admitted by the Master of the Rolls, and will have the same rights and be subject to the same obligations as if the Act had not passed. Solicitors, attorneys, and proctors are to be deemed officers of the Supreme Court, and both branches of that court will exercise over them the same jurisdiction as any of the Superior Courts now exercise: (sect. 87.)

With respect to the jurisdiction of inferior courts, it is provided that Her Majesty may, by order in council, confer on any inferior court of civil jurisdiction the same jurisdiction in equity and admiralty as any County Court now has or may hereafter have. This provision is rather contrary to the spirit of the recommendations of the Judicature Commission, which suggested the union of all jurisdictions in the County Court in the first instance. The Act further gives power to every inferior court to have jurisdiction in equity or in law, and in equity or in admiralty, to give the same relief both as to claims and counter claims in any matter within its jurisdiction as the Supreme Court is empowered to do. Where, however, a counter claim involves matter beyond the jurisdiction of an inferior court, that court may dispose of the whole matter in controversy so far as relates to the claim and defence thereto, but can give no relief exceeding its jurisdiction to a defendant upon such a counter claim; but in such a case the High Court may order a transfer of the whole proceedings to the High Court. This, again, has not the appearance of materially enlarging the County Court jurisdiction, but rather shows that there is little or no intention of throwing all the work into the hands of the County Courts. It is further enacted that all the rules of law declared by the Act shall be in force and receive effect in all English courts so far as the matters are cognizable by such courts. This provision was essential to secure uniformity throughout the country in rules of law.

The miscellaneous provisions of the Act deal mainly with the transfer of court documents to the Supreme Court, with the saving of the right to make circuits and issue commissions therefor, and the rights of the officers of the various circuits, with saving of the rights of the Lord Chancellor and of the Chancellor of the County Palatine of Lancaster. The Chancellor of the Exchequer ceases to be a judge of the Court of Exchequer, but his other rights are untouched. The sheriffs are still to be appointed as they now are, in the Exchequer. The Counties Palatine of Lancaster and Durham will cease to be counties palatine so far as respects the issue of commissions of assize, but not otherwise; all such commissions will in the future be issued as they are in other counties. The remainder of the Act consists of the interpretation of terms.

This completes our notice of the Supreme Court of Judica ture Act 1873, but before leaving the Act finally, it may be as well to point out what are the results of our cursory glances over this important piece of legislation. In the first place, our readers cannot have failed to notice that, although changes are made by the Act, those changes are rather in name than in reality. When the Act comes into operation it will be found that things go on very much in their old grooves. The same courts will sit under a new name, and the same causes be tried under a new title. It must be obvious that if any great change is intended in our judicial system the Act now under discussion is but a stepping-stone to that change. The Act itself, by uniting all courts into one, will enable future reformers to deal more easily with the internal arrangements and jurisdiction of our Supreme Court. There will be no conflict of jurisdiction to overcome. Beyond this, however, little of vital importance has been achieved. The district registries will no doubt be a great boon to persons not resident in London, but they are incomplete without local tribunals. That local tribunals, as courts of first instance, must some day be established is obvious. For the present, however, country solicitors must be content with the assizes. No doubt if it should appear to the Judges to be necessary, there will be three assizes a year instead of two, and this is a matter which is left in the discretion of the Judges themselves. Again, nobody can read the rules of procedure given in the schedule to the Act, which are to be the basis of the future

practice, without feeling that they have been drawn by some person who is not familiar with the practice of all branches alike. This will have to be remedied by the rules to be published under the Act. Indeed, the Legislature has purposely left large gaps in the Act, which are to be filled up by the future rules. These rules, we understand, are now being drawn by competent members of the Bar, and when drawn will be, we have no doubt, submitted to members of the other branch of the Profession, whose experience will enable them to give much practical aid. It is of the utmost importance that these rules should be carefully drawn, as it is upon them that the successful working of the Act depends, and without them the Act is a mere skeleton. If the rules are well-drawn there will be reason on their account alone to hail the Act as one of the most important pieces of legislation of our day; and a portion of the Act which will be recognised as a great boon is that which enables persons injured to recover without running the risk of having commenced their suits in a wrong court, and assimilates the law in all courts alike.

