Arn. 4th edit. 495: Court v. Martineau, 3 Dougl. 161: Bridges v. Hunter, 1 M. & S. 18; Phillips, 9. 659. Immaterial facts misstated by a party do not affect the contract unless made in answer to a specific inquiry; or being made fraudulently infinence the other party; if so made and so operating the policy is void: Phillips, s. 539, 540; Arn. 4th edit. 482. NOTE. A specific inquiry imports that the subject matter of the inquiry is considered material: (Phillips, s. 542.) Phillips, sect. 537. But in the absence of moral fraud a substantial compliance with the terms of a representation is all that is required. De Hahn v. Hartley, 1 T. R. 346; Pawson v. Watson, 2 Cowp. 785. Exception.-A representation that a ship is or was to sail on a particular day, must be strictly complied with: Phillips, sect. 672; Arn. 4th edit. 498. Where it is a reasonable conclusion from all the circumstances that the failure to comply with the strict terms of the representation has not substantially altered the nature of the risk as described in the policy, such non-compliance will not discharge the underwriter's contract: Bize v. Fletcher, 1 Dougl. 231; Arn. 4th edit. 499. facts represented, it must be shown that he actually did obtain the information. Mackintosh v. Marshall, 11 M. & W. 116; Bates v. Waiver and Revocation. A representation is waived by the under writer who executes a policy inconsistent in terms with such representation. Bize v. Fletcher, 1 Dougl. 284. The operation of a representation may be neutralised by the assured confessing his mistake before the policy is executed, or stating that he will not hold himself bound by it, or by controlling or qualifying it by a subsequent statement. Arn. 4th edit. 499, 500. Representation to first Underwriter. A misrepresentation made to the first of several underwriters may (semble, it does) affect the contract with all. Ara, 4th edit. 506 (see Ellenborough, C. J., Foster v. Pigou, 1 M. & S. 13. Essentials.-The representation must be pertinent, of material facts, must relate only to the policy in question, and be made to the first name, and is confined in its operation to the one policy. Ib.; Duer Ins. 667, 678. If one name is put first on a policy as a decoy, and the policy is exhibited to other underwriters who subscribe it, it is void as against them. 2 Duer 679; Arn., 4th edit., 508. COMPANY LAW. A false representation of a fact necessarily pre-into possession of the piece of land, and in March ceding the commencement of the risk avoids the policy. A representation having reference to the continuance of an existing state of things, non-compliance with it subsequent to the commencement of the risk avoids the policy ab initio. Duer Ins. 696. The transitory breach of a promissory representation does not exonerate the underwriter from subsequent losses. 2 Duer Ins. 697-8; Arn. 4th edit. 500-1. Expectation, Opinion, and Belief. An honest statement of an expectation, opinion, or belief, which turns out to be unfounded, will not affect the contract. Phillips, sect. 551; Arn. 487, 4th edit. Nor will a statement of expectation or belief as to a fact material to the risk by a person having no interest in the subject matter of the contract. Bourden v. Vaughan, 10 East, 415; Arn. 488, 4th edit. But if, with the intention to deceive, an expectation or belief is expressed of the possible truth of which the party expressing it knows nothing, the policy is void. Arn. 486, 487, 4th edit.; Maule, J., in Evan: v. Edmunds, 13 C. B. 777, 785. A positive affirmative representation of material facts in respect to the future is, in effect, a stipulation that they shall be substantially as stated. Ibid. s. 553; 2 Duer. Mar. Ins. 657. A non-fulfilment of such a representation will defeat the policy if it occurs prior to or simultaneously with the commencement of the risk, or be a ground of forfeiture if it occurs after wards. Ib. Arn. 486, 4th edit. Communicating Information received. A statement relating merely to information received from others and communicated as such, the person making it is not bound to any substantial compliance with it, but he must show that he repeated truthfully such information: Arn. 4th edit. 490. Exception.-If the information be communicated by an agent to his principal, it being the duty of the agent to give such information, the latter repeating it, is bound by it as by a positive representation. I., citing Gladstone v. King (1 M. & S. 35), which however was a case of concealment where the damage claimed for as an average loss was by reason of the concealment of the accident which had happened, held excepted out of the policy. The principle stated doubtless fol o vs from it: Phillips, s. 504; Fitzherbert v. Mather (1 T. Rep. 12) is quite to the point. Knowledge of the Insurer. To relieve the assured from the consequences of a misrepresentation on the ground that the underwriter has the means of learning the truth of the NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. WINDING-UP.- CONTRIBUTORY-SUBSCRIBER TO MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION.-SALE OF LAND TO COMPANY-PURCHASE-MONEY-SETOFF.-By a parol agreement entered into in May 1865, between the promoters of a company and M., it was agreed that M. should sell a certain piece of land to the company, and should accept 100 fully paid-up shares in part payment of the purchase money. In Nov. 1865 the company was registered under the Companies Act 1862, and M. subscribed the memorandum of association for 100 shares of £10 each. The company at once entered 1866 a written agreement was executed whereby M. agreed to sell the piece of land to the company for £1000. A conveyance of the land was subsequently executed, and M. signed a receipt for £1000. No money was, however, paid to him, but 100 fully paid-up shares were allotted to him prospectus of the company stated that a satis in respect of the £1000 purchase money. The factory arrangement had been made for the purchase of the land in question, the vendor taking £1000 of the purchase money in paid-up shares. And in a report made by the directors to the shareholders in March 1866 it was stated that the vendor had agreed to accept £1000, part of the purchase money, in paid-up shares; and in a board minute of the same date it was stated that 100 paid-up shares had been issued to M. in part payment of the purchase-money. Held (reversing the decision of Bacon, V.C.), that the contract by M. to take the 100 shares for which he subscribed the memorandum of association was satisfied by the allotment to him of the 100 shares in part payment of the purchase money for the land sold by him to the company, and that he was not liable as a contributory in respect of 100 shares: (May. nard's case, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 630. L.C. and L.JJ.) CONTRIBUTORY-SUBSCRIBER TO MEMORANDUM-PAYMENT OTHERWISE THAN IN CASH. The L. Company was formed to purchase the business of C., the capital to be £7500, in 7500 shares of £1 each. The memorandum was signed for 6265 shares, C. subscribing for 2500. The articles dated the same day recited and adopted an agreement already prepared with C. for the purchase by the company of his business and premises for £5000, half to be paid in cash and half in 2500 fully paid-up shares. The memorandum did not state that the 2500 shares subscribed for by C. were fully paid-up. The memorandum and articles were registered on the 27th Sept. 1870. The agreement with C. was executed on the 30th September, and registered on the 6th October following. This agreement did not state that the shares to be allotted to C. as fully paidup were the same as those for which he had subscribed the memorandum. On the 10th October 1870, 2500 fully paid-up shares were allotted to C., "the said shares being the same for which the said C. subscribed the memorandum and articles of association." The court being satisfied that it was the understanding of all parties that the 2500 paid-up shares allotted to C. were the same as those referred to in the agreement, and that it was in respect of those that C. had signed the memorandum. Held, that C. could not be placed on the list of contributories in respect of the shares: (Coates's Case, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 637. V.C. M.) PURCHASER OF SHARES ON STOCK EXCHANGEINFANT TRANSFEREE - MISREPRESENTATION — INDEMNITY TO Vendor.