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night have been, he found that he had no alternative in the matter, seeing that his learned friend the Attorney-General insisted upon every witness who could throw any light upon the inquiry being placed in the box. Under these circumstances he should reserve any further comments upon the evidence until after the witnesses were called. The first witness he proposed to call was the Attorney-General himself.

Sir Henry James, examined by Giffard, explained the circumstances under which he first undertook to contest the borough in 1868. He was invited by some of the constituents to come down, and undertook to do so on the distinct understanding that no corrupt practices would be resorted to, that he should not be required to attend a meeting at any public-house, and that no committee-room should be held at a public-house. These conditions were complied with, and he came down to Taunton. He was seated on petition. Mr. Lane acted as his agent, but was since dead. Mr. Burman, a tradesman, was then appointed, and acted for him in 1873. There was very little drunkenness during the contest, and only on two occasions was he asked for drinkeach time by a woman. One voter wrote a letter to him asking for £5. His canvass was purely a personal one. He was not accompanied in it by Mr. Burman. His canvass was highly successful, and throughout the polling he had no reason to believe that he was ever at the bottom of the poll. One of his agents told him after the polling that he was beaten, and that was the first time he had any reason to suppose that his opponent had a chance of success. It turned out, however, to be a mistake on the part of his agent, and was soon rectified. In regard to Rollings, he knew nothing of him further than as an active member of the Land and Labour League, and never employed him as an agent or canvasser. After some further evidence, the court adjourned.

whether it was filed within the six days required
by the rules of the court. On the matter being
argued, Lord Coleridge discharged the rule, thereby
deciding in favour of the respondent, that the list
could not be received. The question now arose
how far that decision would affect the proceedings
at the hearing of the petition. Mr. Ambrose re-
viewed the history of the election, and explained
how the order had been obtained from the County
Court judge to inspect the documents. There had
been some delay in inspecting the documents,
owing to the illness of the town clerk, and it was
not till near Christmas that the documents were
inspected. This delay had arisen from the lauda-
ble desire of the town clerk, as custodian of the
documents, to be present. It was, therefore, not
till Christmas that the marked registers were in-
spected. Then followed the New Year holidays,
and then the petitioners addressed themselves to
the getting up of the case. By the 7th rule,
which had been issued by the judges, it was
enjoined that six days before the trial a list of
votes objected to, with heads of objections, should
be handed to the master and the respondent.
This had been driven to the last moment, and a
question had arisen as to the construction of the
rule. By the 25th section of the Corrupt Prao-
tices Act, it was provided that in reckoning the
time for the purposes of the Act, Sunday Christ-
mas Day, or any day set apart for fast or public
thanksgiving should be excluded, and the judges
were authorised to make rules, which should be of
the same force as if they were enacted in the body
of the Act.

Cottingham wished the court to take note of
recent judgment of the Lord Chief Justice of the
Common Pleas.

Ambrose contended that the court had decided on the simple question that they had not left the notice at the rule office on the sixth day. The question whether the six "clear" days was not touched upon, because it was a custom with the court never to decide upon a point which did not arise. The trial was to be on the 20th. The list was tendered on the 13th, but not left till the 14th. For his part, if it had been left on the (Before T. W. SAUNDERS, Esq., Recorder of Bath, 13th, he was convinced that it would have been Commissioner.)

Tuesday, Jan. 20.

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At the election for Exchange Ward, in November
1873, B. and N. received an equal number of
votes, and the returning officer gave his casting
vote in favour of B. N. presented a petition
against B.'s return, on various grounds, and
claimed the office on the ground that he had a
majority of lawful votes. In accordance with
the Act of 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 33), the peti-
tioner prepared a list of the votes objected to,
which had to be delivered to the Master, and
the respondent, six days before the day ap-
pointed for trial. The trial was appointed
for the 20th January, and on the 13th the
list was taken to the Rule Office, when the
clerk there said it was too late, and advised
an application to the Court of Common
Pleas for leave to file the list. The list was not
pressed upon him, but it was delivered on the
14th, and an application was made to the court
as suggested, and a rule nisi was granted. The
court discharged the rule on the hearing, on the
ground that the list had not been delivered six
days before the day appointed for trial, but did
not decide whether the list would have been de
livered in time if delivered on the 13th.
The case now came on for hearing before the com-
missioner appointed under the Act. The peti-
tioner's counsel offered no evidence, as the list
was excluded.

The commissioner refused to dismiss the petition
under the circumstances, and determined simply
to certify that B. was duly elected. He refused
to grant costs to the respondent, on the ground
that the petition was bona fide, and was simply
defeated by a technical objection, but granted
the costs of the returning officer.
Ambrose, barrister, for the petitioner.
Cottingham, barrister, for the respondent.
Grundy (of Grundy and Kershaw), for the mayor,
the returning officer.

In this case a petition had been lodged by Mr. Nield against the return of Mr. Batty for Exchange Ward in November last, at which election there had been a tie between these two candidates, and the mayor, who was the returning officer, gave his casting vote in favour of Mr. Batty. The petition declared that the respondent was not duly elected by a majority of lawful votes, and therefore a scrutiny was prayed for. A rule nisi had been applied for and obtained by Mr. Ambrose in the Court of Common Pleas, calling upon the respondent, Mr. Batty, to show cause why the petitioner should not be at liberty to give evidence against the list of voters tendered at the rule office, and why the said list should not be filed. It appeared that the petitioners had deferred the filing of the list to the last moment, and it was a question

in time. When the list was tendered on the 13th,
the legal agents of the petitioner in London con-
clerk it should have been delivered on the 12th.
sidered it was in time, but he was told by the
Unfortunately, in pursuance of that suggestion,
the clerk did not press the matter; and if the rule
clerk had refused to accept the list, he (Mr.
Ambrose) should have felt in a different position.
As it was, the rule clerk simply gave advice,
which was accepted, namely, that a summons
should be taken out, which was done. No
order was made on this summons, and appli-
cation was then made to the Court of Com-

Pleas with the result above stated.
He had offered in the Court of Common Pleas,
and before the judge, and was now prepared to
offer to pay the costs of the adjournment if the
respondents would waive the objection taken in
respect of the lists not being delivered in time,
and he was prepared with evidence of the most
reliable character in support of his list of objec-
tions; and he ventured to think that he should
lay such evidence before the judge as would en-

title him to a verdict in his favour.

