this proposition that such property was in equity, though not in fact, personal property for all purposes. Phillips v. Phillips (1 L. J. N. S. 214, Ch.) was referred to as having carried out that rule and determined that real estate in such circumstances is personal estate for all intents and purposes. A decision against the Crown in this case would not conflict with that decision, or with the other cases upon the same subject, and consequently I am not called upon to express any opinion upon Phillips v. Phillips. All that is necessarily involved in the cases referred to, including that of Phillips v. Phillips, may be referred to this, that those whom property directed to be converted, is vested in or bequeathed to, are trustees for the owners of the personal estate, and the rule is fully satisfied by that interpretation." Again: "Those who claim under him are bound to take the property with the character which the testator has impressed upon it, but that does not alter the real nature of the property at the time of his death:" (Bourne v. Bourne, 11 L. J., N. S., 416, Ch.). Again: "The right to discharge the property from the trusts for sale on the part of the testator, or those who claim under him, is part of the original equity which, in the first instance, treats the real estate directed to be converted as personal estate." And the Vice-Chancellor concluded: "The argument, which at the moment had some effect on my mind, was that the interest of a deceased partner in the estate is an interest in the balance to be recovered in respect of the partnership accounts, but that, in my opinion, makes no difference. That is true as between the partners themselves, but it does not alter the nature of the property. The state of the accounts may render a sale unnecessary, and so may the acts of the parties themselves, so that no difference is made by that view of the case."

In the case of Darby v. Darby (25 L. J., N. S., 371, Ch.) two brothers had purchased land for the purpose of selling it again in lots, and the purchase money was paid out of moneys standing to their joint credit with their bankers, and the land was conveyed to them as tenants in common. After selling some parts of the land one of the brothers died, and Kindersley, V.C., held that the share of the deceased brother in the real estate "ought, as between the real and personal representatives, to be regarded as personalty." It is therefore fair to assume that the Vice-Chancellor did not consider such real estate should be considered personalty except as between the real and personal representatives.

We shall later on have occasion to refer to two or three other cases in Chancery in which a direction for sale has been held not to be a conversion out and out-or, in other words, for all purposes; and if there be but one state of affairs under which a direction would be held not to be a conversion, it seems to us but reasonable to hold that so far as regards taxation such out and out conversion should not be relied upon.

(To be continued.)

THE IIABILITIES OF SOLICITORS FOR IMPROPER

SUITS.

Is making some comments last week upon the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Chancery in the case of Beall v. Smith, we expressed our reluctance to commit ourselves to any opinion upon the merits, the matter being still sub judice-that is to say, there being the remedy of an appeal to the House of Lords. On reconsideration, however, we conceive that the question involved is one so intimately affecting the fortunes and characters of solicitors, that the facts of the case ought to be clearly understood, and if Messrs. Merriman, Powell, and Co. have been guilty of any misfeasance, that professional opinion should plainly express itself to that effect; but, on the contrary, if they have been made responsible for an error in law and in judgment to which the Court of Chancery was a party, they should be fully exonerated, and receive the sympathy of their professional brethren.

The facts of the case are very few and very simple. Beall was a warehouseman carrying on business in the City. In Nov. 1870, he first became a client of Messrs. Merriman and Co., he having previously, it would seem, been a client of a Mr. Heather. Messrs. Merriman received Beall as a client, but declined to undertake some complicated matters on which Mr. Heather was then engaged. Differences existing in Beall's family, his wife consulted Mr. Heather, whilst he himself was advised by Messrs. Merriman. To the credit of the solicitors for husband and wife, they appear to have made every effort to bring about a reconciliation, and this we mention at the outset, because Messrs. Merriman have been accused of mala fides. It is obvious that had such reconciliation been brought about, no stranger would have been introduced into the subsequent proceedings, and the suggestion that the solicitors wished to act independently of the family loses its weight.