-E., the defendant, instructed his brokers to purchase shares in a limited company, who accordingly purchased 100 shares from the plaintiff M. E. subsequently instructed his brokers to pass the name of his son as the "My son G. E., transferee, describing him as drysalter.' The shares were transferred into the name of G. E., who executed the deed of transfer. On the company being shortly afterwards woundup it was discovered that G. E. was an infant, and steps were taken to substitute the plaintiff's name on the register and list of contributories. Neither the defendant's brokers nor the plaintiff knew at the time of the purchase that G. E. was an infant. G. E., through the defendant as his next friend, brought an action at law against the plaintiff to recover the purchase money for the shares, charging the plaintiff with fraud and misrepre sentation as to the value of the shares. The action was compromised by the plaintiff (the defendant at law) returning the purchase money, the charges of fraud being withdrawn, he being still unaware of G. E.'s infancy. Defendant's answer stated that the shares were purchased as an investment for money advanced by the defendant to his son. Held (1), that the defendant was the true owner of the shares; (2) that the compromise of the action at law was not binding upon the plaintiff, as the fact of G. E.'s infancy was concealed from him; and that the defendant was bound to indemnify the plaintiff in respect of the shares: (Maynard v. Eaton, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 637. V. C. M.) THE COUNTY COURTS. MALDON COUNTY COURT. Friday, Dec. 19, 1873. (Before T. ABDY, Esq., Judge.) REV. C. G. G. TOWNSEND . THE GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY. Railway company-Liability to maintain fences. C. Gepp, of Chelmsford, appeared for plaintiff. Moore appeared for the company. Gepp said the action was brought to recover 50s. damages sustained by the plaintiff through the company neglecting to provide a sufficient fence between plaintiff's land and their line of railway at Hatfield Peverel; in consequence of which a sheep breaking through the fence was killed on the line by a passing train. Mr. Townsend had thought it proper to bring this action to establish his rights in the matter. He might mention that had not Mr. Townsend's man visited the field from which the sheep had escaped soon after the accident, a great many sheep would probably have been killed, as there was then a flock of 105 sheep on the railway; and the consequences might have been very serious. Isaac Harvey, a man in the plaintiff's employ, went about five o'clock on the morning of the 17th Aug. to a field adjoining the railway, in which he had left 105 sheep the night before. Not seeing the sheep, he had discovered a gap in the hedge through which the sheep had passed on to the railway; with the assistance of the bailiff he got the sheep off the line, but one had been run over and killed by a train, the driver pulling up the engine as quick as possible after the accident. The fence was a quick hedge. Gepp.-Was it sufficiently thick to keep the sheep in ? Witness.-If it had been they would not have got through, sir. In answer to Moore, witness said the fence had been there since the formation of the railway, thirty-two years ago, and it had been the habit to turn sheep in the field year after year; there were no gaps in the fence the previous evening. John Tyler, bailiff, corroborated, and Mr. Upson, manager of the farm, said the railway company always trimmed and kept the hedge in order, and they had repaired it since the accident; the hedge was not in sufficient repair to keep the sheep in. Moore contended that as the evidence showed the fence was in good repair just prior to the accident, there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the company. If he showed that the hedge was in good repair at the time, the plaintiff could not say it was not a sufficient hedge, as by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20, s. 68, it was laid down that if after the lapse of five years no complaint is made of a fence, it was deemed a sufficient fence, and thirty-two years had elapsed before any complaint was made of this hedge. Gepp urged that the Act quoted by Mr Moore was not applicable to that line of railway, as the line was formed before that Act was passed. The action was taken upon the Eastern Counties Railway Act 1846, which in the 107th section, after providing as to the erection of fences, says such fences shall be kept in proper repair. In the course of a conversation, his HONOUR said railway companies had great statutory powers, and it was very necessary for the protection of property and lives of persons travelling by the rail that they should keep the fences in proper order. For the defence, Moore called Thomas Mead, platelayer, who saw the hedge the day before the accident, when it was in good repair, and in conversation, Tyler, plaintiff's bailiff, told him he saw nothing amiss with the fence. A gap was made by the violence of the sheep through the bottom of the hedge; he had noticed that the sheep lay alongside the hedge in a flock, and they had forced themselves under the hedge to escape from the sun. A ditch interposed between the field and the hedge. Gepp said the sheep being found on the line at five in the morning, they must have broken through during the night, and would not then have been seeking shade from the sun. Mr. Kemp, inspector of platelayers, said that the fence seemed to him to be an unusually good one. His HONOUR did not think the Company had done all they ought to have done in looking out for weak places. The sheep seeking shade at this particular spot, it was very probable the fence would be weakened thereby. His HONOUR gave judgment for the amount claimed with costs. BANKRUPTCY LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. EXECUTION-PAYMENT TO SHERIFF BEFORE LEVY-LIQUIDATION NOTICE PAYMENT BY SHERIFF AFTER-THE BANKRUPTCY ACT, ss. 6, 87.