Cottingham refused to accede to the suggestion. He argued that the petitioners tried, by the ruse of keeping back the information as long as they could, to put the respondent to a disadvantage, and as they had not complied with the law, they must abide by the consequences.

A long discussion then ensued on the question of costs, Cottingham contending that the costs should fall on the defeated party.

Ambrose said that all precedents tended to show that the costs in a case under these peculiar circumstances should not fall on the petitioner, who was ready to go on with his case, but was met by a frivolous technical objection.

Cottingham said if the petition had been withdrawn altogether no court would have refused to give the respondent costs, and the petitioner said he would have withdrawn if he had had time to do so.

Ambrose contended that the commissioner had a
discretion in the matter of costs, and that there
were special circumstances in this case calling for
the exercise of that discretion in favour of the
petitioner. The petitioner had offered long ago to
pay the costs of a postponement, and the offer
had been renewed that morning, but it was not
accepted, and this was a case of an inquiry being
defeated on a purely technical objection. At all
events, it was a case in which the respondent was
entitled to no indulgence from the court; on the
contrary, it was a case having special circum-
stances which would justify the commissioner in
depriving him of his costs.

Cottingham having briefly replied.
The COMMISSIONER said this was a peculiar
case, and he was sorry it fell to his lot to adju.
dicate upon it in the first:instance. The earnest
ness of the petitioner was shown by the deposit

of £500. He had shown that he was animated by a desire honestly to go on with and have the petition tried. He (the Commissioner) did not, therefore, look upon his conduct as being in any way tinctured by frivolity or insincerity. The 7th rule provided that the list of objections should be filed six days before the day of trial. That meant that one day should be included, and another excluded, and therefore if the particulars had been filed on the 13th they would have been in time. The clerk who tendered them volun tarily took them away again, but if he had insisted upon their being received, the question would have arisen whether the tender was not in fact a filing. No doubt the petitioner drove the thing to the last moment. It was a pity that he was not more liberal in his views, and did not file his particulars in ample time, but he did nothing more than he was lawfully justified in doing. The particulars, however, were not strictly filed, and the respondent had a right to rely upon that, and so far he had the advantage of retaining his seat. He could not shut his eyes to the fact that this was a bona fide petition. There were on both sides a great many questionable matters for the consideration of the court, but it was impossible for him to suggest which side would have been victorious. Here, however, was a bona fide petition, honestly presented, and he could not look upon it as being in any way frivolous. It failed to some extent on a techni cality. He thought the petitioner had the moral merits of the case, and did not think that he was called upon to visit him with the costs, he there. fore made no order as to costs, and should certify that Mr. Batty had been duly elected.

Cottingham thought the Commissioner had power to reserve a point of law, and he wished the point in reference to the construction of the Act of Parliament on the question of the time of notice to be reserved.

The COMMISSIONER said his discretion as to costs was unfettered, and Mr. Cottingham could hardly go to the Court of Common Pleas with a case as to how he exercised his discretion.

Grundy (who represented the Mayor).-I under stand you to dismiss the question of costs with regard to Mr. Batty and to grant costs to the Mayor?

Ambrose said he must consent to an order that the returning officer should have his costs. He must also consent to the costs of the town clerk being allowed.

objections were made to votes upon which the The COMMISSIONER remarked that a number of register was conclusive. For instance, voters the ward sufficiently long, or because they were were objected to because they had not resided in not duly rated to the poor. The court had nothing to do with these questions.

both sides, and a question would have arisen as to Ambrose said these objections were made on them.

The proceedings then terminated.


NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. BILL OF SALE-COVENANT TO PAY 66 IMME DIATELY ON DEMAND "-REASONABLE TIME FOR PAYMENT-CONSTRUCTION.-By a bill of sale dated the 15th April 1873, the plaintiff assigned all his goods, &c., to the defendant to secure & sum of £100, upon the express condition that if the plaintiff did not "immediately upon demand thereof in writing," delivered to the plaintiff or left for him at his home, pay the money due, it shall be lawful for the defendant to seize and sell the goods comprised in the bill of sale. On the 27th April 1873, the defendants went with bailiffs to the plaintiff's house and there saw the plaintiff's wife and son, who told him that the plaintiff was from home, they knew not where, and that he might be gone to America for aught they knew. The defendant then read and delivered to the wife and son a written demand for payment, which not being complied with, he at once put the bailiffs in possession, and after an interval of eight days sold the goods. The plaintiff returned to his home on the 8th May, and said he had started with the £100 to go to S. on business, but had gone to R., had got drunk, and remained away on a spree." In an action against the defendant for so seizing and selling the plaintiff's goods, it was held by the Court of Exchequer Kelly, C.B., and Bramwell and Pollock, BB.) that the defendant was under the circumstances perfectly justified by the terms of the bill of sale in seizing the goods as he did, immediately upon the demand having been made as above stated. Toms v. (Wilson and another in the Q.B. and Ex. Chamber (7 L. T. Rep. N. S. 421, 8 ib. 799; 3 B. & S. 422 and 455; 30 L. J. 32 and 382, Q.B.), and Massey, Sladen and others in the Exchequer (L. Rep. 4 Ex.

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13; 38 L. J. 34, Ex.), discussed and distinguished: (Wharlton v. Kirkwood, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 644. Ex.) VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT-WORDS OF LIMITATION IN GRANT-LIFE ESTATE.-A., by a voluntary settlement, in 1838 conveyed freeholds to trustees upon trust (together with a sum of stock already transferred) for himself for life, and after his death in trust for his reputed son, W., when and in case he attained twenty-one, with a trust for maintenance if W. should be under twenty-one at the settlor's death. And in case W. should die under twenty-one, or die in the settlor's lifetime, without leaving issue living at his decease, then over. There were no words of limitation in the trust for W. There was a power of sale in the settlement, but no trust to invest the proceeds in land. A. died in 1849, having made his will in 1843, which recited the settlement and confirmed it, except as to the stock which had been sold. W. attained twenty-one, and died in 1872. Held, that W. took a life estate only in the freeholds under the settlement, and that there was a resulting trust for the settlor: (Middleton v. Barker, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 643. V.C.B.) MINES EXCEPTED OUT OF GRANT OF SURFACE -RIGHT OF OWNER TO SUBTERRANEAN WATER. -In a case in which mines were altogether excepted out of a demise of the surface, held (reversing the judgment of the court below), that the rights of the owner of the surface, and the owner of the mines did not in any way differ from those of the owners of adjoining closes, who are strangers in title, each of whom is entitled to the water found upon his land, but neither of whom is entitled to complain of the loss of that water by natural percolation set in motion by his neighbour's excavations; for it makes no difference whether the respective closes are adjacent vertically or laterally, and the grant of the surface cannot carry with it more than the ownership of the entire soil would: (The Ballacorkish &c., Mining Company v. Dumbell, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 658. Priv. Co.)

