The great and serious drawback to the ballot appears to be the delay entailed by the tedious process of counting the ballot papers. That the result of an election should not be known for twenty-four hours after the close of the poll is a decided defect in the system and we doubt very much whether it will be tolerated. We do not see why there should be any objection to the papers being counted and examined by the presiding officers at the respective polling stations. The agents of the candidates would be present, and with an efficient staff of clerks the work might be got through very rapidly, and the returns with the ballot papers sent to head quarters. The Town Clerk of Bath counted 4865 ballot papers in three hours, so that the result was announced by seven o'clock, and only eight officials were employed in counting. Mr. John Stone, the town clerk in question, should make known his system. It is certainly a reproach to a city like London that the result of a contest should not be known for certain until nearly thirty hours after the close of the poll.

There is no intelligible reason why the ballot should not be worked expeditiously and with perfect success. There ought to be no doubt what the closing of the poll means-supposing there to be any at present-nor should it be open to returning officers to take fanciful objections to ballot papers. We have learnt our first lesson in a general election. In several constituencies more voters have polled than ever polled before, which is a decided recommendation of the system, and on the whole there is every reason to anticipate that Parliament will make it a permanent institution.

THE COMING ELECTION PETITIONS.

MANY of the misdeeds of the past fortnight connected with the general election will doubtless soon be arraigned before the election Judges, and it will not be amiss, perhaps, if we remind the Profession of the nature of the case which has to be established before an election can be invalidated.

Anything which actually interferes with the freedom of election is a ground for declaring it void. Thus we remember in the Nottingham case, before a committee of the House of Commons, it was a question whether the " lambs had actually prevented voters from going to the poll by the terror which they excited. This is a form of intimidation more likely to come into prominence as the working population begin to take greater interest in politics under the ballot; it is indeed the only certain mode of ensuring that undue influence has its effect upon the result of the election. The enactment on this subject is that every person who shall directly or indirectly, by himself or by any other person on his behalf, make use of or threaten to make use of any force, violence or restraint, or threaten the infliction by himself, or by or through any other person, any injury, damage, harm, or loss, or in any other manner practise intimidation upon or against any person in order to induce or compel such person to vote or refrain from voting, or on account of such person having voted or refrained from voting at any election, or who shall by abduction or duress, or any fraudulent device or contrivance, impede, prevent, or otherwise interfere, with the free exercise of the franchise of any voter, or shall thereby compel, induce, or prevail upon any voter to give or refrain from giving his vote at any election, shall be deemed to have committed the offence of undue influence. And it has been held that though no damage, harm, or loss, be sustained by the voter, if the doing of the act inflicts loss on the other side it is wit hin the statute. Therefore as to

By dismissal from employment.

As to withdrawing custom it has been a subject of judicial doubt whether a lady looking at a box of ribbons, and on learning the politics of the tradesman refusing to purchase, would be undue influence. We need hardly say that in the case of the intimidation of single voters, the agency of the person exercising the influence must be proved; but in the case of general riot or violence it is a question of degree, and it must appear that the result was affected. Where the majority is a large one, and the rioting has not been extensive, the return would not be avoided.

It would seem hardly necessary to say very much about

ciding upon the motive with which hospitality has been dispensed or employment given. One good illustration is furnished by the request of a candidate to an elector to come some distance to vote. There is no implied promise to pay travelling expenses. The payment of travelling expenses has been held to be bribery, but a request to come and vote simply, holds out no inducement. Promises must be intended to influence the vote.

The prominent instance in which a corrupt intent will be implied is where money or its equivalent is given to a voter without any consideration. But even here the mere fact of the recipient being a voter will not be conclusive; it will be open to the candidate or his agent to show that the payment was innocent.

Bribery by strangers has assumed an important position under recent decisions. By receiving a bribe a voter loses his status, just as a candidate loses his by giving one. The vote of the corrupt voter may be struck off on a scrutiny, and although the candidate and his agents knew nothing of any corrupt practice, the majority may melt away before a petition which the respondent defends as being in his opinion wholly groundless. The evidence to impeach the return in this way, however, must be cogent. Bribery, therefore, may take the form of: Payment to induce the voter to vote. Offering money to induce a voter to vote. Employing electors for reward.

Payment of voters for loss of time.
Corrupt payment of rates.

