settlements which have been made at any time upon her in her character as a wife. I think the substantial feature of this settlement which brings it within the clause is, that it is a sum of money covenanted to be paid to the wife in her character as a wife, and upon the fair supposition that she was and would continue to be a wife. But the wife has committed adultery, the marriage has been dissolved, and she is no longer a wife, and the court would be acting in concert with the intentions of the Legislature in dealing with that settlement." Baron Bramwell, in Charlesworth v. Holt, doubted whether the above case could be accepted as any authority, inasmuch as the deed there under consideration was executed in 1865, after the passing of the Divorce Act, whilst that in Charlesworth v. Holt was executed before. If Worsley v. Worsley is not taken as an authority, then Charlesworth v. Holt becomes stronger, because the defendant had no opportunity of having his settlement reviewed by the Divorce Court.

On the whole the Court of Exchequer have proceeded in the straight groove of precedent, and upon principles which are strict law. The Divorce Act makes matters somewhat less intolerable for husbands who have made settlements on their wives, and have not inserted a dum casta clause; but even then, under that Act, an adulterous wife will probably receive a portion of the annuity, whereas, according to the most ancient principles of justice, and under the wisest divorce law, the husband retained part of her dowry, and was absolutely relieved from all liability concerning her. The law, however, is perfectly clear, and those practitioners who have to advise on the subject can have no excuse for want of knowledge.

RELEVANCY OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES. (Continued from page 139.)

THE Indian Evidence Act of 1872 contains the following provisions:-"When there is a question whether an act was accidental or intentional, the fact that such act formed part of a series of similar occurrences, in each of which the person doing the act was concerned, is relevant." (Sect. 15.)

In illustration of this section the following cases are put:(a) A. is accused of burning down his house, in order to obtain money for which it is insured. The facts that A. lived in several house successsively, each of which he insured, in each of which a fire occurred, and after each of which fires A. received payment from a different insurance office, are relevant, as tending to show that the fires were not accidental.

(b) A. is employed to receive money from the debtors of B. It is A's duty to make entries in a book, showing the amounts received by him. He makes an entry, showing that on a particular occasion he received less than he really did receive. The question is, whether this false entry was accidental or intentional. The facts that other entries made by A. in the same book are false, and that the false entry is in each case in favour of A. are relevant.

(c) A. is accused of fraudulently delivering to B. a counterfeit rupee. The question is whether the delivery of the rupee was accidental. The facts that soon before, or soon after the delivery to B., A. delivered counterfeit rupees to C., D., and E., are relevant, as showing that the delivery to A. was not accidental.

Thus it appears that the Indian legislators have found it necessary to admit proof of previous and subsequent offences without regard to whether they were committed against the party in respect of whom the proceedings are being instituted.

In Wills on Circumstantial Evidence, p. 47, it is said that “all such relevant acts of the party as may reasonably be considered explanatory of his motives and purposes, even though they may severally constitute distinct felonies, are clearly admissable in evidence."

It is thought that this passage contains the true principle on which the admission or rejection of such evidence should depend, viz., that where it is material to ascertain quo animo a particular act was committed, any collateral facts affording a presumption or bearing reasonably on the question of guilty knowledge or intent may be given in evidence. This is indeed the rule laid down in Taylor on Evidence (vol. 1, p. 357, 6th edit.), where the admission of evidence of collateral facts for this purpose is said to be grounded on reasons similar to those governing the relevancy of such evidence in civil actions where knowledge, good faith, or intent is material.

There is, indeed, one case which is opposed to the admission of the collateral evidence we are considering; it is that of R. v. Winslow (8 Cox. C. C. 397), the facts of which are as follows:The prisoner was indicted for causing the death of Ann James, who was proved to have died from the effects of antimony. The prisoner was manager to the deceased, who kept an eating-house, and it was proved that in 1859, while the prisoner was her manager, there were staying in the house with the deceased, four of her relatives. Between Sept. 1859 and the following February three of these relations sickened and died after short illnesses, in which each exhibited exactly similar symptoms. In February Mrs. James, who had long been ill, became worse, and in the following June died. Martin, B. (after consulting Wilde, B.) held that evidence of the three other members of the same family

having died of similar poison, and of the prisoner having been present at all the deaths and having administered something to two of the parties, was admissible. It is, however, submitted that this decision can no longer be supported against the above authorities to the contrary.

An enactment in the recent Prevention of Crimes Act of 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 112) appears to favour the above views. It enacts that "where proceedings are taken against any person for having received goods, knowing them to be stolen, or for having in his possession stolen property, evidence may be given at any stage of the proceedings that there was found in the possession of such person other property stolen within the preceeding period of twelve months, and such evidence may be taken into consideration for the purpose of proving that such person knew the property to be stolen, which forms the subject of the proceedings taken against him: (sect. 19.)

Upon the whole we think it may fairly be laid down that in all cases, where it is material to determine malice, knowledge, motive, or intent, evidence of collateral facts should be admitted, though antecedent or subsequent to the principal act; and that it should make no difference whether the previous offences were committed against the same or another person since the sole ground on which its admission can be supported is that, from the frequency of certain occurrences, it tends to show whether the offence in question was intentional or not, or, in other words, to lead to the inference that each act has been too often an accident to be always an accident. That it is an exception to the general rules, which govern our law of evidence must be conceded, but it is submitted that it is a necessary one for the obvious reason that it would, in the great majority of cases, be impossible to prove such psychological facts without admitting evidence of collateral matters. It is difficult to see, moreover, how testimony which goes to prove the very gist of a charge can be said to be disconnected with the matter in issue, and how facts which give a quality to the principal fact can be considered irrelevant. As to the objection that a prisouer is thus taken by sur prise, it is conceived that a person who is charged with a crime of the nature we are considering, cannot suppose that the evidence against him will be confined to the mere circumstances of the act for which he is on his trial, and which would generally furnish insufficient material from which the jury could presume a guilty knowledge or intent, and that he should come to trial prepared to explain any actions connected with the charge of which he has direct notice.

