« EelmineJätka »
Liquidations by Arrangement.
MAY, WILLIAM, shipping agent, Barrow-in-Furness. Pet. Dec. 6. MOORE, JOHx, printer, Beaufort-bldgs, Strand. Pet. Dec. 5.
Dec. 22, at eleven, at Lomax, 3, Jermyn-st, St. James's. Sol.
MURPHY, NEIL, fishmonger, Wolverhampton. Pet. Dec. 8.
Dec. 93, at hall past ten, at office of Sol. Stratton, Wolverhamp
ton To surrender at the Bankrupts' Court, Basinghall-street. O'REILLY, GBORGE FRANCIS, draper's assistant, Mansfield. Pet. JACKSON, HENRY, fruit salesman, Borough Market. Pet. Dec, 13.
Dec. 9. Dec. 29, at three, at office of Sol, Hogs, Mansfield Reg. Roche. Sur. Jan. 22
PARISH, ALEXANDER, builder, Southampton-rd, Kentish-town. VILLIMY, HENRY, surveyor, Gracechurch-st, and Fairview,
Pet. Dec. 8. Dec. 29, at two, at offices of Sol. Rodwell, ChanMacaulay-rd, Clapham-common. Pet. Dec. 13. Reg. Roche.
cery.lu Sur. Jan. 15
PIKE, JOHN, gentloman, Brixton.rd. Pet. Dec. 4. Dec. 22, at WATTS, HENPY, hot water engineer, St. John-st, West Smith.
three, at offices of Bols. Manning, Great George-st, Westfield. Pet, Dec. 12. Reg. Murray. Sur. Jan. 9
PLOWMAN, WILLIAM, and TAYLOR, WILLIAM, grocers, Wands-
worth-rd. Pet. Dec. 5. Dec. 23, joint creditors at two; sep. HUDSOX, HERON, provision merchant, Birmingham. Pet. July
creditors of Taylor, at three, at office of Sols. Harper, Broad, 13. Reg. Chauntler. Sur. Deo. 30
and Battock, Rood la JOHNSON, ELIZABETI, widow, Harborne. Pet. Nov. 28. Reg. RIPPIN, AM09, and RIPPIN, JOSEPH, curriers, Geddington, Chauntler. Bur. Dec. 30
Pet. Dec. 8. Dec. 29, at twelve; sep. creditora of J. Rippon, at WILLIAMS, THOMAS SEYMOUR, dealer in Sheffield goods. Wyr. hall-past twelve, at office of Sol. Rawlins, Market Har. ley. Pet. Dec. 11. Reg. Clarke. Sur. Jan. 6
borough PUGU, MARY, spinster, Levenshulme, near Manchester. Pet.
RODYAN, GEORGE, cabinet maker, Bristol. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec. Dec. 11. Reg. Kay. Sur. Jan. 7
23, at eleven, at office of Sol. E-sery, Bristol
ROSE, WILLIAM, stocktaker, Middlesborough. Pet. Dec. 4.
Dec. 22, at eleven, at Bennison and Co., accountanta, Middles
borough. Sol. Dobson
Dec, 23, at eleven, at office of Sol. Dyer, Bonton
SALVIDGE, JAMES, victualler, Bristol. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec. 20, at
eleven, at offices of Sol. Essery, Bristol
on-Trent. Pet. Dec. 6. Dec. 23, at eleven, at office of Sol.
SEPUTOX, WILLIAM, marble mason, Liverpool. Pet. Dec. 8.
Dec. 29, at three, at office of Sol. Pemberton, Liverpool
SMITH, CHARLES, commission wgent, Bristol. Pet. Dec. 5. Dec.
22, at eleven, at 'J. Downing, All Saints-la, Exchange, Bristol. AKROYD, SAMUEL, butcher, Halifax. Pet. Dec. 9. Dec. 22, at four STACY, SAMUEL, and STACY, BENJAMIN, wholesale stationers, at office of Sol. Storey, Halifax
High-st, Shoreditch, and New inn-yard. Pet. Dec. 9. Dec. 29, ATKINSON, JOSEPH FREEMAX, retired lieutenant, Southsea. Pet.
joint creditors, at two; sep. creditors of S. Stacey, at hall past Dec. 8. Dec. 31, at three, ut oftice of Sols. Cousins and Bur.
three; sep. creditors of B. Stacey, at four, at the Guildhall bidge, Portsmouth
coffee-house, Gresham.st. Sol. Angell BECK, CHARLES, grocer. St. John-st-rd, Clerkenwell. Pet. Nov.
STEPHENS, SAMPSON, wine merchant, Penryn and Truro. Pet. 27. Dec. 16, at twelve, at Mr. Hudgett's offices, 37, Gresham-st.
Dec. 9. Dec. 27, at twelve, at the Inns of Court hotel, Holborn. Sol. Gray, Gresham-st
Sol. Jenkins, Penryn BISSELL, WILLIAM, axle manufacturer, Birmingham. Pet. Dec. STEPHENSOX, CHARLES, cabinet maker, Huddersfield. Pet. 5. Dec 22, at twelve, at ottices of Sol. Collis, Birmingham
Dec. 9. Dec. 23, at eleven, at office of Sol. Berry, Hudders. BLICK, JAMES, gentleman, Regent's-pk.rd. Pet. Dec. 4. Dec.
field 28, at two, at office of Sol. Vernede, Craven-st, Strand
STONE, FRANCIS, builder, Oxford. Pet. Dec. 6. Dec. 22. at BOWYER, GEORGE JOSEPH, gentleman, Brecknock-ter, Camden- eleven, at St. Michael's.chmbs, Ship-st, Oxford. Sols. Hurford
rd. Pet. Dec. 6. Dec. 22, at eleven, at the London tavern, and Taylor Bishopsgate-st. Sol. Crowther, Queen-st, Cheapside
SWINDELLS, JOHN, innkeeper, Manchester. Pet. Dee. 8. Dec. BON BERNARD, LOUIS, commission agent, Cheapside. Pet. Dec.
24, at ten, at office of Sol Marlow, Manchester 10. Jan. 6, at two, at the Chamber of Commerce, 145, Cheapside.
TAYLOR, JAMES, publican, Crewe. Pet. Dec. 6. Dec, 23. at Sol, Dutton, Strand
cleven, at the Royal hotel, Crewe. Sol. Pointon CLIFFE, JOHN GEORGE, commission agent, Manchester. Pet.
THIRKILL, JOHN, joiner, Bradford. Pet. Dec. 4. Dec. 31. at Dec. 10. Jan. 7, at three, at offices of sol. Barling, Manchester
eleven, at offices of Sols. Lancaster and Wright, Bradford CROUCHER, JAMES, baker, Southampton. Pet. Dec. 9. Dec. 24, THOMPSON, JOHN, draper, Birkenherd. Pet. Dec. 9. Dec. 26, at twelve, at office of Sol. Robins, Southampton
at three, at office of Sol. Moore, Birkenhead DALES, GEORGE, builder, Parchmore-rd, Thornton-heath. Pet.
UTTLEY, SAMUEL FIELDEX, warp sizer, Walsden. Pet, Dec. 8.
Dec. 23, at three, at office of Sol. Shippey, Manchester
VICKERS, CHARLES, manufacturer of chains, Birstal. Pet. Dec. 8.