Corrupt payment of barristers' court money.
Buying the influence of another candidate.
Payment of travelling expenses.

Charitable gifts (a question of degree).
Payment to induce personation.

It is immaterial how long before an election the consideration for the vote was given. It will be regarded as having influenced the voter.

There is nearly as much difficulty in deciding upon what

amounts to

Treating.

The statute speaks of corruptly giving, or providing, or causing to be given or provided, or paying expenses incurred for any meat, drink, entertainment or provision, in order to be elected, or to induce a voter to refrain from voting. Treating may be either before or after the election-if treating subsequent is relied upon, a previous understanding must have existed. The mere giving refreshment is not in itself a corrupt act, although punishable under the statute, but if it be given to influence votes, or to gain popularity, it is corrupt, and a single act of this kind done corruptly by an agent avoids the election.

General treating is the supply of refreshments in such excessive quantities with reference to the election as to produce a general corruption of the constituency. In this case the election would be void at common law, even if no agency were proved. A question of the first magnitude with reference to corrupt practices, is of course that of

Agency.

Very concise and clear expositions of the law as far as it can be considered to be established on any plain principles will be found in the work of Messrs. Leigh and Le Marchant, which we review to-day (in chap. 2), and also in a treatise by Mr. F. O. Crump, in Cox and Grady's Election Law. From the former we take the following passages :

An agent is a person authorised by the candidate to act on his behalf in affairs connected with the electlon, and the candidate, as regards his seat, is as liable for acts committed by his agent as if he himself had been personally concerned therein; although the agent may not only have exceeded the authority committed to him, but have acted in opposition to the express commands of the candidate. So extreme, in fact, is the liability of the candidate for his agent, that the relation between them is not analogous to that existing at common law between principal and agent.

The candidate is answerable for the acts of his agent in the same way as a master is answerable for the acts of his servant done in the course of his employment, whether lawful or not, notwithstanding a prohibition may have been given to him by his master.

A candidate has been held answerable for acts committed by a person employed in a subordinate capacity by the agent for the pur poses of the election on his own responsibility to the same extent as if those acts had been committed by the superior agent himself.

Besides the agent for election expenses, there are other paid persons whose names would appear in the detailed statement of election expenses under 26 & 27 Vict. c. 29, s. 4.

The mere fact of their names appearing in that statement as paid by the candidate for the purposes of the election would probably be held as sufficient evidence of their agency, unless they were merely employed and paid in some subordinate capacity such as that of a messenger or bill-sticker, &c. The candidate may be bound also by acts committed in the course of the election by other persons on his behalf, though not named in the election accounts and unpaid.

A man's wife, if she interfere in the election, is ipso facto his agent. Hastings, Judgments, 235.

Any act, however trifling, is evidence of agency, and an aggregate of isolated acts will by their cumulative force constitute agency; though no one of them alone, if severed from the others, might be conclusive. Exempli gratiâ :

1. Being a member of the committee.

2. Canvassing alone, and with or without a canvassing-book.

66

The words used in the Corrupt Practices Act to denote acts which are to affect a member's return are these, by himself or by any other person on his behalf." In one of the first petitions tried before a Judge (the Norwich Petition, 19 L. T. Rep. N. S. 615), the effect of these words was considered, and Baron Martin held that they included any person for whom in law the member was responsible, whether he be an agent directly appointed by the member, or whether he be an agent by reason of the construction which has been placed upon the Act of Parliament-a construction_which, his Lordship remarked, is to some extent binding on the Judges. The conten. tion of counsel for the respondent in that case was that the respondent could not be held responsible for an act to which he was not privy. This contention was at once disposed of, and without citing further authorityand every petition tried is an authority on this point-it is to be taken that the candidate must suffer the consequences of the acts of every person for whom he is legally responsible.

The important question which we have now to consider is what constitutes an agent. And in the first place it should be observed that it was held by Mr. Justice Willes, in the Windsor Petition (19 L. T. Rep. N.S. 613), that mere employment does not constitute agency, and that therefore bribery by a messenger unauthorised to canvass did not affect the election. Payment for services, indeed, is not an element in the matter at all, for it was held by Mr. Justice Blackburn, in the Bewdley Petition (19 L. T. Rep. N. S. 676), that it is not necessary that an agent should be paid in order that his act should affect a member's seat. But agency is not established by the mere fact of a person's name being on the published list of the committee (20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 24). Mr. Justice Willes there said, however, "If I find a person's name on a committee from the beginning, that he attended meetings of the committee; that he also canvassed, and that his canvass was recognised so far as it went, I must require considerable argument to satisfy me that he was not an agent within the meaning of the Act of Parliament."