With regard to the inconvenience arising from raising different issues, it is to be remarked that the admission of such evidence in cases of the felonious receiving of stolen goods and of knowingly uttering forged documents is open to precisely the same objection; but in those cases the inconvenience is tolerated in order that justice may not be defeated, and it is thought that this reason applies with at least equal force to those charges which form the immediate subject of this article.

The only other point to which it will be necessary for us to refer is as to what should be the proximity, in point of time between the offence charged, and the previous ones offered in evidence.

It would appear, on principle, that the fact of the offences of which evidence is tendered being divided by considerable intervals of time, either from the one charged or from each other, should form no objection to the reception of such evidence, though of course, it would materially affect its weight; for it is impossible to say at what distance of time a particular act will cease to have any effect on the minds of the jury in assisting them to arrive at a correct conclusion as to the matter in issue. The language of Lord Chief Justice Ellenborough in Whiley's case (2 Leach, 983), strongly favours the above proposition; for though that was a case of felonious uttering, the reasoning seems equally applicable to other charges. To prove the guilty knowledge of the prisoner, evidence of three previous utterings of forged notes within the course of the month preceding was tendered, and on the authority of the former case of R. v. Tattershall was admitted, Lord Ellenborough saying, "True it is, that the more detached the previous utterings are in point of time, the less relation they will bear to the particular uttering stated in the indictment; and when they are so distant the only question that can be made is whether they are sufficient to warrant the jury in making any inference from them as to the guilty knowledge of the prisoner, but it would not render the evidence inadmissible. Circumstances of this kind may produce such strong evidence as to leave no doubt as to the prisoner's knowledge that these notes were forged."

Undoubtedly lapse of time between the principal and evidentiary matters is an infirmative fact; it renders the evidence less conclusive, but this should merely affect its weight and not its admis sibility. Mr. Beatham, in his learned treatise on Judicial Evidence (Book ix.), discusses this question at great length, and the conclusion at which he arrives with regard to circumstantial evidence is that it should never be excluded on the ground of its apparent want of probative force, unless its admission would be more productive of delay, expense, or vexation than conducive to the certainty of the decision.

We have already treated of the objections to the admission of this evidence, and shown that the advantage to the cause of justice

outweighs the inconvenience occasioned by it, and where this is so we think that the hearing should be in favour of receiving proof of collateral facts, though detached by long intervals of time, since they may assist the jury in coming to a correct conclusion, in which case the evidence is relevant; and, if they are so disconnected as to furnish no presumption, no injustice is done by its admission.

THE BENCH AND BAR IN IRELAND.

THE Irish Bench, as we pointed out last week, stands at the present moment in the most unfortunate position as regards the Government, the Bar, and the public of Ireland. Whilst a Chief Baron must be appointed, it is perfectly clear that the staff of Judges may be very safely reduced. The reduction, however, cannot be founded upon any decrease in the amount of business during the past year; but it appears that for a considerable time past the courts in Ireland have not been worked up to their powers. It would, of course, be unfair to compare the business transacted in the Irish with that transacted in the English courts, and we shall not do so, but we have looked at the returns so as to enable us to say that the work of the Irish courts cannot possibly keep the present staff fully occupied if it is done with due diligence and a proper application of judicial power.

The Times correspondent informs us that the last tables computed by Dr. HANCOCK show that in 1872 the number of proceedings other than writs of execution in the three Common Law Courts was 18,338, or 2089 more than in 1871, and of these 5728 were summonses and plaints returnable to the Queen's Bench, an increase of 695 over the preceding year. It should be observed, however, that the largest number was for sums under £20, which might very properly be disposed of by the Civil Bill Courts. The total number of writs of execution was 4883, an increase of 79 over the year 1871. The returns from the Masters' offices show an increase of 1371 in the number of writs of summons and plaints filed in 1872 as compared with 1871, the total for the three courts being 13,144, of which 4453 were in the Queen's Bench, against 4369 in the previous year. The return of the business in banco shows a decrease in 1872 of 53 in the proceedings (1184) before the full courts as compared with an increase of 163 in 1871. This is partly explained by the increase in the number of records, which have to some extent thrown the business in banco into arrear. The total number of cases heard at Nisi Prius was 555 in 1872, against 547 in 1871, There has been a decrease of 22 in the number of cases on circuit, and an increase of 14 in the number heard in Dublin. There are, however, attached to the courts in Ireland other duties, such as the courts in England are unacquainted with, and they absorb a certain small proportion of the time devoted to business.

But the aspect of the question which has struck us most forcibly is that which bears upon the relation of the Bench to the public. Mr. GLADSTONE is told by the Pall Mall Gazette that if he ventures to save £4000 a year by making no new appointment, he will "assuredly sacrifice the last fragment of his Irish popularity." That journal then refers to the argument in favour of keeping up the judicial staff, that " Irish judgeships are the only great professional prizes attainable by Roman Catholics, and are the only posts in the country which render their incumbents independent of the Roman Catholic clergy." This argument our contemporary acknowledges is" wholly out of harmony with the commonplaces current on this side of the channel." Not only so, but it is wholly out of harmony with the objects for which Judges are made; and it seems a truly absurd idea that we should overload a bench in order to allow Roman Catholics to jump into positions in which they can snap their fingers at the priests. The Gazette acknowledges that the number of judges is exorbitant and indefensible," and yet says that it would be a great misfortune if that number was curtailed by one person only. We consider it to be a calamity to the Bench to have more men upon it than the business will fully employ; and it would be still more calamitous if Irish barristers were taught to look forward to promotion to judicial sinecures on the single ground of the necessity for keeping up an independent body of well-paid officials in Ireland.

