night have been, he found that he had no alternative in the matter, seeing that his learned friend the Attorney-General insisted upon every witness who could throw any light upon the inquiry being placed in the box. Under these circumstances he should reserve any further comments upon the evidence until after the witnesses were called. The first witness he proposed to call was the Attorney-General himself. Sir Henry James, examined by Giffard, explained the circumstances under which he first undertook to contest the borough in 1868. He was invited by some of the constituents to come down, and undertook to do so on the distinct understanding that no corrupt practices would be resorted to, that he should not be required to attend a meeting at any public-house, and that no committee-room should be held at a public-house. These conditions were complied with, and he came down to Taunton. He was seated on petition. Mr. Lane acted as his agent, but was since dead. Mr. Burman, a tradesman, was then appointed, and acted for him in 1873. There was very little drunkenness during the contest, and only on two occasions was he asked for drinkeach time by a woman. One voter wrote a letter to him asking for £5. His canvass was purely a personal one. He was not accompanied in it by Mr. Burman. His canvass was highly successful, and throughout the polling he had no reason to believe that he was ever at the bottom of the poll. One of his agents told him after the polling that he was beaten, and that was the first time he had any reason to suppose that his opponent had a chance of success. It turned out, however, to be a mistake on the part of his agent, and was soon rectified. In regard to Rollings, he knew nothing of him further than as an active member of the Land and Labour League, and never employed him as an agent or canvasser. After some further evidence, the court adjourned. whether it was filed within the six days required Cottingham wished the court to take note of Ambrose contended that the court had decided on the simple question that they had not left the notice at the rule office on the sixth day. The question whether the six "clear" days was not touched upon, because it was a custom with the court never to decide upon a point which did not arise. The trial was to be on the 20th. The list was tendered on the 13th, but not left till the 14th. For his part, if it had been left on the (Before T. W. SAUNDERS, Esq., Recorder of Bath, 13th, he was convinced that it would have been Commissioner.) MANCHESTER SESSIONS COURT. At the election for Exchange Ward, in November The commissioner refused to dismiss the petition In this case a petition had been lodged by Mr. Nield against the return of Mr. Batty for Exchange Ward in November last, at which election there had been a tie between these two candidates, and the mayor, who was the returning officer, gave his casting vote in favour of Mr. Batty. The petition declared that the respondent was not duly elected by a majority of lawful votes, and therefore a scrutiny was prayed for. A rule nisi had been applied for and obtained by Mr. Ambrose in the Court of Common Pleas, calling upon the respondent, Mr. Batty, to show cause why the petitioner should not be at liberty to give evidence against the list of voters tendered at the rule office, and why the said list should not be filed. It appeared that the petitioners had deferred the filing of the list to the last moment, and it was a question in time. When the list was tendered on the 13th, Pleas with the result above stated. title him to a verdict in his favour. Cottingham refused to accede to the suggestion. He argued that the petitioners tried, by the ruse of keeping back the information as long as they could, to put the respondent to a disadvantage, and as they had not complied with the law, they must abide by the consequences. A long discussion then ensued on the question of costs, Cottingham contending that the costs should fall on the defeated party. Ambrose said that all precedents tended to show that the costs in a case under these peculiar circumstances should not fall on the petitioner, who was ready to go on with his case, but was met by a frivolous technical objection. Cottingham said if the petition had been withdrawn altogether no court would have refused to give the respondent costs, and the petitioner said he would have withdrawn if he had had time to do so. Ambrose contended that the commissioner had a Cottingham having briefly replied. of £500. He had shown that he was animated by a desire honestly to go on with and have the petition tried. He (the Commissioner) did not, therefore, look upon his conduct as being in any way tinctured by frivolity or insincerity. The 7th rule provided that the list of objections should be filed six days before the day of trial. That meant that one day should be