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puted children, C. Occleston and E. Occleston, and all other the children which he might have, or be reported to have, by the said Margaret Lewis, then born, or thereafter to be born," at twentyone or marriage. Margaret Lewis, with whom James Occleston had gone through the ceremony of marriage, was the sister of James Occleston's deceased wife. At the date of the will the two children named were living, and a third child, with whom Margaret Lewis was then pregnant, was born afterwards in the testator's lifetime. The Vice-Chancellor, following the view taken by Lord Romilly in Pratt v. Matthew (22 Beav. 328), held that the child born after the date of the will was not entitled to participate.

On the appeal the Lord Chancellor, while fully recognising that an illegitimate child en ventre sa mère at the date of the will might have taken, if aptly described, considered that, as in the case of Pratt v. Matthew, the child in question was only described as one of the class of future reputed children, and was not a persona designata at all. That also, as far as we can gather, was the view of the Lords Justices. The real difficulty and the real importance of the case, therefore, centred on the question whether all the reputed illegitimate children of the testator who might have come into existence prior to the testator's death could be allowed to participate. In other words, whether the date of the will or the death of the testator was the point of time to be regarded. The Lord Chancellor asserts that for the purpose of determining whether a devise or bequest in favour of illegitimate children contravenes public policy, the date of the will must be regarded. The Lords Justices say that the will being totally inoperative during the life of the testator, and its contents possibly or probably known to himself alone, no rule of public policy can be infringed, and that the will is of precisely the same force and effect as if it had been reexecuted and re-attested at the last moment of the testator's life, and that all the children who had then acquired the reputation of being the testator's would be entitled. They admit agreeing with the Lord Chancellor that a provision by deed in favour of future illegitimate children would be void, as tending to facilitate concubinage and the procreation of bastards, but deny that a provision by will would have a similar tendency. They do not, however, appear to be able to adduce a single authority in which such a distinction has been acted on or even hinted at, which the decision of Lord Macclesfield in Metham v. The Duke of Devon (1 P: W. 529) seems entirely adverse.

The conflicting judgments of the Lord Chancellor and his coadjutors will be read with great interest. That of the Lord Chancellor strikes us as being a clear, calm, and altogether admirable statement of the law on the subject. We say of the law, for we believe that the question raised in Occleston v. Fullalove, if carried before the ultimate Court of Appeal, will be decided in accordance with the views of Lord Romilly, ViceChancellor Wickens, and Lord Selborne. We hold that the law will not contemplate the procreation of future illegitimate children, or allow them as such, to be the objects of bounty.

We hold that on the expressions of the particular will and the surrounding circumstances, the testator intended a gift to illegitimate children who were reputably his; that, as Lord Colonsay says, it is impossible to provide for future illegitimate children as such "by any form of words," that the testator made the gift to his " reputed children," because of his paternity, and because he was assured that they would not gain the reputation of being his children without being so in reality-such children being by reason of the affinity between himself and Margaret Lewis necessarily illegitimate; that a provision for such children by will differs only in degree and not in its essential nature from a gift by deed; that a testator sitting down to provide for future concubinage and its probable results, must be considered as doing so turpi animo, and contemplating-perhaps to some extent compounding with his own conscience for a course of conduct which if he chooses to contemplate, the law will not, but will do all in its power to discountenance. We hold, however, that where a will is made in favour of a class of future children, it is a perverse mode of construction to take the death of the testator as a standpoint, and then to read the will as if it had been re-executed or confirmed by codicil at the testator's death, and by this process, ingenious, but as we think wholly unwarranted, to convert a gift to a class of future illegitimate children who as such cannot take, into a gift to existing individuals who can. For certain purposes

no doubt a will is read as if executed at the death of the testator; this, however, is not one of them. In order to ascertain the intention of the testator as to the objects of his bounty, and the mode

in which they are to receive it, the court has not merely to sit in the testator's chair for the purpose of ascertaining his intention, but in so sitting must take its survey at the same point of time as the testator took his-i. e., at the date of his will, and not at any other time, before or after. The opinion of the Lord Chancellor is fortified by the opinions of Lords Chelmsford and Colonsay in Crook v. Hill. No doubt as Lord Justice James remarks, the opinions were obiter dicta, but those learned lords would in all probability act on them if ever Occleston v. Fullalove or a similar case presents itself for their decision.

LAW LIBRARY.

Shelford's Real Property Statutes. Eighth edition. By THOMAS H. CARSON, M.A., of Lincoln's-inn, Barrister-at-Law. London: Sweet, Maxwell and Son, and Stevens and Sons.

MR. CARSON exercised a wise discretion when he determined not to increase the bulk of this very useful standard work. Whilst adding new material which was absolutely essential, he has either entirely got rid of what was old and of little use, or reduced it so as to give him space for the additions which the growth of case law and statute law render necessary.

On more than one occasion when we have had to review works which are similar in their plan to the one before us, we have remarked how little there is to be said. No work can call for less ability of a high order than annotating Acts of Parliament: industry and a capacity to express concisely what cases have decided are all that is required. An excellent specimen of Mr. Carson's work is the Partition Act (31 & 32 Vict. c. 40), p. 746; but when we say that the case law is intelligently noted up, we can give Mr. Carson no higher praise. Throughout the volume we trace the hand of a careful editor, and whilst it is quite out of our power to say whether he had gleaned all the learning which the reports furnish, we think it may be taken on trust that the work is perfect. Lawyers owe to conscientious editors a very great deal, and if Mr. Carson cannot lay claim to the rewards of an original writer, he may console himself with the reflection that he has rendered a considerable service to the profession, and probably stored up for application in practice a fund of learning on real property law. At the opening of the work is a table of contents, and the volume is closed by a clear and full index.

Stephen's New Commentaries on the Laws of England. Seventh edition. By JAMES STEPHEN, Esq., LL.D., Judge of County Courts. London: Butterworths.

WE have in this work an old and valued friend. For years we have had the last (sixth) edition upon our shelves, and we can state as a fact that when our text books on particular branches of the law have failed us, we have always found that Stephen's Commentaries have supplied us with the key to what we sought, if not the actual thing we required. We think that these Commentaries establish one important proposition-that to be of thorough practical utility a treatise on English law cannot be reduced within a small compass. The subject is one which must be dealt with comprehensively, and abridgment, except merely for the purposes of elementary study, is a decided blunder.

Serjeant Stephen gives us as heretofore four goodly volumes, and when we say that, aided by an industrious son, he has devoted the leisure, which is not inconsiderable in the life of a County Court Judge, to the labour of bringing down his authorities to the present year, incorporating as far as possible the provisions of the Judicature Act, it will be understood that the work is one of great present value. We are glad to see a County Court Judge employed in keeping the world well informed on English law, on the two-fold ground that a Judge will probably take more pains with his work than members of the Bar, and that his own decisions will benefit by his familiarity with the progress of our jurisprudence. Of the scope of the Commentaries we need say nothing. To all who profess acquaintance with the English law their plan and execution must be thoroughly familiar. The learned author has made one conspicuous alteration, confining "Civil Injuries " within the compass of one volume, and commencing the last volume with "Crimes "-and in that volume he has placed a table of statutes. In every respect the work is improved, and the present writer can say, from practical experience, that for the student and the practitioner there is no better work published than Stephen's Commentaries.

PATENT LAW.

<By C. HIGGINS, Esq., M.A., F.C.S., Barrister-at-Law.)

COMPLETE SPECIFICATION.

(Continued from p. 161.) Sellers v. Dickinson. 1850.-Per Pollock, C.J.: The specification should be met with candour and indulgence. Per Rolfe, B.: The court should read a specification as a person of ordinary understanding would do, not loosely conjecturing anything, but, at the same time, not scanning it as if it were a special plea. (5 Ex. 312.)

Wallington v. Dale. 1852.-The sufficiency of the description of an invention contained in a specification is a question for the jury. (7 Ex.

