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loans to such other metropolitan bodies as are empowered, by statute, to borrow from the Metropolitan Board. MESSES. MORTON, ROSE, and Co. are prepared to receive subscriptions for £1,000,000 five per cent. sterling sinking fund bonds of the Illinois Central Railroad Company of £200 each, payable 1st April 1903, if not previously redeemed by the action of the sinking fund, which are issued under the provisions of an Act of the Legislature of the State of Illinois, dated 12th Feb. 1855, entitled "An Act to enable railroad companies to enter into operative contracts, and to borrow money.' The loan is raised for the purchase of an equal amount of New Orleans, Jackson, and Great Northern Railroad and Mississippi Central Railroad Seven per Cent. Bonds, by which means the Illinois Company will gain two per cent. annually, thereby providing a sinking fund sufficient to redeem the whole of this issue in about twentysix years. The bonds of the above railroads so purchased are to be held by the Illinois Company as security for the payment of this loan.

ELECTION LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS-CORRUPT PRACTICES -DELIVERY OF LIST OF OBJECTIONS-POWER OF COURT.-Where the parties required by No. 7 of the Regulæ Generales of Michaelmas Term 1868 to deliver a list of objections six days before the day appointed for the hearing of a petition under 35 & 36 Vict. c. 60, have failed to do so within that time, the court has no power to allow the list to be delivered subsequently, the discre. tionary power given by the rule having reference only to the amendment of a list that has been duly delivered: (Nield v. Batty, 29 L. T. Rep. N.S. 747. C.P.).

THE WORKING OF THE BALLOT. COUNTING VOTES.-Mr. E. G. L. Anderson writes:-"The system of calling over the votes for the purpose of ascertaining the number given for each candidate is not only tedious, but involves the necessity of more checking than is, I think, desirable. Will you, therefore, allow me to suggest the following plan as an improvement? namely, that as the voting papers are scrutinized to ascertain their validity, they should be sorted into as many heaps as the names on them admit of variations in voting, each heap being then counted in the same manner as a bank clerk ruus

various combinations."

through a bundle of notes. The working of the plan can be followed by taking, say, the East Surrey election. There are four candidates, and the variations possible are 10, with an additional heap for bad votes, these heaps would be as follows:-1, Plumpers for Gassiot; 2, for Grantham; 3, for Locke King; 4, for Watney; 5, split votes for Gassiot and Locke King: 6, for Grantham and Watney; 7, for Gassiot and Watney; 8, for Locke King and Watney; 9, for Grantham and Gassiot; 10, for Grantham and Locke King; 11, rejected votes. The papers being thus divided, the time occupied in counting would be reduced to a minimum, while the chance of error would be almost nil. Moveover, this plan would give reliable figures as to the number of electors who actually voted, the plumpers and split votes, and in the latter the proportion of the Mr. John Stone, town clerk of Bath, writes in reply:- Referring to Mr. Anderson's sugges tion in The Times of Saturday as to making up the poll by sorting the voting papers, I beg to say that so simple, effective, and rapid a plan was the first that presented itself, and has been used here in four Parliamentary elections (within one year) and in several municipal elections, each of the latter being similar in almost every respect to a Parliamentary election. Taking the Parliamentary election of last Tuesday as an instance of its efficiency, we had 4865 voting papers, which classed themselves (there being four candidates) into ten combinations. At the close of the poll (4 o'clock p.m.), after about one hour occupied in verifying the ballot boxes (19 in number), two hours sufficed to classify and count the papers, so that soon after 7 o'clock the Mayor was able to declare the numbers from the steps of the Guildhall. I may add that there were eight official counters employed." REJECTED BALLOT PAPERS. Mr. Gerald A. R. Fitzgerald, writes to the editor of the Times: "Some doubt and confusion seem to exist in the minds of returning officers as to the construction of the provisions of the Ballot Act relating to the validity of ballot papers. I observe, for instance, in the Times of Saturday that the returning officer for Finsbury rejected no fewer than 474. (a) Of these, many are stated to have been rejected because the voters had put figures on them, or