RIGHT OF WAY-SUBSTITUTED WAY.-The grantor of a right of way over a towing path along a private canal built a bridge over the canal, which entirely blocked up the towing path, and obliged the grantee to go through the grantor's land around the foot of the bridge in order to rejoin the towing path. Purchasers from the grantor of the land over which this right of way existed, attempted to prevent the grantee from using the substituted way which the building of the bridge had obliged him to use. Held, that the grantee was entitled to an injunction restraining the purchasers from interfering with his use of the substituted way: but that the injunction must be limited to the period during which the obstruction of the towing path by the bridge might continue, and was not to extend so as to authorise the grantee to use the substituted way for any other purpose than towing barges. Order of Bacon, V.C., varied: (Selby v. Nettlefold, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 661. L.C. and L.JJ.). TESTAMENTARY SUIT-MARRIED WOMAN'S WILL SETTLEMENTS COSTS. A married woman executed a will by virtue of a power, by which she appointed A., her husband, her universal legatee. A. did not prove the will, but dealt with the estate, which was all included in the marriage settlement. On the intermarriage with B., his adopted daughter, with C., he settled on her a sum of £5000, in which he included a certain portion of his wife's estate. B. and C. proved the will of the testatrix, which was opposed by her next of kin, and the court, in decreeing costs out of her estate, held, that no portion of the fund settled at the marriage of B. and C. was liable to the costs of the litigation: (Adamson v. Adamson and Hammond, 29 L. T. Rep. N.S. 700. Prob.) EJECTMENT FOR FORFEITURE-NONPAYMENT OF RENT-CONSTRUCTION OF COMMON FORMMEANING OF 66 BEING DEMANDED."-The defendant was tenant to the plaintiff under an agreement containing a condition for re-entry if defendant should "make default in payment of the rent within twenty-one days after it should have become due being demanded." The defendant made default on the 25th March, and the plaintiff made demand on the 9th April, but the defendant failed to pay. The plaintiff waited twentyone days, and then brought ejectment: Held, that the demand being made before the expiration of twenty-one days, was not a good demand within the meaning of the agreemet, and a rule to set aside a verdict for the plaintiff in ejectment made absolute: (Phillips v. Bridge, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 792. C. P.)

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BANKRUPTCY COMPOSITION SUBSEQUENT RESOLUTION TO REDUCE-WHEN PERMISSIBLEACTION BY DISSENTING CREDITOR-INJUNCTION -POWERS OF CREDITORS-32 & 33 VICT. c. 71, s. 126, CLAUSES 1, 5, and 6.-Under sect. 126 of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, creditors have power by an extraordinary resolution to reduce the amount of a composition previously accepted by them when the circumstances require it, and it will be for the benefit of the debtor and the creditors

generally. A dissentient creditor is as much bound by such extraordinary resolution as he was by the resolution accepting the original composition. The word "persons "in clause 5 of sect. 126 of the Bankruptcy Act 1869 does not mean "creditors," but " persons" other than creditors, whose interests may be affected by the proceed ings: (Ex parte The Liquidators of the Radcliffe Inves'ment Company (Limited); Re W. H. Glover and Co., 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 694. Bank.) WILL ADEMPTION BEQUEST OF LEASEHOLDS NOTICE TO TREAT FOR SERVED ON TESTATOR-NO WRITTEN AGREEMENT-CONVEYANCE BY EXECUTRIX-MESNE BENTS.-A testator bequeathed two leasehold houses to A., and appointed B. his executrix and residuary legatee. Previously to his death the testator was served, by a railway company with notice to treat for the sale of the leaseholds. No written agreement was executed, but surveyors assessed the amount of the purchase money, and it was arranged that the testator should continue to receive the rents until the completion of the purchase. Nothing more was done until after the death of the testator, when B., as executrix, conveyed the property to the company. Held, that the bequest was adeemed, but that A. was entitled to the rents received from the testator's death to the date of the conveyance: (Watts v. Watts, 29 L. T. Rep. N.S. 671. V.C. H.).

DOMICIL OF ORIGIN ABANDONMENT OF WILL-GIFT OF RESIDUE - ADEMPTION.-In 1858, the testator, a native of Montreal, where, up to that time he had carried on the business of a merchant, sold his house, and also a piece of ground that he had there purchased in the burial ground, and accompanied by his family went to Paris for the education of his children, where he resided until 1868, when he came to England and purchased the lease, having thirteen years unexpired, of a house, which he furnished, and in which he lived until his death in May 1871. Testator on several occasions returned to Canada for the transaction of business, and on one of such occa sions made his will in the French language, and in the form usual in Lower Canada, describing himself as of Montreal, merchant, and appointed four executors, of whom three were resident in Canada; and on another such occasion made a codicil to his will, describing himself in the same manner. While residing in England, testator's daughter married an Englishman, and he also established his son in business in England. Held, that the testator had acquired an English domicil. Testator, by his will made in 1853, gave all his property, subject to an annuity, to his wife (who predeceased him) for life, to be divided equally between his two children. In 1869 testator, on the occasion of the marriage of his daughter, covenanted to pay to the trustees of her marriage settlement the sum of £8500, and in the meantime to pay to them the annual sum of £525, upon trust for his daughter for life for her sole and inalienable use, with remainder to her children as she should appoint, and in default of appointment for all her children who should attain 21 or marry. Testator also advanced to his son a sum of £2000 for the purpose of placing him in business. Held, that the sums settled by the testator on the marriage of his daughter and advanced in his lifetime to his son, must respectively be taken into account in estimating the shares to which they respectively were entitled under the testator's will: (Stevenson v. Masson, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 666. V.C. B.)