THE ESTATES OF PARTNERS IN BANKRUPTCY.—III. Ir will have been seen, as of course might have been expected, that the first question arising when members of an alleged partnership fail, must be one of evidence, what is partnership and what is separate property. Apart from the common law doctrine that a partnership may be created by parties holding themselves out to the world as such, Re Rowland and Crankshaw (L. Rep. 1 Ch. App. 421) referred to in our first article, shows that where it is proved that no partnership in effect existed, the property which was the subject of joint dealing will be considered by the Court of Bankruptcy as joint assets. And the partnership may possibly be proved to have extended to particular dealings, and not to have been a general partnership, and the complicated question may arise, to meet which sect. 37 of the last Bankruptcy Act was enacted.

Having discussed the general principles regulating the liability respectively of joint and separate estates, and the right of proof of joint and several creditors respectively, we will here shortly notice the procedure provided by the statute for dealing with insolvent partners and partnerships. By sect. 108 of the Act, any creditor whose debt is sufficient to entitle him to present a bankruptcy petition against all the partners of a firm, may present such petition against any one or more partners of such firm, without including the others. This is a useful alteration of the old law, it formerly being essential to the validity of a joint adjudication that it should include all the members of a firm, and if for any reason a commission could not be maintained against one partner, a joint commission against the other could not be supported. It was, therefore, necessary to take out separate commissions against each partner. A further reform is provided by sect. 101, by which power is given to dismiss a petition against some respondents only. Mr. Robson says (p. 574) that it would seem doubtful whether the above provisions authorise a petition against some only of the members of a partnership, founded on a debt jointly due from them.

This is a point of some interest, and we are inclined to consider it clear that a joint creditor might present a petition against a single partner. The law, as we have already stated it, is, that where there is no joint estate the joint creditors prove with the separate creditors against the separate estates of the partners. Suppose, therefore, that notoriously there is no joint estate of a partnership, but one of the partners has considerable separate property. It surely is open to the joint creditor to select that partner and present a bankruptcy petition against him, so as to procure the administration of his separate estate. When we consider the practice established by decided cases as to separate adjudications, there ought, it appears to us, to be no doubt on the point. Mr. Robson himself tells us (p. 575) that "although a joint adjudication cannot be founded on a separate debt, still a joint debt will support a separate adjudication against any member of the firm. For this purpose, an adjudication of bankruptcy is regarded as in the nature of an execution, which, in respect of a joint debt, may be levied on the separate estate of each partner, although an action for recovery of the debt must be brought against all the partners." Further, upon the separate adjudication of a partner, his share of the partnership property, after payment of partnership debts and the claims of his co-partner, vest in his trustee. If there were no analogous case, we should be decidedly of opinion that one partner might be made bankrupt on a joint debt; but in Ex parte Chambers (2 M. & A. 440), a case decided on the 97th section of the Bankruptcy Consolidation Act of 1849, where the whole of the partnership property belonged to two of the partners, and the third had little or no property, an adjudication against the two, founded on a debt due from them jointly, was held a valid adjudication.

But although we think that, on a joint debt, a creditor might obtain a separate adjudication, any voluntary action upon the part of the partners to divert partnership property to secure separate debts, is contrary to the policy of the law. This point arose in Ex parte Snowball; Re Douglas (26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 295, 894; L. Rep. 7 Ch. 534.) There one partner gave a power of attorney, autho