The first step in connection with the lunacy of Beall was taken in the Greenwich Police Court. Messrs. Merriman appeared for him there, and urged the magistrate not to send him to a lunatic asylum; but on a medical report as to his mental condition, the magistrate made the order. According to the affidavit of Mr. Merriman, Mr. Heather agreed with him that it was undesirable to commence proceedings to have Beall declared a lunatic. The next step in the matter was taken by the family, who applied to Mr. Smith, Beall's manager, for an account of receipts and payments and the stock on the premises. Smith (according to Mr. Merriman's affidavit) consulted Mr. Alfred Turner (of the firm of Messrs. Sole, Turner and Turner), who, in consequence called upon Messrs. Merriman. We here arrive at a point when Messrs. Merriman are entitled to give their own version of the proceedings to prove their bona fides.

"At such interview," Mr. Merriman says in his affidavit, "he (Mr. Turner) stated that the defendant who was the plaintiff's confidential manager and agent had called upon him for advice as to how he should act and the said Mr. Turner explained the embarrassing position in which his client was placed and that he felt himself unable or unauthorised to carry on the business during Mr. Beall's absence if that was likely to be of other than a temporary nature because to carry on the business would involve the making of large purchases of goods the negotiation of consignments of other goods on commission and the entering into of engagements involving responsibilities which the plaintiff himself had always been accustomed to do and which the defendant had never interfered in. It also appeared that there was great danger of heavy loss arising to the plaintiff's estate through goods which were held on commission not being disposed of nor returned to the consignors and there were a number of debts and claims for payment of which pressing applications were being made and in respect of which hostile proceedings were likely to be taken had they not been prevented the loss and damage would have been incalculable for an execution or distress must not only have been levied upon the plaintiff's own property but also upon goods which were held on commission as aforesaid. There were also salaries wages rent and incidental expenses which it was desirable to curtail and stop. That I was not able to give Mr. Turner an assurrance that Mr. Beall would speedily recover although I informed him of my belief that a few months of seclusion and curative treatment would I thought restore his mental health. Mr. Turner said he could not let the matter remain open so indefinitely as the position was one of much anxiety to his client who desired to be relieved from the embarrassment and responsibilities of his position and that I as Mr. Beall's solicitor must do something because Mr. Heather representing some of the members of Mr. Beall's family had given the defendant notice that he would not recognise any of his transactions and that he (the defendant) would be held respon sible for all the property in the business which was of very considerable value. That I discussed with Mr. Turner the expediency and desirability of closing Mr. Beall's warehouse and winding-up the business and depositing the proceeds upon security pending his recovery or being found a lunatic and the appointment of a committee of his estate but to this Mr. Turner pointed out that such a course would certainly be beyond his client's power and authority as Mr. Beall's manager and agent and that as Mr. Beall believed he had started a lucrative business the defendant might in the event of the plaintiff recovering (as I hoped he would recover) be liable to have proceedings taken against him for destroying the business. That I saw Mr. Turner on two or three occasions after this and we addressed ourselves to the difficulties of the case and I was greatly assisted by his experience and counsel as he had himself acted for Mr. Beall and like myself I believe he felt as he professed to do great sympathy for Mr. Beall's unfor tunate position and a desire to aid and assist in doing the best that could be done for his interests and ultimately at Mr. Turner's suggestion we both agreed to take counsel's opinion in the interests of our respective clients with the view of arriving at the best mode of protecting the estate of Mr. Beall who was then in confinement legally incompetent to act for himself and at the same time to secure to Mr. Turner's client (the defendant) what he required namely a proper discharge and indemnity."

Messrs. Merriman thereupon filed a short bill, Beall (by his next friend) being the plaintiff, and Smith the defendant, the sixth paragraph of which alleged that "under the circumstances above stated, great difficulties have arisen with regard to the plaintiff's said business, and great loss will be sustained by the plaintiff if steps are not immediately taken to protect the plaintiff's property by means of the intervention of this hon. court, and in particular to wind-up or otherwise deal with the said business and the affairs thereof."