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NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. RAILWAY-COMPULSORY POWERS-NOTICE TO TREAT-DELAY - EVIDENCE.-A railway company, incorporated by an Act of Parliament, which passed on the 29th July 1869, limiting the time for the exercise of the compulsory powers to three years, and the time for the completion of the railway to five years, served a notice to treat for certain lands belonging to the plaintiff company on the 21st April 1866. By an Act of Parliament of the 26th July 1869 (against which the plaintiff company petitioned), the railway company was dissolved, and its undertaking was amalgamated with that of the defendant company, and by the same Act the time for completing the works was extended for three years; but the period within which the compulsory powers given by the first Act were to be exercised was not extended. On the 18th Aug. 1871, the defendant company took possession of the lands, whereupon the landowners filed a bill to restrain them from continuing in possession. Held, that the time for completion of the works having been extended by the Act of 1869 (of which the plaintiff company had notice) to the 29th July 1872, the notice to treat was not invalidated by lapse of time. Held also, that the magistrate's certificate under ss. 16 & 17 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 must, in the absence of fraud, be taken as

conclusive evidence that the capital has been subscribed (Ystalyfera Iron Company v. The Neath and Brecon Railway Company, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 662. M. R.)

UNREGISTERED ASSOCIATION-WINDING-UP.In reply to a circular issued by M. and D., setting forth a project for acquiring and remodelling & theatre at the cost of £12,000, with the intention of selling it to a company, to be formed for the purpose, for £40,000, which would enable a return to be made of £300 for every £100 subscribed, several persons, exceeding seven in number, subscribed to the project. The theatre was at first carried on by M. and D., and afterwards by three of the subscribers. A creditor, on the grounds that the subscription to the project constituted the subscribers partners, presented & petition to wind-up the partnership under the 199th section of the Companies Act 1862. Held, that the subscribers were partners, and being more than seven in number, came within the Act, and the order was accordingly made: (The Royal Victoria Palace Theatre, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 668. V.C. B.) VOLUNTARY WINDING-up CONTINUATION UNDER SUPERVISION PRACTICE.-The 147th section of the Companies Act 1862, empowers the court, notwithstanding the opposition of unpaid creditors to order a voluntary winding-up to be continued under supervision. Where, therefore, the creditors of a company, in the course of voluntary liquidation, presented petitions for windingup the company, the court declined to make a compulsory order, but directed the voluntary winding-up to be continued under supervision. Where successive petitions were presented for winding-up a company, in ignorance of prior petitions, the court, in making the order, allowed one set of costs on all petitions: (Re Owen's Patent Wheel, &c. Company, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 672. V.C. H.)

Saturday, Jan. 17.


Lands Clauses Act-Money deposited by company Purchase money paid-Payment out of deposit. THIS was an appeal from a decision of ViceChancellor Bacon. The above railway company in 1865, being desirous of entering on some lands belonging to Mr. John Lloyd Vaughan Watkins, which they required to take for the purposes of their railway, before any agreement for purchase was come to, paid into the bank, under the provisions of sect. 85 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, the sum of £1541 78. 4d., and entered into the usual bond. The sum was afterwards invested in Consols. The sum of £1700 was subsequently awarded for the purchasemoney of the land, and another sum of £1700 for compensation for severance. These sums, with interest, were paid by the company, and on the 10th June, 1873, a conveyance of the lands to the company was executed. The company then petitioned for payment to them of the sum deposited in court. The Vice-Chancellor ordered the vendor's costs and expenses of the purchase to be paid out of this sum, and the balance to be paid to the company. The company appealed.

Eddis, Q.C. and W. D. Gardiner were for the company.

Kay, Q.C., Cracknall, and Whately, were for the landowners and others interested.

Lord Justice JAMES was of opinion that the Vice-Chancellor's order was not in accordance with the Act. The money was paid into the bank to answer a particular purpose-viz., to secure the payment of the purchase-money with interest; that purpose having been answered the Legisla ture had said that the money was to be paid out to the company. It would be unlawful for the court to do anything else with it. The ViceChancellor's order must be discharged.

Lord Justice MELLISH was of the same opinion. The money was deposited as security for the performance of the condition of the bond. If the matter stopped there, it would be a strange thing to apply the money to any other purpose. But the Act went on to say, in sect. 87, that on the condition of the bond being fully performed it should be lawful for the Court of Chancery to order the money to be repaid to the promoters of the undertaking. The court was bound in that case ex debito justitia to make an order for payment to the company. If any of the costs claimed were costs under sect. 80 of the Act, that section only said that it should be lawful for the court to order them to be paid to the promoters: it did not say that they were to be paid out of the money deposited.

A discussion then arose as to the costs of the petition, and

Lord Justice JAMES said that if the respondents had simply appeared, they would have been entitled to their costs; but as they had chosen to raise a litigation, no costs would be given.


NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. DAMAGE TO CARGO-GOODS CARRIED INTO ANY PORT OF ENGLAND AND WALES-SHIP CALLING FOR ORDERS-GOODS DETAINED AT A FOREIGN PORT.-When a foreign ship carrying cargo, acting in pursuance of the contract of affreightment, which gives the option of several ports of call, English and foreign, puts into an English port of call for orders, she carries her cargo into the English port within the meaning of the Admiralty Court Act 1861 (24 Vict. c. 10), s. 6; and, though she be ordered to a foreign port, and there discharge her cargo, the Court of Admiralty has jurisdiction to entertain against her a suit by the assignees of the bills of lading of the cargo, for damage to cargo, and to arrest her on her return to this country: (The Pieve Superiore, 29 L. T. Rep. N.S. 702. Adm.)

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Non-compliance: Its operation. Non-compliance with an express warranty is excused only

(1) When the state of things contemplated by the warranty ceases; and

(2) When a subsequent law makes compliance illegal.

Failure even temporarily to comply with the warranty at any stage of the risk is fatal to the policy.

American Law.-It relieves the underwriter from liability for subsequent loss.

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Means unmoored and got under way in complete preparation for the voyage, with the intention of proceeding to sea without further delay at the port of departure.

The warranty to sail is not complied with by leaving harbour imperfectly equipped.

Graham v. Barras, 3 Nev. & Man, 125; Pettegrew v.
Pringle, 3 Barn, & Ad. 514.

The risk under the policy having commenced before the time fixed for the sailing, the warranty is complied with if the ship is ready to sail, and is only prevented by a peril insured against by the policy:

1 Phillips, p. 427, s. 772..

But if the risk is to commence only at the sailing of the ship, the warranty is not complied with unless the vessel actually sails within the time warranted.