(a) This is incorrect, there were only 167 rejected.ED.

had placed two or more crosses opposite a candidate's name, or had placed the crosses in the wrong place. Will you allow me to point out the true state of the law. First, "the directions for the guidance of the voter" in Schedule II. of the Ballot Act which are placarded in the polling stations are directory merely and not imperative. Secondly, the only grounds assigned by the Act for rejecting a paper on the score of the mode of marking are-(1), Writing a mark by which a voter could be identified; (2), Uncertainty (Schedule II. and Rule 36). The true construction, then, of the Act is that where the returning officer has no reasonable doubt for whom the votes are intended, and there is nothing on the paper to identify the voter, he is bound to allow the paper as good. To reject papers because, e.g., two crosses or a tick are employed instead of a single cross, is contrary alike to common sense and to the policy of the Legislature, which certainly never intended to disfranchise electors by the minutest of technicalities."

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In reply to Mr. Fitzgerald, "A Chancery Barrister writes:-"Before the law on voting by ballot is absolutely settled by Mr. Fitzgerald, may I be allowed to point out what I cannot presume to call the true state of the law,' but what I venture to say would be the probable decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the questions treated in Mr. Fitzgerald's letter in the Times of this morning? In the first place, with regard to the directions for the guidance of the voter,' which Mr. Fitzgerald describes as directory merely, the 28th section of the Ballot Act is as follows:-The schedules to this Act and the notes thereto and directions therein shall be construed and have effect as part of this Act.' And the directions referred to are contained in the second schedule. It is true that the direction uses the word 'will' and not the word 'shall,' but if I say to my clerk you will wait in till I come back,' most people will admit that my directions are not only directory," but are intended to be imperative. With regard to the grounds upon which papers may be rejected, the Act says (sect. 2) that any ballot paper on which anything is written or marked by which the voter can be identified shall be void and not counted.' Now, suppose an agent instructs a voter with whom he contemplates pecuniary relations-I am, of course, putting a purely supposititious case-to mark against the candidate to be voted for two crosses instead of one cross, or a tick instead of one cross, or to place the cross on the left hand side instead of the right, would not the result be a mark by which the voter could be identified? Perhaps Mr. Fitzgerald is not aware that the examination of the under the supervision of the agents of the candi ballot papers is carried on in the presence and dates. No doubt, the Ballot Act does not aim at actual uniformity in the shape or size of the cross to be made, which must depend upon the taste or capacity of the voter; but the difference between a cross on the right and a cross on the left, between two crosses and one cross, or between a cross and the tick, is certainly not to described as a minute technicality."

And Mr. Richard A. Essery, town clerk of Swansea, also says: "On the subject of the voter's 'mark' I very fully agree with the opinion of Mr. Fitzgerald, for the body of the Ballot Act refers simply to a mark,' and not to a X. The form in the schedule doubtless indicates the latter, but it is, in my opinion, a mere example, and I think a tick, or dash, or any other mark not for identification, is a sufficient mark' within the statute. On the recent contest here I advised the returning officer to reject all marks and figures except a X, but this was in accordance with counsel's opinion previously obtained, and which, for obvious reasons, I adhered to, contrary to my own and to that of many other town clerks. On the question of counting the votes, the process of sorting is clearly the most expeditious and safest, inasmuch as there is not so much calling out of names, and possible interference between one set of counters and another. As to the point raised by Lex,' namely the hour of closing the poll-the question is capable of being brought within sufficiently narrow limits. A presiding officer cannot poll more than about 100 votes per hour, with illiterates and all; and it is found that each compartment in the booth having by the statute to accommodate 150 persons per day, five compartments only represent as near as siding officer), therefore, having the power to need be that officer's complement. He (the preregulate the number to be admitted at a time, may stop the poll at any time within five votes mission of voters five minutes before the hour of (i.e., he may, as he should do, prevent the adclosing-four o'clock, or five, as the case may be. If these last five voters should happen to be illiterate, the presiding officer could not complete their declarations, certificates, &c., under ten minutes. It is a fine point undoubtedly."