Dec. 23, at ten, at office of Sol. Wooler, Batley
10. Jan. 2, at twelve, at office of Sol. Richards, Warwick-st, Dixox, DAVID, innkeeper, Garston. Pet. Dec. 8. Jan. 3, at two,
Regent-st at offices of sol. Lowe, Liverpool
WEST, HENRY, carpenter, Oxford. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec, 31, at DYER, JOHN, baker, Birmingham. Pet. Dec. 8. Dec. 22, at three,
one, at office of sol. Thompson, Oxford at office of Sol. Parry, Biriningham
WILLIAMS, JOHN, out of business, Shrewsbury. Pet. Deo. 6 EVANS, WILLIAM, commission agent, Caebricks. Pet. Dec. 9.
Dec. 23, at eleven, at office of Sol. Morris, Shrewsbury Dec. 23, at twelve, at office of Sols. Davies and Hartland, Swan
Gazette Dec. 16.
Rate-st-within. Sols. Keene and Marsland, Lower Thames-st two, at office of Sol. Digby, Lincoln's-inn fields, London
6. Dee. 23, at twelve, at office of Sol. Nind, St. Benet.pl, Grace- st, Clerkenwell, Lea-bridge, Hackney, and Cricktield-rd, Clap-
ton. Pet. Dec. 10. Jan. 5. at twelve, at office of Sol. Smith, GASS, FREDERICK, manufacturer, Bartholomew close. Pet. Deo. Great James-st, Bedford-row
5. Dec. 30, at two, at the Chamber of Commerce, 145, Ch eapside AsHWORTH, Jons, and HALSTEAD, RICHARD, builders, SpotSol. Chidley, Old Jewry
land. Pet. Dec. 12. Dec. 30, at two, at the Wheatsheaf inn, Man. GEORGE, JOUN OVERLAND, draper, Gooderstone. Pet. Dec. 3. chester. Sols. Hall and Baldwin, Olitheroe
Dec. 22, at twelve, at the County Court House, Downham Mar. BAKER, WILLIAM, baker, Southwick. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec. 27, at ket. Sol. Reed, Downham Market
twelve at office of Bertie, 17, Great James-st, Bedford.row, GILES, WILLIAM, of no occupation, Redruth. Pet. Dec. 4. Dec. London. Sol. Goodman, Brighton
20, at three, at Paull's hotel, Chacewater. Sol. Tre vena, Red. BLACK, WILLIAM, commission agent, Manchester. Pet. Dec. 11. ruth
Dec. 20, at three, at the Clarence hotel, Manchester, Sol. GILL, THOMAS, whitesmith, Taunton. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec. 30, at Woolley, Manchester one, at offices of Sols, Reed and Cook, Taunton
BRADLEY, FRANCIS, publican, Rochdale. Pet. Dec. 10. Deo.
Hanley. Pet. Deo. 6. Dec. 24, at eleven, at T. H. and F. W. jun., Rochdale
BROWN, SAUL, jeweller, Sunderland. Pet. Dec. 11. Dec. 29, at
BURLEY, HENRY RAWSON, fruiterer, High st, Wandsworth. HAMILTON, WILLIAM HENRY, corn merchant, Cardil. Pet. Dec.
Pet. Dec. 11. Jan. 8, at three, at 10, Trinity-st, Southwark. 9. Dec, 24, at eleven, at Barnard, Thomas, Clarke, and Co., ac. Sol. Ody countants, Cardiff. Sol. Griffith, Cardir
CARNEY, CATHERINE, manager for a poultry dealer, Liverpool. HEATLEY, JOHX, fruiterer, Liverpool. Pet. Dec. 3. Dec. 24, at Pet. Dec. 12. Jan, 6, at three, at office of Vine, Liverpool.
two, at Gibson and Bolland, accountants, Liverpool. Sol. Wil. Sol, Ritson, Liverpool liams, Liverpool
DALE, HENRY AUGUSTUS, private hotel keeper, Bedford. Pet. HORTON, GEORGE, pearl button manufacturer, Birmingham. Dec, 10. Dec. 30, at eleven, at office of Sol. Tebbs, Bedford
Pet. Dec. 10. Dec, 24, at twelve, at otfice of Sol. Fallows, Bir- DARBYSHIRE, WILLIAM, plumber, Southport. Pet. Dec. 12. mingham.
Dec. 30, at eleven, at office of Sol. Walton, Southport HOWORTH, THOMAS, and HOWORTH, JAMES, cotton manu. DUxN, WILLIAM, painter, Saltburn-by-the-Sea. Pet. Deo. 9. facturers, Stacksteads. Pet. Dec. 8. Dec. 30, at three, at office Dec. 29, at eleven, at Mrs. Barker's Temperance hotel, Middles. of Sols. Sale, Shipman, Seddon, and Sale, Manchester
borough, Sol. Bainbridge, Middlesborough HUTCHINSON, JAMES, beer dealer, Chorlton-on-Medlock. Pet. EAST, EDWARD, gunmaker, Birmingham. Pet. Dec. 11. Dec. 30,
Dec. 10. Dec. 26, at three, at the Falstaff hotel, Manchester at twelve, at offices of Sol. Rooke, Birmingham ISAACS, LEWIS, boarding house keeper, Birmingham. Pet. Dec. EDWARDS, JOHN, and WESTPHAL ERNST HEINRICH, com. 9. Dec. 24, at ten, at office of Sol. Burton, Birmingham
mission merchants, Great Toner-st. Pet. Deo. 10. Dec. 30, at JAVAL, EDWARD CREMIEU, of no occupation, Lewes. Pet. Dec twelve, at offices of Sols. M'Leod and Watney, London-st, Fen. 8. Dec. 20, at two, at office of Sol. Smith, Gresham House,
church-st Old Broad-st, London
ELLIOTT, WILLIAM RICHARD, millwright, Plymouth. Pet. Dec.
Pet. Dec. 10. Dec, 27, at eleven, at offloes of Sols. Messrs. George-at, Plymouth. Sol, Chilcott, Tavistock
ESCHLE, FRIDOLIN, watchmaker, Swansea. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec.
29, at eleven, at office of Sols. Davies and Hartland, Swansea at one, at office of Sol. Scargill, Serjeant's-inn, Chancery-la, GRAHAM, ROBERT, draper, Dudley. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec. 30, at London
half past ten at office of Bol. Barrow, Wolverhampton KEATLEY, GEORGE, farmer, Sutton Coldfeld. Pet. Dec. 10. Doc.
GRAVELY, CHARLES EWART, provision merchaut, Brighton. 19, at twelve, at office of Sol. Fallows, Birminghamn
Pet. Dec. 10. Dec. 30, at three, at office of Sol. Lamb, Brighton
Bow, and Railway-arches, Bow Common-la. Pet. Dec. 8. Dec. Pet. Dec. 11. Dec. 30, at eleven, at Peele': Coffee-house, Fetter.
GHEGORY, STEPHEN, brick manufacturer, Upper Braíles. Pet.
