Page images
PDF
EPUB

MAY, WILLIAM, shipping agent, Barrow-in-Furness. Pet. Dec. 6. Reg. Postlethwaite. Sur. Jan. 2

PLANCK, JOSEPH WILLIAM, builder, Trowbridge. Pet. Dec. 9. Reg. Smith. Sur. Dec. 24

Gazette, Dec. 16.

To surrender at the Bankrupts' Court, Basinghall-street. JACKSON, HENRY, fruit salesman, Borough Market. Pet. Dec. 13. Reg. Roche. Sur. Jan. 22

VULLIMY, HENRY, surveyor, Gracechurch-st, and Fairview, Macaulay-rd, Clapham-common. Pet. Dec. 13. Reg. Roche. Sur. Jan. 15

WATTS, HENPY, hot water engineer, St. John-st, West Smithfield.Pet. Dec. 12. Reg. Murray. Sur. Jan. 9

To surrender in the Country. HUDSON, HERON, provision merchant, Birmingham. Pet. July 15. Reg. Chauntler. Sur. Dec. 30

JOHNSON, ELIZABETH, widow, Harborne. Pet. Nov. 26. Reg. Chauntler. Sur. Dec. 30

WILLIAMS, THOMAS SEYMOUR, dealer in Sheffield goods. Wyrley. Pet. Dec. 11. Reg. Clarke. Sur. Jan. 6

PUGH, MARY, spinster, Levenshulme, near Manchester. Pet. Dec. 11. Reg. Kay. Sur. Jan. 7

BANKRUPTCIES ANNULLED.

Gazette, Dec. 12.

DAVENPORT, EDMUND SHARRINGTON, landagent, Bucknill Oct. 3, 1966

FITZSIMONS, JOHN, out of business, Liverpool. Sept. 2, 1873 MCCOY, GEORGE, general hardware merchant, Liverpool. Aug.7, 1873

Liquidations by Arrangement.

FIRST MEETINGS.
Gazette, Dec., 12.

AKROYD, SAMUEL, butcher, Halifax. Pet. Dec. 9. Dec. 22, at four at office of Sol. Storey, Halifax

ATKINSON, JOSEPH FREEMAN, retired lieutenant, Southsea. Pet. Dec. 8. Dec. 31, at three, at office of Sols. Cousins and Burbidge, Portsmouth

BECK, CHARLES, grocer. St. John-st-rd, Clerkenwell. Pet. Nov. 27. Dec. 16, at twelve, at Mr. Hudgett's offices, 37, Gresham-st. Sol. Gray, Gresham-st

BISSELL, WILLIAM, axle manufacturer, Birmingham. Pet. Dec.
5. Dec 22, at twelve, at offices of Sol. Collis, Birmingham
BLICK, JAMES, gentleman, Regent's-pk rd. Pet. Dec. 4. Dec.
28, at two, at office of Sol. Vernede, Craven-st, Strand
BOWYER, GEORGE JOSEPH, gentleman, Brecknock-ter, Camden-
rd. Pet. Dec. 6. Dec. 22, at eleven, at the London tavern,
Bishopsgate-st. Sol. Crowther, Queen-st, Cheapside
BONBERNARD, LOUIS, commission agent, Cheapside. Pet. Dec.
10. Jan. 6. at two, at the Chamber of Commerce, 145, Cheapside.
Sol. Dutton, Strand

CLIFFE, JOHN GEORGE, commission agent, Manchester. Pet.
Dec. 10. Jan. 7, at three, at offices of Sol. Barling, Manchester
CROUCHER, JAMES, baker, Southampton. Pet. Dec. 9. Dec. 24,
at twelve, at office of Sol. Robins, Southampton
DALES, GEORGE, builder, Parchmore-rd, Thornton-heath. Pet.
Dec. 8. Jan. 2, at twelve, at Mullen's hotel, Ironmonger-la. Sol.
Pullen, Harp-la, Great Tower-st
DILLON, FOSTER CREWE, clock maker, Tunstall. Pet. Dec. 8.
Dec. 24, at eleven, at the County Court Offices, Hanley. Sol
Hollinshead, Tunstall

DIXON, DAVID, innkeeper, Garston. Pet. Dec. 8. Jan. 3, at two, at offices of Sol. Lowe, Liverpool

DYER, JOHN, baker, Birmingham. Pet. Dec. 8. Dec. 22, at three, at office of Sol. Parry, Biriningham

EVANS, WILLIAM, commission agent, Caebricks. Pet. Dec. 9. Dec. 23, at twelve, at office of Sols. Davies and Hartland, Swan

sea

FULLWOOD, EDWARD, civil engineer, Queen's-sq, St. James's-pk. Pet. Dec. 8. Dec. 24, at twelve, at the London tavern, Bishops. gate-st-within. Sols. Keene and Marsland, Lower Thames-st GAME, THOMAS, harness maker, Tooley-st, Southwark. Pet. Dec. 6. Dee. 23, at twelve, at office of Sol. Nind, St. Benet.pl, Gracechurch-st

GASS, FREDERICK, manufacturer, Bartholomew-close.

Pet. Dec. 5. Dec. 30, at two, at the Chamber of Commerce, 145, Cheapside Sol. Chidley, Old Jewry GEORGE, JOHN OVERLAND, draper, Gooderstone. Pet. Dec. 3. Dec. 22, at twelve, at the County Court House, Downham Market. Sol. Reed, Downham Market

GILES, WILLIAM, of no occupation, Redruth. Pet. Dec. 4. Dec. 20, at three, at Paull's hotel, Chacewater. Sol. Tre vena, Redruth GILL, THOMAS, whitesmith, Taunton. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec. 30, at one, at offices of Sols. Reed and Cook, Taunton GOODALL, EDWARD PHILIP, commercial traveller, Berkeley-st. Hanley. Pet. Dec. 6. Dec. 24, at eleven, at T. H. and F. W. Tomkinson, Burslem. Sol. Tomkinson, Burslem GRAY, JOHN, furniture dealer, Alfreton. Pet. Dec. 9. Dec. 31, at

twelve, at the Black Boy hotel, Nottingham HAMILTON, WILLIAM HENRY, corn merchant, Cardiff. Pet. Dec. 9. Dec. 24, at eleven, at Barnard, Thomas, Clarke, and Co., accountants, Cardiff. Sol. Griffith, Cardiff

HEATLEY, JOHN, fruiterer, Liverpool. Pet. Dec. 9. Dec. 24, at two, at Gibson and Bolland, accountants, Liverpool. Sol. Williams, Liverpool HORTON, GEORGE, pearl button manufacturer, Birmingham. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec. 24, at twelve, at office of Sol. Fallows, Birmingham. HOWORTH, THOMAS, and HOWORTH, JAMES, cotton manufacturers, Stacksteads. Pet. Dec. 8. Dec. 30, at three, at office of Sols. Sale, Shipman, Seddon, and Sale, Manchester HUTCHINSON, JAMES, beer dealer, Chorlton-on-Medlock. Dec. 10. Dec. 26, at three, at the Falstaff hotel, Manchester ISAACS, LEWIS, boarding house keeper, Birmingham. Pet. Dec. 9. Dec. 24, at ten, at office of Sol. Burton, Birmingham JAVAL, EDWARD CREMIEU, of no occupation, Lewes. Pet. Dec 8. Dec. 29, at two, at office of Sol. Smith, Gresham House, Old Broad-st, London

Pet.

