-or to one of their officers, the sum of

(e) towards the relief of the said child during such time as the said child should continue or thereatter become chargeable to the said union (d), until such child should attain the age of years (1), together with the sum of for the costs incurred in obtaining the said order: And that the said had had due notice of the said order, and that the payments directed to be made by the said order have not been made according thereto by the said and that there is now in arrear for the same the sum of , being the amount of arrears of payweeks: ments for These are, therefore, in Her Majesty's name, to command you, or some or one of you, forthwith to apprehend the said and convey him before two of Her Majesty's Justices of the Peace in and for the said county (c) to answer the premises, and be dealt with according to law.

in the

Given under my hand and seal, at county (c) of this day of year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and

L.S. (a) This should be addressed to the constables of the metropolitan police force, or of the county, borough, or parish, according to circumstances. (b) or affirmation.

(c) or city, borongh, or other place. (d) or the parish of

(e) Insertweekly," of the order.

or otherwise according to the terms

sion (a) of

·

day of

Whereas the above-bounden having to wit. been apprehended upon a warrant issued under the hand and seal of one of her Majesty's justices of the peace in and for the county (a) of upon the information and complaint of , an officer made in the petty session holden in and for the diviof the union (b), for disobedience to an order in the county (a) of on the in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and in the , by two of her Majesty's justices of the peace having jurisdiction in the said union, then and there assembled, whereby he was adjudged to be the putative father of a bastard child, born of the body of , single woman, which child had become chargeable to the said union (b), and whereby he was ordered to pay certain sums of money as therein set forth; and having been brought before two of her Majesty's justices of the peace for the county (a) of by virtue of the said warrant, and having neglected (c) to make payment of the sums due from him under such order, together with the costs attending such warrant, apprehension, and bringing up of him before such justices, they have by warrant under their hands and seals, addressed to directed the sum so due, together with such costs, to be recovered by distress and sale of the goods and chattels of the and have made the said warrant returnable on the day of to them, or unto two justices of the peace acting for the county (a) Now the condition of this recognisance is such, that if the above-bounden do appear before the justices unto whom the said warrant is made returnable on the day so appointed for the return thereof, to abide the further proceedings thereon, then the same shall have no effect, otherwise to remain in full force. Taken and acknowledged the

(f) Insert "thirteen" or "sixteen," according as the Justices may have ordered.

of

No. 9.

Warrant of Distress against the putative Father of a
Bastard Child chargeable to a Union or Parish.
To (a)

to wit.

of

WHEREAS information and complaint were, on the day of in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and made upon oath (b) before one of Her Majesty's justices of the peace in and for the county (c) of by in the county (c) of , an officer of the union (d), that by an order made at the petty session holden in and for the division (c) of in the county (c) on the day of in the year of our lord one thousand eight hundred and by two of Her Majesty's justices of the peace in and for the said County (c), acting in and for the said division (c), and having jurisdiction in the said union (d), then and there assembled, one of in the parish of in the County (c) of was adjudged to be the putative father of a certain bastard child born of the body of single woman, which child had become chargeable to the said union (d), and that in and by the said order it was ordered that the said should pay to the guardirns of the said union (d), or to one of their officers, the sum of (e) towards the relief of the said child during such time as the said child should continue or thereafter become chargeable to the said union (d), until such child should attain the age of (f) years, together with the sum of for the costs incurred in obtaining the said order: And that the said had had due notice of the said

order, and that the payments directed to be made by the said order had not been made according thereto by the said , and that there was then in arrear for the same the sum of being the amount of arrears for weeks' payments: And whereas the said justice, by warrant under his hand and seal directed to commanded them, or some or one of them, forthwith to apprehend the said and to convey him before two of Her Majesty's justices of the peace for the said county (c), to answer the premises, and be dealt with according to law:

To (a) and to the keeper of the common to wit. gaol (b) at in the county (c) of WHEREAS information and complaint were, on the day of in the year of our Lord one thousand eight made upon oath (d) before

hundred and

on the

one

of Her Majesty's justices of the peace for the county (c) of by of in the county (c) of an officer of the union (e), that by an order made under the Bastardy Laws Amendment Act 1873, at the petty session holden in and for the division (c) of in the county (c) of day of in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and by two of of Her Majesty's justices of the peace for the said county (c) acting in and for the said division (c) and having jurisdiction in the said union (e) then and there assembled, one of in the parish of in the county (c) of was adjudged to be the putative father of a bastard child born of the body of single woman, which child had become chargeable to the said union (e); and that in and by the said order it was ordered that the said should pay to the guardians of the said union (e) or to one of their officers, the sum of (f) towards the relief of the said child during such time as the said child should continue or afterwards be chargeable to the said union (e), until such child should attain the age of years (g) togefor the costs incurred in ob