DOUBLE VOTING BY BALLOT.-A "Fair Voter" writes: "However desirable voting by ballot may

be, there seems a great laxity in the present mode of procedure amounting to a grave defect in the system. I am a freeholder in the Strand district, occupying business premises, and duly received my voting cards as such; and having a private residence in St. George's-road, Ecclestonsquare, I also there received my voting cards, with a different number, entitling me to vote again, had I been so disposed, for my private residence. The votes for the Strand district were recorded by me at the school-room, Russell-street, Covent-garden, and the votes required by me to be given for the same election were to be recorded at the Pimlico voting rooms, thus showing that, had I been so disposed, I could have voted twice over for the same candidates.

Another "Fair Voter" writes: "The defects in the system of voting complained of by "A Fair Voter in his letter in the Times of Saturday prevailed also in Southwark. I also received voting cards for two different pollingplaces in the borough, with a different number, being for different properties I have long held in different parishes, and I know of others who received the same. Thinking it could not be right that I should vote twice for the same candidates, I asked a friend well acquainted with the subject, and in consequence voted at the one place and did not go near the other. How many, similarly situated, may have voted twice, in ignorance, there is, I suppose, no means of ascertaining.

CLOSE OF THE POLL.-"Lex" writes :-"What does the close of the poll' under the Ballot Act mean? Does it mean-(1) That all voters who are in the room at 4 (or 5) o'clock are entitled to vote? (2) That no voting papers are to be delivered out after these hours? or (3) That no papers are to be put into the ballot box after those hours? I have asked half-a-dozen late 'presiding officers,' but none of them can tell me, and they said they had no instructions thereon when they were appointed. You will see that where, as at Bath, there was only a difference of six votes between the successful and unsuccessful candidates, the meaning of the words 'close of the poll may make all the difference."

PREPARATIONS FOR POLLING.--Messrs. Knight and Co., of 90, Fleet-street, write: May we venture to give you our experience in providing the largest metropolitan constituency with the refer to that of Lambeth, which contains upwards necessary apparatus for voting by Ballot? We of 40,000 registered electors. We submit, and have no doubt that all Returning Officers will endorse our opinion, that for such large constituencies the time allowed between the nomina. tion day and the polling day should be extended. held on The nomination for Lambeth was clear days in which to provide the ballot papers Saturday, leaving (exclusive of the Sunday) three and all other requisite forms of papers for conducting the election. The numbering of the ballot papers alone occupied six of our staff without cessation from Monday noon till Wednesday morning. These, together with stamping instruments and ballot boxes for 78 polling stations, had, of course, to be assorted and distributed to the 78 presiding officers before the opening of the poll on Thursday morning. This could not be completed until a late hour on Wednesday evening, and, after the anxiety and responsibility devolving upon the Returning Officer in reference to this, in settling the situation and preparations of the polling stations, in securing and duly instructing something like 150 responsible men to act as presiding officers and poll clerks, it is no wonder that at the close of the poll he should take some hours' rest, instead of at once superintending the counting of the votes. We are clearly of opinion that, to prevent a repetition of the Hackney collapse, in all constituencies numbering over 25,000 voters a week should intervene between the nomination day and the day of poll."

REGULATIONS UNDER THE BALLOT ACT.