included, and another excluded, and therefore if the particulars had been filed on the 13th they would have been in time. The clerk who tendered them volun tarily took them away again, but if he had insisted upon their being received, the question would have arisen whether the tender was not in fact a filing. No doubt the petitioner drove the thing to the last moment. It was a pity that he was not more liberal in his views, and did not file his particulars in ample time, but he did nothing more than he was lawfully justified in doing. The particulars, however, were not strictly filed, and the respondent had a right to rely upon that, and so far he had the advantage of retaining his seat. He could not shut his eyes to the fact that this was a bona fide petition. There were on both sides a great many questionable matters for the consideration of the court, but it was impossible for him to suggest which side would have been victorious. Here, however, was a bona fide petition, honestly presented, and he could not look upon it as being in any way frivolous. It failed to some extent on a techni cality. He thought the petitioner had the moral merits of the case, and did not think that he was called upon to visit him with the costs, he there. fore made no order as to costs, and should certify that Mr. Batty had been duly elected. Cottingham thought the Commissioner had power to reserve a point of law, and he wished the point in reference to the construction of the Act of Parliament on the question of the time of notice to be reserved. The COMMISSIONER said his discretion as to costs was unfettered, and Mr. Cottingham could hardly go to the Court of Common Pleas with a case as to how he exercised his discretion. Grundy (who represented the Mayor).-I under stand you to dismiss the question of costs with regard to Mr. Batty and to grant costs to the Mayor? Ambrose said he must consent to an order that the returning officer should have his costs. He must also consent to the costs of the town clerk being allowed. objections were made to votes upon which the The COMMISSIONER remarked that a number of register was conclusive. For instance, voters the ward sufficiently long, or because they were were objected to because they had not resided in not duly rated to the poor. The court had nothing to do with these questions. both sides, and a question would have arisen as to Ambrose said these objections were made on them. The proceedings then terminated. REAL PROPERTY AND NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. BILL OF SALE-COVENANT TO PAY 66 IMME DIATELY ON DEMAND "-REASONABLE TIME FOR PAYMENT-CONSTRUCTION.-By a bill of sale dated the 15th April 1873, the plaintiff assigned all his goods, &c., to the defendant to secure & sum of £100, upon the express condition that if the plaintiff did not "immediately upon demand thereof in writing," delivered to the plaintiff or left for him at his home, pay the money due, it shall be lawful for the defendant to seize and sell the goods comprised in the bill of sale. On the 27th April 1873, the defendants went with bailiffs to the plaintiff's house and there saw the plaintiff's wife and son, who told him that the plaintiff was from home, they knew not where, and that he might be gone to America for aught they knew. The defendant then read and delivered to the wife and son a written demand for payment, which not being complied with, he at once put the bailiffs in possession, and after an interval of eight days sold the goods. The plaintiff returned to his home on the 8th May, and said he had started with the £100 to go to S. on business, but had gone to R., had got drunk, and remained away on a spree." In an action against the defendant for so seizing and selling the plaintiff's goods, it was held by the Court of Exchequer Kelly, C.B., and Bramwell and Pollock, BB.) that the defendant was under the circumstances perfectly justified by the terms of the bill of sale in seizing the goods as he did, immediately upon the demand having been made as above stated. Toms v. (Wilson and another in the Q.B. and Ex. Chamber (7 L. T. Rep. N. S. 421, 8 ib. 799; 3 B. & S. 422 and 455; 30 L. J. 32 and 382, Q.B.), and Massey, Sladen and others in the Exchequer (L. Rep. 4 Ex. 13; 38 L. J. 34, Ex.), discussed and distinguished: (Wharlton v. Kirkwood, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 644. Ex.) VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT-WORDS OF LIMITATION IN GRANT-LIFE ESTATE.