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Character of the Property.

The character of the subject is fixed by the domicil of the owner:

Tabbs v. Bandslack, 3 B. & P. 207 n.; 4 Esp. 109;
Arn. 565, 4th edit.

If the subject of a belligerent state reside and carry on business at the time of insurance in a neutral country, his property will be considered neutral owned.

McConnell v. Hector, 3 B. & P. 113. American Law.-A neutral character cannot be

The breach of warranty need not be connected acquired by migration flagrante bello. [This is with the loss:

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obviously good law.]

2 Wheaton, 76.

Property connected with a commercial establishment in a hostile country by whomsoever owned cannot be neutral so as to be within the warranty.

Arn. 4th edit. 566.

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delivered before the declaration of war.

Ibid. Phillips, sect. 792.

NOTE.-But if imported into a neutral country it is neutral during its subsequent passage by re-ex portation to a belligerent country.

Arn. 4th edit. 568.

The shipment of goods after notice of the breaking out of a war which makes them contraband, although in pursuance of a prior contract, is not within the warranty:

Phillips, sect. 793.

Good shipped by a belligerent, to be delivered to a neutral only on conditions and contingencies other than the general right to stop in transitu, are not within the warranty:

Phillips, sect. 794.

But a declaration of war after the policy is ject from neutral to belligerent, so as to take it made does not change the character of the subout of the warranty:

Eden v. Parkinson, Dougl. 732; Tyson v. Gurney, 3 Term. 477; Salonica v. Johnson, Park, 8th edit., 716.

But where goods are, shipped by a belligerent, conditionally to become those of a neutral, and the latter complies with the condition before a capture, they thereby from that time are within the warranty:

Phillips, sect. 795.

If a consignor becomes a belligerent by the breaking out of war during the transit, he cannot by assignment to a neutral screen them from capture, and they will not therefore thereby be within

the warranty.

NOTE. Whether such is the object of the transfer is to be gathered from the circumstances. Phillips, sect. 796, and n. 5.


If an owner changes his national character during transit of the goods, the national character of his property in transit does not change: Phillips, sect. 797; 1 Duer, Mar. Ins. 437.

Proofs of neutrality.

warranty the ship must be furnished with all those In order to be neutral within the meaning of the herself and her cargo required to be on board documents and proofs of the neutral character of either by the law of nations or by the regulations

of international treaties :

Arn. 569, 4th edit; Phillips, sect. 802.
NOTE. These should comprise the flag, the passport,
sea-brief, sea-letter, or pass; the register, or cer-
tificate of registry; the muster-roll, the charter-
party, the log book, the bill of health; proofs of
the national character of the cargo; ex. gr. invoices,
bills of lading, certificates of origin:

Arn. 570, 571, 4th edit; Phillips, sect. 802, et seq.
A master forfeits the neutral character of his

ship by covering belligerent goods on board as neutral, even though without the knowledge or consent of the shipowner:

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Throwing papers overboard is not of itself a breach of the warranty, although raising a strong presumption of enemy's property:

Bernardi v. Motteux, Dougl. 581; The Pizzaro, 2
Wheaton 227.

Breaches of the warranty. All voluntary illegal acts forfeiting the character of a neutral are breaches of the warranty.

Ex. gr.-Resisting the right of search when properly exercised (a). Rescuing, or attempting to rescue, a neutral vessel sent in for examination by an authorised belligerent captor. Violating blockade(b). Carrying hostile despatches(c).

(a) As to what is a proper exercise of the
right of search, see
Phillips, s. 819, 820; Arn. 580, 4th edit.; The Maria,
1 C. Rob. Adm. 340.

(b) Blockade must be effective, and neutral nations must have had notice of it. (e) "A distinction has been made between carrying despatches of the enemy between different parts of his dominions and carrying despatches of an ambassador from a neutral country to his own sovereign. The effect of the former despatches is presumed to be hostile; but the neutral country has a right to preserve its relations with the enemy, and it does not necessarily follow that the communica tions are of a hostile nature." Kent 1, s. 153. Attempting to disguise belligerent goods as neutral, and carrying them as such with the neutral part of the cargo, is a breach of the warranty of neutrality, and will avoid the policy as to the whole of the neutral cargo: Arn, 576, 4th edit.

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If during war neutral property be engaged in any branch of the colonial or coasting trade of the enemy that is open to foreigners in time of peace, such property loses its character of neutrality:

1 Kent, Comm. 81-86; The Immanuel, 2 C. Rob. Ad. R. 186.

NOTE. This rule is confined to trade between the enemy's colony and the mother country, and is not applicable where the produce of a hostile colony is bona fide imported into a neutral country, and thence re-exported into the mother country: (Arn. 574, 4th edit.) Property despatched to a neutral in pursuance of a contract with a belligerent government, or employed by him in a trade for which a privilege is given by a belligerent, does not answer to a warranty of neutrality:

The Anna Catherina, 4 C. Rob. Adm. 107.

A warranty that a vessel is neutral is not forfeited merely by the supercargo being a belligerent:

Mayne v. Walker, 3 Dougl. 79.

The employment of a neutral vessel in a service auxiliary to the hostile operations of a belligerent forfeits its neutral character:

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NOTE.-Kent says, "It is a presumption almost de jure that the neutral, if found on the interdicted waters, goes there with an intention to break the blockade."

A master being informed during a voyage to a port that it is blockaded, violates the blockade if he continues his voyage.

NOTE. The pursuit of the voyage is, however, open
to explanation.
Phillips, s. 838.

Sailing to a port with a design to enter, if the blockading squadron should be blown off by the winds is a violation of the blockade.

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seems to be supported by the English cases, in which it was decided, after much conflict, that there was no warranty of seaworthiness in a time policy.


The materials of which the ship is made;
Its construction;

The qualifications of the captain;

The number and description of the crew;
The tackle, sails, and rigging;

The stores, equipment, and outfit generally, must be such as to render the ship in every respect fit for the proposed voyage or service : Phillips, s. 695.

The cargo must be properly stowed;
There must be sufficient ballast.

If the existing state of things does not comply with the warranty, the policy is void, although the owners have acted honestly and fairly and in ignorance of any defect.

The warranty requires seaworthiness in conformity with the standard at the time for the contemplated service at the port to which the vessel belongs, unless some other standard is referred to expressly or by implication : Phillips, sect. 719.