JEWELL, JOHN, boot manufacturer, Plymouth, and Tavistock.
Pet. Dec. 10. Dec. 27, at eleven, at offices of Sols. MessIS.
Edmonds, Plymouth
JONES, JAMES MAURICE, grocer, Luton. Pet. Dec. 5. Dec. 22,
at one, at office of Sol. Scargill, Serjeant's-inn, Chancery-la,
London

KEATLEY, GEORGE, farmer, Sutton Coldfield. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec.
19, at twelve, at office of Sol. Fallows, Birmingham
KELLER, JOHN ANTON, japanner, Bloomfield-rd, Burdett-rd,
Bow, and Railway-arches, Bow Common-la. Pet. Dec. 8. Dec.
31, at eleven, at office of Sol. Brighten, Bishopsgate-street-
without
KITCHENER, THOMAS, doctor of medicine, Chippenham. Pet.
Dec. 9. Dec. 24, at ten, at the residence of the petitioner, St.
Mary's-st, Chippenham. Sol. Bartrum, Bath
KNIGHT, GEORGE. law stationer, Gray's-inn-rd. Pet. Nov. 29.
Dec. 20, at eleven, at office of Sol. Parker, Lombard-ct
LAWRENCE, THOMAS, shopkeeper, Wollaston. Pet. Dec. 2. Dec.
19, at three, at office of Sol. Addison, High-st, Brierley-hill
LAWSON, EDWIN GEORGE, and LAWSON, HENRY, tobacconists,
Birmingham. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec. 23, at three, at office of Sol.
Fallows, Birmingham

LEONARD, EDWARD, out of business, Aston-juxta-Birmingham. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec. 19, at twelve, at office of Sol. Kennedy, Birmingham

LUCKMAN, CHARLES JAMES, commission agent, Silver-st. Pet.
Dec. 11. Dec. 29, at two, at Ladbury, Collison, and Viney, 99,
Cheapside. Sols. Davidson, Carr, Bannister, and Morriss,
Basinghall-st

MACDONALD, DUNCAN GEORGE FORBES, gentleman, Eastbourne.
Pet. Dec. 8. Dec. 24, at ten, at the Crown hotel, Lewes. Sol.
Barrow, Leadenhall-st
MCLEAN, JOHN, joiner, Lower Broughton. Pet. Dec. 9. Dec. 29,
at three, at the Union-chmbs, 15, Dickinson-st, Manchester
Sols. Messrs. Bond, Manchester

MEARS, ISAAC, gasfitter, Hammersmith. Pet. Dec. 9. Dec. 29,
at four, at office of Sol. Parker, Cambridge-rd, Hammer-
smith
MITCHELL, ALFRED, hosier, Gloucester. Pet. Dec. 5.

Dec. 23, at twelve, at the Bell hotel, Gloucester. Sols. Burrup, and Coren, Gloucester MITCHELL, WALTER, and SOUTH, HENRY, bedroom furniture manufacturers, Motley-st, Curtain-rd, and City-rd. Pet. Dec.

9.

Jan. 8, at one; sep. creditors of Mitchell, at two; sep. creditors of South, at three, at 10. City-rd. Sola. Roscoe, Hincks, and Sheppard, King-st, Finsbury-8q

MOLONY, JOHN, stationer, Brick-la, Spitalfields. Pet. Dec. 4. Dec. 22, at two, at office of Sol. Copp, Essex-st, Strand

ton

MOORE, JOHN, printer, Beaufort-bldgs, Strand. Pet. Dec. 5. Dec. 22, at eleven, at Lomax, 3, Jermyn-st, St. James's. Sol. Morris, Leicester-sq MURPHY, NEIL, fishmonger, Wolverhampton. Pet. Dec. 8. Dec. 23, at half-past ten, at office of Sol. Stratton, WolverhampO'REILLY, GEORGE FRANCIS, draper's assistant, Mansfield. Pet. Dec. 9. Dec. 29, at three, at office of Sol. Hogg, Mansfield PARISH, ALEXANDER, builder, Southampton-rd, Kentish-town. Pet. Dec. 8. Dec. 29, at two, at offices of Sol. Rodwell, Chancery.la PIKE, JOHN, gentloman, Brixton-rd. Pet. Dec. 4. Dec. 22, at three, at offices of Sols. Manning, Great George-st, Westminster PLOWMAN, WILLIAM, and TAYLOR, WILLIAM, grocers, Wandsworth-rd. Pet. Dec. 5. Dec. 23, joint creditors at two; sep. creditors of Taylor, at three, at office of Sols. Harper, Broad, and Battock, Rood-la

RIPPIN, AMOS, and RIPPIN, JOSEPH, curriers, Geddington, Pet. Dec. 8. Dec. 29, at twelve; sep. creditors of J. Rippon, at half-past twelve, at office of Sol. Rawlins, Market Harborough

RODMAN, GEORGE, cabinet maker, Bristol. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec. 23, at eleven, at office of Sol. Essery, Bristol

ROSE, WILLIAM, stocktaker, Middlesborough. Pet. Dec. 4. Dec. 22, at eleven, at Bennison and Co., accountants, Middlesborough. Sol. Dobson ROSSINGTON, JOSEPH WILLIAM, builder, Boston. Pet. Dec. 9, Dec. 23, at eleven, at office of Sol. Dyer, Boston ROXBURGH, WILLIAM, draper, Kingston-on-Thames. Pet. Dec. 6. Dec. 24, at twelve, at office of Sol. Bennet, Friday-st SALVIDGE, JAMES, victualler, Bristol. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec. 20, at eleven, at offices of Sol. Essery, Bristol

SAMBROOK, JOHN, and SAMBROOK, SAMUEL, builders, Stokeon-Trent. Pet. Dec. 6. Dec. 23, at eleven, at office of Sol. Stevenson, Stoke-on-Trent

SEPHTON, WILLIAM, marble mason, Liverpool. Pet. Dec. 8. Dec. 29, at three, at office of Sol. Pemberton, Liverpool SMITH, CHARLES, commission agent, Bristol. Pet. Dec. 5. Dec. 22, at eleven, at J. Downing, All Saints-la, Exchange, Bristol. STACY, SAMUEL, and STACY, BENJAMIN, wholesale stationers, High-st, Shoreditch, and New-inn-yard. Pet. Dec. 9. Dec. 29, joint creditors, at two; sep. creditors of S. Stacey, at half past three; sep. creditors of B. Stacey, at four, at the Guildhall coffee-house, Gresham-st. Sol. Angell

STEPHENS, SAMPSON, wine merchant, Penryn and Truro. Pet. Dec. 9. Dec. 27, at twelve, at the Inns of Court hotel, Holborn. Sol. Jenkins, Penryn

STEPHENSON, CHARLES, cabinet maker, Huddersfield. Pet.
Dec. 9. Dec. 29, at eleven, at office of Sol. Berry, Hudders-
field
STONE, FRANCIS, builder, Oxford. Pet. Dec. 6. Dec. 22, at
eleven, at St. Michael's-chmbs, Ship-st, Oxford. Sols. Hurford
and Taylor
SWINDELLS, JOHN, innkeeper, Manchester. Pet. Dec. 8. Dec.
24, at ten, at office of Sol. Marlow, Manchester
TAYLOR, JAMES, publican, Crewe. Pet. Dec. 6. Dec. 23. at
eleven, at the Royal hotel, Crewe. Sol. Pointon
THIRKILL, JOHN, joiner, Bradford. Pet. Dec. 4. Dec. 31. at
eleven, at offices of Sols. Lancaster and Wright, Bradford
THOMPSON, JOHN, draper, Birkenhead. Pet. Dec. 9. Dec. 26,
at three, at office of Sol. Moore, Birkenhead
UTTLEY, SAMUEL FIELDEN, warp sizer, Walsden. Pet. Dec. 8.
Dec. 23, at three, at office of Sol. Shippey, Manchester
VICKERS, CHARLES, manufacturer of chains, Birstal. Pet. Dec. 8.
Dec. 23, at ten, at office of Sol. Wooler, Batley
WAGGETT, ALFRED, tailor, Green-st, Grosvenor-sq. Pet. Dec.
10. Jan. 2, at twelve, at office of Sol. Richards, Warwick-st,
Regent-st
Dec, 31, at
Pet. Dec. 6

WEST, HENRY, carpenter, Oxford. Pet. Dec. 10.
one, at office of Sol. Thompson, Oxford
WILLIAMS, JOHN, out of business, Shrewsbury.
Dec. 23, at eleven, at office of Sol. Morris, Shrewsbury

Gazette Dec. 16.