-A., by a voluntary settlement, in 1838 conveyed freeholds to trustees upon trust (together with a sum of stock already transferred) for himself for life, and after his death in trust for his reputed son, W., when and in case he attained twenty-one, with a trust for maintenance if W. should be under twenty-one at the settlor's death. And in case W. should die under twenty-one, or die in the settlor's lifetime, without leaving issue living at his decease, then over. There were no words of limitation in the trust for W. There was a power of sale in the settlement, but no trust to invest the proceeds in land. A. died in 1849, having made his will in 1843, which recited the settlement and confirmed it, except as to the stock which had been sold. W. attained twenty-one, and died in 1872. Held, that W. took a life estate only in the freeholds under the settlement, and that there was a resulting trust for the settlor: (Middleton v. Barker, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 643. V.C.B.) MINES EXCEPTED OUT OF GRANT OF SURFACE -RIGHT OF OWNER TO SUBTERRANEAN WATER. -In a case in which mines were altogether excepted out of a demise of the surface, held (reversing the judgment of the court below), that the rights of the owner of the surface, and the owner of the mines did not in any way differ from those of the owners of adjoining closes, who are strangers in title, each of whom is entitled to the water found upon his land, but neither of whom is entitled to complain of the loss of that water by natural percolation set in motion by his neighbour's excavations; for it makes no difference whether the respective closes are adjacent vertically or laterally, and the grant of the surface cannot carry with it more than the ownership of the entire soil would: (The Ballacorkish &c., Mining Company v. Dumbell, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 658. Priv. Co.) RIGHT OF WAY-SUBSTITUTED WAY.-The grantor of a right of way over a towing path along a private canal built a bridge over the canal, which entirely blocked up the towing path, and obliged the grantee to go through the grantor's land around the foot of the bridge in order to rejoin the towing path. Purchasers from the grantor of the land over which this right of way existed, attempted to prevent the grantee from using the substituted way which the building of the bridge had obliged him to use. Held, that the grantee was entitled to an injunction restraining the purchasers from interfering with his use of the substituted way: but that the injunction must be limited to the period during which the obstruction of the towing path by the bridge might continue, and was not to extend so as to authorise the grantee to use the substituted way for any other purpose than towing barges. Order of Bacon, V.C., varied: (Selby v. Nettlefold, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 661. L.C. and L.JJ.). TESTAMENTARY SUIT-MARRIED WOMAN'S WILL SETTLEMENTS COSTS. A married woman executed a will by virtue of a power, by which she appointed A., her husband, her universal legatee. A. did not prove the will, but dealt with the estate, which was all included in the marriage settlement. On the intermarriage with B., his adopted daughter, with C., he settled on her a sum of £5000, in which he included a certain portion of his wife's estate. B. and C. proved the will of the testatrix, which was opposed by her next of kin, and the court, in decreeing costs out of her estate, held, that no portion of the fund settled at the marriage of B. and C. was liable to the costs of the litigation: (Adamson v. Adamson and Hammond, 29 L. T. Rep. N.S. 700. Prob.) EJECTMENT FOR FORFEITURE-NONPAYMENT OF RENT-CONSTRUCTION OF COMMON FORMMEANING OF 66 BEING DEMANDED."-The defendant was tenant to the plaintiff under an agreement containing a condition for re-entry if defendant should "make default in payment of the rent within twenty-one days after it should have become due being demanded." The defendant made default on the 25th March, and the plaintiff made demand on the 9th April, but the defendant failed to pay. The plaintiff waited twentyone days, and then brought ejectment: Held, that the demand being made before the expiration of twenty-one days, was not a good demand within the meaning of the agreemet, and a rule to set aside a verdict for the plaintiff in ejectment made absolute: (Phillips v. Bridge, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 792. C. P.) BANKRUPTCY COMPOSITION SUBSEQUENT RESOLUTION TO REDUCE-WHEN PERMISSIBLEACTION BY DISSENTING CREDITOR-INJUNCTION -POWERS OF CREDITORS-32 & 33 VICT. c. 71, s. 126, CLAUSES 1, 5, and 6.-Under sect. 126 of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, creditors have power by an extraordinary resolution to reduce the amount of a composition previously accepted by them when the circumstances require it, and it will be for the benefit of the debtor and the creditors generally. A dissentient creditor is as much bound by such extraordinary resolution as he was by the resolution accepting the original composition. The word "persons "in clause 5 of sect. 126 of the Bankruptcy Act 1869 does not mean "creditors," but " persons" other than creditors, whose interests may be affected by the proceed ings: (Ex parte The Liquidators of the Radcliffe Inves'ment Company (Limited); Re W. H. Glover and Co., 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 694. Bank.) WILL ADEMPTION BEQUEST OF LEASEHOLDS NOTICE TO TREAT FOR SERVED ON TESTATOR-NO WRITTEN AGREEMENT-CONVEYANCE BY EXECUTRIX-MESNE BENTS.