rising the sale of a particular ship, which was partnership property. In pursuance of this power, a deed was executed, to which the other partner was a party, mortgaging the ship, to secure a private debt of such partner. The Chief Judge held that the power of attorney was rendered invalid by an act of bankruptcy committed by the partner who gave it in going abroad, and that therefore the mortgage was never executed by such partner. But the point in the case in which we are now interested is that decided by the Lords Justices, that the execution of a deed professing to pledge partnership property for the present and future separate debts of the partners, made the execution of the deed by the partner who remained in England an act of bankruptcy. Lord Justice Mellish, delivering the judgment of the court, said: "We are of opinion that it is a fraud upon the creditors of a partnership for a partner who knows that his firm is insolvent to transfer partnership assets to a creditor of his own, or to give a security over the partnership assets for his own private debt. Such a transfer necessarily tends to defeat the creditors of the partnership, and to prevent the proper distribution of the assets under the bankrupt law. It was admitted in the argument before us that the deed would not give Mr. Snowball a valid security on the partnership property for private debts owing to him by Martin Douglas; but it was contended that the deed might notwithstanding be valid, so far as it gave a security for partnership debts. We do not see how, upon the question whether the execution of a particular deed is an act of bankruptcy, one part of the deed can be separated from the rest. If by any part of a deed authority is given to apply partnership property, transferred by the deed, to purposes which are a fraud upon the creditors of the partnership, we think the execution of the deed makes a fraudulent transfer of property, and is, therefore, an act of bankruptcy." The Lord Justice further remarked that, if the partner giving the power of attorney had executed the deed, the partnership property would plainly have been transferred as a security for the several debts of the partners, unless they were held to have committed acts of bankruptcy; and the case of Bowker v. Burdekin (11 M. & W. 128) is a direct authority that, where a deed to which all the partners in a firm are made parties, would operate, if executed by all, as a fraudulent transfer of partnership property, each party commits an act of bankruptcy at the time he executes the deed, unless he executes it as an escrow.

(To be continued.)

LAW LIBRARY.

The Law and Practice of Bankruptcy. By A. A. DORIA, of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. London: Law Times Office. WE must regret that in bringing out this edition of his work on bankruptcy Mr. Doria has been unable to incorporate with his text the decisions reported up to the end of the last legal year. So far from accomplishing this most desirable object, we find that he has reserved for his introduction cases reported in 1872. He may have thought it desirable to give, in a compact form, all the case law upon the Bankruptcy Act of 1869 distinct from the old law; but inasmuch as he has necessarily recast his book, basing it upon the new law, it is difficult to understand why the cases should not have been introduced into the body of the work, and thus brought down to the latest practicable period.

We do not deny, however, that the arrangement adopted has its advantages. It is useful to be able to master the recent case law without wading through an entire treatise, and for chamber use Mr. Doria's digest will be very acceptable. And it is decidedly preferable to have a complete digest than elaborate "addenda." If at the page in the volume indicated in the digest of new cases a back reference is made, the practitioner will find that he possesses a treatise brought down to last term.

The scheme of the book is undoubtedly the best of any that has been published. The Act and rules are not placed in an appendix, but they are set out in effect or in hæc verba when referred to in the body of the work. This is a great advantage, as it relieves the person consulting it from the necessity of turning backwards and forwards. The arrangement is this: the section or part of the section applicable to the subject matter under consideration is first stated, then the rules relating to the particular question, afterwards the law and authorities bearing upon the point, and lastly the forms by reference to the numbers they bear in the schedules to the rules.

Mr. Doria is an author of established reputation in this branch of the law, having, in conjunction with Mr. Macrae, brought out a work some years ago which was thoroughly appreciated by the Profession. We have looked through his present work, and we may say that it is well and carefully executed. In form it is less bulky than its rivals, and is excellently adapted to the exigencies of County Court practice.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Shelford's Real Property Statutes, 8th edit., by Carson. Sweet; Maxwell.
Manual of the Laws and Courts of the United States. Stevens and Haynes.
Rattigan's Roman Law of Persons. Wildy and Sons.
Winslow's Manual of Lunacy. Smith, Elder, and Co.
Currie's Indian Law Examination Manual. John Flack and Co.