it, "I think that the plaintiffs did not by their conduct enable Coles and Co. to hold themselves out as the proprietors of these goods so as to impose on the defendants; that the defendants were not imposed on; and even supposing that they were, they must have been guilty of gross negligence." That is a strong case, and we may take it that if we substitute for gross negligence, bare negligence, the case would remain the same.

This leads us straight up to the distinction between factors and brokers, thus referred to by Smith in his Mercantile Law: "Though if a factor sells goods in his own name, the buyer may avail himself of a right of set-off against the factor, yet, if a broker do so, the rule will, except under extraordinary circumstances, be different; for" (quoting Baring v. Corrie) "a factor who has the possession of goods differs materially from a broker; the factor is a person to whom goods are consigned, and when he sells in his own name it is within the scope of his authority; and it is right, therefore, that his principal should be bound by the consequences of such sale, one of which is the right of setting-off a debt due from the factor; but the case of a broker is different-he has not the possession of the goods, and so the vendee cannot be deceived by that circumstance If, therefore, he sells in his own name, he acts beyond the scope of his authority, and his principal will not be bound." It may be remarked, however, that something more than the description of a broker, as such, is necessary to raise the right of set-off, and if the broker so describe himself in conditions of sale, yet if he sell goods as principal, being enabled by possession to deceive the vendee, the true owner will be liable to be met by a set-off. This was the case in Blackburn v. Scholes (2 Camp. 341). There the marginal note at p. 343 says: "The circumstance of persons selling goods being described in the catalogue as sworn brokers is not sufficient notice to the purchaser that they are only agents, to prevent him from dealing with them as principals."

Analogous to the subject which we have been discussing is the doctrine of representation. As in the case of a broker dealing as principal, a person would contract with him the more readily if there were mutual credits between them, so representations of circumstances alleged to exist, although not the consideration for a contract, may induce it, and alter the position of the other side. The doctrine was considered in the case of The Citizens' Bank of Louisiana v. First National Bank of New Orleans (L. Rep. 6 E. & I. App. 352) where bills of exchange were sold on the representation that there were ample funds in the hands of third persons to meet them. That representation was held not to amount to an appropriation of the funds referred to, or an equitable assignment. Representations have been divided by the authorities into two classes, (1) representations of facts, and (2) representations of intentions. Lord Cranworth said in Jorden v. Money (5 H. of L. Cas. 213) "I think that the doctrine does not apply to the case where the representation is not of a fact, but a statement of something which the party intends or does not intend to do. In the former case it is a contract, in the latter it is not." And Lord Selborne said in the recent case, "I apprehend that nothing can be more certain than this, that the doctrine of equitable est oppel by representation is a wholly different thing from contract, or promise, or equitable assignment, or anything of that sort. foundation of that doctrine-which is a very important one, and certainly not one likely to be departed from-is this, that if a man dealing with another for value makes statements to him as to existing facts, which being stated would affect the contract, and without reliance upon which, or without the statement of which, the party would not enter into the contract, and which being otherwise than as they were stated, would leave the situation after the contract different from what it would have been if the representations had not been made: then the person making those representations shall, so far as the powers of a court of equity extend, be treated as if the representations were true, and shall be compelled to make them good. But those must be representations concerning existing facts.

The

We shall not further enter into that case, which is a very interesting one. It may be read with advantage, and well illustrates the necessity for correct knowledge on the part of parties to contracts to render contracts binding.

ON THE VALUATION OF ANNUITIES AND FUTURE AND CONTINGENT DEBTS AND LIABILITIES IN

BANKRUPTCY.

(36 & 37 VICT. c. 66, s. 22, SUB-SECT. 1.)

ARE annuities debts? On the one hand an “annuity creditor" is generally described, eo nomine, as in the repealed Bankruptcy Act 1849, sect. 172-the word "creditor" alone, therefore, appearing insufficient to include him-and annuities partake of the character of descendibility (e.g., a personal annuity to A. and his heirs), while debts do not; and do not partake of the attribute of nonassignability (which characterises debts), and "are not strictly choses in action," as is observed by Mr. Joshua Williams, who accordingly classifies them separately: (Personal Property, 3rd edit., 160). On the other hand, the Bankruptcy Act 1869, nowhere speaks of these annuities, eo nomine, and defines "debts

provable in bankruptcy "as including liabilities by the Act made provable in bankruptcy (sect. 4). Are they then "liabilities ?" which word is now a legal and legally defined one, at least for the purposes of bankruptcy, which definition, we presume, the Judicature Act adopts when it uses the word in the sub-section before us, since it nowhere itself defines it. A "liability " then, includes, for the purposes of the bankruptcy," any compensation for work or labour done, any obligation or possibility of an obligation to' pay money or money's worth on the breach of any express or implied covenant, contract, agreement, or undertaking. whether such breach does or does not occur, or is or is not likely to occur, or capable of occurring before the close of the bankruptcy; and, generally, any express or implied engagement, agreement, or undertaking to pay, or capable of resulting in the payment of, money or money's worth, whether such payment be, in respect of amount, fixed or unliquidated, as respects time present or future, certain or dependent on any one contingency, or on two or more contingencies; as to mode of valuation capable of being ascertained by fixed rules, or assessable only by a jury, or as matter of opinion" (Bankruptcy Act 1869, s. 31)-words so comprehensive, that it would seem hopeless to contend that they do not extend to "annuities."