-If a judgment debtor voluntarily, and to avoid execution, pay to the sheriff the amount of the judgment debt and costs, he does not thereby constitute the sheriff his agent, and the sheriff cannot, if he receive notice of a bankruptcy petition, within fourteen days, pay over the amount of the debt to the creditor. Consequently, if before paying over the money to the judgment creditor, the sheriff have notice of the filing of a bankruptcy petition within the time prescribed by the 87th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, the creditor must refund: (Ex parte Brooke, re Hassall, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 653. Bank.) WORKMEN'S WAGes-Order for PAYMENT OF -PROSPECTIVE COSTS-DUTY OF TRUSTEE. The effect of an order directing a trustee to set apart a certain sum for the payment of certain preferential claims, is to sever that amount from the debtor's estate, and the trustee cannot delay the payment thereof merely upon the ground that the balance in his hands will be insufficient to meet prospective costs: (Ex parte Powis, re Bowen, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 655. Bank.) COURT OF BANKRUPTCY. (Before Mr. Registrar HAZLITT). Discharge-Examination not passed, but good Layton (Nash, Field, and Co.) for the trustee. It would seem that, in the autumn of 1871, the bankrupt left this country and proceeded to Australia, where he is now living. An adjudication having been obtained, the trustee administered the property, and dividends amounting to 15s. 6d. in the pound were paid. At a meeting of the creditors, recently held, it was resolved to accept a proposal made by Col. W. R. Strange, the father of the bankrupt, for the purchase from the trustee, at the price of £700, of the debt due from Mr. G. S. Elliott under a contract dated Jan. 31, 1868, and for the payment of the sum of £300 for the purpose of replacing the £300 taken by the bankrupt with him when he left England; and the creditors assented to the bankrupt applying to the court for an order of discharge. A difficulty arose, however, in carrying out the wishes of the bankrupt and his creditors, in consequence of the bankrupt's absence, and the fact that that he had not passed his examination. Knight contended that there was nothing in the statute which placed any limitation upon the mode of applying for an order of discharge, and that the rules were directory merely and not imperative. The case stood upon an entirely different basis under the old law. The Chief Judge in the matter of Hine v. Anthony (14 S. J., 656), where application was made for the appoint ment of a sitting for discharge before the examination had been passed, said there seemed to be no objection to the appointment of a sitting, and if the examination should be passed, the discharge the promise made previously to the filing of the would stand upon its own merits. petition, and renewed subsequently, to pay in full. In answer to the court, That he (Storer) submitted, was no consideration at all. Layton said that after the bankrupt's departure an approximate statement of affairs was made out, and the creditors were satisfied they had obtained the necessary information in reference to his transactions; and they desired the bankrupt should receive his discharge if the court thought it could be granted. His HONOUR said the court was desirous of affording every facility in a case where a handsome dividend had been paid, but in the face of the 19th section and the 140th rule it was impossible to grant the discharge until the bankrupt had produced a statement of his affairs and attended the court for public examination. The matter would be adjourned sine die, with liberty to the bankrupt to apply when he had conformed to the law. MANCHESTER COUNTY COURT. Saturday Jan. 10, 1874. (Before J. A. RUSSELL, Q.C., Judge.) HAND V. KAUFMANN. Bankruptcy Act 1869-Issue tried by consent. H. sought to recover on two bills of exchange, drawn by N. and Co., accepted by K., the defen. dant, and endorsed by N. and Co. to H. the plaintiff, a solicitor, as security for a sum agreed upon as consideration for H.'s acting in the affairs of N. and Co., who were in difficulties. Held, that this was a legitimate transaction, the agreement for H. to act in winding-up N. and Co.'s affairs being a good consideration, and that H. was entitled to recover on the bills from K. irre. spective of the consideration as between K. and N. and Co., whatever might be his position with regard to the estate of N. and Co. S. Taylor, barrister, for the plaintiff. Storer, solicitor, for the defendant. THIS was an issue directed to be tried, under a trader debtor summons, between Lewis Hand, solicitor, 22, Coleman-street, London, and Louis Kaufmann, of 15, Market-street, Manchester, with reference to certain bills of exchange, which, having been accepted by the defendant, were now overdue. The bills, in respect of which the defendant was alleged to be liable were drawn on the 14th March 1873, by Messrs. Neumann, Gingold, and Co. merchants, London, for the sums of £153 and £164, being directed to and accepted by Kaufmann, payable to the order of the said Neumann, Gingold, and Co. five months and six months respectively after date, and indorsed ty them to the plaintiff. Taylor stated the facts, from which it appeared that the plaintiff was, on the 25th April, 1873, consulted by Messrs. Neumann, Gingold, and Co. who were in difficulties, with reference to their affairs. He told them that before he could consent to act for them he should require as security a sum of £300. The liabilities of the firm were heavy, amounting, he believed, to over £300,000. Mr. Neumann and Mr. Gingold both said that they were without ready money, but were prepared to hand over "good bills" to the amount required if he would take them. To this he consented, and undertook the winding-up of their affairs. They endorsed to him the bills in question, one of which-that for £155-he paid to his bankers, but it was dishonoured. He did not, knowing what had been the fate of the first, tender them the second. At the time when the bills were endorsed to witness, he knew nothing of the circumstances under which it was said they had been accepted. The plaintiff had incurred liabilities on account of Messrs. Neumann and Co. in reliance on the security of these bills. Kaufmann had suspended payment in November 1872, being indebted to Neumann and Co., and had paid 2s. 6d. in the pound, having promised to pay Neumann and Co. in full, according to the plaintiff's contention which promise was the consideration for these bills, but according to the defendant's contention the consideration for them was the supply of goods to Kaufmann, which goods had never really been supplied. A part of Kauf. mann's composition amounting to £154 had been paid to Neumann, for which the latter gave an I. O. U., to be returned when the balance of the composition was paid. Storer, addressing his Honour for the defence, argued that Kaufmann's indebtedness to Messrs. Neumann, Gingold, and Co, at the time of his filing his petition was satisfied by the payment of the £154, being part of the composition, and the promise of extended time for payment of the balance. The bills were not paid in any sense in satisfaction of that balance, therefore it followed that Kaufmann stood indebted to Messrs. Neumann, Gingold, and Co., and he was still indebted to the trustee of the estate, in the amount which would make up the difference between the £154 and the composition arranged to be paid. Mr. Neumann said that the only consideration for giving these bills on the part of Kaufmann on the 14th March 1873, was His HONOUR.-If the debt was satisfied by payment of the composition there was, of course, no consideration. Storer. Starting from that point-and it is my standpoint I say that that was not the arrangement. The bills were given upon the faith of the defendant Kaufmann's representation that he was in a good position. Mr. Neumann, who thought he was only fettered for a short time, said, “I'll send you a stock of cigars if you will let me have some bills." Upon that the bills were given. Whether, therefore, we accept the statement of Mr. Neumann or that of the defendant, clearly there was no consideration made for these bills, because, on Mr. Neumann's testimony, no goods were sent to Kaufmann in return for the bills. His HONOUR.