So much for negative decisions. Now, as to affirmative, we have the high authority of Mr. Justice Willes for saying that no distinction is to be drawn, as regards agency, in cases of bribery, treating, and undue influence (23 L. T. Rep. N. S. 990). His Lordship was at first disposed to exclude treating from the acts done by an agent which should avoid the election, but his conclusion was that the 36th section of the Act must be read literally. Therefore all the corrupt practices stand upon the same footing as regards agency. In the Norwich Petition (sup.) we have the strongest evidence of agency, for there the learned Judge held that the agency of a particular individual had been proved "up to the hilt." Three persons stated him to be a canvasser. It was proved that he canvassed in the company of the son of the sitting member, and that on the afternoon of the day of polling he went to a publichouse and bought votes. Further, as to canvassing, Mr. Justice Willes, in the Guildford Petition (19 L. T. Rep. N. S. 729), said (p. 732) "as a rule agency to bind the member would be agency to canvass or to procure votes on his behalf."

Now arises the question what is authority to canvass?

In the Windsor Petition (sup.) Mr. Justice Willes said, "an authority for the general management of an election would involve an authority to canvass. And in making that observation his Lordship remarks that he purposely used the word "authority" and not " employment," because he intended to refer to persons who were not paid for their services. It is quite clear, of course, as remarked by Mr. Justice O'Brien in the Londonderry Petition (Printed Judgments, Part II., p. 252), that no mere supporter of a candidate who chooses to ask for votes, and to make speeches in his favour, can force himself upon the candidate as an agent. In the Westbury Petition, Mr. Justice Willes said the act done to affect the candidate must be done by his procurement, and held it immaterial whether a desire that a person should canvass be expressed or implied, by words or by actions. And the learned Judge, in that case, gave a definition of canvassing. Canvassing," he said, " 'may be either by asking a man to vote for the candidate for whom you are canvassing, or by begging him not to go to the poll, but to remain neutral and not vote for the adversary. No distinction can be drawn, except in the amount of favour, between voting for a man and abstaining from voting for his adversary. That such is the law appears from the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102, which places on the same footing inducing a man to vote at an election and inducing a man to abstain from voting.'

66

The question What is agency? was much discussed in the Staleybridge Petition (20 L. T. Rep. N. S. at pp. 76, 77), especially with reference to the acts of volunteers. One of the counsel there urged that the responsibility of the candidate should be limited in the case of volunteers, that the petitioners should be bound to show some authorising on the part of the candidate to the persons whose acts are sought to be made available against him. In his judgment, Mr. Justice Blackburn considered the arguments addressed to him, and went fully into the matter. And first he noticed a mode of constituting a person an agent, which he had held in the Bewdley case to be most effective, that is, so as to make the candidate responsible not only for the acts of the person so appointed, but for the acts of those whom that person might employ as his agents. Sir R. Glass put money into the hands of a person at Bewdley, and exercised no supervision as to how it was to be expended, simply giving directions that it should not be expended illegally. The Judge came to the conclusion that there was such an agency established as to make the candidate responsible to the fullest extent. The evidence did not go so far as this in the Staleybridge case, but the learned Judge held that the mere act of taking the committee rooms by the volunteer committee amounted to evidence that the sitting member and his people did request those committees to bring up voters when they could, and consequently that the persons who, joining those volunteer committees, went and fetched voters, were in one sense employed by the sitting member to bring up voters.