66

The matter then stands thus: All debts and liabilities (except demands in the nature of unliquidated damages), present or future, certain or contingent, are debts provable in bankruptcy, and may be proved in the manner prescribed (i.e., prescribed by general rules of court, s. 4) before the trustee in bankruptcy. An estimate shall be made, according to the rules of the court for the time being in force, so far as the same may be applicable, and, where they are not applicable, at the discretion of the trustee, of the value of any debt or liability, which by reason of its being subject to any contingency or contingencies, or for any other reason, does not bear a certain value;" and then follows a right of appeal by the party aggrieved by any estimate of value made by the trustee, to the court. Then the Lord Chancellor with the advice of the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy, is empowered to make general rules for (inter alia) "the valuing of any debts" (not, observe, liabilities") "proveable in bankruptcy;" and "until such rules have been made" (and, none such have yet been made, and if made, they would hardly catch "annuities," unless they are "debts")" the principles, practice, and rules on which courts having jurisdiction in bankruptcy have hitherto acted, shall be observed:" (Bankruptcy Act 1869, s. 78.) Now, these "principles, practice, and rules" are those prescribed in the Bankruptcy Act 1849, viz., the court was "to ascertain the value by whatever assurance the annuity might be secured, regard being had to the original price given for it, deducting therefrom such diminution in the value thereof as may have been caused by the lapse of time from the grant to the date of the fiat or filing the petition for adjudication." Mr. Robson thinks that these principles of valuation are still applicable (Law of Bankruptcy, 1st edit. 173), and such would seem to be the case with regard to annuities, certain and absolute, unless, under sect. 31 of the Act of 1869, the discretion of the trustee extends to all annuities (as being "debts or liabilities which do not bear a certain value"), which, however, it is too much to contend. He appears to us, however, hardly correct in remitting us to the Act of 1819 for the valuation of contingent annuities.

"Rules of the court" (i.e., of "the court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy as by the Act of 1869 provided," see sect. 4), "for the time being applicable" to the making of an estimate of contingent annuities within sect. 31 there are none, simply because the Lord Chancellor has not yet made any, and therefore such annuities (if "liabilities ") must be valued by the trustee. But annuities certain and absolute, may still be valued under sect. 173 of the Bankruptcy Act 1849, because the principle of valuation there laid down is a "principle on which courts having jurisdiction in bankruptcy have hitherto acted" (sect. 78), and is therefore preserved.

And yet, if this be a correct representation of the law in bankruptcy, what can be more unsatisfactory than to be obliged, as the Judicature Act appears to oblige us, to have recourse, in the valuation of annuities, to the section of an Act which is no longer on the statute book (it having been wholly and expressly repealed by the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 83), and which cannot therefore with truth be said to contain any "rules which are in force for the time being under the law of bankruptcy," within the meaning of those words in the sub-section of the Judicature Act under consideration.

Had the Judicature Act defined "debt" as including "annuity," and had the sub-section used the words "valuation of debts and liabilities," instead of its present words "valuation of annuities and future or contingent liabilities," things would have been plainer, although even then there would have remained perhaps the question whether all annuities are within sect. 31 of the Bankruptcy Act 1869.

The sub-section, though it declares the rules in bankruptcy "shall prevail and be observed," as to debts and liabilities proveable, omits the valuation of future or contingent debts, and confines itself to the valuation of "annuities" and "liabilities." Is there, then, to be no adoption of the rules of bankruptcy in the

valuation of such debts? A future or contingent "liability," assuming, as we have said, that the Judicature Act adopts the new definition of "liability" given in the Bankruptcy Act, will be valued according to sect. 31, i.e., according to the rules of the Court of Bankruptcy in force where applicable, and if none apply, then at the trustee's discretion. Future or contingent "debts"-a much more numerous and probable class of cases-will, unless debt and liability are synonymous terms, remain to be estimated as best they may. The scope of the Bankruptcy Act has been enlarged, so as to admit proof of "liabilities" which were inadmissible before. The scope of the Judicature Act is to be narrowed, if we are right in our interpretation of it, by excluding the valuation of " debts" from it, for even if all "annuities" be " debts," all "debts" are clearly not "annuities."

The latter part of the sub-section, beginning with the words, "And all persons," seems superfluous; and the sub-section would end much better with the words "adjudged bankrupt; but, if it be retained, it should surely stand thus: "And all persons who, in any such case, would be entitled to prove for and receive dividend out of the estate of any such person, if a bankrupt" (not "any such deceased person") "may come in under the decree or order for the administration of such estate, and make such claim against or receive such payments out of the same". (making a claim alone would be no remedy) "as they would be entitled to under the law of bankruptcy "(not "by virtue of this Act").

DUTIES PAYABLE BY REASON OF DEATH.

(Continued from p. 194.)

THE decisions and the dicta of the judges go to the following extent: The estate of a person dying entitled to the proceeds of unsold real estate is liable to the payment of probate duty, because the sale ought and in equity is considered to have actually taken place. The estate of a person dying entitled to real estate, to be purchased with personal estate, is liable to the payment of probate duty, because at his death the property which actually passes upon his death is of a personal nature. A voluntary transferee of real estate from a reversioner who predeceases the tenant for life is subject only to duty by reason of the gift to him, and at a rate to be determined by the relationship between the transferor and transferee; but such transferee is not liable to the duty to which the transferor, had he survived the tenant for life, would have been subject, it being tacitly admitted by the Crown that the death of the reversioner puts an end to any claim for duty by reason of the original estate taken by him. A transferee for value from a reversioner, who predeceases the tenant for life is, however, liable to the payment of duty at the same rate to which the reversioner himself would have been liable had he survived the tenant for life, but upon a basis which may according to circumstances be either less or very much greater than that upon which the duty would have been calculated had the reversioner retained his property and survived the tenant for life.