Dec. 9. Dec. 24, at ten, at the residence of the petitioner, St. GRIFFIN, JOHN, and RUDD, WILLIAM HENBY, glass manufac-
turers, Birmingham. Pet. Dec. 12. Dec. 29, at half past eleven,
GRIFFIN, WILLIAM, surgeon, Ledbury. Pet. Dec. 13. Dec. 29, at LAWRENCE, THOMAS, shopkeeper, Wollaston. Pet. Dec. 2. Dec. twelve, at the Feathers hotel, Ledbury, Sols. Messrs. Corbett, 19, at three, at office of Sol. Adaison, High-st, Brierley-hill
Birmingham. Pet. Dec. 10, Dec. 23, at three, at office of Sol. at eleven at office of sol. Barrow, Wolverhampton
HANBERG, HENRY WILLIAM, tin merchant. Dod-st, Limehouse.
Pet. Deo. 10. Dec. 19, at twelve, ut office of Sol. Kennedy, Bir. Learoyd, South-st, Finsbury-sq mingham
HASKINS, HESTER, widow, out of business, Wick and Abron. LUCKMAN, CHARLES JAME8, commission agent, Silver-st. Pet.
Pet. Dec. 13. Der, 21, at three, at office of Sol. Peterson, Bristol Dec. 11. Dec. 20, at two, at Ladbury, Collison, and Viney, 99, HAWORTH, JAXES, LAWORTH, THOMAS, and HAWORTH, ROBERT, Cheapside. Sole. Davidson, Carr, Bannister, and Morriss, cotton spinners, Bacup. Pet. Dec. 5. Dec. 29, at three, at the Basinghall-et
Derby Arms hotel, Bury. Sols. Handsley and Artindale, Burn.
Pet. Dec. 8. Dec, 94, at tren, at the Crown botel, Lewes. Sol. HERRMANN, ALEXANDER prestidigitateur, Brighton. Pet. Dec.
10. Dec. 22, at three, at offices of Clennell, Great James-street, MCLEAN, JOHN, joiner, Lower Broughton. Pet. Dec. 9. Dec. 29, Bedford.row, London. Sol. Brandreth, Brighton
at three, at the Union.chmbs, 15, Dickinson-st, Manchester HILL, GEORGE HENRY, out of business, Wednesbury. Pet. Dec. Bols. Mesers. Bond, Manchester
10. Dec. 23, at three, at office of sol. Sheldon, Wednesbury MEARS, Isaac, gasfitter, Hammersmith. Pet. Dec. 9, Dec. 29,
HOCKENHULL, ROBERT, nureery gardener, Sale. Pet. Dec. 13.
HODGES, JAMES, grocer, Deal. Pet, Dec. 11. Jan. 7, at eleven,
Dec. 12. Dec. 23, at eleven, at the Ship hotel, Barrow-in-Fur.
IRELAND, THOMAS ROBERT, baker, Theobalds-rd, Holborn. Pet.
31, at twelve, at office of Sol. Churton, Chester
Dec. 12. Dec. 23, at half.past ten, at offices of Sol. Smith, Old
at offices of Sols. Evans and Lockett, Liverpool
Dec. 13. Dec. 30, at three, at offices of Sols. Ellis and Cross
field, Mark.la LAWTON, JOSEPH, dealer in millinery, Middlesborough. Pet,
Dec. 8. Jan. 2, at three, at office of Sol. Addenbrook, Middles. borough LEAROYD, JANE, private lodginghouse keeper, Huddersfield.
Pet. Deo. 10. Dec. 31, at three, at ufflces of Sols. Messrs. Lea.
royd, Hudderefield LONG, JOHN CRAVEX, blacksmith, Eccleshill. Pet. Dec. 12. Dec.
31, at three, at office of Sols. Fawcett and Malcolm, Leeds LYNDEX, EDWIN, smack owner, Lowestoft. Pet, Dec. 9. Jan. 5,
at twelve, at ottices of Sol. Archer, Lowestoft
24, at twelve, at 299, Regent.st. Sol. Alcock
facturer, Newman-st, Oxford-st. Pet. Dec. 19. Jan. 8, at two, at 14, Southampton-st, Bloomsbury. Sols. Routh and Stacey MAXWELL, JOHX, cotton waste bleacher, Bolton, Pet. Dec. 11.
Dec. , at three, at office of Sols. Hall and Rutter, Bolton MILLARD, ANNIE, general shop keeper, Bridge-st, Kilburn,
Pet. Dec. 15. Dec. 31, at four, at office of sol, Cambridgeter, Hyde pk MORRIS, HENRY, joiner, Liverpool. Pet. Dec. 10. Jan. 5, at
three, at ofrice or Sol. Harper, Liverpool NICHOLSON, WILLIAM, gentleman, Grayshot-rd, Wandsworth.
Pet. Dec. 8. Dec. 23, at twelve, at offices of Sols. Reed and
Lovell, Guildhall.chmbs, Basinghall.st
31, at twelve, at office of Sol. Shelton, Nottingham
29, at eleven, at office of Sol. Barrow, Wolverhampton PHILLIPS, THOMAS EDWARD, Packing case maker, Birmingham.
Pet. Dec. 12. Dec. 30, at twelve, at office of Sol, Griffin, Bir
mingham PRICE, REES, commission agent, Llandewibrefi. Pet. Dec. 9.
Dec. 27, at half past ten, at office of Sul. Griffiths, Carmarthen RANDS, THOMAS, licensed victualler, Ealing.common. Pet. Dec.
10. Jan. 5, at two, at office of Sol. Pittmann, Guildhall.
chmbs, Basinghall-st RILEY, HENRY, and CLEGG, JOHN, builders, Accrington. Pet.
Dec. 6. Dec. 30, at two, at office of Bannister, solicitor, Accring.
ton. Sol. Nowell, Burnley ROTHWELL, JOny, and CLARKE, JAMES WILLIAM, builders,
Kirchen-ri, Ealing. Pet. Dec. 8. Dec. 24, at eleven, at offices of Kent, Flaxman, Haydon, and Co., accountants, 55, Basic.
hall.st. Sol. Warrand, Ludgate-hill SAINSBURY, WILLIAM MARSDEN, out of business, Liverpool.
Pet. Dec.;11. Dec. 29, at two, at office of Gibson and Bolland, accountants, Liverpool. Sol. Rilson, Liverpool SIMS, REUBEX, wine merchant, Barrow.in. Furness. Pet. Dec, 13.
Dec. 23, at two, at the Victoria hotel, Preston. Sol. GÜbertson,
Islington. Pet. Dec. 11. Dec. 31, at twelve, at office of Sol.
29, at three, at office of Sol. Nordon, Chester
twelve, at the Dolphin inn, Colyton. Sol. Wilton, Colyton STOREY, WILLIAM HOLLINGWORTH, cordwainer, Navenby. Pet.
Dec. 11. Jan. 3, at eleven, at ofr.ce of Jay, public accountant,
Lincoln. Sols. Toynbee and Larken, Lincoln
eleven, at office of Rawson, George, and Wade, solicitors, Brad.
ford. Sols. Wright and Waterworth, Keighley SWAINSON, WILLIAM, wood turner, Dirham. Pet. Deo. 12. Dec.