After the election and transmission of the documents to the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery, it is provided that, unless otherwise directed by an order of the House of Commons or of one of Her Majesty's Superior Courts, he shall cause the same to be destroyed, after being retained for one year. No rejected ballot-paper is to be inspected without such an order as already mentioned, to be granted on evidence that the inspection is necessary for a prosecution in relation to ballot papers, or for the purpose of an election or reJudge at Chambers. Further, no person, except turn, and the power given may be executed by a by order of the House of Commons, or any tribunal having cognizance of petitions, complaining of sealed packet of counterfoils after the same has undue returns or undue elections, shall open the been once sealed up, or be allowed to inspect any counted ballot paper in the custody of the clerk of the Crown in Chancery; such order to be made subject to conditions; and care is to be taken, in carrying out such order, that the mode in which any particular elector has voted shall not be discovered until it has been proved that he has

voted, and his vote, by a competent tribunal, has been declared to be invalid. All documents forwarded by a returning-officer to the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery other than ballot papers and counterfoils shall be open to public inspection at such times and under such regulations as may be prescribed by the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery, with the consent of the Speaker of the House of Commons, and extracts may be furnished on the payment of fees sanctioned by the Treasury. When an order is made for the production by the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery of any document relating to any specified election, the production by such clerk or his agent, as ordered, shall be conclusive evidence that such document is the one specified, and any endorsement appearing in any packet of ballot papers produced shall be evidence of being such papers as they are by the indorsement stated to be. The production from proper custody of a ballot paper purporting to have been used at any election, and of a counterfoil marked with the same printed number, shall be prima facie evidence that the person who voted by such ballot paper was the person who had affixed to his name the number written on the counterfoil.

entitled to demand this amount; and that the dis-
allowance was right: (Reg. v. Haslingfield, 29 L.T.
Rep. N. S., 801. Q.B.,

In the case of Searle v. Reynolds (14 L. T. Rep. N. S. 518), the members of the court came to the but arrived at that decision conclusion that a conviction should be affirmed, on different