We first propose to consider the question of probate duty. Is it right that real estate should or should not be liable to probate duty? The law does not make such a charge when a man dies seised of real estate. For what reasons? Because, we suppose, it is considered that real estate already otherwise bears its full share of public burdens. We are not aware of any other sufficient reason; and assuming that reason to be valid, upon what grounds can the charge of probate duty upon leasehold property be defended? Surely land in the holding of a leaseholder bears exactly the same burdens as it would were it in the hands of the freeholder. A. is a freeholder, and, in common language, is called the holder of a freehold ground rent. B. is his immediate lessee, and by reason of his having sub-let the propery is, in common language, called the holder of a leasehold ground rent. Both A. and B. receive their ground rents free of deduction except for property tax, yet upon the death of B. his estate has to pay probate duty upon the value of his ground rent, whereas upon A.'s death his estate altogether escapes probate duty in respect of his ground rent, which is more valuable than that of B. As the law stands, however, real estate upon the death of its owner contributes nothing in the shape of probate duty, and the only duty to which it is liable is succession duty, to which we shall presently refer. If, then, it is considered fit that real estate should altogether escape probate duty because of the other charges upon it, or for any other reason, we are at quite a loss to understand by what process of reasoning it can be considered fair that the fact of such real estate being held subject to such a power as in equity would for certain purposes confer upon such real estate the incidents of personalty, should make it liable to taxation, when but for such power it would wholly escape. If such power were to have the effect of freeing the land, whilst held subject thereto, from all or any of its other public burdens, which would clearly work an injustice to other landowners, we could understand the fairness of such a proposal, but to treat it as land for the purpose of one kind of taxation, which were it money it would altogether escape, and at the same time to treat it as money for the purpose of another kind of taxation to which land is not subject appears to us to be not only inequitable but simply unjust.

Admitting, however, that real estate directed to be sold should for the purpose of probate duty be considered as personalty, there appears to us to be no answer to the converse proposition that money directed to be invested in real estate should be considered real estate. It appears, however, to be the opinion of the court that such is not the law, which seems to us to be doing what is usually called blowing hot and cold.

The most glaring injustice seems to be worked when real estate is held for partnership purposes. In equity such real estate is, but solely for the partners' benefit, considered personalty, but why should such doctrine be carried further than its legitimate ends? Why should one house be chargeable with the payment of probate duty because it is used by two persons for the purpose of the trade in which they are partners, whereas the adjoining house, although it may be used for exactly the same kind of trade, is not so chargeable because the owner does not happen to have a partner? Can anything be more absurd? Why should the public be partly relieved of taxation in consequence solely of the private relations of the owners of the houses?

We will now consider the question of legacy and succession duty. If real estate be by will directed to be sold and the proceeds paid to A., he has to pay legacy duty upon the whole of the proceeds, whereas if the estate were given direct to him he would only have to pay succession duty at exactly the same rate, but calculated upon the basis of the value of his own life only. If the real estate were given to A. for life the amount of succession duty payable by him would be just the same as if the fee simple were given to him, with this exception, that if he died within four years and a half of his testator's death he would escape so many equal eighth-parts of the duty as there remained half years to complete that term. Why should a tenant for life and a tenant in fee have to pay exactly the same amount of duty when the estate of the latter is of a far greater saleable value than that of the former ? and why should a tenant in fee who has full powers of disposition which he subsequently exercises have to pay a far less amount of duty because his testator happened to give the property direct to him instead of directing it to be sold and giving him the proceeds? Again, why should a purchaser from a reversioner have to pay succession duty upon a different basis from that upon which his vendor would have paid it, and why should such purchaser have to pay duty when by reason of the death of his vendor it would but for the sale never have been payable, or if such purchaser is to pay such duty as would have been paid by the representatives of the vendor who would have taken the property if no sale had taken place, why should those representatives have to pay duty, both probate and legacy, upon the purchase moneys which but for the sale would never have passed to them, and would never have become liable to the duty?

Until

We can see no reason why probate duty should not be paid in respect of freeholds as well as upon leaseholds and money, and it would seem but right if the Government is entitled to a percentage of any dead man's property, that the real estate of A. should contribute as well as the personal property of B. 1853, unless the real estate were directed to be sold, no duty of any kind was payable by reason of its passing upon a death from one owner to another, but in that year it was made liable to succession duty, reckoned upon the value of the taker's life, whether such taker were absolutely entitled or not.

In cases of reversionary legacies passing by the death of the original legatee, two duties are payable, one under the will of the original testator and the other under the will of the original legatee. It does seem manifestly unfair that personal estate passing under wills should be subject to such accumulative duties. Assume a testator gave his personal property, amounting to 1000l., to his wife, a young woman, for life, and after her death to A., a stranger, and before the wife's death A. and three successive legatees, all strangers to each other, had bequeathed such legacy, the Crown would, irrespective of probate duty, be entitled to 3447., and the last legatee to 6561. By the Succession Duty Act provision is made for the payment of one duty only in respect of personal estate which passes from one successor to another by reason of death, so that in no case can the Crown become entitled to more than 10 per cent., and that only from the person who becomes entitled to the actual enjoyment of the property. If it be considered unfair to charge double duty when the interest passes, by reason of death, under settlements, why should it be otherwise when a similar interest passes by the same reason under wills? No intelligible reason can be given.

Another thing strikes us as improper. Probate Duty and Probate Court fees are payable upon a scale according to the value of the testator's personal property. In estimating such value no deduction is allowed on account of debts, and until very recently no deduction was even allowed for debts secured upon mortgage of leaseholds, the result being that when a man in a large way of business happens to die, his executors have to pay a very large sum for duty and fees, whereas perhaps the estate is of small actual value, or perhaps insolvent. It is true that a return of the duty can be obtained, but the process is by no means an casy or inexpensive one, and no return can be had of the court fees.