A vessel seaworthy for one stage of the voyage may be unseaworthy for another, and unless she is fit for each stage of the voyage when she enters upon it, the warranty is not complied with. [Ex. gr., a boiler efficient in fresh water, cracked in salt water-case cited infra.]

The enumeration as excepted from the policy of some losses of the same kind as those resulting from defects which constitute unseaworthiness, does not exclude the general implied warranty:

The Quebec Mar. Ins. Co. v. The Commercial Bank of
Canada, L. Rep. 3 P. C. 234.

Unseaworthiness arising after the commencement of the voyage, and produced by a peril insured against, does not of itself discharge the underwriter. It imposes upon the assured the duty of using reasonable diligence to repair it, and negligence in that respect may discharge the insurer from any loss arising from the want of such due diligence:

Kent. Comm., sect. 288.

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Phillips, sect. 734.

The remedy of a defect after sailing-unless

with the consent of the underwriters-does not

aid owners of a ship unseaworthy at the time of sailing:

Forshaw v. Chabert, 3 Br. & B. 158: The Quebec Marine Ins. Co. v. The Commercial Bank of Canada, L. Rep. 3 P. C. 231 [in which Lord Tenterden's dictum to the contrary (in Weir v. Aberdeen, 2 B. & Ald. 320) is dissented from]. "At and from a port:"

A ship would appear to answer the warranty if capable of being moved about in port: Parmeter v. Cousins, 2 Camp. 257; Annen v. Wood.

man, 3 Taunt. 259.

If the ship arrives at the port so shattered as to be a mere wreck, or in such a state as to be unable to lie there in reasonable security till she is properly repaired and equipped for the voyage, the policy does not attach:

Arn. 604, 4th edit.

As to Freight and Cargo.

A ship whose condition complies with the warranty in a policy on ship may yet fail to comply with the warranty in a policy on cargo and freight. The policy being on cargo and freight the war. ranty of seaworthiness is not complied with if the cargo is put on board for the voyage when the ship is in so defective a state that the cargo must be relanded in order to make the necessary repairs, and the policy therefore does not attach on the cargo if the risk is to commence at the time of loading.

Phillips, sect. 723, vol. 1, p. 391.

The doctrine of seaworthiness does not apply to lighters engaged in loading or unloading the cargo. Lane v. Nixon, L. Rep. 1 C. P. 412.

(2.) Navigation.

The captain must be competent to conduct the vessel in safety through all the ordinary perils of the voyage, and in long voyages-not in all voyages-there should be a competent mate:

Arn. 615, 4th edit.; 3 Kent. Com. p. 337, n. e.

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Phillips, sect. 713.

NOTE.-If a pilot cannot be procured, and it is
prudent to enter the port rather than wait, the
underwriter will not be discharged if the master
enters without a pilot.
Arn. 617, 4th edit.

skill when the vessel sails:
The crew must be adequate and of sufficient

Hicks v. Thornton, Holt's N. P. 30; Forshaw v.
Chabert, 3 Br. & B. 158.

If the master takes on board a person representing himself to be a qualified pilot, although in fact he is not so, the warranty is satisfied:

Phillips, sect. 374, citing Law v. Hollingsworth, 7 T.
Rep. 160.

A sufficient crew being shipped originally, an occasional disability or absence of the men does not violate the warranty:

Busk v. Roy. Ex. Áss. 2 B. & Ald. 73, per Bayley, J. (3) Legal Conduct.

An illegal act committed by the assured, or on his behalf, is a violation of this implied warranty.

The illegality must induce loss by a peril insured against to violate the warranty.

But if the act arise out of negligence or mistake the insurers are not exonerated from consequent loss by perils insured against.

The vessel must be furnished with all proper evidence of her national character, for want of which she might be condemned if taken by a belligerent:

Phillips, sect. 745; Arn. 619, 4th edit. NOTE. This is necessary, although there is no warranty of neutrality in the policy: Steel v. Lacy, 3 Taunt. 285.




Bank presented a bill of exchange to B. and Co., the drawees, for their acceptance, accompanied by a ticket representing that the bank held bills of lading to cover it. B. and Co. thereupon accepted the bill, relying on the statement that the bank held bills of lading which both parties thought to be genuine. The bills of lading had been forged by the drawer of the bill of exchange. Held, that B. and Co. were not entitled to demand from the bank genuine bills of lading before paying the amount of the bill of exchange: (Baxter v. Chapman, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 642. V.C. B.)

FACTOR-SALE BY-SET-OFF AGAINST PRINCIPAL-"MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE" OF BUYER THAT HE DEALT WITH AN AGENT-PLEADING. To a declaration for goods sold and delivered, the defendants pleaded, that the goods were sold and delivered to the defendants by S. and Co., agents of the plaintiff's in that behalf, and entrusted by the plaintiffs with the possession of the said goods, as apparent owners thereof, and that S. and Co. sold and delivered the goods to the defendants as their own, with the consent of the plaintiffs, and at the time of the said sale and delivery of the said goods, the defendants believed the said S. and Co. to be the owners of the said goods, and did not know that the plaintiffs were the owners of the said goods, or of any of them, or were interested therein, or that S. and Co. were agents in that behalf; and the plea First averred a set-off against S. and Co. replication, that before, &c., the defendants had the means of knowing that S. and Co. were merely the apparent owners of the goods, and sold them as agents for the plaintiffs; secondly, the like, but averring means of knowledge that S. and Co. were agents generally. On demurrer to the plea and replications: Held, that the plea was good, without any allegation negativing "means of knowledge" on the part of the defendants that S. and Co. were agents; and that the replications, being therefore immaterial, were bad: (Borries and others v. The Imperial Ottoman Bank, 29 L. T. Rep. 689. C. P.).

THE will of Mr. Thomas Wontner, late of No. 3, Cloak-lane, solicitor, who died on the 19th ult., at Weston green, Thames Ditton, was proved on the 3rd inst. by Mr. Russell Wontner, the son, the sole executor, the personalty being sworn under £5000. The provisions of the will are in favour of testator's wife and four sons.

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A surety for the debtor upon a bill of exchange
deposited as security for a larger debt, if he pay
the amount for which he is liable is entitled to
the benefit, pro tanto, of the creditor's proof,
if made for the whole debt: (Ex parte Holmes,
8 L. J., N. S., 44, Bank; see also Hobson v.
Bass, L. Rep. 6 Ch. App. 792.)
Killick (Wood and Killick) for the motion.