888.)

Heath v. Unwin, Ex. Ch. 1852. Coleridge, C.J., in the course of his judgment, said: "The specification, to be perfect, must be taken to specify impliedly all the chemical equivalents of those chemical means expressly stated for producing the promised result, which were at the time of specifying known to ordinarily skilled chemists or to the patentee himself; the latter of these seems to me to be as necessary as the former. If the inventor of an alleged discovery, knowing of two equivalent agents for effecting the end, could by the disclosure of one preclude the public from the benefit of the other, he might for his own profit force upon the public an expensive and difficult process, keeping back the simple and cheap one, which would be directly contrary to the good faith required from every patentee in his communication with the public." Alderson, B.; said: "Every specification is to be read as if by persons acquainted with the general facts of the mechanical or chemical sciences involved in such invention. Thus, if a particular mechanical process is specified, and there are for some parts of it as specified, other well-known mechanical equivalents, the specification of those parts is in truth a specification of the well-known equivalent also, to those to whose general knowledge we refer, namely, mechanics, and readers of specifications; and so it is with chemical equivalents also in a specification which is to be read by chemists. But it may be that there are equivalents, mechanical and chemical, existing, but previously unknown to ordinary skilful mechanics and chemists. These are not included in the specification, but must be expressly stated there. (2 Web. P. C. 243, 245.) Crogsley v. Potter. N. P. 1853. Pollock, C.B. said: "This patent is taken out for the making of coach lace, carpets, velvets, and velveteens of all sorts, and it must be, competent to do all and every part of that work, by the means stated in the specification, otherwise the patent is not good. A patent for an invention which is merely to obstruct every subsequent improvement, which is to step in and prevent the exercise of the ingenuity of mankind and the introduction of other inventions adapted to the particular subject to which the invention may be applicable-a patent which has for its object to snatch and grasp at everything in all directions which may possibly come within the general language the patentee may choose to adopt in his specification-a patent, the object of which is, not to benefit the world by its communication, but to obstruct, by the very general character of the claims made for conferring peculiar privileges on the patentee; such a patent as that, in my judgment, cannot be supported. safest course for patentees to adopt in framing their specifications is, instead of including everything, to confine themselves specifically to one good thing, and a jury will always take care that if that be a real invention, no man, under colour of improvement, shall be allowed to interfere with that which is the offspring of their genius." (Macrory's P. C. 239.)

The

Hastings v. Brown. 1853.-A specification in a patent, for a particular construction of windlasses, stated that the object was " to hold, without slipping, a chain cable of any size." Before the date of the patent constructions were known by which a windlass might be made to hold a single chain cable of any assigned size. Held, that the specification did not unequivocally show that the object was to construct a single windlass which might hold different chain cables, whatever their size, and that such a windlass was therefore not protected by the patent. (1 E. & B. 450; 22 L. J. Q. B. 161.)

Bush v. Fox, H. L. 1856.-In an action for an alleged infringement of a patent, where the defence is that the supposed invention is not new, the judge may compare the plaintiff's specification with the specification of a previous patent, and may on such comparison direct the jury to find a verdict. (5 H. L. C. 707; Macrory's P.C. 183.) Bovill v. Pimen. 1856.-Pollock, C.B., in the course of delivering the judgment of the court in this case, said: It appears to us that where a subject is not new, as this certainly was not, viz., "the cooling of substances undergoing the process of grinding" (which had been long known to

be a desideratum in grirding, and to effect which various contrivances had been adopted, and several, if not many, patents taken out), any patent taken out for a method of performing the operation is substantially confined to that method, and cannot be extended to other methods obviously different, because they involve some common principle applied to the common object, and may apparently be described by the same general phrase. (11 Ex. 739.)

Booth v. Kennard. 1857.-Action for the infringement of a patent for "Improvements in the Manufacture of Gas." The specification stated the invention to "consist in the direct use of seeds, leaves, flowers, branches, nuts, fruit, and other substances and matters containing oil, or oily or resinous matter." The specification also stated "that the mode of using seed and constructing the apparatus used under this my patent in preparing gas may be the same as the apparatus used in the ordinary mode of making gas with coal." The claim was as follows: "I claim for making gas direct from seeds and matter herein named for practical illuminations or other useful purposes, instead of making it from the oils, resins, or gums, previously extracted from such substances." A previous patentee had, by his specification, proposed, for the manufacture of gas, to use 'fatty substances, such as greaves or graves; also the residuum after the oil had been expressed from seeds, such as oil cake; also beech nuts, mast, cocoa nuts, and other matters abounding in oil, and he proposed to use these substances separately and in combination. Held, first, upon the authority of Bush v. Fox, that as the want of novelty in the plaintiff's invention appeared clearly from the two specifications in evidence, it was for the court, and not for the jury, to determine the identity of the two supposed inventions. Secondly, that the claim, being merely for making gas direct from seeds and matter stated in the specification, without reference to any method of doing it, was too large and general, and could not be supported. (2 H. & N. 84; 26 L. J. N.S., Ex. 305.)

Thomas v. Foxwell. 1858.-Lord Campbell, C.J., Bench, said: "We by no means lay down, as a in delivering the judgment of the Court of Queen's general rule, that upon a question of novelty of invention such as this, raised by the comparison of two specifications, it must necessarily be a pure question of law for the court. The specifications may contain expressions of art and commerce, upon which experts must be examined, and there may be conflicting evidence raising a question of fact to be determined by the jury. But it is quite clear that there may be cases in which the court would be bound to decide the question of novelty exclusively; for the two specifications might be, in ipsissimis verbis, the same; and if they be in such plain and common language that the judge is sure he understands their meaning, he is bound to construe them as he does other written documents. (5 Jur. N.S. 38.).

Lister v. Leather. 1858.-A patent for a combination is not a claim that each part thereof is new: (8 E. & B. 1004; 3 Jur. N. S. 811.) Affirmed on appeal to the Exchequer Chamber. Held, also, that a patent is a patent for a combination, if a combination is distinctly stated in the specification to be a part of the invention, although the combination is not expressly claimed; for a claim is not an essential to a specification, or necessary for the protection of the invention. Nor is it necessary to disclaim those matters which manifestly form no part of the invention: (8 E. & B. 1004; 27 L. J., N. S., 295, Q. B..).

The Patent Type Founding Company v. Richards. Ch. 1859.-The specification of an invention, which consists in the use of known materials in new proportions, is not necessarily bad for uncertainty, though the patentee does not limit himself to the precise proportions recommended. The patentee is bound, according to the authorities, to state what he considers the best proportions. A specification stated in substance, that the usual practice in the manufacture of type was to employ lead and antimony, and in some cases to add a small per centage of tin; that the object of the invention was to obtain tougher metal by employing tin in large proportions with antimony, greatly reducing or wholly omitting the use of lead; that the best proportions were seventy-five of tin and twenty-five of antimony, but that this might be, to some extent, varied; and that, if lead were used, it must not exceed fifty per cent. of the whole, one part of antimony to three of tin, or tin and lead, being the best. Held, on demurrer, that the specification was not bad on the face of it for uncertainty, and that the evidence of persons acquainted with the usual modes of manufacture was necessary to determine whether the invention was stated with sufficient precision. (1 John Rep. 381; 6 Jur. N. S. 39.)

Thomas v. Foxwell. Ex. Ch. 1859.-The patentee of a sewing machine, in his specification, claimed "the application of a shuttle in combination with a needle, as shown in sheet 1, for forming and sewing loops of thread or other substance, for the

purpose of producing stitches either to unite or ornament fabrics, whatever may be the means employed for working such shuttle and needle when employed together." By a disclaimer. he stated, "I do not claim the use in a machine of several needles and shuttles, nor do I claim any of the mechanical parts separately of which the machinery shown in the drawing is composed." Held (affirming the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench), that the claim was not confined to the single application of a shuttle in combination with a needle, as shown in sheet 1, but extended generally to the application of a shuttle with a needle, for attaining the object therein stated. (6 Jur. N. S. 271.)