-I have said that if the composi tion was paid there was no consideration for the bills. The original debt was gone. Storer. Then is the plaintiff in a different position, with regard to these bills, than Messrs. Neumann, Gingold, and Co. and their trustee were ? He continued: The material part of this case was, what, as a matter of fact, was due to Mr. Hand at the time the bills were given to him? In fact, nothing. He received the bills in anticipation of charges that were to be incurred in liquidating the affairs of Messrs. Neumann, Gingold, and Co. Up to the 13th May, when the petition was presented to the London Bankruptcy Court, all that he was in a position to claim was the costs then incurred-namely, £21. He had no right to take into his custody property belonging to the debtors' estate and say, "I have a lien upon this in respect of charges to be incurred in this bankruptcy." By rule 31 of the rules of 1870, it was provided that in all cases of bankruptcy the solicitor should be entitled to receive his costs, charges and expenses, out of the estate, from the trustee; and that is one of the first payments to be made by the trustee. His HONOUR-The question here is whether a person under liquidation is not entitled to employ and bound to pay the solicitor whom he and his trustee think it necessary to consult for the purpose of aiding the winding-up of the estate. It is a question between Mr. Hand and the firm who employed him, Messrs, Neumann, Gingold, and Co., for the purpose of protecting their interests. Storer submitted that Mr. Hand could only claim as against these bills for the amount of his costs incurred prior to the filing of the petition. Mr. Dubois's claim, however, might be added to the amount, Mr. Hand having made himself responsible for it; but with regard to all subsequent legitimate charges, the estate of Neumann, Gingold, and Co. was liable. Their trustee was the person to sue upon these bills, and not Mr. Hand. His HONOUR (who did not call upon Mr. Taylor for a reply), in giving judgment, said it appeared from the evidence that £154 was received by Mr. Neumann from the defendant in part payment of the composition due to his firm under the latter's liquidation; and the I O U given by Mr. Neumann for the amount was by arrangement to have been returned on payment of the balance. That bills of exchange were given there could be no question; the only question was, in respect of what were they given? Were they given in respect of the balance of the original debt, or in respect of some fresh consideration in the way of sending goods, which consideration was never complied with? Mr. Storer had argued that, by reason of the composition having been paid as it was, by the giving of the IOU, and the promise to pay the balance between £154 and £212, the matter stood precisely as it would have done supposing the original arrangement to have been carried out. He (the judge) was entirely of a contrary opinion. The balance in question never was paid; and the effect of the nonfulfilment of the agreement was to revive the original debt. If it were material to the issue, he should hold, on the evidence, that there was a perfectly good consideration as between Neumann, Gingold, and Co., and Kaufmann in respect of these bills of exchange; but now came the question, even assuming that there was no consideration at all, in what position did Mr. Hand stand? Was he the holder of the bills without consideration? Mr. Storer appeared to have confounded the ques tion as it arose between Mr. Hand and Kaufmann with the question that would have presented itself supposing Mr. Hand to have been going against Neumann's estate. That was not the position of matters. Mr. Hand came forward as the holder of two bills of exchange, which bills were handed to him before an act of bankruptcy was committed, and therefore, of course, before he could have had notice of an act of bankruptcy, and the question was, was he a holder for value in respect of those bills? The facts were that, some days prior to the filing of their petition, Messrs. Neumann, Gingold, and Co., consulted him with reference to their affairs. Mr. Hand said, "Your estate is large, and as the expense of winding-up will be considerable, I cannot undertake it unless I have cash in hand." Having no cash, they gave him the bills in question, saying, "You will be able to raise upon them all the money you want." Was that, or was it not, a legitimate transaction? Was it contrary to the policy of the bankrupt laws? Surely not; it was a bona fide and lawful agreement; and the consideration-namely, that he was to manage their affairs under the liquidation-given for the bills was a perfectly good and valid consideration. Then, had he any further liabilities? He had. He was liable to Mr. Dubois, the accountant, for £148; and he had likewise incurred with other parties liabilities to the extent of something like £70 or £80; and if he had to continue acting for Mr. Neumann, in consultation with the trustee and other parties interested in the estate, he would incur still further liabilities. He (the judge) held that, under all the circumstances, Mr. Hand was, in the strictest terms, a holder for value of these bills; and, whatever his position as regarded the estate of Mr. Neumann, the simple question was, had he or had he not, being such holder for value, any good claim against Kaufmann, the acceptor of the bills? Most clearly he had. He had a perfectly good title to recover upon them; and judgment would therefore be for the amount claimed-namely, £315, with costs. SWANSEA COUNTY COURT. Liquidation-Receiver's costs-Subsequent bank- His HONOUR.-Mr. Clifton's contention is that the liquidation proceedings were quite regular. Glascodine.-Your Honour has already decided In this case a bankruptcy petition was presented that the liquidation proceedings were wrong against one F. Perkins, and he was adjudicated ab initio. A petition in bankruptcy was presented bankrupt. The bankrupt was in partnership with against F. Perkins, and he was adjudicated bank. R. W. Perkins, and subsequently to the bankrupt on 12th Oct. 1871. That bankruptcy is still ruptcy of the former, the firm presented a petition subsisting. Some time in that month or November, for liquidation by arrangement (sects. 125 and 126). the two Perkins (F. and R. W.) filed a petition Resolutions were passed, but his Honour on motion for liquidation-after the first meeting of credirefused to register them. A bankruptcy petition tors in F. Perkins's bankruptcy and trustee apwas then presented against R. W. Perkins, and pointed. By this proceeding the two Perkins he was also adjudicated bankrupt. While liquida- hoped to throw aside the bankruptcy proceeding tion proceedings (partnership) were pending, one against F. Perkins, and supersede it by joint Warwick was appointed receiver. The question action. Bankruptcy may be turned into liquidanow to be debated was, whether the costs of this tion, but bankruptcy is not to be superseded by gentleman were to be paid out of the bankruptcy liquidation on action of debtor. Your Honour assets in priority, or whether he was to prove as a has already decided in Jan. 1872, that the liquidacreditor in the bankruptcy, and receive dividend tion was simply void. It was never intended that pro rata with other creditors. proceedings should be superseded in this way. Clifton.-I see no reason why it could not be done by the partner. Clifton for Warwick, receiver in liquidation. Glascodine, solicitor, trustee under two bank. ruptcies opposing. Clifton made the application, and read the notice. Glascodine.-I object to the application being made on account of informality. It does not appertain to one of the two bankruptcies of which I am trustee. Clifton.-A day has been named by the registrar for the hearing of the motion, and the costs have been taxed by him. Glascodine.