Robinson (C. Berry and Robinson) opposed.
His HONOUR.-This is an application made in
the bankruptcy of William Moore, of Pudsey,
in the parish of Calverley, in the county of
York, stuff manufacturer, bankrupt, by Syl.
vester Emil Sichel and John Groves, of Brad-
ford, stuff merchants, trading as S. E. Sichel
and Co., for an
order directing that the
proof made by Charles Joseph Buckley upon
this estate may be reduced to the extent of £780,
the amount of the bill of exchange accepted by
the said S. E. Sichel and Co., and set out in each
of the proofs made by him. And for an order
that the decision of the trustee in this matter,
rejecting the proof of the said S. E. Sichel and
John Groves, upon the estate of the said bankrupt,
may be reversed or varied; and that the trustee
may be directed to admit the said S. E. Sichel and
John Groves as persons entitled to prove upon
the estate of the said bankrupt for £628 17s.,
or such other sum as the court shall direct, or for
an order declaring that the said Charles Joseph
Buckley is a trustee for and on behalf of Mr.
S. E. Sichel and John Groves, in respect of the
dividend or dividends to be received by him upon
so much of the amount proved by him as is equal
to or represents the said sum of £628 17s., or
such other sum as the court shall direct; and
for an order that the trustee of the pro-
perty of the said bankrupt do pay it out of the
estate of the said bankrupt, and that the said
C. J. Buckley do personally pay, the costs of the
said S. E. Sichel and John Groves of and inci-
dental to this application, and the orders to be
made thereon. The application arises out of the
following circumstances: Wm. Moore, the bank
rupt, in Feb. last, presented a petition to this
court for liquidation under the 125th section of
Bankruptcy Act 1869, and at the first meeting of
creditors, held on the 4th March last, resolutions
were passed for liquidating his affairs by arrange-
ment and not in bankruptcy, and Buckley was
appointed trustee. These resolutions were duly
registered, and Buckley's appointment duly cer-
tified. Shortly afterwards the debtor Moors made
an offer to Buckley to repurchase his estate upon
the terms of paying the trustee's costs, charges,
and expenses, all the debtor's preferential
creditors in full, aud a composition of 6s. in the
pound to all his other creditors by three equal
instalments, at three, six, and nine months from
the acceptance of said offer, the second of such
instalments to be secured by the acceptance by
the firm of S. E. Sichel and Co. of the debtor's
draft for £780 at six months, and the third of
such instalments to be secured in like manner by
the aceeptance by Wm. Sharp of the debtor's
draft for the further sum of £780 at nine months.
And on the 7th March last the said firm of S. E.
Sichel and Co. addressed and sent to the trustee
under the liquidation the following offer: "We
hereby offer to become surety for the payment of
any composition which the creditors may accept
to the extent of £780, such security to be our
acceptance of the debtor's draft for £780, dated
on the day of the acceptance of the composition
by the creditors, and payable six months after
date. This bill to be deposited with the person
who may be appointed trustee for the receipt and
distribution of the composition." On the 24th
March last, at a meeting of creditors duly
held under the liquidation by a special reso-
lution then passed, the trustee was duly
authorised to accept the offer of the debtor
the terms and conditions contained in
an agreement produced at the meeting, and
executed and signed by the chairman and trustee,
and the committee of inspection are thereby
authorised to sign the same as a general scheme
of settlement of the affairs of the debtor. And
at the same meeting resolutions were duly passed
whereby the immediate discharge of the debtor
was granted; the liquidation was closed, and
Buckley as trustee was released as from the 24th
March last. And Buckley was appointed trustee
for the receipt and distribution of the composi-
tion. On the 1st April last the agreement referred
to in the said resolutions was duly approved, and


such approval certified by this court as a scheme
of settlement of the debtor's affairs under the
28th sect. Bankruptcy Act 1869. The acceptances
for £780 and £780 at six and nine months from
the 24th March last, were duly delivered to
Buckley, indorsed by the debtor, and the
arrangements provided for by the agreement were
transferred to the debtor, Buckley, as trustee for
duly completed. The estate was in effect re-
the receipt and distribution of the composition,
taking from the debtor his personal covenant for
payment of the costs, charges, and expenses,
three several instalments before-mentioned, col-
preferential debts, and the composition by the
laterally secured as to the second and third
instalments by the two acceptances of £780 and
£780. The legal and equitable effect of this
transaction was to rehabilitate the debtor as a
trader discharged from all his provable debts
at the time of his liquidation, and he ac-
cordingly forthwith resumed business 88 a
stuff merchant. On the 24th June last the
first instalment of the composition became due,
and was not paid. And the trustee, therefore,
applied to and obtained from this court an order
for payment by Moore, which was duly served on
him, and payment not being made, an execution
was issued against his goods under which they
were seized; but upon sale Moore filed a declara-
tion of insolvency, and thereupon a petition for
adjudication was presented by a creditor in re
spect of a debt incurred since the previous liqui-
dation, and the debtor was adjudicated bankrupt
by consent on the 4th July. Buckley was after.
wards appointed trustee under the bankruptcy,
thus filling the two characters of trustee for
receipt and distribution of the composition, and
trustee under the bankruptcy. At the date of the
bankruptcy there was an open account between
the bankrupt and S. E. Sichel and Co. for goods
manufactured and delivered by the bankrupt to
them, upon which a balance was due from S. E.
Sichel and Co. This balance, after some inter-
change of accounts, was agreed by the trustee at
£384 08. 6d., and the trustee applied to this court
by motion for an order on S. E. Sichel and Co.
for payment, which was resisted by them on the
ground that under the 39th section of the Bank-
ruptcy Act 1869 they were entitled to set-off,
among other items, as a mutual credit, their lia.
bility upon the acceptance for £780, treating it as
an accommodation acceptance not yet due. It
being quite clear upon the authorities that such
an acceptance is a credit within the meaning of
the statute (see Robson on Bankruptcy, p. 312,
note x.), the motion was dismissed. S. E. Sichel
and Co., having paid to Buckley, as trustee for
receipt of the composition, the sum of £780 upon
the acceptance when it arrived at maturity, after.
wards carried in a proof for £628 17s. as the
balance due upon an account as stated by them,
claiming on the one side the £780 as money paid
for the use of the bankrupt, the sum of £70
as a premium agreed to be paid by the bankrupt
to S. E. Sichel and Co. for the accommodation
given by them to him by the acceptance, and the
sum of £162 17s. 6d. for damages in respect of
inferiority of goods sold by the bankrupt to them,
making a total of £1012 178. 6d. Against this
sum credit was given for the aforesaid balance
in the goods account, £384 0s. 6d., leaving the
sum of £628 17s. as due. The trustee rejected
the proof altogether, as to the £780, because it
had already been proved upon the estate, and S.
E. Sichel and Co. were not entitled to receive
dividends thereon until the full amount of the
composition, for which the same was part security,
was paid; as to the £70, that there was no such
agreement to pay that sum as alleged; and as to
the £162 17s. 6d., that there were no such damages
as alleged. As to the last item it has been arranged
that, subject to the question of S. E. Sichel and
Co. being entitled by law to set-off unliquidated
damages, the amount due shall be ascertained
by reference to a skilled person mutually agreed
upon. Upon the question of the right to set-off
such damages, I am clearly of opinion that such
right has been created by the Bankruptcy Act
1869, as the necessary consequence of making
unliquidated damages proveable debts. These
damages will, therefore, be assessed by the
referee, but the inquiry before him will be limited
to damages in respect of goods delivered subse-
quently to the date of the petition for liqui-
dation. Damages in respect of any goods
delivered previously, would constitute a prove-
able debt under the liquidation, and be barred
by the order of discharge. As regards the
£70, that is a question of fact depending
upon the evidence, and having considered the evi-
dence I have come to the conclusion that the fact
is established, and the £70 will therefore be
allowed. As to the other ground of objection by
the trustee, that the £780 have already been
proved upon the estate, and that S. E. Sichel and
Co. are not entitled to recover dividends thereon
until the full amount of the composition for which
the acceptance as part security has been paid, that
depends upon the question what was the nature and