Hills v. The London Gas Light Company. 1860. In a patent for an improved mode of manufac turing gas the plaintiff claimed a mode of purify. ing gas by means of "hydrated or precipitated oxides of iron." Held, that this included only precipitated hydrates. Bramwell, B., in delivering the judgment of the Court of Exchequer, said: "The next objection was that the plaintiff's spe cification was insufficient on this ground. He says: 'I use the hydrated or precipitated oxides.' It was said that included all hydrated oxides, and inasmuch as some of the natural hydrated oxides would not do, the plaintiff's specification was bad. Now, that question turns upon this: If the plaintiff in his specification means all the hydrated oxides, it is open to that objection; but if he means only those hydrated oxides which are also precipitated,

that is, the artificial hydrated oxides-it is not open to that objection. It may be said that the language is in any sense ungrammatical, and that hydrated or precipitated-the whole or the partcannot be right. To say,The works of Shakespeare, or Hamlet and King Lear,' would obviously be an inaccuracy, which cannot be judged by the ordinary rules of grammar, and therefore we must endeavour to find out the proper meaning of this inaccurate expression. It appears to us, upon looking at the specification, that the plaintiff uses those equivalent expressions, because he says 'hydrated or precipitated,' and that oxide of iron may be conveniently prepared for these purposes, and so on; and therefore it is obvious that when he uses that word hydrated, he uses it as synonymous with precipitated; and consequently, when he speaks of using hydrated or precipitated oxides, he means such hydrated oxides as are precipitated." Upon the comparison of two specifications, the same learned judge says: "We hold that there are certain cases in which, upon the mere collocation of the two specifications, or the speci fication of a patent and a previous written document, the court may say that the patentee has been anticipated. Undoubtedly that is so; the process may be described in identically the same words, or, if there be a variety in the words, there may be no variety in the process. Probably it will be found that in the case of what are called mechanical patents, the court can do so more readily than in the case of chemical patents, or in other cases where the invention depends on what may be called the occult qualities of matter, those in fact which are not the subject of popular know. ledge." (5 H. & N. 363, 368; 29 L. J., N. S., 421, 424., Ex.)

SOLICITORS' JOURNAL.

WE are very glad to notice that in addition to those solicitors who sat in the Commons House of Parliament last session, and who again seek re-election, two others are seeking election at the approaching Parliamentary contests. Even now it is not too late for others to take the field in some of those small constituencies in which a candidate appearing upon the scene at the eleventh hour has, almost as much to his own surprise as that of his supporters, found himself successful. None better than solicitors know that if they can only secure a fair representation in the House of Commons, the many ills that their branch of the Profession is heir to will speedily cease to be, and we shall hear no more of the meekness with which they have endured their exclusion from judicial offices, their subordination to the other branch, and their exile from the dignity of and the most solid rewards in connection with the legal profession.

THE following lectures and classes are appointed for the ensuing week, at the Law Institution, for the instruction of students seeking admission on the Roll of Attorneys and Soliciters: Monday, 2nd Feb., class, 4.30 to 6 p.m., Conveyancing; Tuesday and Wednesday, ditto; Friday, 6th Feb., lecture, 6 to 7 p.m. To prevent interruption at lectures, subscribers are not admitted to the hall after lectures have commenced.

ON Wednesday, the President and Council of the Incorporated Law Society dined at their hall in Chancery-lane. Among the guests present were

Sir Barnes Peacock, Baron Pollock, Baron Amphlett, Mr. Sheriff Johnson, Mr. Joseph Brown, Q.C., and Mr. G. Little, Q.C. The Lord Mayor, and Mr. Alderman and Sheriff Whetham, who had accepted invitations were prevented from attending by engagements connected with the pending election.

A LONDON Solicitor, writing to us on the subject of the improper advertisements (in relation to the legal Profession) which find their way into newspapers which it might fairly be expected would not insert them, observes, "There was a certain class of advertisement of quack doctors which used to appear, but which respectable papers refuse to insert. They were physically dirty Those invitations to the Profession which you so often and properly expose are morally nearly as bad." The following seems to indicate that this kind of thing is beyond all question on the increase. We take the advertisement from a Surrey news

paper :

LEGAL ASSISTANCE.-Messrs. P. and V., land agents and accountants, are prepared to carry out and conduct liquidations and arrangements with creditors upon reasonable terms, without publicity; bankruptcy, or suspension of business, also all actions and executions, whether in the Superior or County Courts, immediately stayed by injunction. Chancery, divorce, probate suits, and common law actions, conducted with dispatch, and County Coutrs attended; wills, leases, assignments, and agreements prepared; money advanced on mortgage, reversions, bills of sale, &c., and debts collected at five per cent.-Apply to P. and V., W.C.

For the credit of the Profession some means ought to be devised for checking the practices of such persons as the advertisers.

BEALL v. SMITH.

WE regret that in a letter from Mr. Heather which appeared in our last issue on the subject of this case, some intemperate expressions were used, casting serious reflection upon professional gentlemen who had been opposed to him. We inserted the letter as emanating from a solicitor of twenty-eight years' standing, with less regard to the phraseology than we should have given to ordinary correspondence, and the objectionable passages certainly escaped our observation. Mr. Albert Turner and Mr. White, who are mentioned by Mr. Heather, are entitled at our hands to the explanation that no reflection was cast upon them by either Vice-Chancellor Wickens or the Lords Justices. We certainly concur with Mr. Turner that under these circumstances the strictures which were inadvertently admitted into our columns under Mr. Heather's signature may be treated with that indifference which sweeping accusations inconsistent with recorded judgments deserve. Considering the case of decided importance to the Profession, we treated it elaborately, and found no cause for casting injurious reflections upon Messrs. Merriman or Mr. A. Turner and Mr. White, who were concerned with them. Mr. Heather's letter must be taken, therefore, to be the heated production of an irritated opponent, and, for our part, we should have been glad had the strong expressions which he used not appeared in our columns.

We have received the following communication from Messrs. Merriman and Powell, which we trust may, so far as the Profession is concerned, close this correspondence:

SIR,-Although nothing is further from our wish than to have any personal controversy with Mr. Heather, we cannot allow the letter which appeared in your last issue to remain unanswered, as there is no single statement which is entirely accurate, and several of them are directly opposite to the sworn testimony filed in the Court of Chancery, upon which perjury might be assigned, but which had not even met with responsible contradiction, that is, by counter affidavit.

The first allegations of Mr. Heather are a denial that we were employed by Mr. Beall in November 1870, and that he never consulted us about undertaking some complicated matters in which he (Mr. Heather) was engaged. Our call book, letter books, and cheques show that we did act for him at and from that time. The affidavit of Mr. Dunfee, a friend, who had known him twenty years, and a former client of ours, shows that Mr. Beall came to us because he was dissatisfied with Mr. Heather. Mr. Merriman's affidavit states that Mr. Beall did propose to remove his general business from Mr. Heather, but from a general dislike to take business away from another solicitor's office, he declined to do so. We may add that letters addressed to us by our unfortunate client since his incarceration up to a very recent date, betray a strong aversion to Mr, Heather, and a belief rightly or wrongly that that gentleman had not acted properly by him.