-A testator bequeathed two leasehold houses to A., and appointed B. his executrix and residuary legatee. Previously to his death the testator was served, by a railway company with notice to treat for the sale of the leaseholds. No written agreement was executed, but surveyors assessed the amount of the purchase money, and it was arranged that the testator should continue to receive the rents until the completion of the purchase. Nothing more was done until after the death of the testator, when B., as executrix, conveyed the property to the company. Held, that the bequest was adeemed, but that A. was entitled to the rents received from the testator's death to the date of the conveyance: (Watts v. Watts, 29 L. T. Rep. N.S. 671. V.C. H.). DOMICIL OF ORIGIN ABANDONMENT OF WILL-GIFT OF RESIDUE - ADEMPTION.-In 1858, the testator, a native of Montreal, where, up to that time he had carried on the business of a merchant, sold his house, and also a piece of ground that he had there purchased in the burial ground, and accompanied by his family went to Paris for the education of his children, where he resided until 1868, when he came to England and purchased the lease, having thirteen years unexpired, of a house, which he furnished, and in which he lived until his death in May 1871. Testator on several occasions returned to Canada for the transaction of business, and on one of such occa sions made his will in the French language, and in the form usual in Lower Canada, describing himself as of Montreal, merchant, and appointed four executors, of whom three were resident in Canada; and on another such occasion made a codicil to his will, describing himself in the same manner. While residing in England, testator's daughter married an Englishman, and he also established his son in business in England. Held, that the testator had acquired an English domicil. Testator, by his will made in 1853, gave all his property, subject to an annuity, to his wife (who predeceased him) for life, to be divided equally between his two children. In 1869 testator, on the occasion of the marriage of his daughter, covenanted to pay to the trustees of her marriage settlement the sum of £8500, and in the meantime to pay to them the annual sum of £525, upon trust for his daughter for life for her sole and inalienable use, with remainder to her children as she should appoint, and in default of appointment for all her children who should attain 21 or marry. Testator also advanced to his son a sum of £2000 for the purpose of placing him in business. Held, that the sums settled by the testator on the marriage of his daughter and advanced in his lifetime to his son, must respectively be taken into account in estimating the shares to which they respectively were entitled under the testator's will: (Stevenson v. Masson, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 666. V.C. B.) COMPANY LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. RAILWAY-COMPULSORY POWERS-NOTICE TO TREAT-DELAY - EVIDENCE.-A railway company, incorporated by an Act of Parliament, which passed on the 29th July 1869, limiting the time for the exercise of the compulsory powers to three years, and the time for the completion of the railway to five years, served a notice to treat for certain lands belonging to the plaintiff company on the 21st April 1866. By an Act of Parliament of the 26th July 1869 (against which the plaintiff company petitioned), the railway company was dissolved, and its undertaking was amalgamated with that of the defendant company, and by the same Act the time for completing the works was extended for three years; but the period within which the compulsory powers given by the first Act were to be exercised was not extended. On the 18th Aug. 1871, the defendant company took possession of the lands, whereupon the landowners filed a bill to restrain them from continuing in possession. Held, that the time for completion of the works having been extended by the Act of 1869 (of which the plaintiff company had notice) to the 29th July 1872, the notice to treat was not invalidated by lapse of time. Held also, that the magistrate's certificate under ss. 16 & 17 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 must, in the absence of fraud, be taken as conclusive evidence that the capital has been subscribed (Ystalyfera Iron Company v. The Neath and Brecon Railway Company, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 662. M. R.) UNREGISTERED ASSOCIATION-WINDING-UP.In reply to a circular issued by M. and D., setting forth a