In this same case, Mr. Justice Blackburn takes occasion to say that he does not think the principle that a person employed to canvass makes the candidate responsible for his acts, laid down by Mr. Justice Willes in the Windsor case, can be accepted as a hard and fast rule. "As a general proposition," he said, "that would go a great way towards saying who is an agent, but I don't think we can take it as an absolute hard and fast rule, on which we can say that wherever a case of corruption has been brought home to a person who was within the limit, the seat should be vacated. The effect of that would be to say that wherever there were volunteers who were acting at all, and whose voluntary acting was not repudiated by the candidate or his agents; wherever, in fact, a person came forward and said, 'I will act for you and endeavour to assist you,' and the candidate or

his agent said, 'I am very much obliged to you, sir;' any corrupt or improper acts done by the volunteer, although unconnected with the member, would render the election void. At present," his Lordship added, "I cannot go further than to say that each case must be considered upon the whole facts taken together, and it must be determined in that way whether the relation between the person guilty of the corrupt practice and the member was such as to make the latter fairly responsible for it." This is equivalent to saying that no general rule can be laid down on the question of authority by implication; but his Lordship said, later on, that in drawing the inference the reason of the rule which makes a candidate responsible for the unauthorised acts of his agents should be borne in mind.

It seems to be agreed by all the Judges that in considering the question of agency the nature of the acts done by the alleged agents are most material. In the Staleybridge judgment, from which we have been quoting, Mr. Justice Blackburn said that "whenever it appears that the things are numerously done it would go very far to show that the agents did come within that principle upon which the law is founded, viz., that they were persons, the benefit of whose foul play the member was to get, and therefore it would be right that he should forfeit his seat in consequence." The same learned Judge further considered this question in the Hastings Petition (21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 234). His Lordship there says: "I have frequently had it in my mind that there is great difficulty, in strict logic, in making the agency of a person dependent upon the extent of the corrupt practices committed by him. It does seem that in strict logic, if a man would be an agent if he was shown to have corrupted one hundred people by paying them £5 a-piece, then if he corrupts only a single man by giving him a single glass of beer, he ought to be regarded as an agent equally. There is no doubt, in strict logical language, you will find a difficulty in making the distinction, yet I cannot but feel that, in administering justice and in administering the law in such a way that it would be tolerable, one must make some distinction of that sort. There is the same thing that constitutes a man an agent in the one case present also in the other case; but I cannot but feel that where the case is a small isolated solitary case, it requires much more evidence to satisfy one of agency than would otherwise be necessary. If a small thing is done by the head agent. the agent for the election expenses, I think that would have upset the election; and if small things to a considerable extent were done by a subordinate person, comparatively slight evidence of agency would probably have induced one to find that he was an agent."

This may be taken to be the view adopted by the election Judges, and having disposed of the mode in which an individual agent may be constituted, we will proceed to the question of the agency of associated supporters.

In the Westminster Petition, at page 246 of 20 L. T. Rep. N. S., Baron Martin deals with the point, observing that he could not suppose that where an association of persons numbering 600 or 700 members chooses to call itself a committee, therefore they become the agents of a candidate for the purpose of making him responsible for a wrong act or an illegal act done by them. And subsequently he defined a committeeman. "The committeeman," he said, "whom I mean, and for whom I would hold Mr. Smith responsible, is a committeeman in the ordinary intelligible sense of the word, that is to say, a person in whom faith is put, and for whose acts he is responsible." Nothing more need be said as regards this, we having noticed the subject of the agency of political associations incidentally in discussing the Wigan and Taunton cases under "Candidate and Agent." Suffice it to say that it must be taken as established that there is no partnership privity between the parties subscribing to a political association; nor does the fact of subscribing confer any authority upon the person who manages it to make them responsible for an illegal act done by him.

We have now to consider at what point an agent ceases to be an agent, so as to make a candidate responsible for his acts. And, in the first place, it is to be noticed that treachery will deprive an agent of his capacity as such. This was expressly pointed out by Mr. Justice Blackburn in the Stafford Borough Petition (21 L. T. Rep. Ñ. S. 212). He said, referring to the proceedings of one Machin, "If the evidence was to the effect that Machin, though he was then a paid agent of Colonel Meller, was at that time planning to betray Colonel Meller, that it was what is called a plant, then I do not think that Machin could any longer be considered an agent of Colonel Meller, so that his acts would vacate the election. I wish to point out the distinction which I make, that according as the law stands at present, if a member employs an agent, and that agent, contrary to his wish, and contrary to his directions, commit a corrupt act, the sitting member is responsible for it; but when he employs an agent, and the agent treacherously or traitorously agrees with the other side, then if he does a corrupt act it would not vacate the seat, unless it is proved that the corrupt act was at the special request of the member himself or some untainted and unauthorised agent of the member who directed the act to be done." His Lordship was very particular upon the point, for he added, "The distinction is pretty obvious, and I mention it to avoid any difficulty or doubt that there might be hereafter, from its being supposed that I have said anything more than I do say; I say if Machin was a treacherous agent he loses the power of upsetting the seat by reason of his unauthorised acts of corruption; it would require actual proof of authority in order to make it so. It is a very different affair if a man being an agent has been tricked by the other party into committing a corrupt act, he him. self honestly still intending to act as an agent."