It appears to us that probate duty should be payable upon the

of the will: the court held, that none of the documents were sufficiently identified as being in existence when the will was executed, and refused probate of all three: (In the Goods of Matilda Zockey, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 699. Prob.)

THE APPORTIONMENT ACT-CONSTRUCTION OF WILL MADE BEFORE. Capron v. Capron, before Malins, V.C., on Wednesday, was a special case to obtain the opinion of the court upon an important question as to the construction of the Apportionment Act 1870, under the following circumstances:-The late Mr. George Capron, of Southwick Hall, in the county of Northampton, by his will, drted the 2nd April 1866, after bequeathing certain life annuities, payable quarterly, and charging them upon his estate in the county of Northampton (of which he was seised in fee), devised that estate (in effect) to his eldest son for life, with remainder in strict settlement. By a codicil, dated the 1st July 1871, he made certain trifling alterations in, and subject thereto ratified and confirmed, his will. and he died on the 24th April 1872. The rents of such parts of the testator's Northampton estate as were let on lease were payable at Lady-day and Michaelmas, and the question then arose whether the persons who were interested in his residuary personal estate were not under the recent Apportionment Act of 1870 (which came into operation on the 1st Aug. 1870) entitled, as against the devisee of the estate, to have the rents apportioned and such part of them as accrued before the day of the testator's death paid to

them.

The VICE-CHANCELLOR said the point which

decision to fetter his Honour's discretion, and moreover, if the Legislature had intended such an exception they would probably have expressed it. No doubt every testator while making his will must be supposed to have in view the state of the law at the time; but in this case the testator, though he made his will before the passing of the Act, made a codicil after the passing of the Act, whereby, subject to certain alterations not affecting the present question, he ratified and confirmed his will. This amounted to a repetition and republication of every word so confirmed, and, in fact, rendered the will a will made after the Act. It was also very material to observe that the old Act directed an apportionment of the periodical payments therein mentioned, "under any instrument that shall be executed after the passing of this Act, or (being a will or testamentary disposition) that shall come into operation after the passing of this Act." So that as the former Act applied to a will executed before, but taking effect after the Act, it was in the last degree improbable that the Legislature should have intended the recent Act, which was expressed in very general terms, to have this limited operation. There must be a declaration that there must be an apportionment of the rents in the special case mentioned, and that such portion of them as accrued before the death of the testator belonged to his general personal estate.

Correspondence.

SALE OF PRACTICES.-Is it too much to hope speedy steps to remedy the abuses now perpetrated that the Legal Practitioners' Society will take by law accountants and agents in connection with the disposal of legal practices? SOLICITOR.

[We think the sale of solicitors' businesses may well be taken in hand by the Profession in some way, but, as we understand, the object of the Legal Practitioners' Society, the above is hardly a subject with which they can deal.-ED. SOLS'. DEP.]

UNQUALIFIED PERSONS.-In your impression of Saturday last I notice a letter upon "Our Invaders," C. and V. I have seen several of their circulars during the last few months, I wish I had known as much twelve months ago, for then I answered their advertisement, which appears daily in the Standard and Telegraph. I wanted a divorce, and was without money, as I am still; they said the case was very simple, and undertook it on spec. Week after week during the year they pro

even had it registered for hearing. Now I am in a dilemma. The witnesses then on the spot, are now some distance out of London, and I am without means. VICTIM.

had arisen in this case as to the construction of the Apportionment Act of 1870 (the construction of which had already caused some difficulty) was one of very great and general importance. In this case the testator, who was seised in fee, had devised his estates in strict settlement; but, in considering the question, there was no difference in principle between that and an absolute devise, and the question was in effect the simple onewhether in all cases where a testator seised in fee devised a particular estate, and died between the half-yearly or quarterly days for the payment of his rents, there should be an apportionment of those rents between his own personal estate and his devisee. The state of the law before the recent Apportionment Act was clear; in all cases of money lent the interest was considered as accruing from day to day, and the personal repre-mised me the case would come on, but they never sentative of the testator was entitled to an appor tionment, but where an estate was devised the devisee was entitled to the whole rents from the last day of payment, and the representative of the devisor was not entitled to any apportionment. This was felt to be a defective state of things, and in August 1870, was passed the Act now under consideration, which, after reciting "whereas rents and some other periodical payments are not at common law apportionable (like interest or money lent) in respect of time, and for remedy of some of the mischiefs and inconveniences thereby arising divers statutes had been passed," by its 2nd section enacted that after the passing of the Act "all rents, annuities, dividends, and other periodical payments in the nature of income (whether received or made payable under an instrument under seal or otherwise) shall, like inte rest on money lent, be considered as accruing from day to day, and be apportionable in respect of time accordingly." This his Honour read as a general provision applying to this very case, and, according to it, every day a fresh sum of rent was to be considered as falling due, and the rent of every day which fell due before the death of the testator must go to this estate. Such would have been his decision if there had been no authority upon the case, but in the case of Roseingrave

V.

Burke (Ir. Rep. 7, Eq. 186), the ViceChancellor of Ireland, in a carefully considered judgment, had arrived at the same conclusion. It had been said that that case was decided in chambers, but it had been argued by counsel, and he presumed reported by the sanction of the judge, and his Honour did not consider that it was entitled to less consideration because it was delivered in one room rather than in another. The case of Jones v. Ogle (L. Rep. 8 Ch. 192), had been cited as an authority the other way. In that case, however, the dividend and income of the testator's share in the Lillishall Iron Company were the actual subject of the bequest, and the decision of the Court of peal entirely turned upon the effect of the terms of the testator's will. A testator could do what he pleased with his property, and if in this case he had chosen to say, "I give my lands and all the rents accruing in respect thereof," that would have made the case more like Jones v. Ogle. There were, it was true, certain expressions used by one of the learned judges who had decided Jones v. Ogle, which rather seemed to imply a doubt whether the Act should apply to an instrument already executed. There was, however, no

UNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE
BANK OF ENGLAND.

[Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the
National Debt, and which will be paid to the persons
respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three
months, unless other claimants sooner appear.]

COLES (Henry Beaumont), Middleton House, Long Parish,
Whitchurch, Hants, Esq.; BIRD Rev. Roger), of Inle-
tham, near Sevenoaks, clerk, and FELLOWES (Rev. Henry
John), of Over Wallop, Hants, clerk. £991 19s. ed. Three
per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, said Rev. Henry John
Fellowes, the survivor.

COLES (Henry Beaumont), Middleton House, Long Parish,
Hauts. Esq., and IREMONGER (Wm.), of Wherwell, Hants,
Esq. £128 28. 108. Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant,
John James, surviving executor of Henry Beaumont
Coles, deceased, who was the survivor.

ORD (Rev. John Alexander Blackett). Whitfield Hall,
Hayden-bridge, Northumberland. £8817 14s. 7d. Three
per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, Anne Jane Blackette
Ord, widow. sole executrix of Rev. J. A. B. Ord, deceased.
RANSFORD (Henry), Huron Lodge, Boltons, West Bromp-
ton, Esq. £51 11s. 6d. New Thiee per Cent. Annuities.
Claimant, said Henry Ransford.

SBAPTER (John). Lincoln's-inn, HARVEY (John), of St.
John's-wood, BUSK Hans), jun.. of the Middle Temple.
and SMITH (Win. John Bernhard), of the same place, all
Esqrs. £87 188. 1d. Three per Cent. Annuities, Cla mants,
said John Shapter, Hans Busk jun., and Wm. John B.
Smith, the survivors.

SINGLETON (Henry S.), South Audley-street, Middlesex,
Esq. £189 88, 8d. New Three Per Cent. Annuities.
Claimant, said Henry Sydenham Singleton.
WILLOUGHBY (Mary Ann), and WILLOUGHBY (Charlotte),
both of Cunningham place, St. John's-wood, spinsters.
£300 Three Per Cent Aunnities. Claimant, said Mary
Ann Willoughby, spinster, the survivor.

APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT-STOCK WINDING-UP ACTS. MAREZZO MARBLE COMPANY (LIMITED).-Petition for winding-up to be heard Jan. 31, before the M.R. NEUCHATEL BITUMINOUS ROCK PAVING COMPANY LIMITED. -Creditors to send in by Feb. 11 their names and addresses, and the particulars of claims. to Lord Wm. M. Hay and Edward Wm. Bonham, care of Bischoff and Co., 4, Great Winchester-street-buildings, London, the liqui dators of the said company. Ap-TUMACACORI MINING AND LAND COMPANY (Limited). Peti. tion for winding-up, to be heard Jan. 30, before V. C. M. CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. LAST DAY OF PROOF. BAILEY (Julia E. R.), 29, Grosvenor-place, Bath, widow. Feb. 16; Thos. H. Gill, solicitor. Devenport, March 2; M. R., at 11.30 o'clock. BOOTH (Edward), late of Manchester, and lately carrying on business at Gorton and Salford as gum and starch manufacturer. Feb. 7; R. Page, solicitor, 2, Clarance-buildings, Booth-street, Manchester, Feb 21; V. C. B., at 12 o'clock. CHEKE (John M.), Bancoorah, Bengal, India. March 19; Thos. Plews, solicitor, 14, Old Jewry-chambers, London, England, March 26; M. R., at 11 o'clock.

CHAFFIN (Matthew H.), 19, Berners-street, Oxford-street, Middlesex, gentleman. Feb. 14; Wm. Neal, solicitor, 4, Pinner's Hall, Old Broad-street, London, Feb. 25; M. R., at 11 o'clock.

COLEY (Chas. Wm.), Aberdeen Park, Highbury, and 178 and 180, Essex-road, Islington, and of Holloway-road (corner of Hornsey-road), Islington, Middlesex, pawnbroker. Feb. 16; E. Boulton, solicitor, A, Northamptonsquare, Clerkenwell, Middlesex. Feb. 25; V.C. M, at twelve o'clock. COLEMAN (Wm.), Tewkesbury, Gloucester, brewer. March 11: C. H. Jagger, solicitor, Cannon-street, Birmingham, March 18: V.C. M., at twelve o'clock. COOKE (Catherine P.), Harwich, Essex, widow. Feb. 16; F. R. Hale, solicitor, 74, King William-street, London. Feb. 23; V.C. H., at ten o'clock. FISHER (John), Southampton, shopkeeper. Feb. 16; Edward Coxwell, solicitor, Southampton. Feb. 26; V.C. H., at ten o'clock.

HIGGINS (William), Monmouth, grocer. Feb. 28; R. J. Child, solicitor, 11, Old Jewry Chambers, London. March 2; V.C. M, at twelve o'clock.

HILL (John), Aylesbury, Bucks, miller. Feb. 28: A. Cox, solicitor, 28, St. Swithin's-lane, London. March 2; V.C. B., at twelve o'clock. KEEN (Wm.), 1-3, Essex-road, Middlesex. March 20; H. R. Silchester, solicitor, 15, Great Dover-street, Southwark, Surrey. March 5; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock. NICHOLSON (Wm.), East Ville, Lincoln, farmer. Feb. 20; F. T. White, solicitor, Boston, Lincoln. March 3; M. B., at twelve o'clock. PYE (John), Packington-street and Essex-road, Islington, Middlesex, tea dea er and grocer. Feb. 28; Wm. Mote, solicitor, 1, South-quare, Gray's Inn, Middlesex. March 10; V.C. H., at twelve o clock.