The statement that we were not instructed with reference to his unhappy family differences is further contradicted by the affidavit of Mr. Powell, who during Mr. Merriman's absence on business in Paris went down in obedience to an urgent message, to Mr. Beall's residence, at Sydenham,

-

one evening to meet Mr. Heather, and arrange an amicable adjustment of family differences. Mr. Heather is, however, welcome to the admission of the fact that by this time the domestic troubles of this unfortunate gentleman, with his wife and two sons, were so bitter that he may be said to have moved between our office and that of Mr. Heather in bewilderment and agony · desiring above all things to recover the affections of his wife, and that an end might be put to serious persay again, emphatically, that more in the capacity of friend than solicitor (for, as several persons knew, Mr. Merriman deeply sympathised with Mr. listening to sad and distressing details of family Beall) he spent many anxious hours with him, Mr. Merriman uniformly advised Mr. Beall not to concur in a separation by his wife, as there appeared to be no real or sufficient ground for it, and it was only in the absence of affairs, that Mr. Powell took his positive instrucMr. Merriman, who chiefly attended to Mr. Beall's tions touching a deed of separation.

sonal conflicts between himself and his sons. We

feuds.

Mr. Heather makes in his letter, as well as in his affidavit and in the petition, slight and passing, not to say contemptuous reference to Mr. Merriman's appearance" thrice before the magis. trate" for Mr. Beall. Your readers will be able to put a fair construction upon the surrounding and underlying circumstances of these three ap. pearances. Mr. Heather was there also. Mr. Beall dreaded the presence of Mr. Heather, and it is not to be denied that Mr. Heather procured the doctors to give medical testimony for locking him up in an asylum; while, on the contrary, Mr. Beall's confidence and reliance were placed in Mr. Merriman, who struggled hard to prevent his being sent to the asylum. Mr. Maude, the magistrate, and the two doctors are aware Mr. Merriman contended to the last that Mr. Beall's case was one of temporary mental aberration, or insanity in its initial, acute, and easily curable stages. Mr. Beall was removed to Dr. Wood's Asylum, Mr. Merriman giving in the end only a reluctant consent, when Dr. Wood said that he was far from thinking that Beall's case was an incurable one. Whose visits after that were the sole indications of human sympathy available to this poor man? Mr. Merriman, on Mr. Beall's invitations, was the only person who visited him until these visits were prohibited by the doctor, with the concurrence of Mr. Heather and the person who had officiously made himself responsible for his maintenance in the asylum-the eldest son and present committee to his estate. Neither wife, child (nor of course Mr. Heather), called upon him for some time, and this gentleman of considerable property was left without simple luxuries and some common necessaries.

We may next refer to the charge that "Merriman, Albert Turner, and White then concocted the suit." What truth there is in this men. dacious assertion is shown in an uncontradicted affidavit. Mr. White knew nothing of the suit until the bill had been filed. It is fair to Mr. Albert Turner to say that he conferred with us as to what was best to be done, and what is called the "concoction" of the suit, was the result of the best thoughts of two conscientious solicitors, after advice upon a full and clear statement of the facts by two equity counsel.

We do not think it worth while to overlay your columns by any reference to the statements about the next friend. The next friend would have been Mr. Dunfee, a friend of twenty years' standing, who had, more than any other living being, the coufidence of Mr. Beall, but that gentleman's health was at the time not good, and he suggested that we should find somebody else. We, however, fully accept the moral responsibility of the action taken in this matter, and have all along avowed that the next friend was asked by us to accept that post. His circumstances are, however, extravagantly misstated by Mr. Heather, and the contradiction of this matter, as on others, is also embodied in two affidavits which remain unanswered.

It is a remarkable thing that Mr. White was appointed receiver, with the concurrence of Mr. Heather, and that Mr. Heather's son and partner who attended the sale of the stock, admitted, as was the fact, that an unusually good sale had been effected.

Mr. Heather is just as inaccurate in his figures as other things. The sum which we have temporarily to find, is a heavy one, but it does not nearly reach £1000, as he states. Whatever the costs of winding-up the estate may have been, we are at all events not property responsible for their amount. The suit has been held by the Vice-Chancellor and Lords Justices to have been properly commenced, and it was indeed the only mode in which the property of Mr. Beall could be protected from utter waste. Our own costs, for which we are willing to be held accountable, were £207 68. 5d. But again what need, on this account, of an appeal from the late Wickens, V.C.'s decision? If the manager or clerk of Mr. Beall's business received £50 more than he ought to have

done, and the accountant and receiver's charges which had been allowed by the court upon affidavit and full information had been improperly paid, the order of the Vice-Chancellor, which gave leave to falsify accounts, would have rectified such mistake or wrong; but we must still add the mistake, or the wrong, cannot in any way be laid to our door, as we fully informed the chief clerk, and that officer satisfied himself by evidence as to the charges and the need for the accountant's work.

We close this letter, which is made longer than it otherwise would be, because, unlike Mr. Heather, we do not indulge in round statements, but prefer to appeal to fact and evidence in every instance.

One other circumstance must weigh with all reasoning men. The bill was filed 15th Aug. 1871, Mr. Beall was found lunatic 25th March 1872. We always expected, and do now hope, that Mr. Beall may regain his liberty, and call upon us for behalf. We have no fear of meeting our real the justification of the course we adopted on his

client.

Perhaps Mr. Heather would also like the admission from us that after the proceedings before the police magistrate, when Mr. Beall was sent to the asylum at the instance of his family, Mr. Heather was regarded in the light of an adverse party; that we did not consider his firm were persons to be taken into our confidence, and that we did not look upon them as people having a right to control our actions.-Yours obediently, MERRIMAN AND POWELL.

V. C. MALINS' COURT. Monday, Jan. 26. THOMSON v. FLYNN. County Court Equity Jurisdiction-Value of Property Exceeding £500-Plaint DismissedCause should have been transferred to the Court of Chancery.

THIS case, which was an appeal from the Lambeth County Court, had a bearing of some importance upon a point of County Court practice. The suit was instituted by plaint in the County Court for the partition of a house, 22, Camberwell Park. the plaint containing an allegation that the value of the house was under 5001. On the case coming on for hearing, the defendant's counsel raised a preliminary objection to its being heard on the ground that the property to which it related exceeded the statutable value, and in support of the objection a surveyor was examined and crossexamined who swore that the value was over 5001. Thereupon the County Court judge found as a fact that the property exceeded in value 500l., and, acting under sect. 14 of the County Court Act, 1867, dismissed the plaint with costs. No application was made on the part of the plaintiff to have the cause transferred to the Court of Chancery. The plaintiff now appealed. The question for the opinion of the Vice-Chancellor was whether the County Court judge was at liberty to make the order dismissing the plaint, or whether he was bound, by the prior Act of 1865, sect. 9, "to direct the said suit to be trans. ferred to the Court of Chancery," it having been ascertained, "during the progress of the suit," that the subject matter exceeded 5001, in value.

Cotton, Q.C., and P. L. Wilkinson, for the appellant, contended that, as the value of the property exceeded 500., it was the duty of the County Court judge, instead of dismissing the suit, to have transferred the matter to the Court of Chancery. The 14th section of the Act of 1867, which provided that, "whenever an action or suit is brought in a County Court which the court has no jurisdiction to try, the judge shall order the cause to be struck out," was controlled by sect. 9 of the Act of 1865, which made it imperative on the judge to direct the cause to be transferred.

Glasse, Q.C., and Cozens Hardy appeared in support of the order of the court below.