Whereupon the said being now brought before us, two of Her Majesty's justices of the peace for the said county (c), to show cause why the same should not be paid, hath not shown any cause why the same should not be paid; and the same duly appearing to us upon oath to be due from the said under the said order, together with the further sum of for the costs attending such warrant, apprehension, and bringther with the sum of ing up of him, the said nevertheless neglects (g) to taining the said order: make payment of the said sums due under the said And that the said had had due notice of the said order, and the said sums so due for such costs. order, and that the payments directed to be made by These are therefore to require you forthwith to make the said order had not been made according thereto by distress of the goods and chattels of the said the said and that there was then in arrear for the and if within the space of days next after such dissame the sum of being the amount of arrears of tress, by weeks. the said with the reasonable charges of taking and keep-hand and seal, directed to sums, together payments for And whereas the said justice, by warrant under his ing the said distress shall not be paid, that commanded them, or then you do sell the said goods and chattels so some or one of them, forthwith to apprehend the said by you distrained, and out of the money arising by and to convey him before two of Her Majesty's such sale thereof that you detain the said sums, and justices of the peace in and for the said county (c) to also the reasonable charges of taking, keeping, and answer the premises, and be dealt with according to selling the said distress, rendering the overplus (if any), law. on demand, unto the said and if no sufficient disbeing now brought before tress can be found, that then you certify the same unto us, two of her Majesty's justices of the peace for the ns or unto (h) two of Her Majesty's justices of said county (c) to show cause why the same should the peace acting for the county (c) of to the end not be paid, hath not shown any cause why the same that such further proceedings may be had therein as to should not be paid; and the same duly appearing law doth appertain; and we further order you to make upon oath (d) to be due from the said day of next,

These are therefore to command you the said to convey the said to the said common gaol (b) at and these are also to command you, the said keeper of the said common gaol, (b) to receive the said into the said common gaol (b), there to remain without bail or mainprise for the term of (i) unless such sum and costs, together with the costs and charges attending the commitment and conveying of the said to the said comm.on gaol (b), and of the person employed to convey him thither, amounting to the further sum of be sooner paid and satisfied. Given under our hands and seals, at in the county (c) of this day of in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and (L.8.) (L.S.)

(a) This should be aldressed to the constables of the

Metropolitan Police Force, or of the county, borough, or parish, according to circumstances. (b) or House of Correction.

(c) or city, borough, or other place. (d) or affirmation.

(e) or the parish of.

(f) Insert "weekly" or otherwise according to the terms of the order. (g) Insert "thirteen" or sixteen," according as the justices may have ordered. (h) or refuses. (i) Not to exceed three calendar months.

Given under our seal of office, this eighth day of January, in the year one thousand eight hundred and seventy-four.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. WILL-CHILD EN VENTRE.-A testator by his will directed a fund to be set apart to answer an annuity for his wife, and after her death he directed his trustees to hold the fund upon trust for the child or children of his married daughter, with a gift over in case there should be no such child or children. By a codicil, the testator directed that in case his daughter should be living at the expiration of five years from the death of his wife, and should not then have had any child or children, the gift over should then at once take effect, as if his daughter were dead without children. The daughter was enceinte of her first child at the expiration of five years after the death of the testator's wife, and the child was born within six months after the expiration of that period. Held (affirming the decision of Wickens, V.C.), that the gift over did not take effect: (Pearce v. Carrington, 29 L. T. Rep. N.S. 706. L.JJ.).