project for acquiring and remodelling & theatre at the cost of £12,000, with the intention of selling it to a company, to be formed for the purpose, for £40,000, which would enable a return to be made of £300 for every £100 subscribed, several persons, exceeding seven in number, subscribed to the project. The theatre was at first carried on by M. and D., and afterwards by three of the subscribers. A creditor, on the grounds that the subscription to the project constituted the subscribers partners, presented & petition to wind-up the partnership under the 199th section of the Companies Act 1862. Held, that the subscribers were partners, and being more than seven in number, came within the Act, and the order was accordingly made: (The Royal Victoria Palace Theatre, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 668. V.C. B.) VOLUNTARY WINDING-up CONTINUATION UNDER SUPERVISION PRACTICE.-The 147th section of the Companies Act 1862, empowers the court, notwithstanding the opposition of unpaid creditors to order a voluntary winding-up to be continued under supervision. Where, therefore, the creditors of a company, in the course of voluntary liquidation, presented petitions for windingup the company, the court declined to make a compulsory order, but directed the voluntary winding-up to be continued under supervision. Where successive petitions were presented for winding-up a company, in ignorance of prior petitions, the court, in making the order, allowed one set of costs on all petitions: (Re Owen's Patent Wheel, &c. Company, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 672. V.C. H.) COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. Ex parte THE NEATH AND BRECON RAILWAY Lands Clauses Act-Money deposited by company Purchase money paid-Payment out of deposit. THIS was an appeal from a decision of ViceChancellor Bacon. The above railway company in 1865, being desirous of entering on some lands belonging to Mr. John Lloyd Vaughan Watkins, which they required to take for the purposes of their railway, before any agreement for purchase was come to, paid into the bank, under the provisions of sect. 85 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, the sum of £1541 78. 4d., and entered into the usual bond. The sum was afterwards invested in Consols. The sum of £1700 was subsequently awarded for the purchasemoney of the land, and another sum of £1700 for compensation for severance. These sums, with interest, were paid by the company, and on the 10th June, 1873, a conveyance of the lands to the company was executed. The company then petitioned for payment to them of the sum deposited in court. The Vice-Chancellor ordered the vendor's costs and expenses of the purchase to be paid out of this sum, and the balance to be paid to the company. The company appealed. Eddis, Q.C. and W. D. Gardiner were for the company. Kay, Q.C., Cracknall, and Whately, were for the landowners and others interested. Lord Justice JAMES was of opinion that the Vice-Chancellor's order was not in accordance with the Act. The money was paid into the bank to answer a particular purpose-viz., to secure the payment of the purchase-money with interest; that purpose having been answered the Legisla ture had said that the money was to be paid out to the company. It would be unlawful for the court to do anything else with it. The ViceChancellor's order must be discharged. Lord Justice MELLISH was of the same opinion. The money was deposited as security for the performance of the condition of the bond. If the matter stopped there, it would be a strange thing to apply the money to any other purpose. But the Act went on to say, in sect. 87, that on the condition of the bond being fully performed it should be lawful for the Court of Chancery to order the money to be repaid to the promoters of the undertaking. The court was bound in that case ex debito justitia to make an order for payment to the company. If any of the costs claimed were costs under sect. 80 of the Act, that section only said that it should be lawful for the court to order them to be paid to the promoters: it did not say that they were to be paid out of the money deposited. A discussion then arose as to the costs of the petition, and Lord Justice JAMES said that if the respondents had simply appeared, they would have been entitled to their costs; but as they had chosen to raise a litigation, no costs would be given. MARITIME LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. DAMAGE TO CARGO-GOODS CARRIED INTO ANY PORT OF ENGLAND AND WALES-SHIP CALLING FOR ORDERS-GOODS DETAINED AT A FOREIGN PORT.