29, at twelve, at offices of Sols, Hunton and Bolsover, Stockton
on Tees TAYLOR, WILLIAM, blacksmith, Gayton. Pet. Dec. 11. Deo. 30,
at twelve, at office of Sols. Glasier and Mason, King's Lynn TESSEYMAN, JOHN MARTIN, fishing smack owner, Kingston.
upon Hull. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec. 19, at two, at office of Sol. Laverack, Kingston upon. Hull THOMPSON, EDMUND, hat dealer, Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Pet.
Dec. 11. Jan. 2, at twelve, at offices of Sol. Clavering, New.
castle upon Tyne WATMOCGR, WILLIAM, :plumber, Manchester. Pet. Dec. 12, Dec. 29, at'three, at ofice
of Sols. Sale, Shipman, Seddon, and Sale, Manchester WELLS, WILLIAM, out of business, Maidenhead. Pet. Dec. 10.
Jan. 8, at half-past two, at the White Horse, High-st, Maldenhead. Sol. Brrr, St. Mary's-sq, Paddington, London WHALLEY, JOHN WILLIAM, bookkeeper, Blackburn. Pet. Dec. 10. Jan. 2, at three, at office of sols. Hall and Holland, Black.
30, at eleven, at office of Sol. Mills, Brighton
29, at hali-past ten, at office of Sol. Duke, Birmingbam ZEWYBAUN, ABRAM BEAR, (commonly known as Barnett,
Abram Bear), cuilder, Beaumont-sq, Mile End rd. Pet. Dec. 11. Jan. 6, at three, at offices of" Sols. Ingle, Cooper, and Holmes, City Bank-chmbs, Threadneedle-st
BIRTHS MARRIAGES AND DEATHS
rister-at-law, Bombay, of a son.
the wife of Patrick William Drummond, solicitor, formerly of
On the 14th inst., &t Ribblesdale House, Preston, aged 65 years, Alderman Miles Myres, for twenty-one years Coroner for the Rundred of Amounderness, and thrice Mayor of Pres.
ton. OXENHAM.-On the 15th inst., at 17, Earl's-terrace, Kensington. aged 74 years, George Nutcombe Oxenham, Esq., barrister-atlaw, Western Circuit, formerly Pellow of Exeter Collego, 01
ford. SCOTT.-On the 7th inst., At an advanced age, David Soott, Esq.
Conveyancer, of 102, Penrose-street, Walworth, and Middle DEPORTS.
Manufacturers, Motley-st, Curtain.rd, and City.rd. Pet. Deo. HCGHES, RICHARD, millstone manufacturer, Bunbury Herth,
HOWNE, CHARLES, auctioneer, Chippenham. Pet. Dec. 12 Dec.
sqnare, aged 43 years, Horace Robert Southee, solicitor.
years, George Bradnock Stubbe, Esq., solicitor.
To Readers and Correspondents.
T. D.-Not for six months.
not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee of good faith.
ruptcy had power to carry out a decree of the Court of Chancery in the matter of a partnership. Lord SELBORNE said that he did not concur in the view of the CHIEF JUDGE that it was competent for the Court of Bankruptcy to carry out the decree under the 72nd section. That section, he observed, gave very large powers to the Court of Bankruptcy to decide all questions necessary for the administration of a bankrupt's estate; but it did not enable it to draw within its jurisdiction the owners of property which was not vested in the assignees, or to work out a decree for dissolution of a partnership which had been previously made by the Court of Chancery.
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An interesting judgment on the subject of testamentary gifts to illegitimate children was delivered by Vice-Chancellor Malins, on the 20th inst. The testator married twice. By his first wife he had two children, both of whom died in his lifetime, one only leaving issue. By his second wife he had two children, both born before the marriage. By his will he gave to his wife power to dispose of his property among “our children,” and in the event of her making no will the property was to be equally divided between his “children by her." It was argued that by allowing the illegitimate children to come in under the will, the legitimate children would be excluded. The Vice-Chancellor said, however, that there is no rule to prevent legitimate and illegitimate children taking together as a class where it is intended they should do so.
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The Taunton election petition has evidently created an amount of excitement which seems likely to result in the introduction of some novel features into the trial. The first of which we hear is the framing of an affidavit on the part of the respondent, making extraordinary allegations against the petitioners as a ground for obtaining particulars of the alleged acts of bribery, &c. Before the application for particulars was made to the Judge, this affidavit had been published in a local newspaper. This would have been a sufficiently improper proceeding had the contents of such affidavit been true; being contradicted by four affidavits on the other side, it should certainly have been confined to the attention of the Judge. Proceedings, however, are to be at once commenced for the purpose of punishing this contempt of court, and to obtain redress for the libel. If election trials are to be conducted with this asperity, Parliamentary electioneering will become more hazardous than it has been hitherto.
CON TEN TS.
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. CROWTHER . APPLEDY; Ne SHARPLEYAttachment for disobedience order to prvauce documents..
LEADING ARTICLES, &c.
Tither-Modus-Conversion into tillage
552 JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY
by the Governor of the Colony of South
ritory Act (No. 33 of 1863)-Northern
550 Ex parte PUERY; R. PIERCY
Inspectorship deed- After acquired
of director bound to hold shares ...... 562 COPE 4. EARL DE LA WARR
Settlement - Construction - Shifting classe.
565 ROLLS COURT. LISE . HALL
Power of appointment-Execution ...... 563 SIDNEY 2. SIDNEY
WIU--Codicil -- Republication-Specific or general bequest....
560 XAXTIELD E. BURTONEquitable mortgage--Agreement to execute legal mortgage
571 V.C. MALINS COURT. Re EXMOUTH DOCKS COMPANY
Winding up--The Companies Act 1862, 9. 183
573 SCAFFOLD . HAMPTON
Practice-Creditor's bill for administration
575 V.C. HALL'S COURT. POWELL DUFFRYN STEAM COAL COMPANY (LIMITED) 1. THE TAFF VALE RAILWAY COMPANY Rallway Clauses Acts 1845, gs. 92, 115;