The next step was the appointment of a receiver-Mr. W. J. White, an accountant. He proceeded to realize the property, and by his affidavit he states that Mr. Heather, the family solicitor, approved of his proceedings. He says:

I have on several occasions during the proceedings in this suit communicated with Mr. Heather and consulted with him respecting the same, and particularly on the occasion of the said sale I caused a circular to be sent to him announcing the said sale, and Mr. Heather's son and partner attended the said sale by tender, and soon after such sale I saw Mr. Heather personally, and informed him of the result thereof, when he expressed his full approval of the sale and his great satisfaction at the result thereof, and throughout the proceedings in the suit Mr. Heather always expressed his satisfaction at my appointment as receiver and manager, and of my conduct in the matter.

And he adds that from his practical experience he could say that he believed the proceedings in the cause saved the plaintiff's estate from great waste and loss.

There appears to be some conflict of testimony as to what the proceedings were in the chambers of the Vice-Chancellor on the appointment of the receiver, but the Lord Justice accepted Mr. Heather's statement that, after objecting that the suit was unnecessary, he agreed to the appointment, but stipulated that no proceedings should be taken without notice being given to him. Vice-Chancellor Wickens in his judgment declared that he did not find this established. That the family thought they had a promise to this effect the ViceChancellor thought reasonably clear; and also that they ought to have had notice of everything done in the suit, both as a matter of courtesy and as a matter of right; "but," his Honour added, "as a matter of fact, I believe that Messrs. Merriman and Powell did not consider any such promise to have been made." In continuation of his judgment, his Honour said, "However, of the next step the family had notice. On the 14th December, 1871, it was proposed to sell the stock-in-trade. The chief clerk, as I gather, thought that this was beyond the functions of a receiver before decree, and probably suggested an immediate hearing, for the purpose of getting over that difficulty. The cause was therefore heard without notice to the family; but I am inclined to believe on the assumption of the petitioner's solicitors that when the family assented to the sale they assented also to the chief clerk's view upon this point." About the necessity for the decree, the Vice-Chancellor entertained doubt. The Lords Justices had no doubt: they concluded that it was altogether unjustifiable to spend a principal's money in giving relief and a release to his agent.

Up to this point, judging impartially of the facts, and remarking that

although the Lords Justices were clear that nothing should have been done by the solicitors of the next friend for the purpose of obtaining a decree, the Vice-Chancellor was not clear that the decree was needless, Messrs. Merriman had proceeded in the ordinary way, with the consent of the Chief Clerk, and the Vice-Chancellor exonerated them from even the alleged breach of faith with the family in not communicating each step in the proceedings.

We now come to the lunacy petition. On the 17th Feb. 1872, while the suit was in progress, the usual petition for an inquiry was presented in lunacy. Messrs. Merriman had notice, and appeared for the lunatic, demanding a jury, and on the order for further consideration of the suit, obtained an order for the payment of their costs in the lunacy. On the 28th March 1872, Beall was found lunatic. From that time, in the opinion of Vice-Chancellor Wickens, the next friend and his solicitors ought to have considered their self-elected committeeship at an end. This they did not do, but they proceeded to pass the receiver's and Smith's accounts, and after the cause had been set down for further consideration, proceeded to partially distribute the funds without notice to the person having the conduct of the lunacy proceedings, or to the family.

Now with respect to the proceedings in lunacy, Mr. Merriman states in his affidavit :

Immediately upon being served with the petition in this matter, I attended at the Chambers of the Master in Lunacy, and there saw Mr. Elmer, who represented the master on the occasion when I requested information as to the alleged sanction, desire, and requirements of the master, referred to in the 41st paragraph of the said petition, and particularly inquired what evidence or statement had been given by which the said petition was authorised to be presented, but I was refused any information whatever upon the subject, and although I stated to the said Mr. Elmer that I was a respondent to the said petition, and produced to him the copy petition which had been served upon me, he informed me that I had no right to the information I asked for, and I could not ascertain whether any authority had been granted or sanction given for the presentation of the said petition.