ACRES, WILLIAM, farmer, Standon. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec. 30, at two, at office of Sol. Digby, Lincoln's-inn-fields, London ARNOULIN, EDWARD, glass shade manufacturer, St. John'sst, Clerkenwell, Lea-bridge, Hackney, and Crickfield-rd, Clapton. Pet. Dec. 10. Jan. 5. at twelve, at office of Sol. Smith, Great James-st, Bedford-row

ASHWORTH, JOHN, and HALSTEAD, RICHARD, builders, Spotland. Pet. Dec. 12. Dec. 30, at two, at the Wheatsheaf inn, Manchester. Sols. Hall and Baldwin, Clitheroe

BAKER, WILLIAM, baker, Southwick. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec. 27, at twelve at office of Bertie, 17, Great James-st, Bedford-row, London. Sol. Goodman, Brighton

BLACK, WILLIAM, commission agent, Manchester. Pet. Dec. 11. Dec. 29, at three, at the Clarence hotel, Manchester. Sol. Woolley, Manchester

BRADLEY, FRANCIS, publican, Rochdale. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec. 29, at three, at the Hare and Hounds inn, Rochdale. Sol, Lomax, jun., Rochdale BROWN, SAUL, jeweller, Sunderland. Pet. Dec. 11. Dec. 29, at three, at office of Sol. Hope, Sunderland BURLEY, HENRY RAWSON, fruiterer, High st, Wandsworth. Pet. Dec. 11. Jan. 8, at three, at 10, Trinity-st, Southwark. Sol. Ody

CARNEY, CATHERINE, manager for a poultry dealer, Liverpool. Pet. Dec. 12. Jan, 6, at three, at office of Vine, Liverpool. Sol. Ritson, Liverpool

DALE, HENRY AUGUSTUS, private hotel keeper, Bedford. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec. 30, at eleven, at office of Sol. Tebbs, Bedford DARBYSHIRE, WILLIAM, plumber, Southport. Pet. Dec. 12. Dec. 30, at eleven, at office of Sol. Walton, Southport DUNN, WILLIAM, painter, Saltburn-by-the-Sea. Pet. Deo. 9. Dec. 29, at eleven, at Mrs. Barker's Temperance hotel, Middlesborough, Sol. Bainbridge, Middlesborough EAST, EDWARD, gunmaker, Birmingham. Pet. Dec. 11. Dec. 30, at twelve, at offices of Sol. Rooke, Birmingham EDWARDS, JOHN, and WESTPHAL, ERNST HEINRICH, commission merchants, Great Tower-st. Pet. Deo. 10. Dec. 30, at twelve, at offices of Sols. M'Leod and Watney, London-st, Fenchurch-st

ELLIOTT, WILLIAM RICHARD, millwright, Plymouth. Pet. Dec.
12. Dec. 29, at one, at office of Wilkes, public accountant, 24,
George-st, Plymouth. Sol. Chilcott, Tavistock
ESCHLE, FRIDOLIN, watchmaker, Swansea. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec.
29, at eleven, at office of Sols. Davies and Hartland, Swansea
GRAHAM, ROBERT, draper, Dudley. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec. 30, at
half-past ten at office of Sol. Barrow, Wolverhampton
GRAVELY, CHARLES EWART, provision merchant, Brighton.
Pet. Dec. 10. Dec. 30, at three, at office of Sol. Lamb, Brighton
GREEN, FREDERICK, cheesemonger, Lower Wandsworth-rd.
Pet. Dec. 11. Dec. 30, at eleven, at Peele's Coffee-house, Fetter-
la. Sol. Marshall, King-st West Hammersmith
GREGORY, STEPHEN, brick manufacturer, Upper Brailes. Pet.
Dec. 11. Jan. 3, at three, at office of Sol. Crosby, Banbury
GRIFFIN, JOHN, and RUDD, WILLIAM HENRY, glass manufac-
turers, Birmingham. Pet. Dec. 12. Dec. 29, at half past eleven,
at offices of Sol. Duke, Birmingham
GRIFFIN, WILLIAM, surgeon, Ledbury. Pet. Dec. 13. Dec. 29, at
twelve, at the Feathers hotel, Ledbury. Sols. Messrs. Corbett,
Worcester

HALES, JOHN, fruiterer, Wolverhampton. Pet. Dec. 12. Jan. 5
at eleven at office of So1. Barrow, Wolverhampton
HANBERG, HENRY WILLIAM, tin merchant. Dod-st, Limehouse.
Pet. Dec. 12. Dec. 30, at two, at offices of Sols. Learoyd and
Learoyd, South-st, Finsbury-sq

HASKINS, HESTER, widow, out of business, Wick and Abson.
Pet. Dec. 13. Dec. 21, at three, at office of Sol. Peterson, Bristol
HAWORTH, JAMES, HAWORTH, THOMAS, and HAWORTH, ROBERT,
cotton spinners, Bacup. Pet. Dec. 5. Dec. 29, at three, at the
Derby Arms hotel, Bury. Sols. Handsley and Artindale, Burn-
ley
HERRMANN, ALEXANDER prestidigitateur, Brighton. Pet. Dec.
10. Dec. 29, at three, at offices of Clennell, Great James-street,
Bedford-row, London. Sol. Brandreth, Brighton
HILL, GEORGE HENRY, out of business, Wednesbury. Pet. Dec.

10. Dec. 29, at three, at office of Sol. Sheldon, Wednesbury HOCKENHULL, ROBERT, nursery gardener, Sale. Pet. Dec. 13. Jan. 7, at eleven, at office of Sol. Simpson. Manchester HODGES, JAMES, grocer, Deal. Pet, Dec. 11. Jan. 7, at eleven, at 98, Middle-st, Deal. Sol. Drew HOLLOWAY, THOMAS, chain maker, Barrow-in-Furness. Pet. Dec. 12. Dec. 29, at eleven, at the Ship hotel, Barrow-in-Furness. Sol. Jackson, Ulverston HUGHES, RICHARD, millstone manufacturer, Bunbury Heath, Lear Tarporley, and Liverpool. Pet. Dec. 12. Dec. 30, at two, at office of Sol. Bellringer, Liverpool

HOWSE, CHARLES, auctioneer, Chippenham. Pet. Dec. 12. Dec. 30, at eleven, at the White Lion hotel, Chippenham. Sol. Dyer, Bath

street

IRELAND, THOMAS ROBERT, baker, Theobalds-rd, Holborn. Pet.
Dec. 12. Jan. 8. at two, at office of Sol. Brown, Basinghall-
JACKSON, MILES, coal merchant, Chester. Pet. Dec. 12. Dec.
31, at twelve, at office of Sol. Churton, Chester
JOHNSON, WILLIAM HENRY, surgeon, Lydd and Lenham. Pet.
Dec. 12. Dec. 29, at half-past ten, at offices of Sol. Smith, Old
Broad-st, London

JONES, ILES, grocer, Rhosymedre. Pet. Dec. 11. Dec. 29, at two,
at offices of Sols. Evans and Lockett, Liverpool
LANGE, DANIEL LARSEN, tailor, Trinity-sq, Tower-hill. Pet.
Dec. 13. Dec. 30, at three, at offices of Sols. Ellis and Cross-
fleld, Mark-la

LAWTON, JOSEPH, dealer in millinery, Middlesborough. Pet. Dec. 8. Jan. 2, at three, at office of Sol. Addenbrook, Middles borough

LEAROYD, JANE, private lodginghouse keeper, Huddersfield. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec. 31, at three, at offices of Sols. Messrs. Learoyd, Huddersfield