servant was not enough to justify a conviction. The Court of Queen's Bench upheld the decision, on the ground that in the case stated to them it METROPOLIS COMMONS ACT RIGHT TO was not found as a fact that the servant was RENEW A TAVERN SIGNPOST.-By the Metro-acting in the management of the house, in his politan Commons Act 1866, the respondents are master's absence. Crompton, J., observed, "There empowered to make a scheme for managing is no doubt that a man may be an aider and Blackheath, but no right of a profitable or bene- abettor though he is only in the capacity of a ficial nature in, over, or affecting the heath shall, servant, for if, as in this case, the master goes except with the consent of the person entitled away, and the servant manages the house in his thereto, be taken away or injuriously affected by absence, that would do to make him liable." any scheme without compensation being made or In Reg. v. Handley (9 L. T. Rep. N. S. 827), the provided for the same. By a scheme thus made decision of the court turned upon the amount of by the respondents, and confirmed by the Metro- acquiescence by the defendant in the act compolitan Commons Supplemental Act 1871, no posts plained of. The contractor for working a mine shall be maintained, fixed, or erected on the heath had been convicted by justices of allowing without the consent in writing of the respondents. females to have charge of the machinery, a tackle One clause of the scheme saves to all persons all by means of which persons were brought up or such rights of a profitable or beneficial nature in, passed down a vertical shaft of a mine, in contraover, or affecting the heath, or any pert thereof as vention of the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 99, ss. 8 and 9. The they before enjoyed. By the bye laws, made in court of quarter sessions, to which an appeal pursuance of this scheme and the said Acts of was made by the defendant, confirmed the conParliament, a penalty is imposed for erecting on viction subject to a case for the opinion of the the heath, unless with the consent of the reCourt of Queen's Bench. It was not found that spondents in writing, any posts. The appellant, females were usually employed, or that they were ELECTION PETITIONS.-Arising out of the the owner of a tavern fronting the heath, was employed upon any other occasion than that present general election, it is expected that a convicted and fined for erecting a new signpost which was the subject of the information, or that number of election petitions will be filed within on the heath opposite the tavern, in place of an they were employed with the knowledge of the the time prescribed by the Parliamentary Elec- old one which had been blown down. The occucontractor. It was held by the Court of Queen's tions Act which was passed in the year 1868, and piers of this tavern had, for more than forty years Bench that there was not sufficient evidence that continued by subsequent statutes. After the as of right, without interruption, and for the the employment of the females was with the knowgeneral election in 1868, the number filed in that more profitable and beneficial occupation of the ledge or tacit acquiescence of the defendant to year was sixty-nine, and five in the following same, kept erected on and fixed into the soil of make him responsible, and the conviction was year. By the Ballot Act, which has now been the heath at this spot a signpost of this kind, and quashed. tested by a general election, the offence of "per- had from time to time replaced it when desirable. sonation" can be added to the charges of bribery, The appellant had no knowledge of the above. treating, and undue influence. The mode of pro- mentioned scheme, and had received no compencedure is by filing a petition in the Rule Office of sation for the right to have this post. Held, upon the Court of Common Pleas, containing the alle- a case stated by the convicting magistrate, that gations charged. A seat can be claimed or not on the appellant's right to renew the signpost was a the part of an unsuccessful candidate. Before a right in, over, or affecting the heath; that it was petition is at issue a recognisance in a sum of therefore saved by the scheme; and that the con£1000 must be lodged, or a sum to that amount viction must be quashed: (Hoare v. The Metro. deposited in the Bank of England. The next pro-politan Board of Works, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 804. ceeding is to appoint the trial, after which the Q. B. sitting member can obtain "particulars" of the offences alleged, and within a few days of the trial the names can be procured of the parties implicated in the bribery, &c. The Ballot Act was passed on the 18th July, 1872; it is to continue in force until the 31st December 1880, and no longer, unless Parliament otherwise determine. Several statutes were repealed during the operation of the Act. It was proposed to make it an offence to induce an elector to disclose for whom he voted, but the provision was struck out. In the present election secrecy was not observed, and cards were forwarded on behalf of candidates and returned after voting. It will be for consideration in the new Parliament whether amendments are not needed in the statute. By the 24th section of the Ballot Act (35 & 36 Vict. c. 33) it is provided that if on the trial of any election petition any candidate is found by the judge, by himself or his agents, to have been guilty of persona tion, or to have aided or procured such personation, at an election, such candidate shall be incapable of sitting in Parliament for a county or borough during the Parliament then in existence; and by the following section, on a petition claiming the seat, if it is proved that the candidate or his agents have been guilty of bribery, treating, or undue influence, there shall, on a scrutiny of the number of votes, be struck off from the number of votes appearing to have been given to such candidate one vote for every person who voted at such election and is proved to have been so bribed, treated, unduly influenced, or retained or employed for reward. Already notices of election petitions have been given, but up to the present time not one has been filed. A petition must be lodged within a specified period after each election. The Election Petition Judges for the current

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year are Mr. Justice Mellor, Mr. Justice Grove,

and Baron Bramwell.

JURY

MAGISTRATES' LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. JUSTICES' CLERKS' FEES-VERIFICATION OF LISTS-OVERSEERS' ACCOUNTS-DISALLOWANCE OF AUDITOR.-A poor law auditor disallowed from overseers' accounts a sum of 48. 6d. charged to the poor rates for fees paid to a justices' clerk for notices and oath upon verification of the jury lists. These fees were allowed in the table of justices' clerks' fees sanctioned for the county by the Home Secretary under 11 & 12 Vict.c. 48, s. 30. Held that the overseers' duties in respect of the jury lists under 6 Geo. 4, c. 50, and 25 and 26 Vict. c. 107, were concluded upon the production at petty sessions; that these fees for the subsequent verification were not costs properly incurred by the officers of the parish in preparing and collecting the lists under 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, s. 60; that the justices' clerk was not

APPOINTMENT OF SERVANT BY BOARD OF GUARDIANS-CORPORATION-APPOINTMENT NOT UNDER SEAL-INFERIOR SERVANT.-The appointment of a clerk to the master of a workhouse by the guardians of a union must, to bind them, be under the seal of the corporation. A clerk to the master of a workhouse is not such an inferior servant as that his appointment comes within the recognised exceptions to the general rule of law that a corporation can only bind itself by seal. The sanction of the Local Government Board, required by No. 153 of the Poor Law Orders to be given to certain appointments by the guardians of assistants that they think necessary is a sanc tion of the office, and not of the individual nominated to fill it: (Austin v. The Board of Guardians of St. Matthew, Bethnal Green, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 807. C. P.)