And when the order in lunacy was made, counsel's opinion was taken as to the effect which it would have upon the Chancery proceedings. The managing clerk of Messrs. Merriman in his affidavit says:

The chief clerk having expressed a doubt as to the effect which the order in lunacy would have upon the suit, counsel's opinion was taken upon the matter, and he advised that the order did not affect the conduct of the suit, and that the same should be proceeded with in the ordinary course. This opinion of counsel was laid before the chief clerk, and he agreed that it was necessary to continue the suit until a committee was appointed, and accordingly the suit was proceeded with in the ordinary course.

He also states that the fact that a son of the lunatic had been appointed his Committee was not communicated to him by Mr. Heather or anyone else.

It was imputed by Lord Justice James to Messrs. Merriman that they were running a race with the lunacy proceedings. This is easily said, and if Messrs. Merriman had been fully advised as to all the circumstances of the institution of the proceedings in lunacy and their probable operation upon the proceedings in Chancery, the imputation might be justified. But we think it is perfectly clear that the solicitors were imperfectly informed and most unfortunately advised. Most unfortunately, also, the Court did not set them right, and itself became a party to the miscarriage.

Lastly, we arrive at the question of costs; and the Lord Justice having expressed his opinion that the solicitors were carrying on the suit for their own purposes, the question of the costs should be narrowly looked into. By order of the court in chambers, the costs of the plaintiff, as between solicitor and client, were directed to be taxed, including in the plaintiff's costs any costs properly incurred by and incident to the inquisition in lunacy. The receiver was directed to pay these sums out of the money in his hands. Those costs included amongst others the following items: 2461. to the accountant for investigating the books; the plaintiff's costs 2071.; the defendant's costs 571.; and the receiver's poundage 1447. The Lords Justices made an order disallowing the amount paid to the receiver, and the plaintiff's and defendant's costs after the appointment of the receiver. This strikes us as a hard measure and rough justice. We have searched through all the papers very carefully and with the sincere desire to trace out any reliable evidence of a want of bona fides, and all that we can put our finger upon is the means by which an order for the taxation of the costs was obtained. Costs were included which the court were of opinion should not have been included; but the Vice-Chancellor considered that the representation upon which such order was obtained, if wrong, was not intentionally so. He remarked, however, "Independently of the peculiar circumstances of this case, it is I think the fundamental and necessary rule that a person who ex parte as this substantially was, and behind the backs of the persons entitled to object, gets from the court an order for payment of a fund which was wrong, and which he was bound to know to be wrong, although his intention may not have been otherwise than venial, cannot be warranted, on the ground of his success, to claim a right to retain what he so got. As a general rule, he must pay it back, and he must pay the costs occasioned by its having been done."

We quite agree that any costs which the solicitors brought within the order of the court, to which they were not strictly entitled, they were bound to repay, and with costs; but taking a full review of what the Vice-Chancellor well describes as the "peculiar circumstances" of this case, is there any pretence for saying that the solicitors acted otherwise than bona fide? They proceeded in the suit with the sanction of the Chief Clerk, and under the advice of counsel. They also acted under the special direction of the court in distributing the fund and paying the

costs.

From beginning to end we fail to discover either suppressio veri or suggestio falsi; and whilst the decree of the Lords Justices may be legally sound, we must consider the measure meted out to Messrs. Merriman exceedingly harsh, and we must retain the opinion which we expressed last week, that it is calculated to excite some alarm in the Profession.

LAW LIBRARY.

The Life of Lloyd, First Lord Kenyon, Lord Chief Justice of England. By the Hon. GEORGE T. KENYON, M.A. London: Longmans and Co.

Memoir of Thomas, first Lord Denman, formerly Lord Chief Justice of England. By Sir JOSEPH ARNOULD, late Judge of the High Court of Bombay. London: Longmans and Co.