If we are to credit our contemporary, the position of the legal profession in Ireland is deplorable. "It is the fact," we are told, "that the priesthood can make or mar any layman in Ireland. It is they who can, in the first instance, determine whether an attorney shall have clients, and whether a barrister shall have briefs." But "at present, it is a matter of every-day observation that the nearer a Catholic barrister is to a judgeship the greater is his independence of spiritual control, which, indeed, when he is once on the bench, he throws off altogether." To apply this to the reduction of the number of Judges, the writer adds,-"if the occupants of the bench were greatly reduced the chances are that he would think it wiser to maintain an understanding with the powerful body which, if it chose, probably could destroy the most eminent man who depended solely on his profession." This is a wretched state of things, and very humiliating to the Profession, but we sincerely trust that Irish judges will not be created for purely political purposes, to officiate as checks on the arrogance of the priesthood. It is essential to the efficiency of the Bench that the

Judges should be employed. If Ireland can substantiate her claim to the number of Judges hitherto existing, as her journals attempt to do, we should not for a moment attempt to limit the strength of the Bench. We fail to see how an overloaded judiciary can serve any useful purpose, and if it is maintained as a political institution it will become a professional evil.

LAW LIBRARY.

By

Lincoln's Inn, its Ancient and Modern Buildings and Library. WILLIAM HOLDEN SPILSBURY, Librarian. London: Reeves and Turner.

THIS brochure is a second edition, and shows that Mr. Spilsbury has been a diligent and intelligent student of the antiquities of the Inn. He does not, however, confine himself to the buildings; he gives us a history of the old lawyers and old laws. But the library is naturally the principal subject of his attention, and it certainly contains a wonderful collection of valuable works. Mr. Spilsbury's book is a small one, and we will encroach upon him only to the extent of a short extract descriptive of the creation of the library:

The original foundation of the Library of Lincoln's Inn is of earlier date than that of any now existing in the metropolis. In the thirteenth year of the reign of Henry VII. A.D 1497, "John Nethersale, late one of this society, bequeathed forty marks, partly towards the building of a library here for the benefit of the students of the laws of England, and partly that every priest of this house, in the celebration of divine service every Friday, should sing a mass of requiem, &c. for the soul of the said John." This building, the site of which is not now known, was finished in the 24th Henry VII. Previously to their removal to the edifice in which they are now commodiously arranged, the books occupied a suite of rooms in the Stone Building, to which they had been transferred in the year 1787 from the Old Square. There are various entries in the records of the society relating to the library in the reign of Elizabeth. It seems, however, that little progress was made in the accumulation of books; for at a Council held in 6th James I. A.D. 1608, " because the library was not well furnished with books, it was ordered that for the more speedy doing thereof, every one that should thenceforth be called to the Bench in this society should give twenty shillings towards the buying of books for the same library; and every one thenceforth called to the Bar, thirteen shillings and fourpence, all which sums to be paid to Mr. Matthew Hadde, who, for the better ordering of the said library was then made master thereof." Three years afterwards it was ordered that Mr. Hadde, thus constituted the first Master of the Library, an office now held in annual rotation by each bencher, "should buy and provide for the library Fleta' and such other old books and manuscripts of the law, and to cause those that be ill bound to be new bound." At a subsequent meeting it was ordered "that ten pounds should be paid by Mr. Hadde out of the money received from Sir William Sedley for copies of 'Corpus Juris Civilis,' in six volumes, and Corpus Juris Canonici,' in three volumes, and that he should cause them to be bound with bosses without chains, and pay the charges of binding out of that money. The books are arranged on the shelves in classes, and on taking a survey of the library from the entrance near the east oriel window, the eye of the visitor may range over a vast collection of Treatises on every branch of English jurisprudence from the earliest period to the present day; then over the Reports of Cases argued in all the courts of law; and then over the voluminous collections of the Journals of the Houses of Parliament, and the Cases heard on Appeal before the House of Lords and the Privy Council, passing on to the volumes containing the Statutes of the Realm, Public, Local, and Private. On the opposite side of the room the observer may notice a goodly assemblage of the works of English and foreign divines, with editions of the Bible in various languages: the poets, historians, philosophers, and orators of Greece and Rome; dictionaries of various languages, and other philological works; the principal writers, ancient and modern, on English history and topography; foreign history; and a selection of works on civil and foreign law. In the upper gallery is ranged a collection of books on civil and foreign law, occupying nearly the whole of one side of the room; and on the opposite side of the gallery may be observed the more voluminous historical works, such as Grævius and Gronovius, Muratori, &c., with the Mémoires de l'Academie, and that monument of the wondrous extension of the Papal power and dominion, the Bullarium Romanum.

Reeve and Turner.

.

The Law Magazine. January 1874. THIS monthly publication has come out under the editorship of perhaps the most voluminous writer the Bar has ever knownMr. W. F. Finlason. If we mistake not he is the author of every contribution to this number, which is equivalent to saying that it is full of interesting and instructive matter. His first article is introductory to his editorship, and treats of the Function and Influence of Legal Journalism. It is replete with the opinions of eminent men on the advantages of the study of the law, and the narrowing influences of practice. We are glad to see that our author has a high sense of the functions of legal journalism, but as we think, rather an exaggerated notion of the influence of legal literature. We extract some passages which are of general interest :

A great concurrence of opinion, among lawyers and laymen, philosophers and statesmen, attest the fact that the mere practice of the law, apart from such general views and philosophic ideas, which belong to its study as a science, tends to narrow and dwarf, if not degrade the mind. Lord Bolingbroke observed this in one of the finest passages of his works, quoted by Lord Kames in one of those elegant and enlightened essays, in which he sought to stimulate to the philosophic study of law. The great commentator was fully aware of the truth of the remark, and made it the basis of his great work, destined to achieve in this country what had been effected in Scotland. And Blackstone pointed out that the mere practice of the law will not suffice even to qualify for the pursuit of the law as a profession; a great truth, which lies at the basis of all the generous efforts made in our own time for the promotion of legal education. Speaking of the practitioner, he says: "If practice be the whole he is taught, practica

must also be the whole he will ever know; if he be uninstructed in the elements and first principles upon which the rule of practice is founded, the least variation from established precedents will only distract and bewilder him. Ità scripta est is the utmost his knowledge will arrive at; he must never aspire to form, and seldom expect to comprehend, any arguments drawn à priori from the spirit of laws and the natural foundations of Justice: Comm. 1, 32. This description, unhappily, as Lord Mansfield had occasion to observe, has app ied to judges as well as practitioners; and, indeed, it could not be otherwise, in a country in which the judicature are taken entirely from the ranks of the practitioners.