LONG, JOHN CRAVEN, blacksmith, Eccleshill. Pet. Dec. 12. Dec. 31, at three, at offices of Sols. Fawcett and Malcolm, Leeds LYNDEN, EDWIN, smack owner, Lowestoft. Pet. Dec. 9. Jan. 5, at twelve, at offices of Sol. Archer, Lowestoft MARVIN, ELIZABETH, milliner, Regent-st. Pet. Dec. 8. Dec. 24, at twelve, at 298, Regent-st. Sol. Alcock MATTHEWS, WILLIAM JAMES, leather dressing case manufacturer, Newman-st, Oxford-st. Pet. Dec. 13. Jan. 8, at two, at 14, Southampton-st, Bloomsbury. Sols. Routh and Stacey MAXWELL, JOHN, cotton waste bleacher, Bolton. Pet. Dec. 11. Dec. 29, at three, at office of Sols. Hall and Rutter, Bolton MILLARD, ANNIE, general shop keeper, Bridge-st, Kilburn. Pet. Dec. 15. Dec. 31, at four, at office of Sol. CambridgePet. Dec. 10. Jan. 5, at

ter, Hyde pk

MORRIS, HENRY, joiner, Liverpool.
three, at office of Sol. Harper, Liverpool
NICHOLSON, WILLIAM, gentleman, Grayshot-rd, Wandsworth.
Pet. Dec. 8. Dec. 23, at twelve, at offices of Sols. Reed and
Lovell, Guildhall-chmbs, Basinghall-st

OLIVER, WALTER, tailor, Normanby. Pet. Dec. 12. Dec. 29, at eleven, at offices of Sols. Hunton and Bolsover, Stockton-onTees

PALETHORPE, THOMAS, agent, Nottingham. Pet. Dec. 11. Dec. 31, at twelve, at office of Sol. Shelton, Nottingham PARRY, SAMUEL, cattle dealer, Wombourn. Pet. Dec. 13. Dec. 29, at eleven, at office of Sol. Barrow, Wolverhampton PHILLIPS, THOMAS EDWARD, packing case maker, Birmingham. Pet. Dec. 12. Dec. 30, at twelve, at office of Sol, Griffin, Bir mingham

PRICE, REES, commission agent, Llandewibrefi.

Pet. Dec. 9.

Dec. 27, at half-past ten, at office of Sol. Griffiths, Carmarthen RANDS, THOMAS, licensed victualler, Ealing.common. Pet. Dec. 10. Jan. 5, at two, at office of Sol. Pittmann, Guildhallchmbs, Basinghall-st

RILEY, HENRY, and CLEGG, JOHN, builders, Accrington. Pet. Dec. 5. Dec. 30, at two, at office of Bannister, solicitor, Accring ton. Sol. Nowell, Burnley

ROTHWELL, JOHN, and CLARKE, JAMES WILLIAM, builders, Kirchen-ri, Ealing. Pet. Dec. 8. Dec. 24, at eleven, at offices of Kent, Flaxman, Haydon, and Co., accountants, 55, Basir. hall st. Sol. Warrand, Ludgate-hill

SAINSBURY, WILLIAM MARSDEN, out of business, Liverpool. Pet. Dec. 11. Dec. 29, at two, at office of Gibson and Bolland, accountants, Liverpool. Sol. Ritson, Liverpool

SIMS, REUBEN, wine merchant, Barrow-in-Furness. Pet. Dec. 13.
Dec. 29, at two, at the Victoria hotel, Preston. Sol. Gilbertson,
Preston

SMURTHWAITE, THOMAS, mantle manufacturer, Almorah-rd,
Islington. Pet. Dec. 11. Dec. 31, at twelve, at office of Sol.
Child, South-sq. Gray's-inn
SPODE, MARTHA, furniture broker, Chester. Pet. Dec. 12. Dec.
29, at three, at office of Sol. Nordon, Chester
SPURWAY, JAMES, publican, Colyford. Pet. Dec. 12. Jan. 6, at
twelve, at the Dolphin inn, Colyton. Sol. Wilton, Colyton
STOREY, WILLIAM HOLLINGWORTH, cordwainer, Navenby. Pet.
Dec. 11. Jan. 3, at eleven, at off.ce of Jay, public accountant,
Lincoln. Sols. Toynbee and Larken, Lincoln

SUGDEN, WILLIAM, grocer, Kildwick. Pet. Dec. 13. Dec. 24. at
eleven, at office of Rawson, George, and Wade, solicitors, Brad-
ford. Sols. Wright and Waterworth, Keighley
SWAINSON, WILLIAM, Wood turner, Durham. Pet. Dec. 12. Dec.
29, at twelve, at offices of Sols, Hunton and Bolsover, Stockton-
on-Tees

TAYLOR, WILLIAM, blacksmith, Gayton. Pet. Dec. 11. Dec. 30, at twelve, at office of Sols. Glasier and Mason, King's Lynn TESSEYMAN, JOHN MARTIN, fishing smack owner, Kingstonupon-Hull. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec. 19, at two, at office of Sol. Laverack, Kingston upon Hull

THOMPSON, EDMUND, hat dealer, Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Pet. Dec. 11. Jan. 2, at twelve, at offices of Sol. Clavering, Newcastle-upon-Tyne

WATMOUGH, WILLIAM, plumber, Manchester. Pet. Dec. 12 Dec. 29, at three, at office of Sols. Sale, Shipman, Seddon, and Sale, Manchester

WELLS, WILLIAM, out of business, Maidenhead. Pet. Dec. 10. Jan. 6, at half-past two, at the White Horse, High-st, Maidenhead. Sol. Burr, St. Mary's-sq, Paddington, London WHALLEY, JOHN WILLIAM, bookkeeper, Blackburn. Pet. Dec. 10. Jan. 2, at three, at office of Sois. Hall and Holland, Black

burn

WILCOX, JAMES JOSEPH, baker, Brighton. Pet. Dec. 10. Dec. 30, at eleven, at office of Sol. Mills, Brighton YOUNG, SAMUEL, brushmaker, Birmingham. Pet. Dec. 10, Dec. 29, at half-past ten, at office of Sol. Duke, Birmingham_ ZEWYBAUN, ABRAM BEAR, (commonly known as Barnett, Abram Bear), ouilder, Beaumont-sq, Mile End rd. Pet. Dec. 11. Jan. 6, at three, at offices of Sols. Ingle, Cooper, and Holmes, City Bank-chmbs, Threadneedle-st

Dividends.

BANKRUPTS' ESTATES.

The Official Assignees, &c., are given, to whom apply for the Dividends.

Anderson, J. C. clerk, 12s. At Sol. Jaques, Birmingham.-Bailey, J. bootmaker, 28. At Sol. Sherratt, Wrexham.-Collins, H. W. of Woodbridge, first, 48. At Trust. W. J. Andrews, Church-st, Woodbridge.-Garrett, J. chemical manufacturer, first, 1s. 6d.; final, is. d. At Trust. P. B. McQuie, Albert-bidgs, Preeson'srow, Liverpool. Head, W. B. hotel keeper, second and final, 32d. At Trust. J. A. Josolyne, 28, King-st, Cheapside.-Moore, A. first and final, 108. At Trust. H. W. Banner, 24, North John-st, Liverpool.-Moore, J. first and final, 10s. At Trust. H. W. Banner, 24, North John-st, Liverpool.-Pollerfen, E. chemist, first 6s. 8d. At Trust. A. C. R. Adoock, 20, South-st, Horncastle.-Shroff, M. D. commission merchant, second, 2s. 6d. At Trust. H. Bolland, 10, South John-st, Liverpool.-Smith, Rev. P. clerk in holy orders, 18. Trust. C. Other, Jun.-Whitworth, G. W. hop merchant, first, 2s, and not 28. 3d. as advertised in Gazette Nov. 28

[blocks in formation]

ton.