WE regret that we have nothing very favourable to say of either of these works. The first probably would not have been compiled had not Lord Campbell taken so much pains to pass a severe judgment upon the character of its subject; whilst the second, expanded into two somewhat bulky volumes, might most advantageously have been compressed into one of moderate dimensions. There were certainly events in the life of Lord Denman which justified the publication of a volume, and his character was high and noble, and such an one as it is desirable to keep before the eyes of aspiring lawyers. But we cannot help thinking that a great mistake is committed when as much care is bestowed upon the little and the domestic phases of the life of an eminent person as upon the great features of his career. The author of Lord Denman's memoir has not, however, limited himself to the minute details of the everyday life of his hero, but has indulged his readers with much weak oratory and third-rate literary productions. More than this, we are favoured in the appendix with some corporate addresses to the learned judge of the Common Pleas, Mr. Justice Denman, on travelling the circuit upon which his father won his fame. Sir Joseph Arnould has doubtless considered it incumbent upon him as a biographer to tell all he knew. A literary hack would have omitted the bulk of the mild speeches and homely letters which are set out in the pages before us, and would thus have toned down some of the Lord Chief Justice's foibles.

According to the present biographer, Lord Denman began life as a model baby, shone as a pupil of Mrs. Barbauld's, and, although he did nothing brilliant at either Eton or Cambridge, the fact is so treated as to leave room for the exercise of a lively imagination. His seven years at Eton are a blank in the biography, although we are told the relatives with whom he stayed during the vacations; and it is freely confessed that at Cambridge the mathematics were too much for him. He was a good scholar, however, notwithstanding, but, as scholars frequently do, he made, on one occasion at least, a most unhappy use of his classical attainments. His speech on the trial of Queen Caroline, not only was ill-judged in its peroration, but contained classical allusions which so much offended the King that Denman with great difficulty recovered the favour necessary to ordinary advancement in his profession.

It will be perceived from what we have said that we do not regard Lord Denman as one of our greatest judges. His legal knowledge was not profound, and he had not the brilliant qualities which we call genius, and which supports a judge's reputation in the absence of that knowledge. But he was an eminently hardworking, highminded and conscientious judge one of a class of judges who probably do the most substantial service to the country; upright, dignified, sufficiently learned, and courageous. Lord Denman lived in stirring times, when courage was an essential qualification for persons seeking to occupy honourably high public positions.

It would be a waste of time and space to refer to Lord Denman's career up to the time that he became Solicitor-General to Queen Caroline-it was the career of a very successful advocate. He had plenty of business at sessions and on circuit, and full details of his successes are set out in his letters to his wife which are largely resorted to by his biographer. His intercourse with Brougham is interesting, but we think this portion of the biography considerably marred by dwelling upon the wretched picture of misery presented by the life of the Queen during and subsequent to her trial. It was certainly not in any way neces sary to the due realization of the character and qualities of Lord Denman. All the autobiographical passages on this subject would have been judiciously omitted.

The law is principally indebted to Lord Denman in his character as a law reformer, and he himself considered this to be his great claim upon the gratitude of his country, one of the results of his labours being by his own direction recorded upon his tomb. He was among the first to draw attention to the flagrant abuses of the Court of Chancery, fostered as they were by the carelessness or indolence of Lord Eldon; and the amendment of our law of evidence which was the work of a statute bearing his name is perhaps one of the best monuments which could be erected to his memory. Everyone admits the value of the reforms which he inaugurated; we know why they were carried, and it is rather late in the day to reproduce a magazine article which expounded his views previous to the carrying of the necessary measures. But although a more enterprising biographer could have done much to improve this part of the subject it is, as it stands, of

considerable interest.

chapter, a chapter which, occupying several pages, might have been compressed into twenty lines. Here we have extracts from speeches at city dinners, autobiographical records of the most ordinary description respecting interviews with the Duke of Wellington and the progress of his intercession with the King; and then a series of letters of congratulation from all sorts of known and unknown people. And when we come to Lord Denman as Lord Chief Justice the glory of the event is obscured by the intrusion of incidents absolutely childish. His first "judicial circuit" seems to have excited not only veneration and esteem, but comments in the provincial press on his personal appearance. A lady unwisely preserved some of the comments, which unfortunately fell into the hands of Sir Joseph Arnould. To justify the discontent which pervades this review we will here cite one specimen of the letters with which these volumes are filled. Lord Denman writes from Lincoln to Lady Denman :-"I have been completely confined to the court all the week, till after post time yesterday; but everything was then cleared away except one case of murder. All things have gone off very well: the attendance of magistrates and grand jurors very large. We had more than forty guests at dinner, including the Lord Lieutenant (Lord Brownlow) and Lord Winchelsea, whom, to my surprise, I found to be a very agreeable man. Charles [Lady Denman's maternal uncle] attended in excellent health and spirits, and with good reports of all at home and abroad. We have a brilliant day, and hope for a delightful ride to Newark. We enter Nottingham exactly at noon to-morrow." And we ought to say that more than three pages are occupied with an extract from an article in the Morning Herald published at the time of Lord Denman's appointment.