MORTGAGE BY ONE OF TWO TENANTS IN COMMON OF PROPERTY IN JOINT OCCUPATIONCONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE.-Two persons purchased a piece of land which was conveyed to them as tenants in common, subject to a joint power of appointment in the two purchasers. They erected thereon premises for the purpose of a business which they carried on in partnership, and the articles of partnership made the premises partnership property. In 1866 one of the partners mortgaged one undivided moiety of the premises to the bankers of the firm to secure repayment of an advance made to him. In 1870 the partnership was dissolved. The other partner filed a bill against the bankers claiming priority over their mortgage in respect of sums advanced by him to his firm. The Vice-Chancellor being of opinion that it was not proved that the bankers knew that the premises were in the joint occupation of the two partners, decided against the plaintiff. On the hearing of an appeal from that decision, one of the bankers was examined in court, and admitted that they knew that the premises were in the joint occupation of the plaintiff and his partner for the purposes of their business. Held, that this knowledge brought the case within the doctrine of Daniels v. Davidson (16 Ves. 249), that the bankers must be taken to have had notice of the plaintiff's interest, and that the plaintiff's claim was therefore entitled to rank in priority to the banker's mortgage. Decision of Wickens, V.C. accordingly reversed: (Cavander v. Bulteel, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 710. L.JJ.)

SETTLEMENT-COVENANT TO SETTLE WIFE'S AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY. In a marriage settlement, a covenant by husband and wife to settle after-acquired property of the wife does not extend to property to which the wife becomes entitled after the death of her husband, but only to property acquired during the coverture, although there be no words in the covenant restricting it to property acquired during the coverture. Dickinson v. Dillwyn (L. Rep. 8 Eq. 516), and Carter v. Carter (21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 194; Stevens v. Van L. Rep. 8 Eq. 551), followed. Voorst (17 Beav. 305), overruled: (Re Edwards, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 712. L.JJ.).

TRUST FUNDS - INVESTMENT-DISCRETION OF TRUSTEES.-After an administration suit has been instituted the discretion given to the trustees of the will as to the investment of the trust funds is subject to the control of the court; and the court will not allow any investment to be made unless it is satisfied of the propriety of it: (Bethell v. Abraham, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 715. M.R.).

WILL-LEGAL PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVENEXT OF KIN.-A fund was settled upon a married woman for life, with remainder to her husband for life, with remainder to her children, with remainder, in default of children, to the person or persons who should happen to be her legal personal representative or representatives at the time of her death. Held, that " legal personal representative or representatives" meant next of kin according to the Statute of Distributions: (Robinson v. Evans, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 715. M.R.)

ANNUITY GRANted and TenaNT FOR LIFEAPPORTIONMENT-ARREARS-ENTRY.-In order to obtain a right to recover the arrears of an annuity, or of an apportioned part of it, upon the death of a tenant for life who has granted it during his life, with a power of entry, the right of entry must have been actually exercised; and a petition claiming against the estate of the tenant for life, payment of the arrears, and an apportioned part from the date of the death, was, in the absence of such entry, dismissed: (Ex parte Watkins, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 721. M.R.)

WILL-LEASEHOLDS-CONTRARY INTENTION. -A testator, by will made in 1861, devised all his messuages, lands, and hereditaments in the county of Middlesex, and all other lands and here. ditaments in England belonging to him," to the use of his eldest son G. for life, with remainder to his issue in tail male .. with an ultimate remainder to his own right heirs. He also bequeathed "all his money, securities for money, goods, chattels, and personal estate," to trustees upon trusts corresponding with the trusts of " the hereditaments thereinbefore devised in strict settlement," but so that the same should not vest absolutely in any person thereby made tenant in tail by purchase, unless such person should attain twenty-one. As to the devised realty, the will contained a power of sale, empowering the trustees to invest the sale moneys in the purchase of freeholds or leaseholds "convenient to be held therewith." The will also contained a bequest of chattels and heirlooms in strict settlement. The testator, both as to any leaseholds to be purchased under the power, and as to the chattels, repeated the above provisions as to their not vesting in any infant tenant in tail. The testator, at the time of his death, was possessed of both freehold and leasehold estates in the county of Middlesex. Held, that the leaseholds did not pass under the devise of real estate, by virtue of the 26th section of 1 Vict. c. 26, as there was sufficient indication of a contrary intention appearing on the face of the will; but passed under the residuary bequest: (Prescott v. Barker, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 727. V.C.M.) WILL-GIFT TO ILLEGITIMATE CHILD.-Testator married, in 1864, his second wife, by whom he had already two illegitimate children, but having no children surviving of his former marriage. By his will, executed shortly after his second marriage, he gave all his property to his wife for life, with liberty to "direct the disposal of the property amongst our children by will," and should she make no will the property to be divided equally between my children by her." Testator died in 1872, leaving his widow and the two children surviving him, but having had no other children by her. The testator had treated the children as his own. Held, that the illegiti. mate children were the objects of the power: (Dorin v. Dorin, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 731. V.C. M.) MARRIED WOMAN-EXECUTION OF CONVEY