The VICE-CHANCELLOR said he had heard nothing to raise any doubt that the statement in the plaint that the value of the property was below 500l. was believed by the plaintiff to be true; but on the plaint coming on for hearing a witness was called who swore that the value was above 500l., and on that evidence the learned County Court judge came to the con. clusion that it was in fact worth more than 500l. It was therefore clear that his jurisdiction was at an end. Then the question arose, What was his proper course to take? The Vice-Chancellor was clearly of opinion that an application ought to have been made on the part of the plaintiff to the County Court judge, under sect. 9 of the Act of 1865, to transfer the suit to this court; but that was not done. The case was similar to that of Birks v. Silverwood, before him in 1872 (L. Rep. 14, Eq. 101), when he decided that the County Court judge, having, during the progress of the suit, ascertained that the value of the property was over £500, and having, accordingly, directed the suit to be transferred to this court, had performed his duty in so doing. But it had been

contended by Mr. Glasse that the 14th sect. of the Act of 1867 was not referred to in that case, and that, if it had been, he would have come to a different conclusion. It was true that he was not referred to that section, and if, on now referring to it. he thought that that decision was wrong, he should not hesitate to say so. Now, what was the object of the Act of 1867 ? The 34th section enacted that that Act, and the several Acts there mentioned, including the Act of 1865, should be construed together as one Act. What was the meaning of the words in sect. 14-"Whenever an action or suit is brought in a County Court which the court has no jurisdiction to try"? They referred to actions for distress, assault, seduction, and others, which might be brought in the superior courts, but not in the County Court. If an action of that class were brought in the County Court, the judge would order the proceedings to be stayed, and the person filing the plaint would have to pay the costs of them. If he were to say that in any case where a person, in the absence of any mala fides, filed a plaint stating that he verily believed that the property the subject of it was worth less than £500, the County Court judge was at liberty to dismiss the plaint because some person came forward to say, perhaps, that the property was worth £501, it would be inflicting a great hardship on the poorer class of persons, for whose benefit the County Court Acts were passed. The 9th section of the Act of 1865, and the 14th section of the Act of 1867, must be taken as standing together, and he read the 9th section in the same way as he did in Birks v. Silverwood, and just as if he had then been referred to the 14th section

namely, that though it did not appear in the plaint, yet it did appear upon the suit coming on for hear. ing that the value of the property was over £500, it would thus appear " during the progress of the suit" within the meaning of the 9th section. He was therefore of opinion that the County Court judge, instead of dismissing the suit, ought to have transferred it to this court; and if Birks v. Silverwood had been cited to him, no doubt he would have so transferred it. There must, therefore, be an order discharging the order of the court below, and substituting for it an order transferring the cause to this court. As the miscarriage had occurred through the attention of the County Court judge not having been called to the case of Birks v. Silverwood, he should give no costs of the appeal.

UNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE BANK OF ENGLAND.

[Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, and which will be paid to the persons respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three months, unless other claimants sooner appear.] KIMPTON (Joseph). Jun., gentleman, and KIMPTON (Jas. Arthur), a minor, both of Lower Sussex-place, Old Keutroad, London. £102 03.31. New Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant. said Arthur Kimpton, now of age, the surv.vor.

HEIRS-AT-LAW AND NEXT OF KIN. CLAIR (Sir Michael Benignas), who was born in the year 1777, at Maidford, Northamptonshire, and who resided in Jamaica (where he practised as physician-general), and then of London, and subsequently and at the time of his death in Cromarty, Scotland. Next of kin to come in by March 9, at the chambers of V.C. B. March 23, at the said chambers at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. EDMETT (Thos.), Arreton House, Maidstone, Kent. gentleman. Next of kin to come in by March 1, at the chainbers of V.C. H. March 9, at the said chambers, at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. NETHERSOLE (Wm. Austin), Kingston, Jamaica, widow. Next of kin to come in by April 21, at the chambers of V.C. H. May 5, at the said chambers, at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims.

APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT-STOCK WINDING-UP ACTS. BRAGANZA GOLD MINING COMPANY (LIMITED).-Creditors to send in by March 30 their names and addresses, and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to A. A. Broad, 35, Wallbrook, London, the official liquidator of the said company. April 17, at the chambers of the M. R., at eleven o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims.

GLAIN PEDRON MINING COMPANY (LIMITED).-Creditors to send in by Feb, 18 their names and addresses, and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Ashurst, Morris, and Co., 6, Old Jewry, London, the official liquidators of the said company. March 4, at the chambers of V.C. B., at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. LA GAULOISE (LIMITED).-Creditors to send in by Feb. 16 their names and addresses, and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Alfred de Lavigerie and Lewis, 1, Mansion Housebuildings, Queen Victoria-street, London, the liquidators of the said company. Feb. -, at the chambers of the M. R. MILLS (GEORGE) AND CO. (LIMITED).-Creditors to send in, hy Feb 28, their names and addresses, and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any) to J. Tasker and Newbould, Sheffield, the liquidators of the said company, to come and prove their said claims at the chambers of the M.R. QUEEN SILVER AND COPPER MINING COMPANY (LIMITED).Creditors to send in, by Feb. 22, their names and addresses, and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any, to Geo. Braginton 6, Ford Park, Mutley, near Plymouth, the liquidator of the said company. SANDHILL FIREBRICK, TILE, AND CLAY COMPANY (LIMITED). -Creditors to send in by Feb. 20, their names and addresses, and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors if any) to Thos. W. Greenfield, Tavistock, Devon, the official liquidator of the said company. March 6. at the chambers of the M. R., is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims.

TRADERS' CO-OPERATIVE ASSOCIATION (Limited). Creditors to send in by Feb. 17 their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims and the names and addresses of their solicitors, if any, to F. B. Smart, 85, Cheapside, London, the official liquidator of the said company. March 3; at the chambers of the M. R. 11.80 o'clock, at the said chambers, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims.

CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. LAST DAY OF PROOF.

ALSTON (David T.). Cheyney Rock, Sheppey, Kent, oyster and coal merchant. Feb. 20: Wm. Clarke, solicitor, 66, Gresham House, Old Broad-street, London, March 2. V. C. M., at 12 o'clock.

BARR (John T.), 19, Victoria-park, Dover, Esq., a colonel in the Bombay Staff Corps of H.M.'s Army. Feb. 23; Barnes and Bernard, solicitors, 11, Great Winchester-street. London. March 5; V.C. H., at one o'clock.

BIGG (Ellen E.), Hyde, Slaugham, Sussex, spinster. March 2; Prior, Bigg, and Co., solicitors, 61, Lincoln's-inn-fields, London. March 16; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock. BUCHANAN (Rev. Alexander H., Hales Hall, Drayton, Stafford. Feb. 23; O. Lucas, solicitor, 50, Fenchurch-street, London. March 9; M.R., at eleven o'clock. BURTON (Richard C. F.), Captain in H.M.'s 63rd Regiment of Foot, late of Willington Manor, near Bedford. Feb. 28; F. Lamb, solicitor. 85, Bedford-row, London; March 14; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock. COLEBY (Wm.), Prince of Orange Hotel, Gravesend, Kent, licensed victualler. Feb. 23; E. J. Layton, solicitor, 2 Suffolk-lane, Cannon-street, London. March3; V.C. M., at noon.

COLYER (Edward), Forest Hill, Surrey, gentleman. Feb. 19; 8. G. Ratcliff, solicitor, 3, St. Michael's-alley, Corn. hill, London.

DUKE (Sir Jas.). Laughton Lodge, Laughton, Sussex, and 72, Portland-place, Middlesex, Bart Feb. 23; J. Pontifex, solicitor, St. Andrew's-street, Holborn-circus, London. March 4; V.C. H., at one o'clock. FLEWKER (John J.), formerly of Derby, late of Dawlish, gentlemen. Feb. 28; Pearson and Whidborne, solicitors, Dawlish. March 7; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock.

HOOPER (John), 35, Elsham-road, and 14, Argyll-street, Middlesex, gentleman. Feb. 20; G. Ford, solicitor, 8. Lincoln's-inn-fields, London. Feb. 27 V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.

HULME (Samuel), Cheadle Hulme, Chester, timber merchant. Feb. 28; Mr. Edwin H. Boothroyd, solicitor, Stockport. March 16; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock.

Stes (John), Wrington, Somerset, solicitor. Feb. 16;
Chas. J. Simmons, solicitor, Wrington.
V.C. H., at twelve o'clock.

March 2;

LUCAS (Jane), Eastbourne, Sussex, widow. Feb. 28; J. Wasden, solicitor, Bardon. March 10; V.C. B.. at twelve o'clock.