Sir

We most distinctly say that we strongly object to this process of bookmaking, which must inevitably produce the impression that there was not enough important material to make a respectable biography. This, however, is not the fact. Lord Denman was actively engaged in questions of great legal and constitutional importance, and in writing his memoir a good opportunity was afforded of skilfully placing these questions before the reader. But, whilst Sir Joseph Arnould carefully details every domestic incident and circuit joke, he shirks the difficult part of his subject. At p. 46 of his second volume, he says, referring to the question of privilege raised in Stockdale v. Hansard:-"No attempt will here be made to weigh the authorities adduced on either side in this ably and exhaustively debated question. Those specially interested in legal and constitutional studies will find ready access to the authentic materials of enquiry in the published Reports of Parliament and of the Court of Queen's Bench "-thus adroitly evading a task requiring some knowledge and the exercise of some ability. In the next sentence the biographer remarks that his work is intended for the general reader rather than for "special students of constitutional law." This is the key to the whole work. Lord Denman has been made the peg upon which to hang a mass of minute and trifling detail interesting to the general reader. As a consequence his reputation is made to suffer, his littlenesses are carefully described, and his greatness magnified by newspaper flattery so as to become almost ridiculous.

We need here only remind our readers of some of the important matters in which Lord Denman was engaged-the Nottingham Insurrection, the Queen's Trial, Stockdale v. Hansard, the questions arising out of the Suppression of the Slave Trade, the important and interesting question relating to the marriage laws arising out of the prosecution of Reg. v. Mills; O'Connell's case, and Dr. Hampden's case. We do not say that these matters do not find a place in the work of Sir Joseph Arnould, but they are padded in a way which detracts from their intrinsic merit and importance. To take only one example-Lord Denman's judgment in the O'Connell case. Who cares two straws what some hack writers in the Morning Post and Morning Chronicle thought on the subject? Yet in the middle of the second volume-a great part of the first being occupied with rapturous description of Denman's voice and appearance-the Post is quoted to this effect: "The dignified impressiveness of his Lordship's manner, and the graceful earnestness of his elocution, are such that they not only engage the attention, but almost win the assent of any feeling auditory, even before the subject matter is fully compassed by the understanding." This in itself is nonsense, and to perpetuate the flattery of the hour in a memoir intended, we presume, to be historical, seems to us to be simply absurd.

We have indicated the rock upon which our author has split. He has endeavoured to make his memoir "popular"-and popular we can quite believe it will be. Many people will enjoy looking beneath the ermine, "going with George to Cambridge -who is never mentioned without a footnote, to the effect that "this is the Hon. Mr. Justice Denman"-following the interest of the Chief Justice in affairs at Eton, even to the circumstance of the wife of Provost Hodgson being in the garden within a fortnight of her confinement, and so on. Sir Joseph evidently has thought little of what the legal profession may think of the work. For Lord Denman's sake we should have been glad could the Profession have welcomed it as a worthy tribute to his memory as one of its ornaments. In every respect it falls short of this. We fear Sir Joseph Arnould has done the same unkind office to Lord Denman that Holliday did to Lord Mansfield.