66

ANCE BY HUSBAND'S DESERTION ·

LIVING

credited as paid up, should be issued in lieu of every two of the B. shares. And these resolutions, the result of which was on the whole to increase the uncalled capital of the company, were duly registered with the registrar of joint-stock compaies. T., who at that time was the holder of ten B shares, exchanged them for five new shares of £10 each, with £5 per share credited as paid up, and in the following August he sold these shares, but his name was by neglect still left in one of the books of the company as the holder of the ten B shares. In 1873, the company having been ordered to be wound-up, the liquidator sought to place T. on the list of contributories in respect of the ten shares: Held, that the cancellation of the B shares, and the issue of new shares with diminished liability in lieu thereof, was valid, there having been no mala fides in the transaction, and that the fact of T.'s name having been left on the books by mistake or neglect, would not render him liable as a contritory. Decision of the Vice-Chancellor of the Palatine Court of the Duchy of Lancaster affirmed: (Teasdale's case, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 707. L. JJ.)

WINDING-UP-PRACTICE.-There is no jurisdiction to depart from the terms of the General Orders, and therefore where a winding-up petition had been advertised in the matter of the Companies Act 1862, and not also of that of 1867, as directed by the 1st rule of the Gen. Order, March 1868, it was ordered to be re-advertised: (Re Marezzo Marble Company, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 720. M. R.)

RAILWAY-PETITION-TRANSFER TO CREDIT OF CAUSE.-When money has been paid into court by a railway company, and invested in stock standing to the proper account ex parte the company, but the stock has been subsequently transferred to the credit of a cause to a separate account of a person interested for life, the company will not have to pay any costs subsequent to such transfer, as, for instance, the costs of a petition for payment out to parties absolutely entitled: (Fisher v. Fisher, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 720. M. R.)

THE BENCH AND THE BAR.

CALLS TO THE BAR.

The undermentioned gentlemen were called to to the degree of barrister-at-law on Monday last

LEGACY AND PROBATE DUTY-DIRECTION BY WILL TO SELL PROPERTY.-Where real property is by will expressly directed to be sold, and the produce and the testator's personalty all are to constitute one fund applicable to the purposes of the will, the land, though unsold, and though, in consequence of the happening of certain events, it might, for the purposes of devolution, go to the heir, is nevertheless, for fiscal purposes, to be treated as personal property. Williamson v. The Lord Advocate (10 Clk. & Fin. 1) followed: (Attorrey-General. Lomas, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 749.

Ex.)

COMPANY LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. CONTRIBUTORY-CANCELLATION OF SHARESALTERATION OF ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION.-In 1865 the capital of a company consisted of 2000 shares of £10 each, one moiety of which (hereinafter called the A shares) were fully paid, while on the other moiety (hereinafter called the B shares) only £2 10s. was paid up. In February of that year two resolutions were duly passed, and confirmed at extraordinary general meetings of the company, whereby it was provided that all the A shares should be cancelled, and that two new shares of £10 each, with £5 per share credited as paid up, should be issued in lieu of each A share and that all the B shares should also be cancelled, and that one share of £10., with £5

Cambridge; Arthur Clement Eddis, Esq., B.A., Cambridge; Harold Thomas, Esq.; Charoo Chunder Dutt, Esq., B.A. and B.L., Calcutta University; Joseph Gundry Alexander, Esq., UniJoseph John Frost Hale, Esq., St. John's College, versity of London; Samuel Stephens, Esq.; Cambridge; Forbes Ernest Hallett, Esq.; Edward Carter, Esq., M.A., Cambridge; Johnston Watson, Esq., M.A., Aberdeen; John Tweedie, Esq., University of Edinburgh and of her Majesty's Indian Civil Service; Henry Charles Creighton Wood, Esq.; Alfred Nundy, Esq., University of Calcutta; and Fendall Currie, Esq., of her Majesty's Indian Service.