OXENHAM.-On the 15th inst., at 17, Earl's-terrace, Kensington, aged 74 years, George Nutcombe Oxenham, Esq., barrister-atlaw, Western Circuit, formerly Fellow of Exeter College, 01ford. SCOTT.-On the 7th inst., at an advanced age, David Scott, Esq. Conveyancer, of 102, Penrose-street, Walworth, and Middle Temple.

SOUTHEE.-On the 12th inst., at 97, Guildford-street, Russellsqnare, aged 43 years, Horace Robert Southee, solicitor. STUBBS.-On the 13th inst., at St. Paull's Close, Walsall, aged 31. years, George Bradnock Stubbs, Esq., solicitor.

[blocks in formation]

MAR

Now ready, price 5s. 6d., VOL. II., Part 1, of

ARITIME LAW REPORTS (New Series). By J. P. ASPINALL, Esq., Barrister-at-Law, in the Admiralty Courts of England and Ireland, and in all the Superior Courts, with a Selection from the Decisions of the United States Courts, with Notes by the Editor. The First Series of "Maritime Law" may now be had com plete in Three Volumes, half bound, price £5 5s. for the set, or any single volume for £28. Back numbers may be had to complete sets.

London: HORACE COX, 10, Wellington-street, Strand, W.C.

[merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small]

ruptcy had power to carry out a decree of the Court of Chancery in the matter of a partnership. Lord SELBORNE said that he did not concur in the view of the CHIEF JUDGE that it was competent for the Court of Bankruptcy to carry out the decree under the 72nd section. That section, he observed, gave very large powers to the Court of Bankruptcy to decide all questions necessary for the administration of a bankrupt's estate; but it did not enable it to draw within its jurisdiction the owners of property which was not vested in the assignees, or to work out a decree for dissolution of a partnership which had been previously made by the Court of Chancery.

66

AN interesting judgment on the subject of testamentary gifts to illegitimate children was delivered by Vice-Chancellor MALINS, on the 20th inst. The testator married twice. By his first wife he had two children, both of whom died in his lifetime, one only leaving issue. By his second wife he had two children, both born before the marriage. By his will he gave to his wife power to dispose of his property among our children," and in the event of her making no will the property was to be equally divided between his children by her." It was argued that by allowing the illegitimate children to come in under the will, the legitimate children would be excluded. The Vice-Chancellor said, however, that there is no rule to prevent legitimate and illegitimate children taking together as a class where it is intended they should do so.

66

THE Taunton election petition has evidently created an amount of excitement which seems likely to result in the introduction of some novel features into the trial. The first of which we hear is the framing of an affidavit on the part of the respondent, making extraordinary allegations against the petitioners as a ground for obtaining particulars of the alleged acts of bribery, &c. Before the application for particulars was made to the Judge, this affidavit had been published in a local newspaper. This would have been a sufficiently improper proceeding had the contents of such affidavit been true; being contradicted by four affidavits on the other side, it should certainly have been confined to the attention of the Judge. Proceedings, however, are to be at once commenced for the purpose of punishing this contempt of court, and to obtain redress for the libel. If election trials are to be conducted with this asperity, Parliamentary electioneering will become more hazardous than it has been hitherto.

THE particulars furnished to us concerning the changes on the Northern Circuit appear to have been in some respects incorrect. The appointments in the offices connected with the Court of Common Pleas, at Lancaster, consequent upon the resignation of Mr. HARRIS, have had the effect of making Liverpool the principal centre, instead of, as hitherto, one of the districts of the county subordinate to Preston. Mr. T. E. PAGET, who has for the last four years occupied the office of district prothonotary, at Liverpool, now becomes the prothonotary and associate for the whole county. Mr. HARRIS's successor at Preston, Mr. SHUTTLEWORTH, is to be district prothonotary for Preston, and deputy-associate for Lancaster; and Mr. E. WORTHINGTON, at Manchester, will act as deputyassociate for Manchester, in addition to his previous appointment of district prothonotary for that city. The registers of judgments and executions to bind land will be transferred from Preston to Liverpool. Mr. PAGET will not have to go either to Lancaster or Manchester Assizes, the district prothonotary for Manchester acting as deputy-associate there, and the district prothonotary for Preston acting as deputy-associate at the Lancaster Assizes. The new arrangements extend to Lancashire only, and do not affect the other counties on the circuit.

THE astonishment expressed by the LORD CHIEF BARON at the revelations made in the case of Edmonds v. Jeynes will probably be shared by all who perused the report. The plaintiff was a solicitor who had lived and practised at Newent for more than thirty years. Owing to the unfortunate circumstance that he had been personally concerned in litigation with some influential persons in the town he had become an object of dislike to persons who seem to have taken advantage of every opportunity to crush him. Some considerable period after the death of his wife he was charged with having murdered her. The coroner who held the inquestwhen Mr. EDMONDS was committed on a charge of manslaughter -was a solicitor, who had been personally engaged in litigation with Mr. EDMONDS and had been defeated. Mr. EDMONDS was then taken before the magistrates, and the chairman on the occasion was Mr. ONSLOW, also an unsuccessful litigant in opposition to Mr. EDMONDS. Mr. EDMONDS was committed to the assizes to take his trial for murder. The grand jury ignored the bill, but he was tried for manslaughter and acquitted. To fill the cup of persecution Mr. EDMONDS was the subject of a special sermon from the parish pulpit by a clergyman who also had differences with the plaintiff, and was his bitter enemy; and lastly, the object of a malignant attack in a local paper-the Gloucester Mercury. For this libel he brought his action, and, we are glad to say, that he has recovered 350l. damages. The LORD CHIEF BARON said, in

addressing the jury, "That we should have had an individual filling the important post of coroner who had himself been the plaintiff in a Chancery suit against the plaintiff, and the bill in which had been dismissed with costs, and who may therefore very well have been suspected of having entertained angry feelings against him -that he should have been the coroner presiding upon the inquiry --an inquiry neither more nor less than whether he was guilty or not guilty of the grave crime of murder-that we should have had an individual in this country filling and executing the functions of that public office under circumstances like these-that we should have had a magistrate, who had been unsuccessful in several actions between himself and the plaintiff, presiding as chief magistrate on the occasion upon an inquiry as to whether it would be his duty to commit the plaintiff for trial on the charge of murder -that all the proceedings should have occurred in this country, in which the law of England prevails, and by Englishmen-and, as they would call themselves, English gentlemen-is altogether to me something so improbable and so extraordinary that I should deem it incredible, but that it is proved beyond any kind of doubt before you." A magistrate and a coroner who can exercise their offices when a personal enemy's character and life are subject to their jurisdiction must be utterly unfit for their positions.

A REMARKABLE feature of Nisi Prius trials, which has forcibly struck us during the sittings in Middlesex and London, is the frequency of the applications for a stay of execution. It would seem indeed that there is rarely any case of importance determined by a jury in which counsel for the unsuccessful party omits to apply either for leave to move or a stay of execution. The Judicature Act will do something towards limiting the grounds upon which new trials may be obtained, but we should be very glad to see the Judges withholding facilities for upsetting verdicts, whilst affording every opportunity to parties of raising matters of law by going to the full court. Juries are the constitutional tribunals for the trial of questions of fact, and it seems unreasonable that where there has been an unanimous determination of twelve men the court on some possibly immaterial misdirection, or admission or rejection of evidence, should send the case after protracted delay to other twelve men with equal chances of miscarriage. We can imagine nothing more calculated to disgust suitors with the law than the want of finality in the verdicts of juries. The expenses of new trial motions, and of new trials themselves, are frequently ruinous, whilst rules nisi are often kept hanging over from term to term until the grievance involved becomes stale. Staying execution is simply keeping succesful litigants out of the proceeds of a fair victory, and should be resorted to only in cases of surprise or palpable miscarriage. Of course, a Judge knows that when he is asked to stay execution it may be intended to impugn his direction to the jury, and he feels a delicacy in refusing to facilitate a review of his law. A little less sensitiveness on this head, we think, would be desirable in the best interests of the law, for uncertainty and delay are the two elements which now deter so many from seeking the regular and most satisfactory means of obtaining the redress of their wrongs.