extent of S. E. Sichel and Co.'s engagement with
the creditors under the liquidation, upon the faith
of which the composition was accepted by them.
Buckley, as trustee for receipt of the composition,
has proved for the whole amount of the composi
tion against the bankrupt's estate, and that
amount includes the two acceptances for £780
proof in respect of either of those sums-the
and £780. There can, therefore, be no further
only question is how is the trustee's proof to be
dealt with? S. E. Sichel and Co.'s liability de-
pends entirely upon the effect of their written
opinion that it extended no further than the
engagement of the 7th March, and I am of
payment of £780 towards any composition the
creditors might accept, and that payment having
been made, S. E. Sichel and Co.'s engage
ment towards the creditors under the liquidation
has been performed, and their liability towards
them discharged. The respective rights and
liabilities of S. E. Sichel and Co. and the bank.
rupt, and those of Buckley as trustee, for receipt
of the composition, and the bankrupt are wholly
separate and independent of each other, and are
unaffected as between themselves by the bank-
ruptcy. If Moore had remained solvent, S.
E. Sichel and Co. having paid the acceptance,
would have become creditors of Moore for the
amount of £780 as money paid by them at
his request and for his use. And if Buckley had
sued Moore upon the covenant for payment of the
instalments contained in the composition agree-
ment, Moore could have pleaded payment of the
£780 as a payment pro tanto in satisfaction of the
covenant. Now what is the effect of the bank.
ruptcy upon these rights? They are plainly
these: S. E. Sichel and Co., having paid the £780
as security for the bankrupt would be entitled to
prove for that sum against his estate, if proof had
not been already made by the holder of the accept-
ance; that proof has been already made by
Buckley, as trustee, for receipt of the composi
tion, and he, having already received the full
amount of the acceptance, must be deemed to be
a trustee of such proof to the extent of the debt
(not exceeding £780), due upon the balance of the
mutual credit account to be taken between S. E.
Sichel and Co. and the bankrupt's estate, the £780
forming an item in that account. The case of
Ex parte Holmes (8 L. J., N. S., 41 Bank.), after-
wards affirmed on appeal by Lord Cottenham,
relied upon by Mr. Killick, is an authority ex-
pressly in point; and the recent case of Hobson
v. Bass (L. Rep. 6 Ch. App. 792), recognises and
supplies the principle. In the present case no
dividend has been received, and the order will
therefore be as follows: Declare that though
C. J. Buckley is a trustee for and on behalf of
S. E. Sichel and John Groves, in respect of the
dividend or dividends to be received by him upon
so much of the amount proved by him as his equal
to represent the sum of £628 178., or such other
sum as shall be agreed to be the balance due
upon the mutual credit account between S. E.
Sichel and Co. and the bankrupt's estate, after
ascertaining the sum to be allowed for damages
in respect of goods supplied by the bankrupt to
S. E. Sichel and Co. since the date of his petition
for liquidation, such balance to be ascertained and
settled by the registrar in case the parties shall
be unable to agree upon and to offer the same..
Buckley to pay the costs of the said S. E. Sichel
and John Groves of and incident to this applica
tion, and to be allowed the same, and to restrain
his own costs out of the funds on his hand as
trustee for receipt of the composition. The costs
to be taxed by the registrar.

Tuesday, Jan. 15.

(Before E. J. LLOYD, Q.C., Judge.)
Railway Company-Delay-Damage-Liability.
HIS HONOUR gave judgment in this case, which
was a claim for £40 odd for damages sustained by
the plaintiff, a hop merchant living at Portishead,
in consequence of his being unable to attend a
hop market in the Borough, London, through the
delay of a train on the defendants' line. The
plaintiff had a yearly ticket over the Bristol and
Portishead Railway, which is worked by the
defendants; and in September last he was desirous
of proceeding to London by the express which
leaves Bristol at 7.50 a.m. The first train from
Portishead departs at 6.50 in the morning, and it
arrives at Bristol, according to the time-tables, at
7.40; and the plaintiff sent to the station master
at Portishead to inquire whether the 6.50 train
would reach Bristol in time for the 7.50 express to
London. He was informed it would unless there
were some coal trucks to be picked up on the line.
The plaintiff went by the 6.50 train, but on the
way the train was stopped at Ashton to pick up
some coal trucks, and was detained twenty or
thirty minutes. In consequence of this delay the
plaintiff failed to catch the express, and had to
wait until the 12.9 train to Paddington; and in

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