NETHERSOLE (Wm. A.), Kingston, Jamaica, merchant. April 91; Shaen and Co., solicitors, 8, Bedford-row, Holborn, Middlesex. May 5; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock. RIS NG (Wm.), Martham House, Norfolk, Esq. Feb. 24; Wm. R. Cooper, solic tor, Upper K ng-street, Norwich. WILKINSON (Helen), Mawdesley, Lancaster, spinster. Feb. March 24: M.R., at twelve o'clock. 27; Wm. Banks, solicitor, Preston. March 13; M.R., at half-past eleven o'clock.

CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. Last Day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent. ALKIN (Ann), North-street, Atherstone, Warwick, spinster. Feb. 10; Radford and Son, solicitors, Atherstone. ALLAN OF WYLLIE (Helen), formerly of 14, Carlton-terrace, Edinburgh, afterwards of 1, Ashford-villas, Cheltenham, late of 37, Belsize-park-gardens, South Hampstead, Middlesex, widow. May 1; J. W. and J. Mackenzie, solicitors, 16, Royal-circus, Edinburgh, or to A. G. Moncreiff Grahame, solicitor, 30, Great George-street, Westminster, Middlesex.

ALLEN (Thos.), 2, Fortess-terrace, Kentish Town, Middlesex, bricklayer. Feb. 14; Rooks, Kenrick, and Co., solicitors, 16, King-street, Cheapside, London. AUSTEN (Major-General Albert G.), R.A., 4. Victoria street, Westminster. Feb. 23; A. F. and R. W. Tweedie, solicitors, 5, Lincoln's-inn-fields, London.

BELL (Rev. Wm.), 4, Tynemouth-terrace, St. Aubin's-road, St. Helier's. Island of Jersey. March 1; Peacock and Goddard, solicitors, 3, South-square, Grey's-inn, MiddleBOULTER (Benjamin), 1, Stanley-terrace, Upper Holloway, Middlesex, gentleman. March 25; J. M. Millin, solicitor, 89, Bloombury-square, London.

sex.

BURTON (Edward), Monument-place, Kendal, Westmoreland, auctioneer. March 1; K. F. Thompson, solicitor, Highgate, Kendal.

BUSFIELD (John), Legrains-Jane, Horton, Bradford. March 1; J. Green, solicitor, 2, Aldermanbury.

COEEMAN (Ann D.), 22, Richmond-place, Brighton, Sussex, widow. March 2; Thos. King and Son, solicitors, 31, Richmond-place, Brighton.

COLLINS (Jas.). Frederick-street, Birmingham, silversmith. March 10; W. J. Burman, solicitor, 19, Cannon street, Birmingham.

CURTIS (Augusta). Sion-row, Twickenham, Middlesex. spinster. Feb. 20; J. McMillin, solicitor, $9, Blooms. bury-square, London.

DIXON (Ann), Cedar Lawn, Grappenhall, Chester, widow. March 20; Marsh, Buckton, and Jeans, solicitors, Warrington.

FISHER (Robert), Finsbury Pantechnicon, Finsbury-place. Middlesex, and 24, Aberdeen Park, Highbury, upholsterer. March 25; J. C. Gant, solicitor, 38, Walbrook, London. FLETCHER Alexander), Major in the 12th Lancers, and of 2, Howick-place, Westminster. Feb. 1: Major Jary, of Battlesden Park, Beds; or to G. W. Quallett. 10, New Bond-street, London.

FORD (Matthew), 8, Lincoln's-inn-fields, and 9, Keppel

street, Middlesex, and of 58, Marine-parade, Brighton, Esq. March 31; Wharton and Ford, solicitors, 8, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Middlesex.

FOUNTAIN (Nathaniel), 1, Endsleigh-street, St. Pancras, Middlesex, Esq. Feb. 23; Messrs. Hillearys, solicitors, 5, Fenchurch-buildings, Fenchurch-street, London.

FREDERICK (Sir Richard), Burwood-park, Surrey, and of Berkeley-square, Middlesex, Bart. Feb. 20; Baker, Folder, and Upperton, solicitors, 52, Lincoln's Inn-fields, GARNETT (Thos.), Kendal, Westmoreland, chemist and druggist. Feb. 25; Joseph Swainson, jun., solicitor,

Middlesex.

Kendal.

HARMONY (Manuel X.), New York, U.S.A., merchant.

street, Westminster.

March 31: Jas. B. Batten, solicitor, 32, Great GeorgeHODGKINSON (Chas.), West Bromwich, pawnbroker. March 10; W. John Burman, solicitor, 19, Cannon-street, Birmingham.

HOLL (Edwd. H.). Bushey-heath, Hertford, gentleman. Feb. 19; Robinson and Co., solicitors, 18, Charter-housesquare, London. Howes (Sarah), Cookham Dean, Maidenhead, Berks, widow. March 1; Barker and Ellis, solicitors, 15, Bedford-row, London.

INGLEBY Rev. Charles), Wood-bank, Cheadle, Stafford clerk. March 31; G. P. Wragge, solicitor, 4, Bennett'shill, Birmingham.

JONES (Edwd.), 138, Leadenhall-street, and 1, Canonbury. place South, London, merchant. March 10; W. Durrant Cooper, solicitor, 81, Guilford-street, Middlesex,

JAMIESON (Andrew), formerly of Great Winchester-street. London, and of Tower-buildings. North Chapel-street Liverpool, merchant, late of 18. Gloncester-square, Hyde park, Middlesex, Esq. May 1; Hunter, Gwatkin and Co.. solicitors, 9, New-square, Lincoln's-inn, Middlesex. KING (Christopher), Leeds, boot and shoemaker. April 1; C. Tempest, solicitor, 10, Albion-street, Leeds. LISBURNE (Right Hon. Ernest A., Earl of), Crosswood, Llanafon-y-Trawscoed, Cardigan. Feb. 28; Tatham and Co., solicitors, 36, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Middlesex. MINTER Sophia), formerly of 61. Balls Pend-road, Isling ton, but late of 81, Essex-road, Islington, Middlesex, widow. Feb. 26; A. C. Cronin, solicitor, 3, Bloomsburysquare, London,

MAUGHAN (Wm. K.), Laura-place, Lower Clapton, Middlesex, gentleman. March 1; R. S. Gregson, solicitor, 8, Angel-court, Throgmorton-street, Londou. O'BRIEN (Hon. Emma, Blatherwycke-park, Northampton, widow. March 18; Rickards and Walker, solicitors, 29, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Middlesex.

ONSLOW (Jas.), Bury-street, Birmingham, carter. Feb. 10: Coleman and Coleman, solicitors, 27, Colmore-row, Bir. mingham.

SIMMANCE (Jos.), Melbourne, Cambridge, publican and farmer. March 12; Hale Wortham, solicitor, Royston, Herts.

SMITH (Chas.), Arundel-street, Sheffield, tinner and brazier. March 7: Watson and Esam, solicitors, 29. Bank-street, Sheffield.

SMITH (Emma). 87, Chester-square, Middlesex, spinster. March 31; T. W. Nelson, solicitor, 6, Lawrence Pountneylane, London.

SOULE (Rev. Israel M.), St. John's-hill, Battersea, Surrey. March 31; J. B. Batten, solicitor, 32, Great George-street. Westminster.

SUTHERLAND (Charlotte), formerly of 12, Pelham-street, Fulham-rd, Middlesex, late of 11, James-street, Larkhalllane, Clapham, Surrey, widow. Feb. 28; Shepheard and Sons, solicitors, 32, Finsbury-circus, London. SWINGLER (Thos.), Douglas House, Litchurch, near Derby, ironmaster, manufacturer of bar iron, railway engineer land coal master. March 25; Henry Swingler, The Laurels, Duffield road, Derby. SWINNERTON (Robert), Weddington, near Nuneaton, farmer and timber merchant. Feb. 28; C. Buchanan, solicitor, Nuneaton.