THE LICENSING ACT 1872.

grounds. The facts were these: By an order of the Privy Council, issued in pursuance of the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 107, every owner or occupier of premises in which animals labouring under the cattle plague had been, was to obey any order given by the district inspector as to the cleansing and disinfecting, subject to a penalty of £20 for disobedience. The inspector gave an order to the foreman of the appellant (who was not himself present, and resided at a distance) to disinfect the premises by a certain hour, which order was not obeyed. The justices found as a fact that the order was communicated to the appellant, and convicted him, and the court affirmed the conviction, but, as before stated, on different grounds. Cockburn, C.J. and Shee, J. based their judgments on the ground that know. ledge of the order had been brought home to the appellant, without which he would not have been liable. But Mellor, J. was of opinion that it was

a case in which the act of the servant was to be considered as an act done in the master's business and within the scope of the authority probably given to him by the master, and that there was no necessity for the mens rea, as it was simply a penalty for "a breach of a sanitary regulation."

CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LICENSED PER- that a person could not be convicted under sect. 8

SONS FOR OFFENCES COMMITTED IN THEIR
ABSENCE, BY SERVANTS, AGENTS, &c.
[By THOMAS COUSINS, Esq., Clerk to the Justices of
Portsmouth.]

As a general rule it may be laid down that
criminal liability does not arise in the absence of
a guilty knowledge or intention. To this rule,
however, there are some exceptions, amongst
which may be classed the various offences against
the licensing laws, committed upon the premises,
but in the absence, of persons licensed to sell
intoxicating liquors.

There are several decisions bearing upon the
subject.

N. S. 640) was one under the Highway Act (5 &

The case of Harrison v. Leaper (5 L. T. Rep.

6

Will. 4, c. 50), by sect. 50 of which statute, a
penalty is imposed for sinking a pit or shaft, or
erecting a steam engine, &c., within twenty-five
yards from a carriage way, &c. The defendant
was the owner of a steam thrashing machine,
which he let on hire to a farmer, and sent his
servant with it, who superintended it. The
machine was erected within a distance of twenty-
five yards from the highway; but there was no
evidence to show that the defendant directed it
to be so erected, and he was not present at the
time. Being convicted by justices he appealed,
and the Court of Queen's Bench held that the
conviction was bad. Cockburn, C.J. said, "The
master was not present, and there is nothing to
show that the engine was placed in that particular
spot by his directions."

The case of Wilson v. Stewart (8 L. T. Rep.
N. S. 277) involved the liability of a servant
in a house of public resort, who harboured
prostitutes there in the absence of his master. A
metropolitan police magistrate refused to convict
the servant as an aider and abettor, on the
ground that the mere relationship of master and

The case of Core v. James (25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 593) may be noticed in passing. Here it was held of 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 37, for using prohibited mixtures or ingredients in the making of bread for sale, unless there be knowledge, either in himself or in the person employed by him, of the presence of the mixture or ingredient.

the passing of the Licensing Act 1872, the law The above cases show that at the time of relating to the criminal responsibility of masters for offences committed by servants was open to some doubt, and it might therefore have been anticipated that all questions would have contrary, however, the Act further mystified been set at rest by that statute. On the the matter by using the word knowingly" in some of its penal clauses, and omitting it in others, and by expressly making a licensed person relating to the entry by constables, and by impli answerable for the acts of his servant in sect. 35, cation in sect. 62 respecting the evidence of a sale of intoxicating liquor.