-There are two bankruptcies and one liquidation. The other side mixed them up. His HONOUR.-I should like to have all the facts before me. Clifton.-I shall read you the affidavit that is on the file. The costs have been taxed by the registrar. The liquidation is quite regular upon the face of it. The costs have been taxed in that matter. The liquidation proceedings become abortive, and two bankruptcy proceedings are now subsisting. Mr. Glascodine is trustee under both those bankruptcies. The court has to inquire whether these costs are properly payable. If no bankruptcy had supervened there would be no doubt that these costs are payable. I shall, therefore, refer you to the last rules (1871) on the subject of liquidation and composition. "Where in bankruptcy or liquidation a receiver or manager is continued as trustee, the remuneration of trustee at the rate determined on shall commence as from the date of his appointment as receiver or manager, and shall be assessed accordingly; and no other than the aforesaid remuneration shall be made to the trustee for his services as receiver or manager.' (Rule 6.) The next rule (7) provides for a state of things where the receiver is not continued as trustee: "Where the receiver or manager is not continued as trustee, or is continued as trustee, but without remuneration, he shall be allowed out of the estate such sum for his services as receiver or manager as the taxing officer of the court shall, having regard to the views of the trustee and committee of inspection (if any), thereon think fit." Upon those two rules I base my claim. Mr. Glascodine wishes Warwick to come in as a creditor. I beg to draw your attention to the cases decided on the subject, and to the 292nd rule: "Where bankruptcy occurs pending proceedings for or towards liqui. dation by arrangement or composition with credi " tors, the proper costs incurred in relation to such | dismissed at the trial before Mr. Justice Black- His HONOUR, recapitulating all the facts adduced before him, proceeded to state that as far as R. Perkins was concerned, it was a personal expense against the persons affected by the liquidation. R. Perkins was a party to it, and if there was any account it was between Warwick and R. Perkins. On his becoming bankrupt Warwick's debt became a provable debt against his estate. It must be proved in the second bankruptcy. It cannot be charged in priority. Costs of the day allowed to trustee. LEGAL NEWS. LITIGATION IN 1873. consider the effect of the respondent's insanity upon the petitioner's right to proceed, so long as that insanity continues. And their Lordships' have, in like manner, postponed their decision as to what constitutes an invitation to alight from a railway carriage-a moot point, raised in the long-pending suit of Bridges v. North London Railway Company. Among other noticeable examples of litigation we may notice the cases of Dent v. Nicholls, and Maynard v. Eaton, which may be taken to have finally established the rule that a purchaser of shares, whether jobber or investor, is answerable to his vendor if he gives, as transferee, an infant, an idiot, or other person under legal disability. In Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, the Court of Exchequer Chamber decided that no action will lie against a military officer for a report as to the conduct of a subordinate, made in the course of his duty to higher authorities, even if the defamatory statements complained of were made maliciously, unreasonably, and causelessly. It should be remembered that this is simply an annunciation of the law, not a decision upon the merits of the particular controversy by which it was evoked. The maritime trials of the year have included an inquiry at Liverpool-instituted at the request, and resulting in the complete vindication of, Messrs. Ismay, Imrie, and Co.-with reference to the equipment of the Atlantic, a fine vessel, which went down when near her destination, causing a loss of several hundred lives. Re The Northfleet, Board of Trade and Admiralty proceedings alike have proved that the original accounts of the catastrophe were pretty nearly correct, and have ended in the seizure, condemnation, and sale of the Murillo. The Judge of the Admiralty Court refused to recognise the Khedive of Egypt as a Sovereign Prince who could not be sued before ordinary tribunals. Mr. Plimsoll defeated Mr. Norwood's attempt to obtain a criminal information for libels contained in his celebrated pamphlet on "Our Seamen," but civil actions are understood to be still pending at the instance of Messrs. Norwood and Gourley. The agitation which Mr. Plimsoll set on foot has caused, or been followed by, the detention and condemnation of many vessels as unseaworthy, and magistrates have so often held sailors justified in refusing to sail in unsafe vessels, that their champion's labours have not been altogether in vain. THE IRISH COURT OF EXCHEQUER. Ir is not our custom to canvass the merits and claims of candidates for positions, judicial or otherwise, in Ireland. When appointments have been made we criticise them honestly, and express our opinion of the choice of the Government. But within the last few weeks a strange controversy has arisen concerning the vacancy in the Court of Exchequer. The lamented death of the Chief Baron Pigot took place at a time when no appointment could possibly be made, and when it was not necessary that there should be any haste in the matter. Some of our contemporaries, however, inferred that the Government have deter. mined not to appoint another judge, but to promote an existing one, and thus to diminish the judicial staff of the Bench. This inference was strongly supported by a certain article in the Times, which, whether inspired or not, was probably intended to try the feelings of the public on the subject; and we trust that the response it elicited from all quarters in Ireland, and from the most influential and (which is more important) independent papers in London, will show that if the Government ever intended to act in the manner shadowed forth above, they would not receive the support of any section in Ireland, and would be strongly opposed even in England. For ourselves we have not hitherto noticed the subject, because we do not believe that any Government would attempt, during the Parliamentary recess, of its own motion, to make such a change as to permanently reduce the number of judges in a Superior Court from four to three judges. This would be clearly unconstitutional, in the best sense of that term, clearly inexpedient in the present state of business, and we had almost said impossible, from the duties to be performed by each member of the court. It is unnecessary to add that it would in some sense be a breach of faith with those who by custom have a right to consider themselves entitled to promotion. When we say that to reduce the number of judges from four to three in each court would be unconstitutional, we do not mean that it would be illegal or impossible the prerogative is doubtless strong enough for greater interference-but we do say that without a radical change in the circuits, and in the method of transacting business, suitors would be prevented from enforcing their rights and remedying their wrongs, and so the great charter itself would be broken-" We will not deny or delay to any man justice or right." That it would be inexpedient, even in a political sense, no one can deny who is acquainted with the state of business and society in this country. We have six circuits, on each of which two judges go twice a year (and we shall probably soon