TAYLOR (Rev. Henry J.), heretofore of Dalverton, Somerset, late of Beauchamp, Washfield, near Tiverton, Devon, clerk. Feb. 13; C. E. Rowcliffe, solicitor, Stogumber, Somerset.

THACKWRAY (Esther), formerly of Harrowgate, York, late of 11, Oxford-terrace, Hyde-park, Middlesex, spinster. March 1; F. and T. Smith and Sons, solicitors, 15, Fur nival's-inn, London. TILDEN, (Joha), Ifield Court, Kent, Esq. March 16; E. Woodard, solicitor, 2, Ingram-court, Fenchurch-street London.

TODD (Matthew), South Gate, Sunderland, gentleman. March 16; Snowball and Allison, solicitors, 1 Nile-street. Sunderland.

WILCOX (Zebedee), 218, Whitechapel-road, Middlesex, soda water manufacturer. Feb. 21; G. Magor Cooke, solicitor, 9, Gray's-inn-square, Middlesex. WORRALL (Samuel), formerly of 47, Conduit-street, late of 28, Albion-street, Middlesex, Esq. March 25; Osborne and Co., solicitors, 41, Broad-street, Bristol. YATES (Geo.), Pritchett-street, Birmingham, and 45, Monument-lane, Edgbaston, electro-plater. March 2: Whateley and Co., solicitors, 41, Waterloo-street, Bir. mingham.

REPORTS OF SALES.

Wednesday, Jan. 21.

By Mr. H. E. MURRELL, at the Mart. Brunswick-square-No. 7. term 18 years-sold for £380, Marylebone-No. 32, Beaumont street, term 16 years-sold for £100,

Kensington-No. 7, Pembroke-square, term 48 years-sold for £115.

Euston-square-Seymour-street, an improved rent of £60 per annum, term 16 years-sold for £500.

Doctors' Commons-The lease of No. 6, Godliman-street, term 8 years-sold for £175.

Upper Holloway-No. 11, Brunswick-road, term 70 yearssold for £150.

[blocks in formation]

Wednesday, Jan. 28.

By Messrs. EDWIN Fox and BOUSFIELD, at the Mart. Holborn-No. 10, Ely-place, freeehold-sold for £3350. Mitre-court-The Mitre Wine Vaults, freehold-sold for £2650.

The freehold house, situate in Mitre-court-sold for £530. Ely Chapel, comprising an area of 4100ft., freehold-sold for £5250

The Ely Mews, area 6000ft., freehold-sold for £3050.
Nos. 22, 23, and 29, Ely-place. freehold-sold for £8520.
Stepney-No. 74, Jubilee-street, term 27 years-sold for £220.
Commercial-road-No. 35, Portland-street, term 25 years-
sold for £253.

Stepney-No. 3, High-street, term 46 years-sold for £215.

ELECTION LAW.

THE TAUNTON ELECTION PETITION. IN giving judgment on this case on Monday last, Grove, J., having stated that the respondent was charged with bribery and treating by him. self and his agents, and that there was also an imputation of general bribery and treating, proceeded to give the following judgment :-In so far spondent himself, the learned counsel for the as relates to bribery and treating by the repetitioners, at the close of his opening speech, admitted that there were no proper grounds for making any personal imputation. On this head I may at once say that nothing has transpired in from the high character the respondent has this inquiry to derogate in the slightest degree always borne, and which her Majesty's AttorneyGeneral ought to bear. With regard to general bribery and treating, and corruption, so as to taint the whole constituency, and thus render the election void, the point was scarcely pressed in the reply of the counsel for the petitioners, and I am of opinion that no such general corruption was proved in this case. Undoubtedly painful disclosures were made, applying to a portion of the constituency, small with reference to the whole body, but not absolutely inconsiderable,

which showed by the mere exhibition of the wit-
nesses themselves, that there was a certain num-
ber of voters, who, for a small bribe or a small
supply of drink, would promise their votes to
either candidate-whether they would keep their
promise is another question-and some of whom
had reached the lowest stage of degradation, that
they gloried in their shame. I see no reason,
however for coming to the conclusion that exten-
sive bribery or corruption prevailed at the elec-
tion. I come now to the point upon which the
great contest in this case arose. Did the respon-
dent not by himself or by any conscious autho-
rity, but by the hands of an agent or agents for
whom he is responsible, so bribe or treat that
this election must be declared void? The law of
agency, as applied to election petitions, has been
sufficiently expressed by different learned judges,
some of whom have likened it to the relation of
master and servant, and another to the employer
of persons to run a race for him; but no exact
definition, meeting all cases, has, as far as I am
aware, been given. Two learned judges-the late
Mr. Justice Willes and Mr. Justice Black-
burn-have pointed out the difficulties of ar-
riving at one. All agree that the relation is
not the common law one of principal and agent,
but that the candidate may be responsible for the
acts of one acting on his behalf, though the acts
be beyond the scope of the authority given, or,
indeed, in violation of express injunction. So far
as regards the present case, I am of opinion that
to establish agency for which the candidate would
be responsible he must be proved by himself or
by his authorised agent, to have employed the
persons whose conduct is impugned, to act on his
behalf, or to have to some extent put himself in
their hands, or to have made common cause with
them for the purpose of promoting his election.
To what extent such relation may be sufficient to
fix the candidate must, it seems to me, be a ques-
tion of degree and of evidence to be judged of by
the election petition tribunal. Mere non-inter-
ference with persons who, feeling interested in the
success of the candidate, may act in support of
his canvass, is not sufficient, in my judgment, to
saddle the candidate with any unlawful acts of
theirs of which the tribunal is satisfied he or his
authorised agent is ignorant. It would be vain
to attempt an exhaustive definition, and possibly
exception may be taken to the approximate limi-
tation which I have endeavoured to express. It
must also be borne in mind in these cases that,
although the object of the statute by which the
tribunal of election judges was created was to pre-
vent corrupt practices, still the tribunal is a
judicial and not an inquisitorial one. It is a court
to hear and determine according to law, and not
a commission armed with powers to inquire into
and suppress corruption. Without expressing my-present at the inquest before the coroner, in order
self in equally strong terms with Baron Martin in
the Wigan case, I am of opinion that the evidence
of corrupt practice must establish affirmatively
to the reasonable satisfaction of the judge that
the acts complained of were done. I now proceed
to consider the evidence in this case. And, having
do so, his Lordship held Sir Henry James duly
elected, and ordered the petitioners to pay the
costs.

MAGISTRATES' LAW.

ACCUSED PERSONS IN CORONERS'
COURTS.

THE following is the judgment of Mr. Fitzgerald,
in the Irish case of Re Marshall, which we re-
ferred to in our leading columns last week :-

FITZGERALD, J.-I quite concur in the statement of the Solicitor-General that, if there is to be a change in the law, it should be made by the Legislature. I confess, I think that the present mode of proceeding presents to the public rather an unseemly aspect, and is liable to be misrepresented; and therefore I have not any hesitation in saying that, in my judgment, some alteration of the law is required, in order to render unnecessary such applications as the present. If the coroner's court is to exist as it stood originally, we are all bound to give it every assistance. It is not for me to say whether it should be abolished or amended, or subjected to any or what regulations. Up to a very recent period, a course had been adopted which, no doubt, was unlawful. The magistrates made an order to take an accused person before the coroner. The law officers of the Crown expressed the opinion that the proceeding was contrary to law, and no doubt it was so; and, in consequence, the case of Ex parte Reardon (7 Ir. L. T. Rep. 193) came before me. The coroner's is a very ancient court. I believe I may say that it existed before such officers as an Attorney-General or Solicitor-General were known. So long as this ancient court exists, it must hold its inquiries. Its sitting is not merely optional with the coroner; and the proceedings before police magistrates do not interfere with nor suspend the inquiry of the coroner. No matter whether

General has argued that the decision would apply to every case throughout the country-I quite agree with him, and I am not afraid to take that view of it. I have not any doubt that, in every proper case in which the law officers of the Crown should think it right to do so, they would, themselves, take measures to have a prisoner brought before the coroners' courts. I am quite sure that, in this particular case, if the Solicitor-General considered it right, he would have advised that the present application should be made at the expense of the Crown. In cases in which the Crown would not make such an application, it would have to be made at the risk and expense of the prisoner, and if I should order the writ in the present case it would be issued at the expense of the party accused. Generally speaking, the very last place in which persons desire to be is in a coroner's court-it is the place they most wish to avoid, and if the police would allow them they would keep out of it altogether. So that I do not think it likely to be a matter of frequent occur. rence that persons would incur the expense of an application for a habeas corpus for the mere pleasure of being present at a coroner's inquiry. In country cases the expense of transmission, also, would have to be borne by the party seeking the writ. Therefore, I do not think that there could be any danger of abuse resulting from the decision which I am about pronouncing. It appears to me, upon two grounds, that the present case comes within Reardon's case. First, it is a case where the attorney swears in his affidavit that he is advised to tender this woman as a witness.