However, the most logical and reasonable solution of the question, even prior to the recently decided case (Mullins v. Collins), and the opinion very generally acted upon by justices, was that a licensed person was liable for an offence against the licensing laws committed in his house, notwithstanding the act was not brought home to his personal knowledge. It was generally considered to be sufficient if the act constituting the offence was committed with the knowledge, permission, or connivance of his wife, servant, or other person employed in the business. If it were otherwise a licensed person has only to absent himself in order perpetually to evade responsibility. On the other hand, he would not be liable if an offence, gaming for example, were committed by his guests, clandestinely and without his knowledge or that of his servants. The question under discussion is now virtually set at rest by the recent case, Mullins (app.) v. Collins (resp.) (29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 838). The appellant, a licenesd victualler, was charged under sect. 16 of the Licensing

Act 1872, with supplying liquour to a constable on duty, without the authority of the superior officer of such constable. It was proved that the constable was on duty and in uniform, and was served in the appellant's house with some brandy by a female (whether the wife or servant of the appellant was not shown), and that he had no such authority as above-mentioned. The appellant admitted the facts, but contended that before he could be convicted it must be proved that the offence was committed either by himself personally or with his knowledge, and that he must have been present, or the liquor must have been supplied by his express authority. The justices, however, convicted him, and the Court of Queen's Bench supported their decision. Blackburn, J., said that the construction contended for by the appellant would render the Act a dead letter, for any person could escape liability by simply keeping out of the way while his servant was supplying the liquor.

DISCRETIONARY

POWER OF FIXING PUNISHMENT IN CRIMINAL CASES. THE message of Governor Noyes to the Ohio Legislature contains the following suggestions of a reform in the laws with reference to the quantum of punishment in criminal cases:

Another year's experience in the matter of hearing and deciding applications for pardon has confirmed me in the opinion that the law should be so modified as to leave less discretion with the courts in passing sentence for criminal offences. It often happens that two prisoners work side by side in the penitentiary, both sent there for precisely the same crime, one for one year and the other for ten. In such case it is impossible to convince the convict incarcerated for the longer time that he has been fairly dealt with. And so long as he is stung with a sense of this injustice he is not likely to reform. There is nothing approaching uniformity in the length of sentences pronounced by different judges for similar offences. I earnestly recommend that the criminal law be so changed as to secure more exact justice; so amended as to leave results affecting the lives and liberties of men less dependent upon the judgment, the temperament, or the caprice of those who ad minister the law."

Undoubtedly, there must in most cases be a discretion reposed somewhere, and within certain prescribed limits, as to the quantum of punishment which a given offence shall carry with it. In some states, as at common law, this discretion resides in the judge; in others it is reposed in the jury. Evidently the policy of the law should be to limit this discretion as much as possible. It would seem worth while to consider whether, in larceny, embezzlement, false pretences, and other like offences affecting property, the punishment might not be gauged more nearly by the value of the property affected by the crime. This might to some extent do away with what is now a reproach to the administration of justice, that the small thieves are punished more severely than the great ones. But in cases of homicide, and assaults to kill, wound or beat, where the defendant frequently acts upon strong provocation or from a principle of self-preservation, and where no two cases stand on the same footing with reference to the quality of the act committed, a provision of law which leaves a large discretion in the court or jury with reference to the quantum of the punish. ment would seem to be conceived in a spirit of justice and mercy. At all events, the question deserves of more extended investigation and patient thought than the average legislator will find time to bestow upon it; and the wise course would seem to be to submit it to a commission, to report to another session.-Central Law Journal.