require a winter assize in Belfast and Cork), and thus the circuit arrangements should be modified; but, in addition, the Exchequer, and indeed, each of the Common Law Courts, has an exclusive jurisdiction which precludes judges of one court from discharging the functions of another. Thus it sometimes happens that we have to wait out of term for some time to obtain an order in a bail motion from a judge of the Queen's Bench, or an order under the 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 92, from a Common Pleas Justice. The absolute as well as relative duties of the judges of all the Superior Courts are considerable, and each year increasing. Several late Acts have vastly increased their duties-for instance, the Act which transferred the trial of election petitions from committees of the House of Commons to the courts of law-the Land Act of 1870, which has given rise to much circuit business, and requires the attendance of a majority of the judges in the Court for Land Cases Reserved, and which indirectly, by its influence in increasing the available wealth of the country and in discouraging emigration, is each year increasing the amount of litigation. We need hardly refer to the report of the commissioners in 1862, who reported against diminishing the number of judges. But we venture to say that in anticipa. tion of a Judicature Bill for Ireland in a few years, and the necessary changes to be then introduced, it would be a piece of wanton extravagance to alter and re-model the present system to found one which could necessarily only exist for two or three years. The Profession and the public showed a fatal apathy in the matter of the vacancy in the Landed Estates' Court; but yet the Government did not proceed with their proposed Bill to render a further appointment unnecessary, and we trust they may yet, by a combined effort, be induced to fill up the vacancies, and thus preserve for Ireland the complete advantages of, perhaps, the most excellent institutions we owe to the English connection. Economy is most wise when wisely pursued, and this limitation, we think, would be broken through if anything were done to impair the strength and symmetry of our legal system, or to alienate the feelings of the most enlightened and influential members of the community.-Irish Law Times. TAUNTON ELECTION PETITION.-The inquiry into the petition against the return of the Attorney-General (Sir Henry James) was commenced on Tuesday morning by Mr. Justice Grove, at the Shire Hall, amid manifestations of great interest. Mr. Charles Russell, Q.C., Mr. W. G. Harrison, and Mr. Collins appeared for the petitioners; Mr. Sergeant Ballantine, Mr. Hardinge Giffard, Q.C., and Mr. J. O. Griffits for the respondent.-Mr. Charles Russell opened the case for the petitioners, stating that the petition derived great importance from the fact of the Attorney-General being the respondent. He alleged that the return was brought about by corrupt means, and that the petition charged bribery, corrupt treating, and general bribery and treating by and on behalf of the respondent such as to void the election. With regard to past elections at Taunton, he stated that before the the late Reform Act the constituency was 900, and after it 1900, and though there was a large Conservative element in the county of Somersetshire, yet, as a rule, Liberal members had been generally returned for the borough. After referring to the frequent petitions at Taunton, and the large number of persons alleged to have been treated and bribed at former elections, he called attention to the fact that those persons who at the last trial at Taunton had been acting in the interests of the then respondent-Serjeant Coxwere now partisans of the respondent, and how the change had been brought about was a question which the learned judge would have to consider-viz., whether it was conversion or corruption. At the former petition, when recriminatory charges were made by Serjeant Cox against the then petitioner, and now respondent, they were not gone into, and although Serjeant Cox was ordered to pay the costs of the petition, yet they never were paid, and the order of Mr. Justice Blackburn to that effect had never been acted on, and the petitioner never claimed them. The learned counsel then suggested that this occurred in consequence of an agreement between Serjeant Cox and the now respondent that if the former were not obliged to pay the costs he should not pursue the recriminatory charges against the latter. After alluding to the respondent's canvass in September of last year, Mr. Russell stated that there was a strong feeling in the borough against Sir H. James at that time, inasmuch as he was supposed to have gained his seat in 1868 not by votes, but by a legal contrivance, and that, in addition, he had to combat some change of feeling on the part of many voters because of the Conservative reaction. He then stated that the number of votes in the constituency was about 1852, and that of these Sir Alfred Slade had 989 promises, while Sir Henry James had 970, the class of voters which comprised the former cumber being in the higher class of life, while those of the latter were of the lower. It was, he stated, a fact that though the last election was conducted under the provisions of the Ballot Act, yet there was far more drunkenness than had ever previously existed in the borough. He then said that he should be able to prove that there had been a great amount of bribery and corrupt treating in No. 3 district, which could be traced to Thomas Burman, a saddler, who had been appointed the respondent's expenses agent, through James Rollings, jun., who acted under Burman's directions. Rollings was one of the secret committee men, and was in the habit of addressing each evening during the canvass the lowest class of voters in the borough in order to obtain their interest for the respondent. He should be able to prove that a Mr. H. Poole, who had been described by Serjeant Ballantime in the 1868 inquiry, as a corrupt agent of the worst kind," and that men named Toogood, Gorier, and Taylor, the latter being the secretary of the Liberal Association, who acted in the interest and with the knowledge of the respondent, had been guilty of bribery and treating. Between 2 and 3 o'clock on the day of the polling-the 13th Oct.-it was believed by Sir A. Slade's supporters that he had polled seventyfive votes more than the respondent, and the latter even considered that his opponent was at the head of the poll, although by a smaller number of votes. Soon after that time both the candidates were seen going about the borough to bring up voters who remained unpolled, and it was a remarkable fact that many who had adopted rosettes and ribands in the morning-buff being the Liberal and blue the Conservative colour -were seen mixed together and voting for the respondent. Between two and three o'clock a man named Small appeared on the scene, and from that time it was alleged that money was flying about and drink freely dispensed at the instance of the respondent's agents and supporters. At the close of the poll there appeared 899 votes for the respondent and 812 for Sir A. Slade. The learned counsel then criticised the expenses account, its amount being about £850, and said that its im portance depended not upon the items included in it, but upon those which did not appear, and that no mention was made of Burman's expenses, who consequently must have looked to some other reward for his services, and took exception to the omission in the account of the respondent's hotel expenses. The personation agents-four of whom were paid ten guineas