STEPHENSON (Mark), Ossett, York, mill owner. Feb. 16; John Barker, solicitor. Dewsbury. March 4; M. R., at half-past eleven o'clock.

TEALE Benjamin H.), Leeds, gentleman. Feb. 28; Wm. B. Craven, solicitor, East Parade, Leeds. March 17; V.C.B., at twelve o'clock.

CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. Last Day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent. ANDREWS (Alexander), 3, Grove-villas, Albion-grove, Stoke Newington, Middlesex, gentleman. Feb. 10: Law, Hu-sey, and Halbert, solicitors, 10, New-square, Lincoln s-iun, London. BARKER (Rev. Chas. A.), late of Apedale-road, Chesterton, Stafford, previously of the Old Hall, Chesterton, and formerly of 12, Onslow-square, Middlesex. April 10; Dod and Longstaffe, solicitors, 16, Berners-street, Middlesex. BIGG (Thomas), 3. Manor-place, Ospringe-street, FaverSam, Kent, gentleman. Feb. 28; F. Johnson, solicitor, 67, Preston-street, Faversham.

BRIDEN, otherwise BATSON (Wm. E., West Croydon, Surre, surgeon. Feb. 21; Wright and Pilley, solicitors, 25. Bedford-row, London.'

BROWN (Ann), Willenhall, Stafford, widow. Feb. 16; Crowther Davies, solicitor, 25, Bennett's hill, Birmingham, and John Clarke, solicitor, Willenhall. BURROUGHES (Rev. Jeremiali), Lingwood, Norfolk. Feb. 23; Fosters, Burroughes, and Robberds, solicitors, Bankstreet, Norwich. CECIL (Clarence F.), Dronfield Lodge, Kilburn. Middlesex, Esq. Feb. 2; J. S. Ward, solicitor, 52, Lincoln's-infields, London. CHAPMAN (Henry), Sheffield, pawnbroker. Feb. 10; Burdekin and Co., solicitors, Sheffield. CLARK (John), M.D., 4, St. Luke's-place, Cork, Ireland, doctor of medicine, staff surgeon. Feb. 15; Hillyer, Fenwick, and Stibbard, solicitors, 12, Fenchurch-street, London. EDEN Hon. Dulcibella M.), Hampton Court Palace, Middlesex, spinster, Feb. 16; Pownall and Co., solicitors, 9, Staple-inn, London.

FROOME (Mary A.), Zinzan-place, Reading, Berks, spinster. Feb. 10; C. W. Hoffman, solicitor, 59, Broad-street, Reading, Berks.

GRUNDON (Thos.), formerly of North Shore, late of 95. Kichmond-street, both in the county of Newcastle-uponTyne innkeeper. March 2; J. G. and J. E. Joel, solicitors, Newcastle-upon-Tyne.

HAY Wm. J.), late of 3, Powis-gardens, Bayswater, Middlesex, Esq., formerly Admiralty chemist at H.M. Dockyard, Portsmouth. Feb. 20; R. J. H. Tucker, 26, Piccadilly, London.

HOLDEN (Oliver), Upper Parliament-street, Liverpool, coal merchant. Feb. 14; Gates and Martin, solicitors, 10, Water-street, Liverpool.

LLOYD (Frederick A.), Park-road, West Brompton, Middle-
sex, Esq. March 1; G scotte, Wadrain, and Daw, solici-
tors, 19, Essex-street, Strand, London.
MAY (Wm.), formerly of Brickdam, afterwards of 18, Upper
Lesson-street, Marylebone, both in the county of Middle-
sex, currier, and late of 33, Henry-street East, Portland-
town, Middlesex, of no occupation. Jan. 24; Drake and
Son, solicitors, 3, Cioak-laue, Cannon-street, London.
MAY (Sarah), 16, Newport-terrace, Barnstaple. widow.
Feb. 28; Willoughby and Cox, solicitors, 13, Clifford's-inn,
London,

MCCLURE (Sir Robert J. Le Mesurier), C.B., 25, Duke.
street, St. James's, Middlesex, Jan. 30; Chauntrell and
Pollock, solicitors, 63, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Middlesex.
MURRAY (Albert Wm.), 41, Great Ormond-street, Middle-
Rex, a retired major in the 5th Middlesex or Royal
Elthorne Militia. Feb. 21; S. Hamilton, solicitor, 11,
Great James-street, Bedford-row, Middlesex.
MURRAY (Hon. Dame Emily), Wimbledon Lodge, Wimble-
don, Surrey, widow. Feb. 28; G. Bramwell, solicitor, 73,
Chester-square, London, S. W.
NESBITT (Elizabeth), 6, Victoria Villas, Mortlake-road.
Richmond, Surrey, widow. Feb. 11; Vandercom, Law,
Hardy, and Aston, solicitors, 23, Bush-lane, London.
PHILLIPS (John), Castle-square, Haverfordwest, retired
chemist and druggist. Feb. 28; Wm. John and Son,
solicitors, 5, Victoria-place, Haverfordwest.

POCOCK (Edw., 59, Burton-crescent, Middlesex, gentleman.
March 10; T. Angell, solicitor, 27, Greshamn-street, Bank,
London.