"The Life of Lord Kenyon" has been published with the declared object of meeting and resenting the unfriendly comments of Lord Campbell. In his preface our author says: "I do not think that posterity will ratify Lord Campbell's condemnation of Lord Kenyon's character, but I have felt it a duty which, as one of his descendants, I owe to his memory, to give to the world all the facts in the possession of his family, which may enable the public to form an impartial opinion as to his merits." With lawyers Lord Kenyon's character required no vindication. We are most of us suspicious of "John Campbell," and the law which Lord Kenyon gives us is received with respect, and is quoted as high authority. In this work, as in that noticed above, there are many records of trifles, but the work is of interest, and may prove attractive to those anxious to understand the politico-legal history of the time in which Lord Kenyon lived.

Manual of Lunacy. A Handbook relating to the Legal Ca and Treatment of the Insane. By LITTLETON S. WINSLOW, M.. and M.L., &c. London: SMITH, ELDER, and Co.

S

THIS book has evidently been compiled with the greatest possible care, under the affectionate supervision of the author's father, Dr. Forbes Winslow. The statutory regulations as to finding pers) s lunatics, the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery over lun and their property, the provisions as to asylums, and the treatment of lunatics, are set out in lucid order, and with sufficient fullness to form a reliable guide. The undoubted increase of insanity in the country, unhappily, gives increased importance to this subject, and solicitors, as we have recently seen by very costly experience, require to exercise great caution in acting with reference to the estates of lunatics. Whilst we heartily commend the general scheme of Mr. Winslow's book, we think he has gone too far in attempting to give an epitome of our jurisprudence, and he has not turned the space he has devoted to it to the best advantage. A handbook of the medical jurisprudence of insanity might possibly be of some use, but to devote a part only of a handbook to it made it requisite that it should be strictly technical. Mr. Winslow, however, has gone in for giving literary embellishments to his work, and in this respeet we think he erred. The value of his handbook is not necessarily thereby diminished, and as the statutes and forms are given in extenso, we anticipate that it will become the vade mecum of practitioners in lunacy.

Introduction to Roman Law. By JAMES HADLEY, LL.D., late Professor of Greek Literature in Yale College. London : Sampson Low, Son, and Marston.

The Roman Law of Persons. By W. H. RATTIGAN, M.A., Ph.D. London: Wildy and Son.

PROFESSOR HADLEY's twelve Academical Lectures, which have been published as an Introduction to Roman Law, in our opinion, furnish a most attractive treatise on a difficult subject. We have read the work with great pleasure. Whilst singularly accurate in all its details, the author has so simplified the matter as to make the first insight into the study clear and satisfactory. Pedantry is studiously avoided. We notice in the first lecture a very happy description of the Digest. "It is," says Professor Hadley, "as if one should make a compend of English law, by selecting the most judicious and accurate statements from treatises like those of Blackstone and Kent, and the most pithy, pointed, luminous utterances from the decisions of Judges like Mansfield, Scott, Marshall, and Story, and placing them together in an arrangement which, if not altogether scientific, should be at least practically convenient, natural, and easily comprehended." Professor's lectures abound in cultivated criticism and learned comparison, and we cordially commend the volume to the attention of beginners in the study of Roman law.

The

Mr. Rattigan has furnished to the student a dry and technically accurate treatise de jure personarum. He makes no claim to originality. "All I claim to have done is to have carefully studied the works of the old civilians; to have compared their views with those of the modern continental jurists, and to have honestly examined for myself the original writings of the Roman jurisconsults, and from all these sources to have compiled an unpretentious volume which might assist the student in the better understanding of the jus personarum of the Romans." We have looked carefully through Mr. Rattigan's labours, and we think that he has carried out his design most faithfully. All his propositions are supported by authority, and he appends an excellent index.

Messrs. STEVENS and HAYNES send us a Manual of the Laws and Courts of the United States, and of the several States and Territories, with a directory of reliable practising lawyers, edited by Mr. HORACE ANDREWS, of the New York Bar. The work, we are told in the preface, is designed for lawyers and business men. The object appears to be to give a plain statement of the law, practice, and procedure of the courts, without the citation of authority, so as to be a guide to nonprofessional persons. It must prove a most useful epitome, for it contains a great amount of varied information.