each, and two eight guineasit appeared, did not personally know the voters as they ought to have done, and were attorneys from a distance, and it was alleged, therefore, that their employment was colourable. The learned counsel then intimated that he should call William Smith, who would prove that he was in difficulties in the early part of 1873, and that he received assistance from Rollings on condition of his supporting Mr. James, and that he further received money from Small and another person, and that he bribed several voters with it. The respondent's agents had endeavoured to get a declaration from Smith that he had never received any money for his own vote or for any other purpose, and had ultimately succeeded under pressure. Mr. Russell gave the names of several voters, among many others who were alleged to have been bribed and treated, and said that he should be able to trace some of the payments to Burman, the respondent's agent; others to Rollings, who was acting under Burman's directions; and that to some voters small payments had been made for distributing bills, and promises of 10s. if they voted for the respondent. The names of nine gentlemen were given as examples of those who were alleged to have bribed and treated many voters. After stating that he exonerated the respondent from all charges of personal bribery, treating, or undue influence, the learned counsel for the petitioners resumed his scat, having spoken for three hours. THE LATE MR. OKE.-At the Mansion House on Saturday last the Lord Mayor, on taking his seat, addressing Mr. Gore, the assistant clerk of the justice-room, took occasion to refer to the sudden death on the previous day of Mr. Oke, who had long filled the office of Chief Clerk there. He could not, he said, help publicly expressing his deep regret at the sad and sudden event. So recently as the previous Monday the deceased was discharging his duties in the justice-room, and now he was no more. He felt bound to say that he and his predecessors in the mayoralty had from time to time received very great assistance on the bench from the legal knowledge and advice of Mr. Oke, and probably great difficulty would be experienced in finding one worthy to fill his place. He was a man of considerable ability, and his many published works on legal subjects and their large circulation testified not only to his great industry and capacity, but also to the respect in which his name was held by the legal Profession. Great confidence had been reposed in him as their legal adviser both by previous Lord Mayors and himself, in consideration of his experience and sound judgment. Personally, he felt his loss very acutely, and he availed himself of that opportunity of publicly referring to the event. DEATH OF THE CROWN SOLICITOR FOR COUNTY DOWN.-Mr. Ross Tod, Crown Solicitor for County Down, died suddenly on Tuesday night. MERIONETHSHIRE QUARTER SESSIONS.-The Marquis of Londonderry has been elected the chairman in succession to the late Mr. Meredith Richards, deceased. THE NEW SHERIFF FOR LANARKSHIRE.-A telegraphic dispatch from Glasgow states that a communication was received yesterday by Sheriff. substitute William Gillespie Dickson, from the Home Office, appointing him sheriff principal of the county, in the room of the late Henry Glassford Bell, Esq. Mr. Dickson was senior sheriffsubstitute, and is the author of a work, entitled "The Law of Evidence." LAND TRANSFER.-"A Victim" complains in the Times as follows: "A plot of land was lately given for the erection of a class room in connection with a national school. The site, according to the requirements of the Committee of Council on Education, was valued at £15; the cost of conveyance, &c., was nearly £25, that is £10 more than the value of the land conveyed; surveyor's fees, £2 28.; solicitor's fees for obtaining signatures of patrons, £5; stamps and parchment, and parchment for copy, 5s.; fee for bishop's signature, £2 28.; fees and stamps on indenture, £3 5s. 6d. ; agent's charges, £2 138.; postage and parcels, 58.; solicitor's fees (returned as donation), £8 8s.total, £24 15s. 6d." nesses are LEGAL PRSOPECTS.-In less than nine months the Judicature Act, according to existing ar rangements, comes into operation. The public and the legal Profession are anxious to know what has been done to meet the exigencies of the new order of things. The Judicature Commission has taken evidence and issued reports more or less useful in the preparation of the Bill on which the Act was founded. The Legal Offices Commission is now sitting, and has taken a large mass of evidence, and procured the nomination by the Chancellor of a committee of officials of the Court of Chancery to assist its labours. We do not believe, however, that the report of this commission will be of much value to the Chancellor and the judges. Almost every witness who has been examined has been unable to explain to the commissioners the nature and exact value of the several Chancery offices under review. The laborious painstaking of the commissioners is highly praiseworthy. It will at least be a satisfaction to the Government which appointed them to know that they have hitherto done their best to arrive at a knowledge of legal and technical phrases which in the mouths of the witas household words, but to the uninitiated misleading, or perhaps wholly want meaning. Baron Bramwell, with the most honest intentions, cannot expect to overrule and direct the views of his colleagues in every instance. Lord Lisgar, the able chairman, does his best to understand the technical evidence brought before him. Mr. Law is too much imbued with the spirit of "retrenchment" to appreciate anything beyond the fact that salaries are high, and that he must endeavour to reduce them by at least one-half. Mr. Trevelyan, who knows a little of every thing, and expects speedy preferment, has a "cut and slash" manner of interrogating a witness by means of a sort of indictment with several counts, ending in an invitation to the witness to plead guilty or not guilty. Mr. West, elegant and seemingly careless of most things, and Mr. Rowsell, bland and precise, endeavour, but without avail, to exhibit to witnesses a knowledge they do not possess. Three or four practical lawyers, with a like number of business men, would have come to the work knowing more than half the technical facts as yet ascertained by the commission, and would by this time have been in a position to report to Parliament early in the session. Though the commissioners' report cannot be expected to prove of any great value for the purposes of the Judicature Act, it will serve to inform the Treasury on a very large subject which has only recently come under its jurisdiction. It will enable the First Lord of the Treasury to impose upon those newly appointed to legal offices the most galling and humiliating conditions, while keeping within the letter of his powers and taking credit for doing all for the public benefit. What, then, we ask, has been done to prepare for the operation of the Judicature Act in November next? What progress has been made by those intrusted with the compilation of the new rules of procedure ? Is the legal profession as yet acquainted with the nature of those rules? Has the draft been printed and circulated? Is such a draft in existence? Is it even sketched out ? Much has to be done, and the public await the reply to these questions with a vague anxiety.Globe. TITHE RENTCHARGES.-The average value of £100 tithe rentcharge for the thirty-eight years elapsed, since the passing of the Tithe Commutation Act, is 16s. 5d. For the year 1874, each £100 of tithe rentcharge will amount to the sum of £112 7s. 3d. EDUCATION.