-When a foreign ship carrying cargo, acting in pursuance of the contract of affreightment, which gives the option of several ports of call, English and foreign, puts into an English port of call for orders, she carries her cargo into the English port within the meaning of the Admiralty Court Act 1861 (24 Vict. c. 10), s. 6; and, though she be ordered to a foreign port, and there discharge her cargo, the Court of Admiralty has jurisdiction to entertain against her a suit by the assignees of the bills of lading of the cargo, for damage to cargo, and to arrest her on her return to this country: (The Pieve Superiore, 29 L. T. Rep. N.S. 702. Adm.) Non-compliance: Its operation. Non-compliance with an express warranty is excused only (1) When the state of things contemplated by the warranty ceases; and (2) When a subsequent law makes compliance illegal. Failure even temporarily to comply with the warranty at any stage of the risk is fatal to the policy. American Law.-It relieves the underwriter from liability for subsequent loss. Means unmoored and got under way in complete preparation for the voyage, with the intention of proceeding to sea without further delay at the port of departure. The warranty to sail is not complied with by leaving harbour imperfectly equipped. Graham v. Barras, 3 Nev. & Man, 125; Pettegrew v. The risk under the policy having commenced before the time fixed for the sailing, the warranty is complied with if the ship is ready to sail, and is only prevented by a peril insured against by the policy: 1 Phillips, p. 427, s. 772.. But if the risk is to commence only at the sailing of the ship, the warranty is not complied with unless the vessel actually sails within the time warranted. Character of the Property. The character of the subject is fixed by the domicil of the owner: Tabbs v. Bandslack, 3 B. & P. 207 n.; 4 Esp. 109; If the subject of a belligerent state reside and carry on business at the time of insurance in a neutral country, his property will be considered neutral owned. McConnell v. Hector, 3 B. & P. 113. American Law.-A neutral character cannot be The breach of warranty need not be connected acquired by migration flagrante bello. [This is with the loss: obviously good law.] 2 Wheaton, 76. Property connected with a commercial establishment in a hostile country by whomsoever owned cannot be neutral so as to be within the warranty. Arn. 4th edit. 566. war, unless delivered before the declaration of war. Ibid. Phillips, sect. 792. NOTE.-But if imported into a neutral country it is neutral during its subsequent passage by re-ex portation to a belligerent country. Arn. 4th edit. 568. The shipment of goods after notice of the breaking out of a war which makes them contraband, although in pursuance of a prior contract, is not within the warranty: Phillips, sect. 793. Good shipped by a belligerent, to be delivered to a neutral only on conditions and contingencies other than the general right to stop in transitu, are not within the warranty: Phillips, sect. 794. But a declaration of war after the policy is ject from neutral to belligerent, so as to take it made does not change the character of the subout of the warranty: Eden v. Parkinson, Dougl. 732; Tyson v. Gurney, 3 Term. 477; Salonica v. Johnson, Park, 8th edit., 716. But where goods are, shipped by a belligerent, conditionally to become those of a neutral, and the latter complies with the condition before a capture, they thereby from that time are within the warranty: Phillips, sect. 795. If a consignor becomes a belligerent by the breaking out of war during the transit, he cannot by assignment to a neutral screen them from capture, and they will not therefore thereby be within the warranty. NOTE. Whether such is the object of the transfer is to be gathered from the circumstances. Phillips, sect. 796, and n. 5. [Doubtful.] If an owner changes his national character during transit of the goods, the national character of his property in transit does not change: Phillips, sect. 797; 1 Duer, Mar. Ins. 437. Proofs of neutrality. warranty the ship must be furnished with all those In order to be neutral within the meaning of the herself and her cargo required to be on board documents and proofs of the neutral character of either by the law of nations or by the regulations of international treaties : Arn. 569, 4th edit; Phillips, sect. 802. Arn. 570, 571, 4th edit; Phillips, sect. 802, et seq. ship by covering belligerent goods on board as neutral, even though without the knowledge or consent of the shipowner: Throwing papers overboard is not of itself a breach of the warranty, although raising a strong presumption of enemy's property: Bernardi v. Motteux, Dougl. 581; The Pizzaro, 2 Breaches of the warranty. All voluntary illegal acts forfeiting the character of a neutral are breaches of the warranty. Ex. gr.