1933, 8. 12--Use of railway by other
TO READERS AND CORRESPONDENTS 137
141 LAW LIBRARY
142 SOLICITORS JOCRNAL :Topics of the Week
141 Notes of New Decisions
145 V.C. Malins' Court
145 Unclaimed Stock and Dividends in the Bank of Ergland
145 Creditors under E-tates in Chancery ...... 145 Creditors under 22 & 23 Vict, c. 30
145 COMPANY LAW:Notes of New Decisions
146 MAGISTRATES LAW:Noter of New Decisions
146 The Masters and Servants Act
140 Borough Quarter Sessions
116 REAL PROPERTY AND CONVEYANCING: Land Transfer
147 COUNTY COURTS :Aylesbury County Court.
147 Norwich County Court
147 Reading County Court
148 BANKRUPTCY LAW:Notes of New Decisions
149 Court of Appeal in Chancery.
149 Liverpool County Court
150 LIGAL NEWS.........
151 Gentlemen who Passed the Final Examination
152 CORRESPONDENCE OF THE PROFESSIOX ... 162 LAW SOCIETIES:
The Incorporated Law Society of Ireland 152
153 PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS ........... 153 THE COURTS AND COURT PAPERS:
Sittings in and after Hilary Term, 1874 153 THE GAZETTES
153 BIRTH 3, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS............ 154
The particulars furnished to us concerning the changes on the Northern Circuit appear to have been in some respects incorrect. The appointments in the offices connected with the Court of Common Pleas, at Lancaster, consequent upon the resignation of Mr. Harris, have had the effect of making Liverpool the principal centre, instead of, as hitherto, one of the districts of the county subordinate to Preston. Mr. T. E. Paget, who has for the last four years occupied the office of district prothonotary, at Liverpool, now becomes the prothonotary and associate for the whole county. Mr. Harris's successor at Preston, Mr. SHIUTTLEWORTII, is to be district prothonotary for Preston, and deputy-associate for Lancaster; and Mr. E. WORTUIngton, at Manchester, will act as deputyassociate for Manchester, in addition to his prerious appointment of district prothonotary for that city. The registers of judgments and executions to bind land will be transferred from Preston to Liverpool. Mr. Pacet will not have to go either to Lancaster or Manchester Assizes, the district prothonotary for Manchester acting as deputy-associate there, and the district prothonotary for Preston acting as deputy-associate at the Lancaster Assizes. The new arrangements extend to Lancashire only, and do not affect the other counties on the circuit.
The Law and the Lawyers.
The astonishment expressed by the LORD CHUEF Baroy at the revelations made in the case of Edmonds v. Jeynes will probably be shared by all who perused the report. The plaintiff was a solicitor who had lived and practised at Newent for more than thirty years. Owing to the unfortunate circumstance that he had been personally concerned in litigation with some influential persons in the town he had become an object of dislike to persons who seem to have taken advantage of every opportunity to crush him, Some considerable period after the death of his wite he was charged with having murdered her. The coroner who held the inquest-when Mr. EDMONDS was committed on a charge of manslaughter --was a solicitor, who had been personally engaged in litigation with Mr. EDMONDS and had been defeated. Mr. EDMONDS was then taken before the magistrates, and the chairman on the occasion was Mr. Onslow, also an unsuccessful litigant in opposition to Mr. EduONDS. Mr. EDMONDS was committed to the assizes to take his trial for murder. The grand jury ignored the bill, but he was tried for manslaughter and acquitted. To fill the cup of persecution Mr. EDMONDS was the subject of a special sermon from the parish pulpit by a clergyman who also had differences with the plaintiff, and was his bitter enemy; and lastly, the object of a malignant attack in a local paper—the Gloucester Mercury. Fer this libel he brought his action, and, we are glad to say, that he has recovered 3501. damages. The LORD CHIEF Baron said, in
The Bankruptcy Court is evidently prepared to go any length in exercising jurisdiction under the 72nd section of the Act of 1869. We recently noticed that it was attempted to compel an equitable mortgagee of a fund who sought to recover 'he fund in the Court of Chancery to go into bankruptcy, because he was a creditor of the bankrupt mortgagor. In another case, heard on the 16th inst., the Chief Judge bad considered that the Court of BankVOL. LYI.-No. 1604
addressing the jury, "That we should have had an individual filling the important post of coroner who had himself been the plaintiff in a Chancery suit against the plaintiff, and the bill in which had been dismissed with costs, and who may therefore very well have been suspected of having entertained angry feelings against him --that he should have been the coroner presiding upon the inquiry --an inquiry neither more nor less than whether he was guilty or not guilty of the grave crime of murder-that we should have had an individual in this country filling and executing the functions of that public office under circumstances like these—that we should have had a magistrate, who had been unsuccessful in several actions between himself and the plaintiff, presiding as chief magistrate on the occasion upon an inquiry as to whether it would be his duty to commit the plaintiff for trial on the charge of murder --that all the proceedings should have occurred in this country, in which the law of England prevails, and by Englishmen-and, as they would call themselves, English gentlemen-is altogether to me something so improbable and so extraordinary that I should deem it incredible, but that it is proved beyond any kind of doubt before you.” A magistrate and a coroner who can exercise their offices when a personal enemy's character and life are subject to their jurisdiction must be utterly unfit for their positions.
and the freight is to be paid as follows: £250 in advance. Therefore, it was contended that the clause of lien was to be read thus—for freight, which word is to include the £250 hereinbefore made payable in advance, and hereinbefore spoken of as a part payment of freight. There is some ingenuity, but, in our judg. ment, no substance, in this contention. It would be an unwar. ranted thing to lay hold of a particular form of expression in one part of a charter-party or other instrument, in order to give to plain unequivocal language in another part of the instrument a meaning different from its ordinary meaning. The ship never earned freight, and never began to earn freight. That it was prevented from doing so by the default of the other party entitles the owner to full compensation for all the loss sustained thereby, but the compensation is not freight, and the nautical lien for freight does not extend to such compensation.”
A REMARKABLE feature of Nisi Prius trials, which has forcibly struck us during the sittings in Middlesex and London, is the frequency of the applications for a stay of execution. It would seem indeed that there is rarely any case of importance determined by a jury in which counsel for the unsuccessful party omits to apply either for leave to move or a stay of execution. The Judicature Act will do something towards limiting the grounds upon which new trials may be obtained, but we should be very glad to see the Judges withholding facilities for upsetting verdicts, whilst affording every opportunity to parties of raising matters of law by going to the full court. Juries are the constitutional tribunals for the trial of questions of fact, and it seems unreasonable that where there has been an unanimous determination of twelve men the court on some possibly immaterial misdirection, or admission or rejection of evidence, should send the case after protracted delay to other twelve men with equal chances of miscarriage. We can imagine nothing more calculated to disgust suitors with the law than the want of finality in the verdicts of juries. The expenses of new trial motions, and of new trials themselves, are frequently ruinous, whilst rules nisi are often kept hanging over from term to term until the grievance involved becomes stale. Staying execution is simply keeping succesful liti gants out of the proceeds of a fair victorv, and should be resorted to only in cases of surprise or palpable miscarriage. Of course, a Judge knows that when he is asked to stay execution it may be intended to impugn his direction to the jury, and he feels a delicacy in refusing to facilitate a review of his law. A little less sensitiveness on this head, we think, would be desirable in the best interests of the law, for uncertainty and delay are the two elements which now deter so many from seeking the regular and most satisfactory means of obtaining the redress of their wrongs.
We report two County Court cases on the subject of delays on railways, in both of which the company was mulcted in damages. One of these was heard in the Norwich County Court, the plaintiff being the son and deputy of the registrar. A preliminary objection was taken under sect. 20 of 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, but there being no regular appointment of this gentleman as deputy regis, trar, the objection was overruled. The substantial question involved was whether the company was liable for delay arising from an accident. At the station from which the train was advertised to start there was only one engine; a tube in the boiler broke, and the engine was useless. The day following the plaintiff attempted to start from another station of the company, and was unable to get on owing to some luggage trucks having got off the rails. As to the first occasion, the Judge held that there was nothing to exempt a railway company from the responsibility which attached to coach owners in the old coaching days, namely, to be in a position to supply the place of a horse which broke down. He was disposed to think that there was gross negligence in having only one engine at a place like Wells (in Norfolk), the terminal station for two lines of railway. But if this doctrine of negligence apply at all it must assuredly apply to all stations, and it strikes us as straining the law to hold that a railway company is liable to its passengers for delay owing to an accident over which the company had no control, His Honour, however, has reserved his formal judgment. In the second case, which was heard at the Aylesbury County Court, a cattle dealer going to a fair was delayed so long that he did not arrive until the fair was
The delay in this instance was owing to the stoker allowing the firebox to be choked, and the Judge held the company liable for the negligence of their servants, and awarded the plaintiff 40s. damages. These cases show a determination on the part of the Judges to keep the companies to the contract entered into with the public by means of the time bills, and if the public make a practice of insisting on their rights the general want of punctuality which now prevails may soon disappear.