Mr. Finlason expresses the opinion, with which we cannot agree, that the jurisprudence of America, which in many respects is superior to our own, is due to legal journalism. He says (having quoted Story):

It is impossible not to imagine that one great reason for this may have been the greater degree to which the discussion of legal questions in legal journals was carried on in America. There is this great advantage in discussions of this kind over forensic arguments that they are not one-sided, nor framed merely to obtain a particular decision, but entirely for the elucidation of a legal question without any other object in view, and without being biased by considerations of its result with reference to a particular case.

The discussion of legal questions in the press is of the more importance from the character of our judiciary law, which, until affirmed by a supreme court, is not law, but only evidence of it, and open to argument. Mr. Burke observes of text books:-" With us doctrinal books had little or no authority, other than as they are supported by adjudged cases and reasons given from the Bench." But the same observation applies to judgments of the courts until confirmed by the highest tribunal. Until then they are themselves open to discussion, and if the particular case is not appealed, it is only in the press they can receive such discussion. In this country there is not a power in the court itself to appeal to the supreme tribunal, and if the suitor does not do so, the law may be in doubt for many years, especially in the case of a division of judicial opinion and fresh applications of it to important questions as they arise. And no one can fail to observe that from time to time such questions do arise, which greatly interest the community at large, and are fully within the scope of ordinary intelligence, especially of educated and thinking men. It would be easy to find immediate illustrations of this within the last few years, or even months, or weeks. The publication of law reports in the Times reports, by barristers competent to understand and to make intelligible legal questions, brings home daily to the minds of men the constant application of law to their affairs and their interest in civil and criminal law is, in consequence, constantly augmenting.

Further, he considers discussions in the legal press calculated to dissipate fallacies. He observes :

:

There are, again, many fallacies current among the Profession which can only be dissipated by discussion in legal journals. For men much occupied in practice have not time to enter into these questions, and have a gregarious tendency to fall into grooves of thought, and follow each other in the use of received terms and phrases, which often embody the grossest fallacies. Such, for instance, is the common phrase as to "fusion of law and equity." Most members of the profession fancy that law and equity are somehow, because separate, opposed, and that somehow this opposition may be removed by fusion. Yet, as Lord Brougham pointed out long ago, law and equity are no more opposed than civil and criminal law, and can as little be fused. For, as Lord Brougham explained, on the same state of facts, and the same question, law and equity are identical. It must be so, for it is a fundamental principle of equity to follow law. Hence the equity can only differ from the law on a different state of facts or a different question from the legal one, and as a difference never can be obviated, therefore they can never be fused.

Innume

rable other instances might be adduced of common fallacies among members of the profession, only to be dissipated by discussion in legal journals. There is a strange tendency in men to blind acceptance of current ideas, even though opposed to actual facts, daily within their observation, and yet not observed. So little, as Dugald Stewart says, do the

mass of men observe out of the scope of their own daily avocations and ideas. Thus, most members of the profession suppose that all matters of fact are determined in courts of law by juries on oral evidence, and in courts of equity by judges upon written evidence. Yet in the same classes of cases, that is, cases relating to property, it is not too much to say that the matters of fact are rarely determined by a jury, and are generally, in courts of law as in courts of equity, determined by the judges upon written notes, or statements, of the evidence, either in the form of applications to review the verdict, or on reservations of the evidence, with power to the courts to draw inferences of fact; in other words, to decide questions of fact. And in courts of law, as in courts of equity, points of law are always, of necessity, decided on written notes of the evidence or statements of the facts, either upon points reserved or on special cases. It is only, for the most part, in classes of cases which arise out of torts, especially personal torts, which do not come into equity, that cases are really determined by the verdict of juries, and even in those cases the verdicts are reviewed by the judges on notes of the evidence. Innumerable cther instances might be adduced, but these will suffice to show how questions may be elucidated and fallacies dissipated by discussion in legal journals.

And he concludes thus :

If indeed the writer were asked more particularly to describe his object, he would say it would be to show the operation of a judicial system, in the administration of justice, and the formation of law, a subject of special importance at this time, when the attention of the country is likely for some years to be fixed on the gradual tranformation and reconstruction of our judicial system. The writer says "gradual," for it is the opinion of the most thoughtful and reflective minds that it will probably be twenty years before the great work is consummated. More than one of our most experienced statesmen have thrown out this prediction, and in all probability it is destined to be realized. During many years, at all events, the new judicial system will be in course of development, and it will be of paramount interest to watch its progress, operation, and results. And for this work the writer ventures to think he may have some special qualification. Thirty years in the profession-during the greater part of that period constantly in the courts-he has been for more than twenty years engaged in the study of our judicial system. It is twenty-one years ago since he first projected a work on the subject, and since he edited the first of the Common Law Procedure Acts. He also edited, in 1855 and 1860, the second and third of those Acts, and since then he has been continually in the courts, watching their operation, and engaged in preparing his work on the subject. Another way in which legal journalism may be of use in aiding both the students and practitioners of the profession is in the exposition of new statutes. There used to be an office in our Inns of Court, that of the Reader, which now exists only in name, but which used to be of some practical utility in giving readings of new statutes. Such were Callis's Readings on the Statutes of Trusts, and Bacon's Readings on the Statute of Uses. These readings were of course carefully prepared, and probably written; and they were originally read, because in ages anterior to the invention of printing, the oral lecture was the only possible mode of instructing students. But when lectures could be printed, it is manifest that they would be far more available and valuable for purposes of study and instruction in a printed form, and then they could be studied at leisure, with far more effect than by being once heard. Hence, probably it is, that the readings became obsolete, and though in our own day they have been revived by Bowyer and Phillimore, yet their learned productions had a permanent value only when printed and published.