-Resisting the right of search when properly exercised (a). Rescuing, or attempting to rescue, a neutral vessel sent in for examination by an authorised belligerent captor. Violating blockade(b). Carrying hostile despatches(c). (a) As to what is a proper exercise of the (b) Blockade must be effective, and neutral nations must have had notice of it. (e) "A distinction has been made between carrying despatches of the enemy between different parts of his dominions and carrying despatches of an ambassador from a neutral country to his own sovereign. The effect of the former despatches is presumed to be hostile; but the neutral country has a right to preserve its relations with the enemy, and it does not necessarily follow that the communica tions are of a hostile nature." Kent 1, s. 153. Attempting to disguise belligerent goods as neutral, and carrying them as such with the neutral part of the cargo, is a breach of the warranty of neutrality, and will avoid the policy as to the whole of the neutral cargo: Arn, 576, 4th edit. If during war neutral property be engaged in any branch of the colonial or coasting trade of the enemy that is open to foreigners in time of peace, such property loses its character of neutrality: 1 Kent, Comm. 81-86; The Immanuel, 2 C. Rob. Ad. R. 186. NOTE. This rule is confined to trade between the enemy's colony and the mother country, and is not applicable where the produce of a hostile colony is bona fide imported into a neutral country, and thence re-exported into the mother country: (Arn. 574, 4th edit.) Property despatched to a neutral in pursuance of a contract with a belligerent government, or employed by him in a trade for which a privilege is given by a belligerent, does not answer to a warranty of neutrality: The Anna Catherina, 4 C. Rob. Adm. 107. A warranty that a vessel is neutral is not forfeited merely by the supercargo being a belligerent: Mayne v. Walker, 3 Dougl. 79. The employment of a neutral vessel in a service auxiliary to the hostile operations of a belligerent forfeits its neutral character: NOTE.-Kent says, "It is a presumption almost de jure that the neutral, if found on the interdicted waters, goes there with an intention to break the blockade." A master being informed during a voyage to a port that it is blockaded, violates the blockade if he continues his voyage. NOTE. The pursuit of the voyage is, however, open Sailing to a port with a design to enter, if the blockading squadron should be blown off by the winds is a violation of the blockade. seems to be supported by the English cases, in which it was decided, after much conflict, that there was no warranty of seaworthiness in a time policy. Essentials. The materials of which the ship is made; The qualifications of the captain; The number and description of the crew; The stores, equipment, and outfit generally, must be such as to render the ship in every respect fit for the proposed voyage or service : Phillips, s. 695. The cargo must be properly stowed; If the existing state of things does not comply with the warranty, the policy is void, although the owners have acted honestly and fairly and in ignorance of any defect. The warranty requires seaworthiness in conformity with the standard at the time for the contemplated service at the port to which the vessel belongs, unless some other standard is referred to expressly or by implication : Phillips, sect. 719. A vessel seaworthy for one stage of the voyage may be unseaworthy for another, and unless she is fit for each stage of the voyage when she enters upon it, the warranty is not complied with. [Ex. gr., a boiler efficient in fresh water, cracked in salt water-case cited infra.] The enumeration as excepted from the policy of some losses of the same kind as those resulting from defects which constitute unseaworthiness, does not exclude the general implied warranty: The Quebec Mar. Ins. Co. v. The Commercial Bank of Unseaworthiness arising after the commencement of the voyage, and produced by a peril insured against, does not of itself discharge the underwriter. It imposes upon the assured the duty of using reasonable diligence to repair it, and negligence in that respect may discharge the insurer from any loss arising from the want of such due diligence: Kent. Comm., sect. 288. restored: Phillips, sect. 734. The remedy of a defect after sailing-unless with the consent of the underwriters-does not aid owners of a ship unseaworthy at the time of sailing: Forshaw v. Chabert, 3 Br. & B. 158: The Quebec Marine Ins. Co. v. The Commercial Bank of Canada, L. Rep. 3 P. C. 231 [in which Lord Tenterden's dictum to the contrary (in Weir v. Aberdeen, 2 B. & Ald. 320) is dissented from]. "At and from a port:" A ship would appear to answer the warranty if capable of being moved about in port: Parmeter v. Cousins, 2 Camp. 257; Annen v. Wood. man, 3 Taunt. 