An attempt has been made to get over the rule that a shipowner has no lien for freight when no freight has been earned. A charter-party provided that a ship should be loaded for Lagos with a general cargo, and bring back a cargo from Lagos, at 77s. 6d. per ton for freight and hire, £250 to be advanced on signing bills of lading and clearing out, £5 a day demurrage. After the vessel was loaded, but before she sailed, the charterers failed. Under the bankruptcy, the shipowner claimed a lien for freight. It was disallowed by the County Court Judge, but the shipowner appealed to the Chief Judge, and from the Chief Judge to the full Court of Appeal. The point is one of some importance. It was contended first, on the principle of cases as to concurrent acts, that the £250 became payable as a sum certain under the contract as soon as the captain was ready and willing to sign the bills of lading, and that that, therefore, constituted a sum certain immediately and still recoverable as such, notwithstanding that the whole contract was determined and the voyage put an end to. The LORD CHANCELLOR said that if it were necessary to decide that point, there would be very great difficulty in applying the principle of the cases referred to to the case of the payment in advance, or at a particular stage, of an instalment of one entire consideration for one complete voyage or other service, where the complete voyage or other service had never been performed, and was on the non-payment entirely given up. But, assuming even that it were so, how, bis Lordship asked, does it become freight for which the nautical lien arises? “It was admitted that it would not be ordinarily so; but it was contended that the lien was created by the express clause of lien. The express clause is, however, for freight, dead freight, demurrage, and other charges. It is not dead freight nor demurrage nor other charge, and it is not freight in the ordinary sense of the word. But the contention was that the word 'freight’here was not to be read in the ordinary sense, but that the clause was to be read in connection with the previous clause as to the payment of freight. The £250, it is said, is there expressly stated to be payable as part of the freight,
A CORRESPONDENT writes : “In the ‘Topics of the Week’ in your issue of the 20th inst. you refer to a decision reported in your County Court news contained in the same paper. The Judge is reported to have held that a husband is not liable to pay for goods supplied for family use by a tradesman with whom he had forbidden his wife to deal; and in your remarks you throw a doubt upon the ruling of the Judge and the authority of the case in the Common Pleas quoted by him in support of his view. I presume the case in question is Jolly v. Rees (10 L. T. Rep. N. S. 298), where it was held by ERLE, C.J. and WILLIAMS and WILLES, JJ. that it was not competent for the wife to make a contract binding upon her husband for necessaries suitable to her estate and degree, against his will, and contrary to his order to her, though without notice of such order to the tradesman.' It is right to say that ByLES, J. dissented, saying: “No private reservation of authority, or private agreement between husband and wife, not communicated to a tradesman honestly dealing with the wife by supplying necessaries for the family in the ordinary course of domestic affairs, can affect the tradesman's right to rely on the apparent authority of the wife.' Mr. Justice Byles's view is the same as that laid down by the Court of Exchequer in Johnson v. Sumner (3 H. & N. 261). The case in question (Jolly v. Rees) does not appear to have been cited in Phillipson v. Hayter, where the question was as to certain articles being necessaries, the implied authority of the wife to bind the husband not being otherwise rebutted. I think Jolly v. Rees may fairly rank with those cases where it has been held that a surety is not discharged by a binding agreement to give time to the principal, though made without his concurrence, if it is at the same time agreed that the surety shall not be discharged. In Smith's Manual of Common Law it is suggested that this last is contrary to principle. Ir may
mention that I some time back moved for a new trial in a County Court (the defendant having previously conducted his own case and lost), on the authority of Jolly v. Rees, and under analogous circumstances, but the Judge declined to rehear the
Our correspondent is doubtless correct in his conjecture; but so much doubt has been thrown upon Jolly v. Rees that we sbould not have thought it could be used to support the doctrin laid down by the learned County Court Judge. The utmost extent to which Jolly V. Rees can be carried, as it appears to us, is that a husband may by private prohibition to the wife prevent her from pledging his credit for necessaries in which he is no participator. In that case the necessaries were clothes for the wife and the children. The object of the majority of the court in that case was to give the husband absolute discretion as to his expenditure, and not to leave to juries to estimate what may be suitable to his station. But obviously no such question can arise where the necessaries are the necessaries of life consumed in part by the husband himself. Jolly v. Rees is doubted on principle by most text writers, and the judgment of Mr. Justice Byles is inexorable logic, and we repeat that to apply the case as proposed would be an extraordinary extension of the law.
RELEVANCY OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES. CONSIDERABLE difficulty is frequently found in applying the rule of evidence, which excludes proof of facts collateral to the point in issue. In the recent case of Reg. v. Cotton, an important question as to the admissibility of certain evidence of this character was raised by the counsel for the prisoner. The facts of this case will be fresh in the minds of our readers. The prisoner was indicted for the murder of a child by poison. It was proved that arsenic was found in the child's stomach, whereupon the prisoner's counsel endeavoured to show that the child might have eaten the arsenic of his own accord, or that, though administered by the prisoner, it was done accidentally. To rebut the presumption that the poisoning was accidental, the counsel for the Crown proposed to give in evidence the death from arsenic of other persons while in the prisoner's charge, or under her control.
This evidence was objected to on the ground of irrelevancy, but was eventually admitted. With a view to facilitate the future application of the rule which excludes proof of collateral facts in similar cases, we think that a consideration of some analogous decisions may be useful. It may be assumed as an axiom that evidence of collateral facts which are incapable of affording any reasonable presumption as to the principal matters in dispute will not be admitted, because it tends needlessly to consume the public time; to draw away the minds of the jurors from the real points in issue; to excite prejudice, and to mislead; while at the same time the adverse party, having had no notice of such evidence, cannot be prepared to rebut it. Though we confine our remarks to criminal proceedings, the same rule prevails in civil causes—the only difference being that probably in the former the exclusion of irrelevant evidence would be more rigidly enforced.
Such being the rule, let us proceed to consider the qualification suggested by it, viz., that where there is a reasonable connection between the principal and evidentiary facts, proof of such facts is admissible. Thus it is laid down in Taylor on Evidence (vol. 1 p. 334, 4th edit.), that when felonies are so connected together as to form part of one transaction, evidence of one may be given to show the character of the other. It might be inferred from this that evidence of collateral facts could not be relevant unless they were contemporaneous with the specific charges under consideration, but though a dictum of Justice Bayley in Reg. v. Ellis (6 B. & C. 147), would appear to support such a supposition, it is submitted that this is not now the law, and that proof of collateral facts is receivable in certain cases, though not occurring at the same time as the act charged in the indictment,
The first case to which we shall refer is one the facts of which bear a strong resemblance to that of Reg. v. Cotton. In Reg. v. Geering (18 L. J. 215, M. C.) the prisoner was indicted for the murder of her husband by arsenic in Sept. 1848. Evidence was tendered on behalf of the prosecution of arsenic having been taken by the prisoner's two sons, one of whom died in December and the other in March subsequently, and also of a third son who took arsenic in the following April, but did not die. Proof was given of a similarity of symptoms in the four cases. Evidence was also tendered that the prisoner lived in the same house with her husband and sons, and that she prepared their meals. This was objected to on the ground that the facts in question took place subsequently to the death of the husband, and that the effect of such evidence would be to show that the three cases of poisoning were felonious. It was conceded that the evidence would have been admissible had the facts taken place previous to the death of the hasband.