This is a bold scheme, which we venture to think, to be carried out successfully, requires varied co-operation. Legal journalism may become too ambitious, and when it is more ambitious than the every day wants of a profession require, it is apt to become useless. We shall look forward with some interest to see Mr. Finlason carry out his project.

There are four other papers on (1) recent changes in the Judicature; (2) illustrations of our judicial system; (3) Michaelmas Term and sittings; and (4) the case of the Virginius. For the benefit of the magazine we must repeat that we distinctly trace the same hand and style throughout, and we think this should not be made the rule.

SOLICITORS' JOURNAL.

THE meeting of the Legal Practitioners' Society on Wednesday last, a report of which appears in another column, is certainly not without importance to the Profession, and indeed the public, and we feel sure that many statements made by members of both branches of the Profession present on the occasion will be read with some astonishment. Whatever may be the ultimate condition of this new law society, as we may call it, already it has somewhat altered its tactics. As we have before pointed out, if the course proposed to be adopted at the meeting on Wednesday is carried to a successful issue, it will certainly have rendered to the Profession and the public signal service, and we cannot but think that it will have the hearty support of all high-minded men in the Profession. The work which it proposes to undertake is, at all events in part, not the most agreeable; such, for instance, as enforcing payment of penalties, which are no doubt daily incurred by unqualified persons. Yet, while these statutory provisions, and no others, exist, they should be

a view to reform are often the last. As an illustration of which we may mention that, notwithstanding the oft-expressed views of the Lord Chancellor on the subject of legal education, and notwithstanding moreover the continued and continuing efforts of the Legal Education Association in the same direction, the Inns of Court have done very little with a view to meeting the demands of the public. We are glad to gather from the report of the meeting that the society is not established in any hostility to existing societies, but rather with a view of aiding them in their work and duties. We may say at once that if we thought for a moment there existed any spirit of hostility to the present governing bodies of the Profession, we should not give to the new society that support which, in so far as it has proceeded at present, it has a right to expect from us. There are hundreds of solicitors, both in town and country, who are not members of any law society; and surely if they are interested in the welfare of their Profession they should join the new society, if not, the more important, the older and more expensive one, the Incorporated Law Society.

UNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE BANK OF ENGLAND.

[Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the
National Deot, and which will be paid to the persons
respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three
months, unless other claimants sooner appear.]
APPACH (Frederick Wm.), of Tokenhouse-yard, gentleman;
£329 158. 3d. three per cent. annuities. Claimant, said
Frederick Wm. Appach.
BAYLEY (John), book-eller, BAYLEY (Ann), his wife, and
BRUTON (Ann), spinster, all of Kensington-terrace,
Gravel Pits; £200 new three per cent. annuities.
Caimants, said Ann Bayley, widow, and Ann Davies, wife
of Lewis Davies, formerly Ann Bruton, spinster, the sur-
vivors.

RANKEN (Chas.), of Gray's-inn, Middlesex, gentleman:
HYDE (Arthur), of Mohill, County Leitrim, Ireland,
clerk; CROFTON (Parsons), of Merrion-street, Dublin,
Esq., and CoNNER (Wm. Henry), Lieut., R. N., £391 58. 3d.
New Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimants said Parsons
Crofton, and Wm. Henry Conner, the survivors.
SOUTH WALES MINERAL RAILWAY COMPANY, per Act 16 & 17
Vict. c. 197. £312 10s., Three per Cent. Annuities.
Claimant said South Wales Mineral Railway Company.

APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT-STOCK WINDING-UP ACTS.

CASTELL CARN DOCHAN GOLD MINING COMPANY (LIMITED). Creditors to send in by Jan. 24 their names and addresses, and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors, if any, to James Ford. 76, Cheapside, London, the official liquidator of the zaid company. Feb. 9, at the chambers of V.C. H., at ten o clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims.

SOUTH WALES DAILY NEWSPAPER COMPANY (LIMITED). Creditors to send in by Jan. 27 their names and addressee, and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors, if any, to James T. Snell, 85, Cheapside, London, the official liquidator of the said company. Feb. 10, at the chambers of the M. R., at half-pa-t eleven o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. STADIL FIORD RECLAMATION COMPANY LIMITED).-Petition for winding-up to be heard Jan. 17, before the M.R.

CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. LAST DAY OF PROOF.

ALLEN (Nicholas B.), Torvole, Penderyn, Brecon, merchant. Feb. 2; Isaac D. Rees, solicitor, Aberdare, Glamorgan, Feb. 17, V.C. M., at twelve o'clock. ATTFIELD (Chas.), Farnham, Surrey, maltster, corn and coal merchant, and hop planter. Jan. 24; Henry Potter. solicitor, Farnham. Feb. 7; M. K., at half-past eleven o'clock.

BAILEY (Martha H.), 11. Daneby-street, Liverpool. Jan. 12, W. W. Wynne, solicitor, 115, Chancery-lane, London. Jan. 22; V.C. H, at one o'clock.

BOLTON (John H.), Lincoln's-inn, Middlesex, and of Lee, Kent, solicitor. Jan. 20; Charles Robbins, solic tor, 1, New-square, Lincoln's-inn, Middlesex. Jan. 27; M. R., at eleven o'clock.

BOLTON (Thos. J., Grove park, Kingsbury, and Goughstreet, Clerkenwell, Middlesex contractor. Jan. 12; J.A. Edwards, solicitor, 8, Old Jewry, London. Jan. 21; V C. M., at twelve o'clock.