MIDDLE TEMPLE.-Thos. Chrysostom O'Mara, Esq., of the University of London, B.A.; John Skilbeck Wood, Esq., of Christ Church, Oxford; William Harmood Cochran, Esq., of Exeter College, Oxford, B.A.; Oliver Beevor, Esq.; Christopher Cavanagh, Esq., of the University of London, B.A.; Isaac Cowley Lambert, Esq., of Trinity College, Cambridge, B.A.; John de Soyres, Esq., of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge; Frederick James Ladbury, Esq., of St. John's College, Cambridge, B.A.; Keyes O'Clery, Esq, of Trinity College, Dublin; Thomas Edward Crispe, Esq.; William Jameson Soulsby, Esq., Associate of King's College, London; Ernest Clifford, Esq.; Evan Evans Francis Griffiths, Esq., of the University of London; John Robertson Shedden Miller, Esq., of Edinburgh University, M.A.; Henry Vansittart, Esq.

INNER TEMPLE.-James William Wilson, Esq.; the Hon. William Ashhurnham, B.A., Cambridge; James Murray Bannerman, Esq., B.A., Oxford; Charles Topham Naylor, Esq., B.Á., LL.B., Cambridge; John Walter Buchanan Riddell, Esq., B.A., Oxford; Christopher Rawlinson, Esq., B.A., Cambridge; Samuel Henry Romilly, Esq., B.A., Cambridge; Tom Hart, Esq., B.A., Cambridge;

David Henry Wilson, Esq., M.A. LL.M., Cambridge; Tonman Mosley, Esq., B.A., Oxford; James Bucknell Broadmead, Esq., B.A., Cam. bridge; Thomas Parkin, Esq., M.A., Cambridge; William Sheepshanks, Esq., B.A., Cambridge; Harmer Steele, Esq., B.A., Cambridge; William Hurle Harrison, Esq., M.A., Oxford; Henry Brockholes Thomas, Esq., M.A., Cambridge; Henry Pearson Banks, Esq., B.A., Cambridge; Charles John Darling, Esq.; Thomas Colpitts Granger, Esq.; Walter Henry Macnamara, Esq.; Thomas Arthur Nash, Esq.; Arthur A. Stewart Reid, Esq., B.A., Cambridge; Henry Denman Macaulay, Esq., Lieut. R.N.; and Raj Kissen Sen, Esq., B.A., Calcutia.

GRAYS-INN.-James Mulligan, M.A., Queen's University, Ireland, certificate of honour Michael. mas Term, 1872; exhibitioner Trinity Term, 1873; Lee prizeman 1873, of Annaclone, county Down, Ireland, Esq., Thomas Joseph Greenfield, of Bath House, Lewisham, Kent, Esq., Benjamin Lewis Mosely, LL.B., of the London University. The Hon. Arthur Romilly, B.A., Trinity College, Cambridge, fourth son of the Right Hon. Lord Romilly, lately the Master of the Rolls, and one of the masters of the bench of this society.

COUNTY COURTS.

BIRMINGHAM COUNTY COURT.
Thursday, Jan. 22.

(Before H. W. COLE, Q.C. Judge.)
LOVERIDGE v. HAGLEY.

Liability of a minor. THIS was an action brought by Mr. George Loveridge, silversmith and jeweller, Birmingham, against a workman named Hagley, to recover the sum of £19 1s. 3d., money overdrawn on account of work unfinished.

Piercy Wilkinson appeared for the plaintiff. Burton for the defendant.-The defendant had pleaded infancy.

Wilkinson said that was a plea which covered a great quantity of charges, but there were certain exceptions, and he thought his Honour would be of opinion that this was one in which the defendant had rendered himself personally liable. In March 1872 the defendant went to Mr. Loveridge and offered himself to do certain work in the trade certain conditions. In answer to questions put to of jeweller. Mr. Loveridge accepted him under twenty-two years of age, and had been in the him by Mr. Loveridge, he stated that he was employment of other persons, mentioning their names and the length of time he had been em ployed. It was agreed that Hagley should serve as a journeyman for Mr. Loveridge for a weekly 1872 to October of the same year, when there was sum of 30s. He did so serve until from March a further agreement come to between them, He worked on these conditions until March 1873, whereby the defendant was to go on piecework. when he complained to Mr. Loveridge that he was ill, and said that he wanted to go into the country to recruit his health. At that time a statement ment it appeared that the defendant had overwas drawn up between them, and from that state£22 6s. 2d. The plaintiff alleged that the excuse drawn on account of piecework the sum of of ill-health was tered into another person's employment Before a fabrication, for within a few days of the defendant leaving him, he enthis, the defendant had told Mr. Loveridge that he had a chance of a better situation in the coloured gold trade, and that when his health was restored he should be able to pay the balance due. The before the magistrates, and the defendant was case was brought ordered to return to his work; but by an agree ment between the parties the defendant gave a promissory note for the amount due, and en gaged to pay £1 per month. had been made, which reduced the amount to the Some payments sum now sought to be recovered.