Pollock, C.B., however, held the evidence receivable, as showing that the death of the sons proceeded from the same cause, viz., arsenic. “The tendency,” he says, “ of such evidence, is to prove and to confirm the proof already given, that the death of the husband, whether felonious or not, was occasioned by arsenic. In this view of the case I think it wholly immaterial whether the deaths of the sons took place before or after the death of the husband. The domestic history of the family during the period that the four deaths occurred is also receivable in evidence to show that during that time arsenic had been taken by four members of it, with a view to enable the jury to determine whether such taking was accidental or not." Alderson, B., and Talfourd, J. concurred with his Lordship in the opinion that the point ought not to be reserved. The above reasoning seems strongly to favour the view
taken above, that collateral facts, though prior or subseqrient to the crime for which the prisoner is on his trial, if suffieiently connected with the principal facts, are admissible in evidence.
In the still more recent case of R. v. Garner et ux. (4 F. & F. 346) the prisoners were charged with murdering, by means of arsenic, the mother of the male prisoner. Willes, J. here admitted evidence that Garner's first wife had been poisoned with arsenic nine months previously; that an attendant who occasionally tasted her food also showed symptoms of having taken poison; that the food was always prepared by the female prisoner, and that the two prisoners, the only other persons in the house, were not affected with any symptoms of poison. This evidence, as in the former case, was tendered and admitted for the purpose of rebutting the inference of an accidental administration of the arsenic. The same learned judge, in R. v. Harris (4 F. & F. 342) stated the true principle to be that facts should be received in evidence if the jury can fairly draw from them the conclusion that by the act of the prisoner an event similar to that charged in the indictment had previously occurred. The prisoner in that case was indicted for arson, and the evidence of his identity being weak, it was proposed to show that at a fire, which occurred a few days previously to another of the prosecutor's buildings, the prisoner was seen standing by, with a demeanour which showed indifference or gratification. This evidence was rejected, but it will be observed that it was tendered for a purpose different from that for which collateral evidence was admitted in either of the previous cases; it was here sought to eke out doubtful evidence of identity by ambiguous testimony of the prisoner's demeanour on former occasions, or, in other words, to establish by means thereof, the substantive charge, whereas in R. v. Geering, and R. v. Garner, the fact of the death being proved, and evidence having in each case been given connecting the prisoner with it, the evidence of other poisonings was admitted merely for the purpose of rebutting the hypothesis of accident.
In the very recent case of R. v. Balls (24 L. T. Rep. N. S. 760; 40 L. J., 150, M. C.), the prisoner was indicted for embezzling three sums of money from a coal society of which he was an agent. It was his duty to pay into a bank every Tuesday to the credit of the society the gross amount received by him in the course of the week, and he was charged in three separate counts with having embezzled the sums which should have been paid in on three successive Tuesdays. It was proposed to show that the prisoner had, during the three weeks, received thirty-one small sums amounting, in the aggregate, to the sums stated in the indictment. To this it was objected, that it would be admitting evidence of thirty-one different acts of embezzlement on one indictment. The evidence was received and the prisoner convicted. Cockburn, C.J., in giving judgment on a case reserved said, “We think this conviction is right. Where a man has to account separately for each individual sum which he receives, more than three sums or items cannot be put in one indictment, but that is not this case. Even in that case, however, if the purpose is not to prove the acts but to explain the intention and show that the omission to account was not an accident, evidence may be given of other instances than those charged for that purpose.
(To be continued.)
DUTIES PAYABLE BY REASON OF DEATH.
(Continued from page 105.) The second case to which we shall refer, viz., Attorney-General v. Cecil (23 L. T. Rep. N. S. 20), has reference to the Succession Duty Act, the facts as reported being as follows: The Marquis of S. was, under his marriage settlement, tenant for life of certain estates, of which his son, Lord C., was tenant in tail. The Marquis and Lord C. in 1855 barred the entail, and resettled the estates to such uses as they should jointly appoint, and subject thereto to the uses of the old settlement. By two deeds dated in 1857 and 1860, the Marquis and Lord C. appointed certain of the settled estates to a trustee for a term of years upon trust to raise, upon the death of the Marquis, a large sum of money for the defendant. Lord C. died in 1866 a bachelor, and the Marquis died in 1868. The Crown claimed duty at the rate of 3 per cent. from the defendant as upon a succession created by Lord C.; but the defendant contended that under sect. 15 he was liable to pay duty at the rate of 1 per cent. only, which was the same rate of duty as his brother, Lord C., would have paid. The court considered that the defendant's interest was a new succession, of which Lord C. was the settlor, so that the case was excepted from the operation of the 15th section. We are inclined to think that the defendant was not liable to any duty at all. We admit that if by the disentailing deed the reversion in fee had been limited to Lord C., he should be treated as predecessor of all persons who took by reason of his death ; but the 12th section of the Act provided that, so far as he was concerned, he was to be treated as if the disentailing deed had not been executed, so that had he survived his father, he would have been liable to pay duty at 1 per cent. upon the value of his succession, or, in other words, his estate tail. The fact of the time for raising the charge having been postponed until the death of the Marquis, was sufficient to make the charge come altogether out of Lord C's estate, and not out of that of the Marqnis, and we think that the case fell within the 15th section. The word
“ succession means “any property chargeable with duty under obtained the lion's share, because it was purely and simply a the Act,” and it cannot be necessary that the whole of such partnership asset, is personal estate-personal estate to all intents property should pass under the alienation, for sect. 43 empowers and purposes-and that the residuary legatees, who are entitled to the commissioners " at the request of any successor or any person it only because it falls within the gift of the residue of his per. claiming in his right” to make separate assessments of the duty sonal estate and property' must take it subject to the legacy duty payable in respect of the interest of the successor in any separate which the law imposes on residuary legatees. It would take a properties, or in defined portions of the same property, and it would good deal more than I have yet heard to satisfy me that a man not therefore appear necessary that the whole estate or interest can with the same breath say effectually in this court 'Give me therein should pass by the alienation. A grant of a sum to be the money because it is residuary personal estate,' and declare raised out of a reversionary estate is surely an alienation of so that it is not taxable because it is not residuary personal estate." much of that estate as is necessary to meet such sum. If, there- It appears to us that the conversion effected by means of a fore, a portion of a reversionary estate or a sum to be raised binding contract for sale entered into by the testator and after. thereout is capable of alienation, we cannot see how a new wards carried out, and the conversion effected by reason of the succession arose in the case before us. There was already a property belonging to a partnership, are totally different. In the succession, part of which was transferred, and that part was to former the testator has by his express act done all in his power to fall into possession at exactly the same period as it would had no change the property for another of a different character, and at alienation taken place. Where was the new succession ? If a his death the real property does not in fact belong to him, and if, simple transfer of a reversion, without consideration, creates a new for instance, it be of a reversionary nature, the death of the tenant succession through being a disposition within sect. 2, a similar for life between the date of the contract and the testator's death, transfer for valuable consideration would also