RANKEN (Cecilia), formerly of Hammersmith, Middlesex, then of Apsley-place, Ciapham, Surrey, and late of Upper Berwick, near Lewes, Sussex, spinster. Feb. 19; Randall and Angier, solicitors, 3, Gray's-inn-place, Gray's-inn, Middlesex.

RICHARDS (Jane), Gloucester, spinster. March 2; Thos, L.
Poole, solicitor, 9, Bell-lane, Gloucester.
SEAGER (Jas. L), Millbank, Midd esex, and Carrong House,
South Lambeth, Surrey, Esq. Feb. 8; Cope, Rose, and
Pearson. solicitors, 26, Great George.street, Westminster,
Middlesex.

SHADFORTH (Elizabeth), Nether Heworth Hall, Durham,
widow. Win, and W. Dickson, solicitors. Alnwich.
SMITH (Rebecca), London-road, near Gloucester, widow.
March 2; Thos. L. Poole, solicitor, 9. Bell-lane, Glou-

cester.

STURDY (Daniel), senior, 18, Priory-road. Wandsworthroad, Surrey, Esq. Feb. 14; Fladgate, Clarke, and Smith, solicitors, 40, Craven-street, Strand. SWIFT (Elizabeth), Kingston-upon-Hull. Feb. 3; Tom Turaner, solicitor, Beverley. TROWER (Penelope Frances), Unsted Wood, near Godal. ming, Surrey, widow. Feb. 16; Bell, Stewarts, and Co., solicitors, 49, Lincolns-inn-fields, Middlesex. WALROND (Rev. Theodore A.), 23, Belmont-park, Lee. Kent. Feb. 2; J. and J. Hopgood, solicitors, 17a, Whitehall-place, London, S.W.

YATES (Elizabeth), 285, Kennington-road, Surrey, widow. Feb. 12; W. F. Baker and Lawrance and Co., solicitors, 15, Old Jewry-chambers, London. YATES (Thomas), late of 285, Kennington-road, Surrey, formerly known as 28, Chester-place, Kennington-cross,

12, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Middlesex.

MAGISTRATES' LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. COUNTY BRIDGE-DAMAGE BY LOCOMOTIVEREPAIR.-The Locomotive Act (24 & 25 Vict. c. 70,

8. 7), enacts that where any bridge on a turnpike or other road, carried across any stream, watercourse, or navigable river, canal, or railway, shall be damaged by reason of any locomotive passing over the same, or coming into contact therewith, none of the proprietors, undertakers, directors, conservators, trustees, commissioners, or other persons interested in, or having charge of, such navigable river, canal, or railway, or of such bridge, shall be liable to repair the damage, &c., but the same shall be repaired to the satisfaction of such proprietors, &c., by the owners or persons having charge of the locomotive at the time of the happening of the damage. Held, that this provision does not apply to bridges repairable by the inhabitants of a county: (Reg v. Kitchener, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 697. C. Cas. R.).

LOCAL GOVERNMENT-NEW BUILDING-BYELAWS.-21 & 22 Vict. c. 98, s. 34, empowers every local board to make bye-laws (inter alia) "with respect to the structure of walls of new buildings for securing stability and the prevention of fires," and to " provide for the observance of the same by enacting therein such provisions as they think necessary as to the giving of notices." The appellants, a local board, acting under the above section, passed a bye-law requiring notice to be given to them before the commencement of any new building. The respondent possessed a stable within the district of the local board. The back of the stable was formed by a wall of the yard in which it stood; the other three sides were of wood. Without giving notice to the appellants, he pulled the stable down and rebuilt it in another part of the yard, so that two of the yard walls formed two sides of the erection, and the other two sides were reconstructed with the old materials. He put on a fresh roof. The respondent having been summoned before justices for the breach of the above-mentioned bye-law, they stated a case, under 20 and 21 Vict. c. 43, wherein they minutely decribed the nature of the restored stable, and decided that the building was not a 66 new building" within the meaning of

KENT GENERAL SESSION.
Tuesday, Jan. 13.

(Chairman: Col. J. T. LENNARD).

Alehouse Licenses.

most important that the privacy of the telegraph should be kept up.

Russell said the course he pursued would insure privacy.

GROVE, J.-But the inspection is of no use to you unless you can make some use of the telegrams before me.

Russell.-We intend to make some use of them, Ballantine, Serjt. said he would leave his learned friend to take his own course; he would neither conceal nor admit anything, nor would he propose any modus operandi.

GROVE, J. thought that at all events there THE quarter session for the county was held at should be some limit laid down as to the examina

Maidstone.

A letter was read from Mr. T. F. Walker, clerk to the justices of the Tunbridge Division, relative to the fee for serving the notices required by Geo. 4, c. 61, p. 15, which enacts that it shall be lawful for the clerk to the justices to receive from each person to whom an alehouse licence is granted (amongst other sums) the sum of 18. for the constable or other peace officer for serving the notices, &c., required by the Act to be served. Mr. Walker goes on to say, "Since the parish constables have ceased to be appointed the county police have served the notices, and the question arises whether the fee should now be charged. I hear that in some divisions it was not taken at the recent annual licensing meeting, and that in those divisions in which it was taken it was proposed by the clerks to the justices to apply it to the police superannuation fund. In this division the fees were received, and the amount (£8 15s.) is still in my hands. Under these circumstances I thought it well to mention the matter to the magistrates at the petty sessions, and I was directed by them to request you to be good enough to bring the subject before the next court of general sessions, with the view of obtaining its opinion as to the propriety or otherwise of charging the fee and the mode of its appropriation in case the court should be of opinion that it should still be charged."