After the examination of the plaintiff and of a witness who had frequently heard the defendant say he was twenty-two years old,

Burton submitted that the defendant was not liable, as the contract was not beneficial to the infant, which it was clearly laid down it must be before the plaintiff could recover.

After hearing Wilkinson on the other side, His HONOUR quoted several cases bearing on the question, and said it was quite clear that if upon the settling of the amount due between the parties there had been a balance due to the infant, the infant could have recovered. He had done the work, and could recover from the master upon the contract the wages due to him. What the court had to consider was whether, under circumstances like these, the plaintiff could recover the balance of the money the defendant had received, and whether, in point of fact, the agreement was a beneficial one to the defendant. The object of the defendant in entering into the agreement was to earn his own subsistence, and under that agree

ment he actually did earn in the first instance 308. a week, which for a youth of that age, seemed to be very good wages. Then, from October to March 1873, he drew between £50 and £60. He could not but consider it was a very beneficial agreement for the infant. He might in time do better, and he appeared to have done so. It seemed to him that the defendant was bound by the contract, which was a beneficial one at the time it was made, and he should find a verdict for the plaintiff for the full amount claimed.

CARLESS v. Wathen.

Agreement-Stamp-Sufficiency. AN action was brought by Mr. George Carless, paper-box manufacturer, Regent-street, against Mr. William Wathen, landlord of the Queen's Arms, Bradford-street, to recover £50 deposit on the sale of the defendant's licensed house and business.

Rosher (instructed by Crowther Davies) appeared for the plaintiff.

Parry for the defendant.

LIVERPOOL COUNTY COURT.
Thursday, Jan. 20.

(Before J. F. COLLIER, Esq., Judge.)
THE ERMINIA FOSCOLA.
Necessaries.