fall within that will not in any manner affect his estate. It is true the legal section. We take it that the contention of the defendant's estate is still vested in the testator, but that is all; he has, in coupsel that to create a new succession a new life must be intro- effect, only a lien upon the real estate to secure the unpaid purduced, upon the expiration of which some new interest is made chase money. In the latter case, however, the real estate does expectant, is the true meaning of the clause, and, that being so, remain the property of the testator, and his estate will be affected the defendant was only liable to contribute his share of the duty by every fluctuation in its value. The object of equitable conupon the whole of the property, or, in other words, Lord C.'s version as applicable to partnership property is solely to prevent reversion, at the same rate and time as such duty would have been the operation of a legal rule under which the survivors would paid upon such property had no alienation taken place. No duty become entitled to the whole of the property, which rule would would ever have been payable in respect of such succession, for by clearly have an effect contrary to the intention of the several the death of Lord C. the term for payment, which is fixed by partners. To carry out this object, the Court of Chancery has sect. 21, nerer arrived, for he was the only "successor," and his made a rule that partnership property shall be considered perlife was the only basis upon which the calculation of duty could sonalty let its nature be what it may. In the present case the law have been made. If Lord C. had survived the Marquis, duty at has vested the whole of the partnership realty in D., from whom it 1 per cent. would have been payable upon the basis of his life was necessary to obtain a conveyance before the court could carry estate in the whole of the property, and it seems preposterous to out a sale. say that he should have been so liable, and that the defendant We quite concur, for the reasons we have stated, in the decision should have been also liable to pay further duty upon the same of the House of Lords but at that point, for the purpose of fiscal property by the reason of the happening of the same event, and liabilities, the principle of conversion must stop. So far as regards that Lord C. would unquestionably have been so liable is clear the public at large it matters not whether the real estate be partfrom sections 42 and 44. If Lord C. was not so liable, duty could nership property or not, as it has to contribute to all impositions be easily evaded, as, for instance, he might have limited the whole to which other real estate is subject, and that being so, why should of the property or the greater portion to the use of his wife. the public be relieved of a portion of taxation, for that is the proper
The third case to which we shall refer, viz., Forbes v. Steven has way of looking at the question, because, owing to the particular reference to the Legacy Duty Acts, the facts as reported being circumstances of the testator the property goes to his A relative as follows: Sir C. with D. and E. carrying on business as partners instead of to his B relative. The question of conversion applies under the style of C. and C., in Bombay, purchased the premises in no further than to give the partnership real property, sold or which the business was carried on, and had the conveyance made unsold, to the persons who are the testator's legatees, instead of to to the three, their heirs and assigns. The partnership was a the persons who are his devisees. Whoever takes takes in the yearly one only, and in 1849 the partners were Sir C. and F., their first instance at least an interest in realty, with a power of obtainshares being respectivelytbree-fourths and one-fourth. Sir C. by ing the legal estate without a legal conversion, and why, therefore, his will gave the residue of his personal property to his grand- should he pay duty in respect of the property which he gets which children, and appointed English executors, and also appointed the in its relation to the general public is realty, when other people several partners of the firm of C. and C. who might be living at who hold exactly the same class of property have not to pay such Bombay at his death, executors of his will for the purpose of duty. realizing his personal estate, including his dwelling-house and It will be noticed that the reasoning of the Vice-Chancellor premises, and remitting the same to his English executors. would have been equally applicable in the case of a claim for pro
The premises in Bombay having been conveyed by D., who had bate, but in the present case, however, no claim for probate duty survived E., to the executors of Sir C., were sold under an order of could arise as the property was out of Great Britain at the testathe Court of Chancery, and the purchase-money was paid into tor's death. court, and an arrangement was come to for settling its distribution The Vice-Chancellor referred fully to the cases of Matson v. between the representatives of the several partners. The Crown Swift (14 L. J., N. S., 354, Eq.); decided by Lord Langdale, claimed legacy duty upon the whole amount (F. having also died) and Custance v. Bradshaw (14 L. J., N. S., 358, Eq.) decided upon the ground (amongst others) that partnership real estate by Wigram, V. C,, and explained away both decisions upon is considered in the Court of Chancery to be converted into money, the ground that the circumstances were different, as and is therefore liable to legacy duty wherever such real estate admit they were. In both cases was the Crown unsuccessful in its may be. James, V.C., decided that legacy duty was payable, and attempts to obtain probate duty. In the former case the testator basing his decision to a great extent upon the decision of had by deed conveyed the real estate to a trustee, upon trust for the House of Lords in Attorney-General v. Brunning (8 H. of L. sale, and after payment of certain charges for the testator “his C. 243), which declared that probate duty was payable upon the executors, administrators, and assigns, and that without any purchase-money of some real estate which the testator had con- claim or equity therein, by, or in favour of the heirs as real repretracted to sell in his lifetime. The Vice-Chancellor quoted with sentatives of the testator, notwithstanding that the trust estate or approval and adopted the words of Lord Chelmsford that “it any part thereof should or might remain unconverted at certainly seems extraordinary that property which is recoverable the time of his death.” In the latter case rcal property by the executor virtute officii which belongs to the next of kin and used for the purposes of the partnership had been conveyed not to the heir at law, and which has the character of personalty to the testator and his co-partners as
Tenants in Common. thus impressed upon it in every other respect, should lose that In the case of Matson v. Swift, Lord Langdale stated: “In the character solely in relation to fiscal liabilities. It is difficult to present case an actual conversion was required, and has accordingly understand upon what principle the conversion into personalty is been made since the testator's death, and the produce of the sale to stop short of this point," and the Vice-Chancellor added that has been by this court treated as the personal estate of the he was asked “to hold that the House of Lords in Attorney- deceased. But I am of opinion that the Crown is not entitled to General v. Brunning, left this as the singular state of the English any benefit from that conversion so made, and that the interest of law, that whereas a conditional and contingent conversion, effected the deceased in the property was not subject to probate duty by means of a contract for sale, enures, when completed, for the because, in fact, the interest of the deceased existed in the form benefit of the Crown, as well as for everybody else, an uncondi. of an equitable interest in land of inheritance, and not in the form tional, immediate, and absolute conversion, effected by means of of personal estate, in which form alone the administration of it the contract of partnership, enures for the benefit of everybody could be granted by probate.” And he was “of opinion that the else, but not for the benefit of the Crown. I am able to say that money to arise, and which afterwards did arise, from the sale of no such absurdity is chargeable against that tribunal, or against the estate comprised in the deed, was not personal estate in respect the English law. The Vice-Chancellor further stated “ I have of which probate was to be granted, and therefore probate duty therefore, no doubt, that the produce of the warehouses, being the is not payable upon it.” In the case of Custance 1. Bradshaw, produce of a partnership asset, of which Sir C.'s estate has in fact Wigram, V.C., stated: “The case for the Crown was rested on