AN attempt has been made to get over the rule that a shipowner has no lien for freight when no freight has been earned. A charter-party provided that a ship should be loaded for Lagos with a general cargo, and bring back a cargo from Lagos, at 77s. 6d. per ton for freight and hire, £250 to be advanced on signing bills of lading and clearing out, £5 a day demurrage. After the vessel was loaded, but before she sailed, the charterers failed. Under the bankruptcy, the shipowner claimed a lien for freight. It was disallowed by the County Court Judge, but the shipowner appealed to the Chief Judge, and from the Chief Judge to the full Court of Appeal. The point is one of some importance. It was contended first, on the principle of cases as to concurrent acts, that the £250 became payable as a sum certain under the contract as soon as the captain was ready and willing to sign the bills of lading, and that that, therefore, constituted a sum certain immediately and still recoverable as such, notwithstanding that the whole contract was determined and the voyage put an end to. The LORD CHANCELLOR said that if it were necessary to decide that point, there would be very great difficulty in applying the principle of the cases referred to to the case of the payment in advance, or at a particular stage, of an instalment of one entire consideration for one complete voyage or other service, where the complete voyage or other service had never been performed, and was on the non-payment entirely given up. But, assuming even that it were so, how, his Lordship asked, does it become freight for which the nautical lien arises ? "It was admitted that it would not be ordinarily so; but it was contended that the lien was created by the express clause of lien. The express clause is, however, for freight, dead freight, demurrage, and other charges. It is not dead freight nor demurrage nor other charge, and it is not freight in the ordinary sense of the word. But the contention was that the word 'freight' here was not to be read in the ordinary sense, but that the clause was to be read in connection with the previous clause as to the payment of freight. The £250, it is said, is there expressly stated to be payable as part of the freight,

and the freight is to be paid as follows: £250 in advance. Therefore, it was contended that the clause of lien was to be read thus for freight, which word is to include the £250 hereinbefore made payable in advance, and hereinbefore spoken of as a part payment of freight.' There is some ingenuity, but, in our judg ment, no substance, in this contention. It would be an unwar. ranted thing to lay hold of a particular form of expression in one part of a charter-party or other instrument, in order to give to plain unequivocal language in another part of the instrument a meaning different from its ordinary meaning. The ship never earned freight, and never began to earn freight. That it was prevented from doing so by the default of the other party entitles the owner to full compensation for all the loss sustained thereby, but the compensation is not freight, and the nautical lien for freight does not extend to such compensation."

We report two County Court cases on the subject of delays on railways, in both of which the company was mulcted in damages. One of these was heard in the Norwich County Court, the plaintiff being the son and deputy of the registrar. A preliminary objec tion was taken under sect. 20 of 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, but there being no regular appointment of this gentleman as deputy regis trar, the objection was overruled. The substantial question involved was whether the company was liable for delay arising from an accident. At the station from which the train was advertised to start there was only one engine; a tube in the boiler broke, and the engine was useless. The day following the plaintiff attempted to start from another station of the company, and was unable to get on owing to some luggage trucks having got off the rails. As to the first occasion, the Judge held that there was nothing to exempt a railway company from the responsibility which attached to coach owners in the old coaching days, namely, to be in a position to supply the place of a horse which broke down. He was disposed to think that there was gross negligence in having only one engine at a place like Wells (in Norfolk), the terminal station for two lines of railway. But if this doctrine of negligence apply at all it must assuredly apply to all stations, and it strikes us as straining the law to hold that a railway company is liable to its passengers for delay owing to an accident over which the company had no control, His Honour, however, has reserved his formal judgment. In the second case, which was heard at the Aylesbury County Court, a cattle dealer going to a fair was delayed so long that he did not arrive until the fair was over. The delay in this instance was owing to the stoker allowing the firebox to be choked, and the Judge held the company liable for the negligence of their servants, and awarded the plaintiff 40s. damages. These cases show a determination on the part of the Judges to keep the companies to the contract entered into with the public by means of the time bills, and if the public make a practice of insisting on their rights the general want of punctuality which now prevails may soon disappear.

A CORRESPONDENT writes: "In the 'Topics of the Week' in your issue of the 20th inst. you refer to a decision reported in your County Court news contained in the same paper. The Judge is reported to have held that a husband is not liable to pay for goods supplied for family use by a tradesman with whom he had forbidden his wife to deal; and in your remarks you throw a doubt upon the ruling of the Judge and the authority of the case in the Common Pleas quoted by him in support of his view. I presume the case in question is Jolly v. Rees (10 L. T. Rep. N. S. 298), where it was held by ERLE, C.J. and WILLIAMS and WILLES, JJ. that it was not competent for the wife to make a contract binding upon her husband for necessaries suitable to her estate and degree, against his will, and contrary to his order to her, though without notice of such order to the tradesman.' It is right to say that BYLES, J. dissented, saying: 'No private reservation of authority, or private agreement between husband and wife, not communicated to a tradesman honestly dealing with the wife by supplying necessaries for the family in the ordinary course of domestic affairs, can affect the tradesman's right to rely on the apparent authority of the wife.' Mr. Justice BYLES's view is the same as that laid down by the Court of Exchequer in Johnson v. Sumner (3 H. & N. 261). The case in question (Jolly ▼. Rees) does not appear to have been cited in Phillipson v. Hayter, where the question was as to certain articles being necessaries, the implied authority of the wife to bind the husband not being otherwise rebutted. I think Jolly v. Rees may fairly rank with those cases where it has been held that a surety is not discharged by a binding agreement to give time to the principal, though made without his concurrence, if it is at the same time agreed that the surety shall not be discharged. In Smith's Manual of Common Law it is suggested that this last is contrary to principle. I may mention that I some time back moved for a new trial in a County Court (the defendant having previously conducted his own case and lost), on the authority of Jolly v. Rees, and under analogous circumstances, but the Judge declined to rehear the case. Our correspondent is doubtless correct in his conjecture; but so much doubt has been thrown upon Jolly v. Rees that we should not have thought it could be used to support the doctrine

laid down by the learned County Court Judge. The utmost extent to which Jolly v. Rees can be carried, as it appears to us, is that a husband may by private prohibition to the wife prevent her from pledging his credit for necessaries in which he is no participator. In that case the necessaries were clothes for the wife and the children. The object of the majority of the court in that case was to give the husband absolute discretion as to his expenditure, and not to leave to juries to estimate what may be suitable to his station. But obviously no such question can arise where the necessaries are the necessaries of life consumed in part by the husband himself. Jolly v. Rees is doubted on principle by most text writers, and the judgment of Mr. Justice BYLES is inexorable logic, and we repeat that to apply the case as proposed would be an extraordinary extension of the law.

RELEVANCY OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES. CONSIDERABLE difficulty is frequently found in applying the rule of evidence, which excludes proof of facts collateral to the point in issue. In the recent case of Reg. v. Cotton, an important question as to the admissibility of certain evidence of this character was raised by the counsel for the prisoner. The facts of this case will be fresh in the minds of our readers. The prisoner was indicted for the murder of a child by poison. It was proved that arsenic was found in the child's stomach, whereupon the prisoner's counsel endeavoured to show that the child might have eaten the arsenic of his own accord, or that, though administered by the prisoner, it was done accidentally. To rebut the presumption that the poisoning was accidental, the counsel for the Crown proposed to give in evidence the death from arsenic of other persons while in the prisoner's charge, or under her control.