BOOTH (Edwd.), late of Manchester and lately carrying on business at Gorton and Salford, Lancaster, in partnership with Robert Booth, as gum and starch manufac turers. Feb. 7; R. Page, solicitor, 2, Clarence-buildings, Booth street, Manchester. Feb. 21; V.C. B., at twelve o'clock.

CASS (Arthur H.), Calcutta, East Indies, hotel keeper.
March 1: Geo. L. Parkinson, solicitor, 8, Jonn-street,
Adelphi, Middlesex. March 16; M. R., at eleven o'clock.
CHELNE (John M. G.), Bancoorah, Bengal, India. March
19; Thos. Plews, solicitor, 14, Old Jewry-chambers, Lon-
don. March 26; M.R., at eleven o'clock.
CONAWAY (Rachel), 39, Baltic-street, Old-street, St. Luke's,
Middlesex. widow. Jan. 21; H. Nicholson, solicitor, 25,
College-hill, London. Feb. 3; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.
COOPER (Thos.) 12, Brookfield-road, South Hackney, Mid.
dlesex, builder. Jan. 23; E. R. Keele, solicitor, 5, Fre-
derick's-place, Old Jewry, London. Feb. 6; M. R. at
eleven o'clock.
COULSON (Wm.), Penzance, Cornwall, general merchant.
Jan. 22; W. Borlase, solicitor, Penzance. Feb. 5; M. R., at
eleven o'clock.

EGGAR (John), Mansfield Farm, Iver, Bucks. Jan. 12;
Hedges and Brandreth, solicitors, 9, Red Lion-square,
Middlesex. Jan. 19; V.Č. H. at twelve o'clock.
FRENCH (Rt. Hon. Fitz-St-phen), M.P., formerly of Lough
Errett, Roscommon, Ireland, late of 68, Warwick-square
Pimlico, Middlesex. Jan. 31; R. Petch, solicitor, 8, John
street, Be ford-row, Middlesex. Feb. 16; V.C. M. a
twelve o'clock.

HAWKE (Edward H., Tolgulla, near Scorrier, Cornwall. Feb. 10 E. H. Busk, solicitor, 1, New-square, Lincoln'sinn, Middlesex. Feb. 20; V.C. B., at twelve o'clock. HOLDEN (Thos.), Nether Thurvaston, Longford, Derby, farmer. Feb. 1; Samuel Leech, solicitor, Derby. Feb. 20; M. R., at twelve o'clock.

HOWARD (Sir Ralph), Bart, Belgrave Mansions, Grosvenorgardens, Middlesex. Jan. 23; C. Gatliff, solicitor, , Finsbury-circus, London. Feb. 6; M.R. at eleven o'clock. JONES (Wm. H.), 156, Borough High-s reet, Southwark, and Annerley, Surrey, leatherseller. Jan. 31; D. Mallam, solicitor, 1, Staple-inn, Holborn, Middlesex. Feb. 16; V C.M., at twelve o'clock. LEWTHWAITE (Jos.), Parkinson House, otherwise Sanitaryplace, near Halifax, York, mathematical teacher. Jan. 15: Norris, Foster, and England, solicitors, Halifax. Jan. 29; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock, MCCABE Esther J.), formerly of Southwick-crescent, Hydepark, Middlesex, late of Ticehurst, Sussex, spinster. Jan. 12; S. Potter, solicitor, 36, King-street, Cheapside, London. Jan. 26; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock. PARTINGTON (Eliza), formerly of Montreal House, Great Malvern, Worcester, late of 4, Westbourre-terrace, Richmond-road, Malvern Link, Worcester, spinster. Jan. 26; Thomas H. Smith, solicitor, In, Frederick's-place, Old Jewry, London. Feb. 4; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock. PATTERSON (Robert), Wimbledon, Surrey, brewer. Jan. 31; Mr. F. Robinson, solicitor, 36, Jermyn-street, St. James's, Middlesex. Feb. 7; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock. POWER (Edward), Gloucester, printer and stationer. Jan. 12; K. H. Fryer, solicitor, Gloucester. Jan. 26; M. R., at half-past eleven o'clock.

PUGH (Evan), Pennell-village, Merioneth, agent and surveyor. Jan. 20; Williams and Gittens, solicitors, Newtown, Montgomery, Feb. 2; V.C M., at twelve o'clock. SMITH (Jas. G.), 29. Fenchurch-street, London, gentleman. Jan. 31; J. R. Adams, solicitor, 15, Old Jewry-chambers, London. Feb. 7; V.Č. H., at twelve o'clock. WEARING (Edward B.), Crowhurst Land Farm, Lingfield, Surrey, yeoman. Feb. 1; Wm. Carpenter and Sons, solicitors, 4, Brabant Court, Philpot lane, London. Feb. 10; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock.

CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. Last Day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent. ALKIN (Ann), North-street, Atherstone, Warwick, spinster. Feb. 10; adford and Son, solicitors, Atherstone. ATTWOOD (Thos.). Stockbridge, Southampton, gentleman. March 1; Stead and Co. solicitors, Romsey.

BENSON (Geo. S.), Secundra Bagh, near Lucknow, East
Indies, Esq. Jan, 21; Merediths, Roberts, and Mills.
solicitors, 8, New-square, Lincoln's-inn, London.
BOVILL (Right Hon. Sir Wm.), Lord Chief Justice of the
Common Pleas, 25, Eccleston square, Middlesex. Jan.
12; Bolton and Co. solicitors, 1, New-square, Lincoln's-
inn Middlesex.

BUTLER (Robert), Woodside, Hertford, Esq. Jan. 31; Wm,
Sills, solicitor, 23, Old Broad-street, London.
CATT (Elijah), Woodbridge, Suffolk, dairyman. Jan. 20;
W. W. Welton, solicitor, Woodbridge.
COOPER (Wm.), St. James Villa, Rye-hill, Peckham-rye,
Surrey, gentleman. Jan. 31; A. 8. Edmunds, solicitor,
11, St. Bride's-avenue, Fleet-street, London.
COSIER (Wm.), Wilmington Hall, Kent, Esq. Feb. 1;
Desborough and Son, solicitors, Sa, Finsbury-circus
South, London.