The Clerk of the Peace read a lengthy opinion on the subject, the substance of, which was that there was no statute relieving the applicant from would, he thought, best comply with the law if the necessity of paying the fee; and the justices they directed the clerks to the justices to continue to demand the 1s. fee, and to pay it over to the treasurer to be applied by him in aid of the police rates, and that it should not be applied to the police superannuation fund. After some discussion, the committee was requested to renew communications with the Canterbury Town Council relative to the use of the police station.

When holden.

Monday, Jan. 26

Friday, Jan. 30

Saturday, Jan. 24

Wednesday, Jan. 28...... Wednesday, Jan. 28..

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. RIGHT OF AN IRISH PEER TO VOTE.-An Irish peer, who is not a member of the House of Commons, is not entitled to have his name kept on the register so as to be able to vote, in the event of his being elected to the House of Commons at a future time: (Lord Rendlesham v. Tabor, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 679. C. P.) BOROUGH FRANCHISE OCCUPATION ABSENCE.-A clergyman who goes abroad, having placed a curate in his house, and having locked up three rooms for his own use, without an animus revertendi, for six months previous to the 31st July, is not entitled to vote under either 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 45, or the Representation of the People Act 1870 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 102): (Durant v. Carter, 29 L. T. Rep, N. S. 681. C. P.) BOROUGH FRANCHISE OCCUPATION - EXCHANGE OF HOUSE.-A man has not resided within the borough for six calendar months previous to the last day of July, within the 27th section of 2 Will. 4, c. 45, when he has for a portion of that time exchanged houses with a friend in another part of England, and had no intention of returning, and does not return until the expiration of the time agreed upon between them: (Penn v. Pye, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 684. C. P.)

UNAUTHORISED ALTERATION OF LISTS-NoTICE OF OBJECTION.-In the copy of the register of voters for the county, sent by the clerk of the peace to the overseers, the appellant, a voter, was described as of a particular place. The overseers, knowing that he had ceased to reside there, struck out the name of the place, inserted that of the place where the voter actually did reside, and published the list so altered. Previously to the annual revision of the lists, a notice of objection was sent by post to the voter, directed to his true

address, as described in the list when altered. The revising barrister deemed the notice sufficient, and expunged the voter's name. Held, that the alteration of the list being beyond the powers given to the overseers by 6 Vict. c. 8, s. 5, the list so altered could not be "deemed to be the list of voters," within sect. 6, and, therefore, that the notice, not having been directed to the appellant, "at his place of abode, as described in the said list of voters," according to the provisions of sect. 100, was improperly served, and the barrister's decision erroneous: (Nosworthy v. The Overseers of Rutland, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 675. C.P.).

tion.

Russell.-That cannot be; that cannot be done. Ballantine, Serjt.-This is a Government concern, and not a private matter. It is like opening

a letter from the Post-office.

GROVE, J. said it was very like calling a postman to say what were the contents of a letter passing through his hands.

Harrison said there were three cases in which

it had been held that telegrams were not privileged.

GROVE, J. said it was rather a formidable thing to say that a counsel, simply because he represented a party in a suit, could ask to have telegrams examined. The Bridgwater case was before the telegraphs had passed into the hands of the Government. It was a point of extreme importance, and before deciding it he should like to ask the opinion of the other election judges upon the matter. It was a point upon which much would depend, and it was very desirable that there should be a general opinion.

Russell. It is clear that they are not privi. leged.

GROVE, J.-Where do you find that point? Was it so held before, or has it been ruled since the telegraphs came into the hands of the Govern

ment ?

Russell. I apprehend that does not make any difference at all.

GROVE, J.-I am not sure of that.

Russell.-There is no case on the subject since Government has had the telegraphs; but I can difference. hardly conceive any reason why there should be a

GROVE, J.-I can see there is some distinction. A message is handed to the Post-office, and the Government is trusted to take certain measures with regard to it.

Russell said when the private companies had the telegraphs they were bound in honour to keep telegrams private, unless a judicial emergency required their disclosure. There was no higher duty laid on the Government than this. They had merely consolidated the companies. As to letters, those that passed to and from candidates and their agents, let them be ever so private, they were bound to be produced when called for.

Jan. 20.-GROVE, J., on taking his seat this morning, said: I have received answers from my learned brothers whom I consulted about the application for the production of the telegrams which passed during the election, and their opinion is very strong, coinciding with that which I rather intimated, without giving an absolute decision upon, on Saturday. Their opinion is that I decidedly ought not to interfere to compel, or even to say anything to the post-office officer, to induce him to produce these telegrams. I do not wish to go into the reasons of this decision, because I do not desire to say that cases may not arise where strong specific grounds may justify the interposition of the election judge. I take it that the witness from the post-office declines to produce the telegrams on his own authority. I do not propose to interfere with the post-office in the matter. I neither compel nor invite them to produce the telegrams.

Russell. There were one or two particular telegrams as to which we desired to make a specific inquiry, but I may at once say that unless we got a full examination of the telegrams which passed between certain persons during the election, it would be perfectly useless to go further into the matter, and I shall make no further apinspec-plication to your Lordship.

GROVE, J.-Not letters of third parties? Russell.-To and from candidates and agents. GROVE, J.-Well, there is the very beginning of the case. You must prove agency. Russell. We do not ask for this merely as a fishing examination.

GROVE, J. said that might not be, but there was a wider question involved. It was a matter on which he now felt more than ever that the opinion of all the election judges should be taken, so that there should be a general ruling. On public grounds there was a good deal of difficulty in assenting to the request, and though it might not be of much moment here, yet on some future occasion it might be of the greatest importance.

Jan. 22.-Ballantine, Serjt., at the sitting of the court to-day, said he had carefully considered the suggestion made last night by his Lordship as to the calling of Rollings; but, whatever his own opinion