This evidence was objected to on the ground of irrelevancy, but was eventually admitted. With a view to facilitate the future application of the rule which excludes proof of collateral facts in similar cases, we think that a consideration of some analogous decisions may be useful. It may be assumed as an axiom that evidence of collateral facts which are incapable of affording any reasonable presumption as to the principal matters in dispute will not be admitted, because it tends needlessly to consume the public time; to draw away the minds of the jurors from the real points in issue; to excite prejudice, and to mislead; while at the same time the adverse party, having had no notice of such evidence, cannot be prepared to rebut it. Though we confine our remarks to criminal proceedings, the same rule prevails in civil causes the only difference being that probably in the former the exclusion of irrelevant evidence would be more rigidly enforced. Such being the rule, let us proceed to consider the qualification suggested by it, viz., that where there is a reasonable connection between the principal and evidentiary facts, proof of such facts is admissible. Thus it is laid down in Taylor on Evidence (vol. 1 p. 334, 4th edit.), that when felonies are so connected together as to form part of one transaction, evidence of one may be given to show the character of the other. It might be inferred from this that evidence of collateral facts could not be relevant unless they were contemporaneous with the specific charges under consideration, but though a dictum of Justice Bayley in Reg. v. Ellis (6 B. & C. 147), would appear to support such a supposition, it is submitted that this is not now the law, and that proof of collateral facts is receivable in certain cases, though not occurring at the same time as the act charged in the indictment.

The first case to which we shall refer is one the facts of which bear a strong resemblance to that of Reg. v. Cotton. In Reg. v. Geering (18 L. J. 215, M. C.) the prisoner was indicted for the murder of her husband by arsenic in Sept. 1848. Evidence was tendered on behalf of the prosecution of arsenic having been taken by the prisoner's two sons, one of whom died in December and the other in March subsequently, and also of a third son who took arsenic in the following April, but did not die. Proof was given of a similarity of symptoms in the four cases. Evidence was also tendered that the prisoner lived in the same house with her husband and sons, and that she prepared their meals. This was objected to on the ground that the facts in question took place subsequently to the death of the husband, and that the effect of such evidence would be to show that the three cases of poisoning were felonious. It was conceded that the evidence would have been admissible had the facts taken place previous to the death of the husband.

Pollock, C.B., however, held the evidence receivable, as showing that the death of the sons proceeded from the same cause, viz., arsenic. 66 The tendency," he says, "of such evidence, is to prove and to confirm the proof already given, that the death of the husband, whether felonious or not, was occasioned by arsenic. In this view of the case I think it wholly immaterial whether the deaths of the sons took place before or after the death of the husband. The domestic history of the family during the period that the four deaths occurred is also receivable in evidence to show that during that time arsenic had been taken by four members of it, with a view to enable the jury to determine whether such taking was accidental or not." Alderson, B., and Talfourd, J. concurred with his Lordship in the opinion that the point ought not to be reserved. The above reasoning seems strongly to favour the view

taken above, that collateral facts, though prior or subsequent to the crime for which the prisoner is on his trial, if sufficiently connected with the principal facts, are admissible in evidence.

In the still more recent case of R. v. Garner et ux. (4 F. & F. 346) the prisoners were charged with murdering, by means of arsenic, the mother of the male prisoner. Willes, J. here admitted evidence that Garner's first wife had been poisoned with arsenic nine months previously; that an attendant who occasionally tasted her food also showed symptoms of having taken poison; that the food was always prepared by the female prisoner, and that the two prisoners, the only other persons in the house, were not affected with any symptoms of poison. This evidence, as in the former case, was tendered and admitted for the purpose of rebutting the inference of an accidental administration of the arsenic. The same learned judge, in R. v. Harris (4 F. & F. 342) stated the true principle to be that facts should be received in evidence if the jury can fairly draw from them the conclusion that by the act of the prisoner an event similar to that charged in the indictment had previously occurred. The prisoner in that case was indicted for arson, and the evidence of his identity being weak, it was proposed to show that at a fire, which occurred a few days previously to another of the prosecutor's buildings, the prisoner was seen standing by, with a demeanour which showed indifference or gratification. This evidence was rejected, but it will be observed that it was tendered for a purpose different from that for which collateral evidence was admitted in either of the previous cases; it was here sought to eke out doubtful evidence of identity by ambiguous testimony of the prisoner's demeanour on former occasions, or, in other words, to establish by means thereof, the substantive charge, whereas in R. v. Geering, and R. v. Garner, the fact of the death being proved, and evidence having in each case been given connecting the prisoner with it, the evidence of other poisonings was admitted merely for the purpose of rebutting the hypothesis of accident.

In the very recent case of R. v. Balls (24 L. T. Rep. N. S. 760; 40 L. J., 150, M. C.), the prisoner was indicted for embezzling three sums of money from a coal society of which he was an agent. It was his duty to pay into a bank every Tuesday to the credit of the society the gross amount received by him in the course of the week, and he was charged in three separate counts with having embezzled the sums which should have been paid in on three successive Tuesdays. It was proposed to show that the prisoner had, during the three weeks, received thirty-one small sums amounting, in the aggregate, to the sums stated in the indictment. To this it was objected, that it would be admitting evidence of thirty-one different acts of embezzlement on one indictment. The evidence was received and the prisoner convicted. Cockburn, C.J., in giving judgment on a case reserved said, "We think this conviction is right. Where a man has to account separately for each individual sum which he receives, more than three sums or items cannot be put in one indictment, but that is not this case. Even in that case, however, if the purpose is not to prove the acts but to explain the intention and show that the omission to account was not an accident, evidence may be given of other instances than those charged for that purpose.'

(To be continued.)

DUTIES PAYABLE BY REASON OF DEATH.
(Continued from page 105.)

THE second case to which we shall refer, viz., Attorney-General v. Cecil (23 L. T. Rep. N. S. 20), has reference to the Succession Duty Act, the facts as reported being as follows: The Marquis of S. was, under his marriage settlement, tenant for life of certain estates, of which his son, Lord C., was tenant in tail. The Marquis and Lord C. in 1855 barred the entail, and resettled the estates to such uses as they should jointly appoint, and subject thereto to the uses of the old settlement. By two deeds dated in 1857 and 1860, the Marquis and Lord C. appointed certain of the settled estates to a trustee for a term of years upon trust to raise, upon the death of the Marquis, a large sum of money for the defendant. Lord C. died in 1866 a bachelor, and the Marquis died in 1868. The Crown claimed duty at the rate of 3 per cent. from the defendant as upon a succession created by Lord C.; but the defendant contended that under sect. 15 he was liable to pay duty at the rate of 1 per cent. only, which was the same rate of duty as his brother, Lord C., would have paid. The court considered that the defendant's interest was a new succession, of which Lord C. was the settlor, so that the case was excepted from the operation of the 15th section. We are inclined to think that the defendant was not liable to any duty at all. We admit that if by the disentailing deed the reversion in fee had been limited to Lord C., he should be treated as predecessor of all persons who took by reason of his death; but the 12th section of the Act provided that, so far as he was concerned, he was to be treated as if the disentailing deed had not been executed, so that had he survived his father, he would have been liable to pay duty at 1 per cent. upon the value of his succession, or, in other words, his estate tail. The fact of the time for raising the charge having been postponed until the death of the Marquis, was sufficient to make the charge come altogether out of Lord C's estate, and not out of that of the Marquis, and we think that the case fell within the 15th section. The word