The Solicitor-General.-He does not swear that, or that he intends to examine her. He says, “Í am advised, and myself verily believe, that the presence of the said Anne Wyndfor Marshall will be necessary at the coroner's inquest."

Byrne.-In order that the prisoner may be tendered as a witness.

the magistrate committed for trial or not, it is the
duty of the coroner to hold an inquest whenever a
case of suspicious death occurs, and to inquire
whether any person or persons were chargeable
with the death of the decased. If a crime is com-
mitted, and the party by whom it was alleged to
have been committed flies from justice, the police
are informed by the authorities of the transaction,
a warrant is issued, the police are properly called
into requisition, and the accused is intercepted
and made amenable to justice. The real question
is, whether a short, summary mode should not be
adopted, either with the consent of the Attorney.
General, or by a warrant issued by the magis.
trates, or otherwise, by which an accused person,
when it happens that he or she is in custody on a
magistrate's warrant, could be conveyed before
the coroner's court, where such a course is proper
and desirable. One of the grounds on which the
present application has been made is similar to
that which was relied on in Reardon's case,
upon which I have explained my views. In
dealing with this application, I must entirely
exclude from consideration what took place before
the magistrate. If I were to determine that the
jurisdiction of the coroner could, in the slightest
degree, be affected by the proceedings before the
magistrate, it would have a tendency to raise an
unseemly conflict, and to cause, as it were, a rush
between two jurisdictions to determine which of
them should have the charge of a case. Besides,
I cannot in this case hold that the inquiry of the
magistrates has closed. The magistrate has re-
manded the prisoner, but, though he might have
been prepared to pronounce judgment on the last
day, it is still quite open to him, on the next day,
to hear fresh evidence on the part either of the
prosecution or of the accused, and to alter the
opinion he had entertained. It is not for me to
say, should the prisoner be tendered as a witness
before the coroner, whether he should or should
not refuse to receive her evidence, nor is it for
me to inquire with what object she might be
tendered as a witness before the coroner. It
is open to her advisers, should they think fit,
to tender her before the coroner as a witness,
and I cannot say, if her evidence is offered, that it
will not be material. I, for one, have long enter-
tained the opinion, and have repeatedly expressed
it from the bench, that, at the final trial before
the judge and petty jury, prisoners should be
allowed to tender themselves and be received as
witnesses, if they so desired it. I believe that
there is a great defect in the law as it stands at
present, and I think that an alteration in the law
to that effect should be made, as it would be most
conducive to the due administration of criminal
justice. The adviser of the prisoner has sworn
that it would be necessary for the prisoner to be
that she might be tendered as a witness; and I
must treat the application with that view as bona
fide. That course, if adopted, will be taken at the
peril of the party; and if I were sitting as a
coroner, although I would not call upon her to be
examined, I should be very slow to refuse to re-
ceive her evidence if it were offered. It might
affect her prejudicially, or it might have a con-
trary effect.
I do not know anything of the
general facts of the case except what I have seen
in the newspapers, but I understand it to be a
case of what is called circumstantial evidence.
The charge is one of administering poison. The
evidence went to to show that the accused pur-
chased the poison-that the deceased met his death
by poison of the same description as that which had
been purchased-that she had been in his com-
pany shortly before the alleged murder, and that
she made some misrepresentations when inquiries
were made to her. This is a strong circumstan-
tial case, but it is just of such a character that
it might be desirable that the prisoner should be
present at the investigation before the coroner,
though it might be considered by her legal
adviser inexpedient to tender her for examina-
tion. Therefore, if the application rested alone
on the ground of the prisoner's desire or that of
her advisers that she should be tendered as a
witness, I should feel very great difficulty in
refusing a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum.
But the application here is made, also, on other
grounds. In Reardon's case I expressed an opi-
nion, to which I still adhere, that it was desirable
on all grounds that the prisoner should be brought
before the coroner's court, and that I was bound
to assist an application for that purpose, if, in
point of law, it was competent for me to do so.
În the course of the argument in that case, it There was no other evidence for the prosecution.
was admitted by Mr. Johnson, as counsel for the Jordan said that the question involved in this
Crown, that the court could, under special cir- case was a very important one, viz., whether his
cumstances, issue the writ in aid of the defective client was or was not bound to treat as travellers
powers of an inferior court. This I regard as a case
omnibus drivers and guards, who were constantly
coming within the principle there admitted. I am on a Sunday travelling to and from places a con-
of opinion that, in a case where the party accused siderable distance from Manchester. The defen-
claims the right to be present at the coroner's dant was extremely desirous that by the magis-
inquiry in order to hear the evidence received trate's decision so important a question might be
against himself or herself, and to assist his or her settled, and he was very willing to conform to the
counsel and attorney, I am bound to grant the law. Jordan said he would prove that the men
application for that purpose. The Solicitor. i seen in the house by the policeman were all known

FITZGERALD, J.-Even upon the statement contained in the affidavit, I would feel great difficulty in refusing the application; and I have already expressed the opinion, in this and other criminal cases, that it would be the proper course to enable a prisoner to have the option of tendering herself or himself to be examined; and I also think that the special circumstances of this case render it advisable that the prisoner should be present. Her presence might aid in the adminis tration of justice, in enabling the coroner's jury to find not merely a verdict-for I do not narrow the administration of justice in the coroner's court to that but a true verdict, whatever that verdict might be. It is not a case resting upon direct evidence of the crime having been actually seen committed; the evidence is circumstantial, and it is one of those cases in which it is desirable that the party accused should be present at the inquest. I therefore feel bound to grant the writ (to be of the same form and nature as in Reardon's case), again expressing the opinion that some alteration in the law is desirable, so as to render unnecessary this very expensive kind of application. Some short and summary process might be devised to meet such cases as the present, and in order to aid in the administration of justice.

S.,

MANCHESTER CITY POLICE COURT.
Wednesday, Jan. 21.

(Before Mr. HEADLAM, the Stipendiary.)
Bona fide travellers-Licensing Act.

a licensed victualler, was summoned for having his house open for the sale of intoxicating liquors during prohibited hours, on Sunday. The only persons proved to have been served were omnibus drivers and guards travelling from Manchester to considerable distances and back. Held, that they were bona fide travellers.

Jordan, barrister, appeared for the defence. THIS was a case involving the question as to who is a bona fide traveller under the Licensing Act. The defendant was Mr. Walter Stopford, of the Old Boar's Head Hotel, Withy-grove, and he was summoned for having his house open for the sale of liquors during prohibited hours on a Sunday.

Police-constable Enoch Wilkinson stated that last Sunday but one he entered the defendant's house by the back door, and found five men inside, one of whom was drinking a glass of rum. Under cross-examination the witness said the man who had the rum was the guard of the Bury omnibus.

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