H. D. Warr, instructed by Bateson and Co., appeared for the plaintiffs.

The facts of the case may be gathered from the judgment: His HONOUR.-This is an undefended suit against the Italian barque Erminia Foscola and her owners for necessaries. The facts, as they appear from the evidence, are these: The vessel sailed from Akyab to Falmouth last. The captain applied to Messrs. Fox and Co. for orders, arrived at the latter port on 3rd Oct. the money was wanted for necessaries for the for £15, stating through their Italian clerk that ship. The money was advanced and laid out in this way-viz., £3 for provisions, and the reRosher in opening the case, stated that in June mainder in paying the wages of a seaman who had last the plaintiff, being desirous of entering into shipped at Akyab for the first port in England, business, as a licensed victualler, instructed Mr. and who claimed his discharge, and was disJohn Binns, of the Plough and Harrow inn High-charged at Falmouth. Messrs. Fox now seek to gate, to negotiate with the defendant for the recover this £15 in the present suit. There is purchase of the Queen's Arms. On the 12th of the same month an agreement was signed for the ample authority to show that money advanced sale of the property, and the sum of £50 was paid for, and bona fide laid out in necessaries, differs in no respect from necessaries themselves. The as a deposit. Mr. Seal and Mr. James Lowe, of only question is, whether in the present case Temple-street, auctioneers and valuers, were employed to make an inventory and valuation of the the definition of necessaries. I have no doubt what the money was expended on comes within property, which valuation was to be completed about the provisions-I think it is clear that they and the purchase effected by the 1st July. The were necessaries. The case of the wages of the contention on behalf of the plaintiff was that the seaman presents more difficulty, and is, I believe, defendant had impeded the valuers in their work, novel. The definition of necessaries in the older so that the valuation was not completed by the cases has received a wider interpretation in the date specified. Rosher contended that the plaintiff recent case of The Riga (L. Rep. 4 Ad. & Ecc. had done his best to complete the purchase, and p. 516), Sir Robert Phillimore in that case that the defendant had no claim whatever in law adopted the doctrine laid down by Lord Tenterden or equity to keep possession of the £50. The in Webster v. Seekamp (4 B. & Ald. 352), viz., that learned counsel then called Mr. Lowe and Mr. Seil, the auctioneers, and a son of Mr. Lowe, to which a vessel is engaged, whatever the owner of "whatever is fit and proper for the service in prove that the agreement had been duly signed. that vessel as a prudent man would have ordered, Their evidence was contradictory as to the time if present at the time, comes within the meaning when the date was affixed on the stamp, and it did of the term necessaries,' as applied to those renot appear certain whether the date had been pairs done or things provided for the ship by written at the same time as the signatures or at order of the master, for which the owners are some subsequent period. liable." The seaman's wages were not repairs done or things provided, but I think the same reasoning may be applied to them, and I am of opinion that the owner, if on no other ground, on the ground of prudence would, if present, have paid liable to arrest. them, for if he had not his ship would have been The same consideration opewithin the meaning of the word necessaries. rates in inquiring whether or not they come The primary and obvious meaning of a necessary is something without which the ship would be unable to continue her voyage. The seaman is entitled to his wages, and he is entitled to institute a suit and arrest the ship unless they are paid. The captain is not bound, I think, to wait to see if the ship is arrested; on the contrary, he is bound to fulfil his contract, the probable alternative being the arrest of the ship, and he swears that without the £15 he had not enough to pay the wages. I have come to the conclusion that they were under these circumstances necessaries. Although, as far as I can discover, there is no case in the books exactly like the present, still there are two which I think may be quoted as fortifying my opinion. The case of Robinson v. Lyall (7 Price 592), in which the plaintiff, a ship chandler at Portsmouth, brought an action against the owners of a vessel for money advanced to the captain to pay seamen's wages, Portsmouth being the port of discharging, and it was held that he could recover on the ground that the money was necessary for the use of the ship, and the case of the Henry Reid (32 L. T. Rep. 166), in which money advanced for the payment of seamen's wages was allowed to be recovered in the Admiralty Court; but it is only right to state that, in deciding the latter, Dr. Lushington said that he was extending the law, and that this case for that decision seems to have been that the case was not to constitute a precedent. One ground was unopposed. In that respect, at any rate, it is a precedent for this one. For the foregoing reasons I hold that Messrs. Fox are entitled to recover the sum claimed in this suit with costs.

Upon this point Parry took a legal objection, and urged that the document could not be received as evidence, as the date had not been inserted on the stamp at the proper time. He submitted that no satisfactory proof had been laid before them to show when the date was affixed, and who had inserted it.

After Rosher had replied to the arguments of Parry,

His HONOUR said: This case involves a question of considerable importance. A document had been tendered to him as an agreement, and the objection taken to it was that it could not be received, because it had not been duly stamped. It appeared that the agreement had an adhesive stamp affixed to it, on or across which were the signatures of the defendant and of John Binns, as the agent of the plaintiff. At the foot of the stamp was written," June 12th, '73." The question was whether, under the recent Stamp Act, that instrument was properly stamped. The

statute enacted that the instrument was not to be deemed duly signed unless the person or persons required by law to cancel it did so by writing on or across the stamp his name or the name and initials of his firm. On the document produced they had the name of both parties to the contract written upon the stamp. The section further required that the true date should be given so that the stamp might be effectually cancelled and rendered incapable of being used for any other instrument. The object of the Act of Parliament was to protect the Government from being defrauded of the stamp duties, and for that purpose it required that the effectual cancellation of the stamp should be made, not merely by writing the name or names of the parties across the stamp only, but that the date also should be written upon it. But the Legislature, anticipating the frequent occurrence of mistakes in the cancelling of the stamp without any intent to defraud, provided an alternative expressed thus: "unless it is proved that the date appearing on the instrument is affixed at the proper time." Supposing the stamp was not duly cancelled, then the persons whose duty it was to see to the cancellation were liable to forfeit the sum of £10. The only question, therefore, that he had to consider was not whether the date had been affixed at the proper time, but whether the person whose duty it was to cancel the stamp had done so by writing the date upon it. The evidence was clear that the stamp had been affixed at the proper time, though it was not proved that the cancellation of it was effected at the same time. Whether it was so or not he should give no opinion, but he ruled that

NORFOLK COUNTY COURT.
Tuesday, Jan. 13.