259. If the ship arrives at the port so shattered as to be a mere wreck, or in such a state as to be unable to lie there in reasonable security till she is properly repaired and equipped for the voyage, the policy does not attach: Arn. 604, 4th edit. As to Freight and Cargo. A ship whose condition complies with the warranty in a policy on ship may yet fail to comply with the warranty in a policy on cargo and freight. The policy being on cargo and freight the war. ranty of seaworthiness is not complied with if the cargo is put on board for the voyage when the ship is in so defective a state that the cargo must be relanded in order to make the necessary repairs, and the policy therefore does not attach on the cargo if the risk is to commence at the time of loading. Phillips, sect. 723, vol. 1, p. 391. The doctrine of seaworthiness does not apply to lighters engaged in loading or unloading the cargo. Lane v. Nixon, L. Rep. 1 C. P. 412. (2.) Navigation. The captain must be competent to conduct the vessel in safety through all the ordinary perils of the voyage, and in long voyages-not in all voyages-there should be a competent mate: Arn. 615, 4th edit.; 3 Kent. Com. p. 337, n. e. Phillips, sect. 713. NOTE.-If a pilot cannot be procured, and it is skill when the vessel sails: Hicks v. Thornton, Holt's N. P. 30; Forshaw v. If the master takes on board a person representing himself to be a qualified pilot, although in fact he is not so, the warranty is satisfied: Phillips, sect. 374, citing Law v. Hollingsworth, 7 T. A sufficient crew being shipped originally, an occasional disability or absence of the men does not violate the warranty: Busk v. Roy. Ex. Áss. 2 B. & Ald. 73, per Bayley, J. (3) Legal Conduct. An illegal act committed by the assured, or on his behalf, is a violation of this implied warranty. The illegality must induce loss by a peril insured against to violate the warranty. But if the act arise out of negligence or mistake the insurers are not exonerated from consequent loss by perils insured against. The vessel must be furnished with all proper evidence of her national character, for want of which she might be condemned if taken by a belligerent: Phillips, sect. 745; Arn. 619, 4th edit. NOTE. This is necessary, although there is no warranty of neutrality in the policy: Steel v. Lacy, 3 Taunt. 285. MERCANTILE LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. BILL OF EXCHANGE-BILLS OF LADINGACCEPTANCE - The U. MISREPRESENTATION. Bank presented a bill of exchange to B. and Co., the drawees, for their acceptance, accompanied by a ticket representing that the bank held bills of lading to cover it. B. and Co. thereupon accepted the bill, relying on the statement that the bank held bills of lading which both parties thought to be genuine. The bills of lading had been forged by the drawer of the bill of exchange. Held, that B. and Co. were not entitled to demand from the bank genuine bills of lading before paying the amount of the bill of exchange: (Baxter v. Chapman, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 642. V.C. B.) FACTOR-SALE BY-SET-OFF AGAINST PRINCIPAL-"MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE" OF BUYER THAT HE DEALT WITH AN AGENT-PLEADING. To a declaration for goods sold and delivered, the defendants pleaded, that the goods were sold and delivered to the defendants by S. and Co., agents of the plaintiff's in that behalf, and entrusted by the plaintiffs with the possession of the said goods, as apparent owners thereof, and that S. and Co. sold and delivered the goods to the defendants as their own, with the consent of the plaintiffs, and at the time of the said sale and delivery of the said goods, the defendants believed the said S. and Co. to be the owners of the said goods, and did not know that the plaintiffs were the owners of the said goods, or of any of them, or were interested therein, or that S. and Co. were agents in that behalf; and the plea First averred a set-off against S. and Co. replication, that before, &c., the defendants had the means of knowing that S. and Co. were merely the apparent owners of the goods, and sold them as agents for the plaintiffs; secondly, the like, but averring means of knowledge that S. and Co. were agents generally. On demurrer to the plea and replications: Held, that the plea was good, without any allegation negativing "means of knowledge" on the part of the defendants that S. and Co. were agents; and that the replications, being therefore immaterial, were bad: (Borries and others v. The Imperial Ottoman Bank, 29 L. T. Rep. 689. C. P.). THE will of Mr. Thomas Wontner, late of No. 3, Cloak-lane, solicitor, who died on the 19th ult., at Weston green, Thames Ditton, was proved on the 3rd inst. by Mr. Russell Wontner, the son, the sole executor, the personalty being sworn under £5000. The provisions of the will are in favour of testator's wife and four sons. A surety for the debtor upon a bill of exchange Robinson (C. Berry and Robinson) opposed. on such approval certified by this court as a scheme extent of S. E. Sichel and Co.'s engagement with BRISTOL COUNTY COURT. (Before E. J. LLOYD, Q.C., Judge.) |