"succession means "any property chargeable with duty under the Act," and it cannot be necessary that the whole of such property should pass under the alienation, for sect. 43 empowers the commissioners "at the request of any successor or any person claiming in his right" to make separate assessments of the duty payable in respect of the interest of the successor in any separate properties, or in defined portions of the same property, and it would not therefore appear necessary that the whole estate or interest therein should pass by the alienation. A grant of a sum to be raised out of a reversionary estate is surely an alienation of so much of that estate as is necessary to meet such sum. If, therefore, a portion of a reversionary estate or a sum to be raised thereout is capable of alienation, we cannot see how a new succession arose in the case before us. There was already a succession, part of which was transferred, and that part was to fall into possession at exactly the same period as it would had no alienation taken place. Where was the new succession? If a simple transfer of a reversion, without consideration, creates a new succession through being a disposition within sect. 2, a similar transfer for valuable consideration would also fall within that section. We take it that the contention of the defendant's counsel that to create a new succession a new life must be introduced, upon the expiration of which some new interest is made expectant, is the true meaning of the clause, and, that being so, the defendant was only liable to contribute his share of the duty upon the whole of the property, or, in other words, Lord C.'s reversion, at the same rate and time as such duty would have been paid upon such property had no alienation taken place. No duty would ever have been payable in respect of such succession, for by the death of Lord C. the term for payment, which is fixed by sect. 21, never arrived, for he was the only "successor," and his life was the only basis upon which the calculation of duty could have been made. If Lord C. had survived the Marquis, duty at 1 per cent. would have been payable upon the basis of his life estate in the whole of the property, and it seems preposterous to say that he should have been so liable, and that the defendant should have been also liable to pay further duty upon the same property by the reason of the happening of the same event, and that Lord C. would unquestionably have been so liable is clear from sections 42 and 44. If Lord C. was not so liable, duty could be easily evaded, as, for instance, he might have limited the whole of the property or the greater portion to the use of his wife.

The third case to which we shall refer, viz., Forbes v. Steven has reference to the Legacy Duty Acts, the facts as reported being as follows: Sir C. with D. and E. carrying on business as partners under the style of C. and C., in Bombay, purchased the premises in which the business was carried on, and had the conveyance made to the three, their heirs and assigns. The partnership was a yearly one only, and in 1849 the partners were Sir C. and F., their shares being respectively three-fourths and one-fourth. Sir C. by his will gave the residue of his personal property to his grandchildren, and appointed English executors, and also appointed the several partners of the firm of C. and C. who might be living at Bombay at his death, executors of his will for the purpose of realizing his personal estate, including his dwelling-house and premises, and remitting the same to his English executors.

The premises in Bombay having been conveyed by D., who had survived E., to the executors of Sir C., were sold under an order of the Court of Chancery, and the purchase-money was paid into court, and an arrangement was come to for settling its distribution between the representatives of the several partners. The Crown claimed legacy duty upon the whole amount (F. having also died) upon the ground (amongst others) that partnership real estate is considered in the Court of Chancery to be converted into money, and is therefore liable to legacy duty wherever such real estate may be. James, V.C., decided that legacy duty was payable, and basing his decision to a great extent upon the decision of the House of Lords in Attorney-General v. Brunning (8 H. of L. C. 243), which declared that probate duty was payable upon the purchase-money of some real estate which the testator had contracted to sell in his lifetime. The Vice-Chancellor quoted with approval and adopted the words of Lord Chelmsford that "it certainly seems extraordinary that property which is recoverable by the executor virtute officii which belongs to the next of kin and not to the heir at law, and which has the character of personalty thus impressed upon it in every other respect, should lose that character solely in relation to fiscal liabilities. It is difficult to understand upon what principle the conversion into personalty is to stop short of this point," and the Vice-Chancellor added that he was asked "to hold that the House of Lords in AttorneyGeneral v. Brunning, left this as the singular state of the English law, that whereas a conditional and contingent conversion, effected by means of a contract for sale, enures, when completed, for the benefit of the Crown, as well as for everybody else, an unconditional, immediate, and absolute conversion, effected by means of the contract of partnership, enures for the benefit of everybody else, but not for the benefit of the Crown. I am able to say that no such absurdity is chargeable against that tribunal, or against the English law. The Vice-Chancellor further stated "I have therefore, no doubt, that the produce of the warehouses, being the produce of a partnership asset, of which Sir C.'s estate has in fact

[ocr errors]

obtained the lion's share, because it was purely and simply a partnership asset, is personal estate-personal estate to all intents and purposes-and that the residuary legatees, who are entitled to it only because it falls within the gift of the residue of his personal estate and property' must take it subject to the legacy duty which the law imposes on residuary legatees. It would take a good deal more than I have yet heard to satisfy me that a man can with the same breath say effectually in this court Give me the money because it is residuary personal estate,' and declare that it is not taxable because it is not residuary personal estate.'

It appears to us that the conversion effected by means of a binding contract for sale entered into by the testator and afterwards carried out, and the conversion effected by reason of the property belonging to a partnership, are totally different. In the former the testator has by his express act done all in his power to change the property for another of a different character, and at his death the real property does not in fact belong to him, and if, for instance, it be of a reversionary nature, the death of the tenant for life between the date of the contract and the testator's death, will not in any manner affect his estate. It is true the legal estate is still vested in the testator, but that is all; he has, in effect, only a lien upon the real estate to secure the unpaid purchase money. In the latter case, however, the real estate does remain the property of the testator, and his estate will be affected by every fluctuation in its value. The object of equitable conversion as applicable to partnership property is solely to prevent the operation of a legal rule under which the survivors would become entitled to the whole of the property, which rule would clearly have an effect contrary to the intention of the several partners. To carry out this object the Court of Chancery has made a rule that partnership property shall be considered personalty let its nature be what it may. In the present case the law has vested the whole of the partnership realty in D., from whom it was necessary to obtain a conveyance before the court could carry out a sale.

We quite concur, for the reasons we have stated, in the decision of the House of Lords but at that point, for the purpose of fiscal liabilities, the principle of conversion must stop. So far as regards the public at large it matters not whether the real estate be partnership property or not, as it has to contribute to all impositions to which other real estate is subject, and that being so, why should the public be relieved of a portion of taxation, for that is the proper way of looking at the question, because, owing to the particular circumstances of the testator the property goes to his A relative instead of to his B relative. The question of conversion applies no further than to give the partnership real property, sold or unsold, to the persons who are the testator's legatees, instead of to the persons who are his devisees. Whoever takes takes in the first instance at least an interest in realty, with a power of obtain ing the legal estate without a legal conversion, and why, therefore, should he pay duty in respect of the property which he gets which in its relation to the general public is realty, when other people who hold exactly the same class of property have not to pay such duty.

It will be noticed that the reasoning of the Vice-Chancellor would have been equally applicable in the case of a claim for probate, but in the present case, however, no claim for probate duty could arise as the property was out of Great Britain at the testator's death.

we

The Vice-Chancellor referred fully to the cases of Matson v. Swift (14 L. J., N. S., 354, Eq.); decided by Lord Langdale, and Custance v. Bradshaw (14 L. J., N. S., 358, Eq.) decided by Wigram, V. C,, and explained away both decisions upon circumstances the ground that the were different, as admit they were. In both cases was the Crown unsuccessful in its attempts to obtain probate duty. In the former case the testator had by deed conveyed the real estate to a trustee, upon trust for sale, and after payment of certain charges for the testator "his executors, administrators, and assigns, and that without any claim or equity therein, by, or in favour of the heirs as real representatives of the testator, notwithstanding that the trust estate or any part thereof should or might remain unconverted at the time of his death." In the latter case real property used for the purposes of the partnership had been conveyed to the testator and his co-partners as Tenants in Common. In the case of Matson v. Swift, Lord Langdale stated: "In the present case an actual conversion was required, and has accordingly been made since the testator's death, and the produce of the sale has been by this court treated as the personal estate of the deceased. But I am of opinion that the Crown is not entitled to any benefit from that conversion so made, and that the interest of the deceased in the property was not subject to probate duty because, in fact, the interest of the deceased existed in the form of an equitable interest in land of inheritance, and not in the form of personal estate, in which form alone the administration of it could be granted by probate." And he was " of opinion that the money to arise, and which afterwards did arise, from the sale of the estate comprised in the deed, was not personal estate in respect of which probate was to be granted, and therefore probate duty is not payable upon it." In the case of Custance v. Bradshaw, Wigram, V.C., stated: "The case for the Crown was rested on

« EelmineJätka »