(Before J. WORLLEDGE, Esq., Judge.) POTTER V. HILLING. Husband and wife living apart—Revocation of wife's authority. JOHN WM. POTTER, shopkeeper, Pulham Market, sued Noah Hilling, labourer, a person residing in the same place, for the recovery of £1 98. 7d. for necessaries supplied to his wife at various times during three years in which they lived separate.

Mrs. Potter represented her husband, and gave her evidence with obvious candour, freedom from hesitation, and undoubted honesty.

In reply to the learned judge, she said that she was not aware of the reasons which had induced the defendant to leave his wife, nor where he went to; but while he was away Mrs. Hilling made the remark that she must not allow herself to get into debt more than she was able to get out of, for she had no husband to pay it. His Honour inquired of Mrs. Potter whether she did not think that this was an intimation to her that she must not look to the defendant to be answerable for any goods supplied to his wife, and whether in fact the defendant himself had not cautioned her against letting Mrs. Hilling have anything on credit? Mrs. Potter acknowledged that on one occasion the defendant requested her not to serve his wife with any goods, but he was drunk at the time.

His HONOUR.-But even if he was drunk, did it not look as if he knew was he was about?

Mrs. Potter replied that she did not think he did, for he was so drunk that his violence to his wife made her interfere between them. She added that a son of the defendant's would have settled the amount now sued for, but his father would not allow him.

In resisting the claim, the defendant said that not only had he cautioned Mrs. Potter against trusting his wife, but he had distinctly forbidden her from dealing at the plaintiff's shop at all. The reason why he left his wife was to go after work; but while absent he used to send her as much money as he could spare.

His HONOUR having expressed a desire to hear what Mrs. Hilling had to say in the matter, she stepped into the witness box, and admitted it was quite true that Mrs. Potter had let her have goods during her husband's absence, for two years of which he never sent her any money whatever. It was also true that her husband had forbidden her to deal with the plaintiff; but Mrs. Potter had always been so kind to her that she wished to put as much as she could in her way, in the hope that it would one day or other be paid for.

His HONOUR observed that there were two reasons why the defendant could not be held liable in the action. The first was, that he had cautioned Mrs. Potter not to trust his wife; and the second was, that he had expressly forbidden his wife to deal at the plaintiff's. In the leading case on the subject as decided in the Court of Common Pleas,

Lord Chief Justice Erle, who delivered the judg ment, laid it down that a husband had a right to be master in his own house; and that where a husband had forbidden his wife to deal with a Mr. tradesman, the creditor could not recover. Justice Byles was of a different opinion, &nd thought a tradesman who supplied necessaries to a wife had a right to recover unless he knew that her husband had prohibited her from dealing with him; but the other judges concurred with Lord Chief Justice Erle in the ruling that it was not necessary, in order to free the husband from lia bility, that the creditor should know that he had forbidden his wife to deal with him. Upon the authority of the decision referred to, he must hold that the defendant was not liable, and that judgment, therefore, must be entered in his favour.

The plaintiff sues for £21 8s. 11d.

His HONOUR said: Mr. W. Siderfin, living at Neath, sold to the plaintiff certain potatoes by sample. The defendant boiled them and tried them before his purchase. Siderfin wrote out a memorandum of sale on these terms:-" April 25th, 1873. Charles Peek takes ten tons of potatoes, and will send sacks next week, price £5 78. 6d. a ton, on the rail at Swansea ;" and it was signed by the defendant, "C. Peek." There is no name of the seller in the book, or on the memorandum thus signed. There was put in evidence a post office card addressed to "Messrs. Burgess, Shaddrick, and Co., Shipbrokers, Swansea. The post mark is dated, "Aberdare, May 7th, 1876." The card is endorsed-" From C. Peek, Aberdare. Dear Sirs,-I could do nothing with your potatoes at the price your agent told me, for I am overstocked, and the market so much down." The defendant did not sent sacks, and they were obtained for him by Siderfin from the Sack Loan Society. Notice was given to him that if he did not take the potatoes they would be re