Express authority will, of course, recreate an agency which has lapsed or been annihilated. As above, it will do away with the effect of treachery; and in the case of corrupt acts done after the election, the agency, having ceased with the close of the election, may be revived by express authority, so as to constitute the person an agent, and thus to affect the return. "The agency at the election," said Mr. Justice Blackburn, in the Norfolk Petition, "which was solely from the canvassing before the election, expires with the election. Whether or no a person who had been requested to canvass would be an agent whose misconduct would avoid the election, would depend upon the evidence; but unless there is something to show continuing authority, that person could not, if he had given a feast ten days after the election, by that act upset the election."

Further, and lastly, it is perfectly clear that where there is a coalition between candidates, each becomes the agent of the other. The limit of this agency is shown in the Norfolk Petition before referred to. Here we conclude the consideration of the very difficult question of agency. Notwithstanding the diffidence expressed by all the Judges in dealing with it, and their doubts concerning the various attempts which have been made to define it, we do not conceive that there will be much difficulty in dealing with the next batch of petitions by the light of the judgments which we have been examining.

LAW LIBRARY.

The Election Manual: a Concise Digest of the Law of Parliamentary Elections. By L. P. BRICKWOOD, M.A., and HERBERT CROFT, M.A., Barristers-at-Law. London: Virtue, Spalding, and Daldy.

The Law of Elections and Election Petitions. By Hon. CHANDOS LEIGH, M.A., and HENRY LE MARCHANT, M.A., Barristers-at-Law. Second edition. London: Davis and Son, Carey-street, Lincoln's

inn.

It is most unfortunate when an unexpected event causes a number of books on a legal subject to be hurriedly pushed through the press. We last week noticed Mr. Hardcastle's edition of "Bushby," which bore evident traces of haste. The authors of the first of the two above-mentioned manuals admit that their "endeavour to comply with the exigency of the moment leaves them with 300 little time at their disposal for satisfactory revision and correction." The second on our list, being a second edition, was Bess liable to errors arising from hasty execution or publication.

Had Messrs. Brickwood and Croft thought over the matter, we do not think they would have given their work the title which it now bears. It is most decidedly not a digest of the law of Parliamentary elections. It is a digest, but by no means a concise digest, of the law relating to corrupt practices at parliamentary elections. According to the table of contents, which is perfectly accurate, the work treats of corrupt practices only-the position of a candidate and his agent, of bribery, treating and intimidation, dealing separately with "conduct money-conveyance," the meaning of "corruptly," and "costs."

However, disregarding the misnomer, we have to recognise in Messrs. Brickwood and Croft careful and intelligent students of the judgments of the election judges. These judgments furnish material for a treatise easy to be moulded and capable of being made into a systematic and scientific code of principles. We hould have been glad had our authors attempted such a code, instead of heaping up quotations from the judgments; but it would have been a task of some difficulty, and would certainly not have been completed so as to be available in the trial of the petitions which are certain to be presented before the end of the month. We will notice, however, a few of the conclusions at which Our authors arrive.

Agency: "Thus we may take it that the doctrine of the liability for the unauthorised and even for the expressly prohibited acts of his agent has received the approbation of the present tribunal for the trial of election petitions after full and deliberate consideration, and may be considered definitely settled :” (p. 11).

The authors cite a great many dicta as to to what constitutes an agent, but wisely refrain from attempting any general definition.

Bribery: The authors draw no conclusions, nor do they classify bribery as found in the various cases. The principles are buried in pages of judgment.

Conduct money: Conveyance.-Here again we have pages of judgment, but no clue to the prevailing principle.

The same remark applies to the question when costs should be given to the successful party.