COWDEROY (John), 4. Triangle-terrace, Camberwell, Surrey, grocer. Feb. 10; Withall and Compton, solicitors, 19, Great George-street, Westminster.

CUSHING (Francis), 2, Gresham-villas, South Church-road, New Town, near Southend, Essex, architect and sur veyor. Feb. 9; William Sturt, solicitor, 14, Ironmongerlane, London.

DAY (Mary A.), Torrington House, Pinner, Middlesex, widow. Jan. 19; Geo. Walker, solicitor, 52, Fitzroy-street, Fitzroy-square, Middlesex.

DE-LA-WARR (Major-General The Right Hon. Chas. R., Earl, K.C.B., Buckhurst Park, Sussex, of Bourne Hall Cambridge, and 18, Pall Mall and The Thatched House Club, St. James's-street, Middlesex Jan. 18; Cope, Rose, and Pearson, solicitors, 26, Great George-street, Westminster. Middlesex:

DILLON (Francis P.), formerly of Spanish-place, Manchester-square, subsequently of 5, Bryanston-street, Portmansquare, and late of 21. Buckingham-street, Strand, Middlesex, spinster. Feb. 19; Wm. C. Gill, solicitor, 3, Miles'sbuildings. Bath.

DYMOKE (John), Scrivelsby Court, the Honourable the Queen's Champion. Feb. 12; Gregory and Co., solicitors, 1, Bedford-row, London.

ELLICE (Russell), Lombard-street, London, and Brickendonbury, Herts, banker. Jan. 31; R. Dixon, solicitor, 5, Finsbury-square, London.

FAULKNER (George N.), formerly of White parish, near Salisbury, late of Wargrave, near Henley-on-Thames, Oxford, Esq. Feb. 12; Gregory, Rowcliffes, and Rawle, solicitors, 1, Bedford-row, London.

FLETCHER (Alexander), late Major in the 12th Lancers, and of 2, Howick-place, Westminster. Feb. 1; Major Jary, Battlesden park, Beds, or to G. W. Quallett, 10, New Bond-street, London.

FULLJANES (Robert), Maidstone, grocer. March 25; Monckton and Co, solicitors, 72. King-street, Maidstone. GALLOWAY (Right Hon. Randolph S. Earl of, Baron Stewart of Garlies). Jan. 31: M. and H. Turner, solicitors, 42, Jermyn-street, St. James's, London.

GLADWELL (William), late of 2, Abercorn-villas, ForestJane, Stratford, Essex, formerly of the Admiralty, Whitehall. Jan. 23; C. J. Lowes, solicitor, 14, Walbrook, Lon. don.

GOALLEY (John), St. John's Villa, Brixton-road, Surrey, gentleman. Feb. 1; Withall and Compton, solicitors, 19, Great George-street. Westminster.

GOODWIN (Harford J.), formerly of 12, York-place, Portman-square, Middlesex, late of 2, Marlborough-place, Harrow.road, Midlesex, Esq. March 1; Bircham and Co. solicitors, 46, Parliament-street, Westminster.

GOOSE (Hannah H.), 4, Eastern-villas, Fortis-green, Hornsey, Middlesex, spinster. Jan 16: Sutcliffe and Summers, solicitors, 5, New Bridge-street, London, E.C.

HALL (Rebecca), Goverton, Bleasby, Nottingham, widow. Jan. 81; Parsons and Son, solicitors, Wheeler-gate, Notts.

HICKMAN (Thos.), 193, St. John-street-road, Middlesex, brushmaker, Feb. 11; Taylor and Co. solicitors, 15, Furnival's-inn, London.

HILL (Wm.), late of 22, Clanricarde-gardens, Kensington, Middlesex, formerly carrying on the business of contractor and builder, at 203, Whitechapel-road, Middlesex, and carrying on the business of a brickmaker, at Ilford, Leyton, Wanstead, and Stratford, all in the county of Essex. Feb, 1; Duffield and Bruty, solicitors, 6, Tokenhouse-yard, London. HORTON (John) otherwise William Morgan, late a gunner in the 7th Battery 23rd Brigade of H. M's. R. A. May 1; F. W. Seaman, solicitor, Wednesbury. KEY (Annabella H.) 12, Albion-street, Hyde-park, Middlesex, widow. Feb. 1; Murray and Hutchins, solicitors, 11, Birchin-lane, London. KEY (John B), Oriental Bank Corporation, Threadneedle street, London, and 26, Duke-street, Manchester square, Middlesex, Eq. Feb. 1; Murray and Hutchins, solicitors, 11, Birchin-lane, London.

LEVERS (Francis), Glebe-street, Nottingham, licensed victualler. Feb. 1 Thomas W. Elliott, solicitor, 6, Middlepavement, Nottingham.

LUCAS (Ralph), Seaton Carew, Durham, and Bampton Grange, Westmoreland. Jan. 31; John B. Stover, solicitor, West Hartlepool.

TAYLEUR (Wm.), Buntingsdale, Drayton-in-Ha'es, Salop. and of 38, Brook- treet, Grosvenor-samare, Middlesex, Esq. Feb. 14; Tucker and Lake, solicitors, 4, Seriestreet, Lincoln's-inn-fields, London. TAYLOR (Jas.), Milton, near Sittingbourne, Kent, gentleFeb. 14; Fairfoot and Webb, solicitors, 13, Clement's-inn, London.

man.