-At the recent Middlesex Sessions for this month, the calendar contained the names of 112 prisoners, 19 of whom were committed for mis demeanor, and 93 for felony. Of these 112 prisoners, 20 cannot read nor write, 15 can read, 70 can read and write imperfectly, and one only possesses a superior education. It is announced from Washington that President Grant has withdrawn his nomination of Mr. Caleb Cushing for the Chief Justiceship of the Supreme Court, in consequence of the discovery in the "rebel" archives of a letter proving his intimate connection with the Government of Jefferson Davis. LICENSING PRACTICE.-At the Surrey Quarter Sessions, Mr. M. D. Scott, on Monday last, succeeded in carrying a motion that "No applicant shall be required to attend before the court of confirmation unless the confirmation of licence be opposed." The attendance, unless the confirmation was opposed, was not only perfectly useless, but involved much expense and great loss of time. CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT.-The January Session which opened on Monday, the 12th inst. was presided over by Baron Pigott and Mr. Justice Hony man. The calendar included one charge of murder, namely, that of William Parker, charged with wilfully killing two of his children at Wapping. Six persons were charged with feloniously wounding, and there were eleven cases of robbery with violence. SCOTCH LAW OFFICES.-Mr. Henry Glassford Bell, Sheriff of Lanarkshire for the last thirtyfour years, became in the early part of November last temporarily incapacitated by illness from performing his duties. A painful disease from which he had long been suffering had at last assumed so aggravated a shape as to render an operation necessary, and after this had been performed his medical attendants recommended an interval of two or three months' rest, but certified that at the expiration of that time he would be able to resume efficiently the discharge of his duties. Under these circumstances Mr. Bell applied to the Court of Session to appoint a substitute to undertake the performance of his functions during this period. The court showed no disinclination to comply with his request, but the Crown, which, as patron of the office, had been duly informed of it, craved delay to consider it during the vaca tion. In the meantime it was suggested that Mr. Bell should apply to the Home Secretary for three months' leave of absence, which he accordingly did. His application set forth in full the whole details of the case, pointed out that his medical advisers had certified that the three months' leave of absence would restore his capacity for his post, and himself offered to "make suitable provision for the remuneration" of such qualified persons as the court might think proper to appoint to exercise the office of sheriff in the interim. On Tuesday, the 6th Jan. Mr. Lowe's reply came back. It was to the effect that while the Home Secretary "fully appreciated" the great value of Mr. Bell's long services, he is" compelled to say that the interests of the public service require his immediate resignation of his appointment." The result of his application was, perhaps, fortunately never known to Mr. Bell, as the reply only reached his house on the morning of his sudden and unexpected death from a paralytic stroke. The Pall Mall Gazette says: "Were this all that was known or suspected in reference to the case, it would be sufficient to account for the general indignation which the conduct of the Home Office has aroused. The Glasgow Herald, a Liberal journal, well describes the situation- A public officer who had discharged with unexampled fidelity the most onerous duties for thirty-four years, who had never missed a day, who had no arrears (though there was no court in the kingdom in which arrears would have been more excusable), is suddenly laid aside from duty by a severe and unexpected illness, In the first moments of his recovery he suggests the appointment of a substitute; he promises to provide for him to the full amount of his own salary, so that his appointment could cost the public nothing; he produces the highest testimony that he is likely to be fully competent to discharge his duties at the end of the three months; and he has the universal witness of Lanarkshire to the efficiency with which he has discharged them. He is summarily dismissed because the public service requires it, or, because his office is wanted.' The last words contain the sting of the whole business; for it is commonly said in Glasgow that Mr. Bell was to have been removed to secure the patronage for the superior law officer of the Government of Scotland. But, as though it were not enough that a meritorious public servant should be driven from his post under circumstances of unexampled harshness, and from motives of doubtful disinterestedness, the step must also be defended upon grounds not only untenable, but, one cannot but believe, untenable to the knowledge of those who pretended them. But the transaction would not have been thoroughly Ministerial unless disingenuousness has been added to its demerits. The Lord Advocate, who advised the course taken by Mr. Lowe in the matter, and upon whom a large share of the discredit must devolve, based his advice principally on the allegation that the Court of Session had no power to appoint a substitute under the circumstances in question, but that an Act of Parliament would be necessary legally to effect the substitution; and this statement again was supported by the alleged precedent of Sir Walter Scott and the shrievalty of Selkirkshire, in whose such an Act was passed. The argument was inconclusive at best; for there was no reason why an Act of Parliament should not have been passed, and it would have been only graceful in Mr. Young, under the circumstances, to have suggested it. But, such as the argument was, Mr. Lowe relied upon it in his answer to Mr. Bell's application. Will it be believed that the very preamble of the Act declares its irrelevance as a precedent that it actually recites that the sheriff of the county of Selkirk is incapacitated by disease from performing any of the functions of his office or appointing any substitute for their performance,' implying plainly that it was only Sir Walter Scott's then condition of mental aberration that precluded an alternative which would have rendered legislation unnecessary, and glaringly distinguishing the case from that of Mr. Bell, who was able, and had declared himself willing, to appoint a substitute? If Mr. Lowe had read this statute before he quoted it against Mr. Bell what are we to think of his candour? If he had not read it, and refused an application on the strength of a statute which he had not con-sulted, what are we to think of his sense of duty and responsibility? But enough; the thing is now done, and the Ministry have refuted our former assertion that there was no blunder left for them to commit. There was one-to alienate the people of Scotland-and they have committed it." Jurisprudence. 1. The Province and Pervading Notions of Jurisprudence. 2. The Growth of Law, including the History of Early Codes. 3. The General Principles of Legislation. (Text books: Austin's Jurisprudence, Sir H. Maine's Ancient Law and Village Communities, and Bentham par Dumont.) Public International Law. 1. The Province, History, and Sources of Public International Law. 2. International Rights of States in their Pacific Relations. (Text book: Wheaton's International Law. Private International Law. 1. The Province, Sources, and Maxims of Private International Law. 2. The Law of Domicil. |