Undue Influence: Our authors give us the intention of the Legislature in enacting the 5th section of the Corrupt Practices Act 1854. It was 66 obviously to secure, as far as human agency can do so, absolute freedom on the part of electors from all improper influences which might operate upon their minds in the exercise of the franchise; and where it can be proved that this 'vital principle' has not been maintained by reason of some vis major operating to any considerable extent, it will follow as a necessary consequence that the election cannot be upheld." The expression "operating to any considerable extent" is rather vague, and is hardly in accordance with the views of Mr. Justices Willes and Mr. Justice Blackburn. Any undue influence by an agent which causes a vote to be given in a way other than that in which it would have been given invalidates the return.

Treating is dealt with by citation of judgments, and no attempt is made to deduce principles or classify cases. We do not see, therefore, that we can say very much in favour of the work. The extracts are undoubtedly correct, but they will be found difficult to handle in practice, notwithstanding the index. Had there been sub-headings or side notes, or anything in the way of subdivision or classification, the work might have been useful. We very much doubt its practical value in its present shape, and we trust that, should it reach a second edition, its form will be altered.

Messrs. Leigh and Le Marchant have erred if at all on the right side. In a work of smaller dimensions than that of Messrs. Brickwood and Croft, they have combined with definitions of corrupt practices practical directions as to presenting, conducting, and withdrawing petitions, and they give in addition all the statute law. A very important chapter is devoted to the subject of 'Scrutiny," dealing with the various grounds upon which votes may be struck off, making great use of the Oldham case before Mr. Justice Blackburn, which is an excellent precedent. This work is arranged in such a way as to give the established principles in lucid order, and so as to be understood almost at a glance, being deeply indented with italic side heads and marginal notes.

We observe that the authors of both these works avail themselves largely of the reports of the election petitions in the LAW TIMES Reports; and without any partiality we believe that those reports will be found the only reports to be used with advantage, as they set out the full statements of fact in each case. reports commence in vol. xix., and end with vol. xxii.

The

SOLICITORS' JOURNAL.

So far as we have been able to ascertain, the following solicitors have been elected to serve as members of Parliament in the new House of Commons:

...

...

...

...

Dover.
East Sussex.
Londonderry City.

WWE are glad to be able to inform our readers that the negotiations which have for some time past been going on between the governing bodies of the Incorporated Law Society and the Metroolitan and Provincial Law Association, will in all probability be shortly closed in a manmer that will be satisfactory to the societies, and, indeed, we may say to the Profession at large.

able an object as their amalgamation will not only lead to a very considerable strengthening of the older society in point of numBers, but it will involve that which is of the greatest importance, namely, the holding of occasional provincial meetings. The Profession will be glad to hear that steps were some time since taken with a view to the election of extraordinary members of the council under the supplemental charter, and it is to be regretted that while the residents of ten country societies were nomimated, two only were found to possess the necessary qualification. As regards the proposed amal. gamation, we are sorry that we cannot inform our readers of the names of the prime movers in the negotiations which have taken place on this important subject.

QUEER little paper called the Criterion which is published at Hull announces that an application is to be made that Hull may be created a Legal centre, under the Judicature Act. The

Mr. Freshfield...
Mr. G. B. Gregory
Mr. C. E. Lewis
Mr. G. Leeman
Mr. G. Golding
Mr. W. Gordon
Mr. J. Dodds
Mr. McCarthy Downing

...

York City. Chippenham. Chelsea. Stockton. Cork County.

for Ireland as England. We think, in view of recent legislation that Mr. Disraeli with his large surplus may well relieve solicitors from the payment of the annual certificate duty, and the claim ought to be advanced by our representatives in the House.

MR. JOSHUA WILLIAMS addressed some very sensible observations to the Birmingham Law Students' Society last week. In the first place he disposed of the notion that a lawyer's education can ever terminate. "A man," said Mr. Williams, "would go on studying to the end of his days if he were worthy of the name of a lawyer," therefore he advised them to study on; "but let not the work be too hard." Too many gentlemen imagine that when they are out of their articles, and have passed their final examination, they have attained all that should be attained by a solicitor in the way of education. Doubtless, as Mr. Farrer very properly observed when one of the spokesmen of the deputation of the Legal Education Association to Lord Selborne in 1873, solicitors have not the time for studying the refinements of the law-for these they must go to the barrister, who has the time and opportunity