TEE (Thos.) formerly of Manchester, and of Barnsley. York, late of 6, Cecil-terrace, Wood-green, Middlesex, linen merchant. Jan. 16; Marriott and Woodhall, solici tors, 12, Norfolk-street, Manchester. TOWLSON (JO.), 1, Fen-villas, Queen's-road, Tunbridge Wella, retired ironmonger. Feb. 3: R. T. Andrew.

solicitor, 1, Calverley Mount, Tunbridge Wells. TUCKER Henry, Blackford, Wedmore, Somerset, gentleman. Feb. 6; E. W. Edwards, solicitor, Wedmore. TUPPER (Martin de Havilland, 13, Church-street. Stoke Newington, Middlesex, gentleman. Jan. 25; W. Blewitt, solicitor, 27, New Broad-street, London. WALKER (Rev. Canon), Scarborough. York. Woodall and Woodall, solicitors, 25, Queen-street, Scarborough.

Jan. 31;

WATES Edward), 15, Harmer-street, Milton-next-Gravesend, Kent, solicitor. Jan. 31; Hooke and Street, solici tors, 27, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Middlesex. WATSON (Wm.), Calow, Chesterfield, Derby. March 2; R. T. Gratton, solicitor, 5, Knifesmith-gate, Chesterfield. WEBB (Harriet), 12, Priory-terrace, Cheltenham, Gloucester, widow. Jan. 23; J. L. Smith, solicitor, Ledbury, Herefordshire.

WEBSTER (Anne E, Glebe-street, Nottingham, widow. Feb 1; Thos. W. Elliott, solicitor, 6, Middle Pavement, Nottingham.

WILLIAMS (Henry B.), 2, Berkeley-villas, Cheltenham, Esq. April 1; F. and E. Griffiths, solicitors, 2, Crescentplace, Cheltenham. WILSON (John), formerly of the George Inn, Rochdale road, Manchester, late of Southport, gentleman. Feb 9; Ed. Heath and Sons, solicitors, 41, Swan-street, Manchester.

WISEMAN (Jas.), Heathfield-terrace, Halifax, York, gentleman. Jan. 15; Wavell and Co., solicitors, 26, George-street, Halifax.

ZILLWOOD (Richard N.), Romsey, Southampton, miller. March 1; Stead, Tyler, and Potter, solicitors, Romsey,

MAGISTRATES' CLERK'S FEES. THE following is a report of a committee appointed by the Town Council of the Borough of Sheffield to prepare a new Table of Fees.

Your committee report that in pursuance of a resolution passed by the council on the 29th Oct., 1873, appointing them to prepare a New Table of Fees, to be taken by the clerk to the justices for this borough, for adoption by the council and confirmation by the Secretary of State, they have considered the table of fees submitted by the Home Office, and after carefully examining the same, and comparing it with the table of fees at present in force, beg to recommend the council to adopt the same, and to take the necessary steps for obtaining the approval of the Secretary of State for the Home Department thereto. A copy of the table of fees is annexed to this report.

Your committee think it their duty further to state that on the 9th day of January, 1850, a com. mittee was appointed by the council to report upon the subject of the fees payable to the clerk to the justices, and on the 26th March, 1850, the council adopted the table of fees now in force, which were then considered to be on a more re

str-et. Middlesex.

MESHAM (Margaret E.), Pontruffydd Hall, Flint, spinster. March 1: Sladen and Mackenzie, solicitors, 8, Delahaystreet, Westminster, Middlesex. MILLNER (Rev. Wm.), formerly of 8, Tottenham-place, Clifton, near Bristol, vicar of St. Augustine-the-Less, Bristol, and minor canon of Bristol Cathedral, afterwards of 50, Regent's-park-road, Regent's-park, Middlesex, but late of 64, Mornington-road, Hegent's park, rector of St. Anthelin, with St. John the Baptist, London. Jan. 20; Yarde and Loader, solicitors, 1, Raymond-buildings.

Gray's-inn, Middlesex.

MUGGERIDGE (Thos.), Green-street Green, near Dartford,

in any other borough.

Afterwards the council considered it desirable that the clerk to the justices should be paid by salary in lieu of fees, and on the 14th January, 1852, they passed the following resolution :

ford, and 14, Old Jewry-chambers, London.

tingham.

PERKINS (William), Mill Hill Cottage, East Grinstead, Sussex, architect. Jan. 19; J. J. Darley, solicitor, 36,

John-street, Bedford-row, London.

RIPLEY (Edward P. W.), late a major in the Bengal Staff Corps. Jan. 30; E. Carleton Holmes and Son, solicitors, 12, Bedford-row, London. RISDON (John), Great Parndon, Essex, Esq. Feb. 20; Geo. Dixon, solicitor, 35, John-street, Bedford row, Middlesex.

SAMUELSON (Alexander), 27, Cornhill, and Kingston Lodge, Addison-road, Kensington, London, civil engineer. Feb. 16; G. S. and H. Brandon, solicitors, 15, Essex-street, Strand, Middlesex.

SANDERS (Chas.), formerly of Braintree, late of Colchester, Essex, corn factor. Feb. 20; Veley and Cunnington, solicitors, Braintree, Essex.

SCOTCHER (Charles), 88, Brecknock-road, Middlesex, and 86, Bull-street, Birmingham. Feb. 16; H. Ivimey, solicitor, 8, Staple-inn, London. TAGART (Thos. B.), late of 27, Dryden-terrace, Turnerroad, Lee, Kent, gentleman, formerly the registrar of Butler's Wharf Company (Limited), at Rotherhithe, Surrey. Jan, 20; Cattarns and Co., solicitors, 33, Marklane, London,

and that a salary of £800 per year should be paid to Mr. Albert Smith, the present clerk (he thereout defraying the expenses of clerks, printing, sta tionery, and all other expenses incidental to the office.)"

Mr. Albert Smith was requested to make a return of receipts and expenditure for the years 1850 and 1851, and the following results were ob tained from the return furnished by Mr. Smith in compliance with such request :

...

:

1850. Gross Income received... Expenses of Clerks, Printing, and Stationery

...

£ s. d. 1875 7 5

395 9 9