REAL PROPERTY AND CONVEYANCING.

lated exclusively to the property sold to the purchasers. The purchase-money was paid to C., who gave S. a receipt for the amount signed by him on behalf of himself and co-trustee. In 1870 S. contracted to sell another portion of the mortgaged property to P. for £1500 and on that occasion C. represented to H., who then heard of it for the first time, that S. had then sold part of the mortgaged property for £3080 and had contracted for the sale of another part for £1500, and was desirous of having such parts reconveyed to him upon payment of those sums in part discharge of the mortgage debt. Two deeds were accordingly executed by H. and C., the one being a conveyance by H. and C., by the direction of S., to P., in consideration of £1500, the other a reconveyance to S. in consideration of £3080, of several small portions of the mortgaged property, so as to enable him to convey them to the respective purchasers. At this time S. was aware that C. had misapplied the £3080. P. completed his purchase, paying the £1500 to C., and receiving from him the conveyance, and at the same time the reconveyance was delivered to S. Shortly afterwards C. absconded, taking with him all the deeds relating to the trust. Upon a bill filed by H. against C., S., and the several purchasers, held, that the deed of reconveyance must be delivered up to be cancelled, that an account must be taken of what was due in respect of the mortgage, and that upon the failure of S. or the purchasers (other than P., against whom the bill was dismissed) to pay the amount so found due, the mortgaged premises (other than the part conveyed to P.) must be sold, and that, for the purposes of the sale, the purchasers must produce the title deeda in their respective possessions, and deliver them up to the new purchasers. Secondary evidence of the mortgage deed under the circumstances admitted. The doctrine of estoppel by deed remarked upon : (Heath v. Crealock, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 763. V.C. B.)

makers, the partnership paying him rent for the lands, stock, and plant, and royalties for the stone raised and bricks and tiles manufactured. Under the articles of partnership the partnership was continued after the testator's death by his former partner and the testator's nephew, further leases being granted and rents and royalties reserved to the executors. Held, that the tenant for life was entitled to the rents and royalties absolutely during her life: (Greaves v. Smith, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 798. V.C.B.)

WILL-CONSTRUCTION-LEGACIES, WHETHER SPECIFIC.-Testator gave to his trustees £700 £3 per Cent. Consolidated Bank Annuities, "part of a larger sum of like annuities standing in my name," upon trust to pay a weekly sum to J. He also bequeathed various other sums for the benefit of some of his children, designating the sums as "£3 per Cent. Consolidated Bank Annuities further part of the said larger sum," and bequeathed to others of his children various legacies of "like annuities, further part of such larger sum." The legacies amounted to a sum far beyond the amount of Three per Cent. Consols possessed by the testator at the date of his will and death, but he had at the date of his will and death, besides Three per Cent. Consols, a large amount of "New Three per Cent. Annuities," and "Three per Cent. Reduced Annuities." Held, that the legacies were not specific: (Bumpus v. Bumpus, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 800. V.C. B.)

MERCANTILE LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. LETTER OF HYPOTHECATION-CONSTRUCTION -WHETHER POLICY OF INSURANCE REPRESENTS

GOODS INSURED.-V., a merchant in Bombay, consigned cotton to C. and Co., at Liverpool, per the Aurora, and drew a bill against it on C. and Co., which, before acceptance, was sold to a bank. LIGHT AND AIR-ANCIENT LIGHTS-EFFECT V. insured the cotton, and deposited the bills of OF THE PRESCRIPTION ACT (2 & 3 WILL. 4, lading and policy with the bank, with a letter of c. 71)-LATERAL OR OBLIQUE CONSTRUCTION-hypothecation, authorising the bank in case that SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE.-The Prescription Act bill or any other bills of his held by the bank (2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71) has made a material altera- should not be accepted or paid, to sell the cotton tion in the way in which a right to the access of and recoup themselves. The letter of hypothelight and air may be acquired, but it has not in cation made no mention of the policy. V. shipped any way altered the nature or extent of the right cotton on other vessels to W. and Co., and drew itself. In a suit to restrain an interference with bills against it upon W. and Co., which were the access of light and air to the plaintiff's house, accepted by them and sold to the bank. The the question for the court to determine is (just bank, at W. and Co.'s request (for value), as it was before the passing of the Prescription deferred presenting their bills for payment at Act) whether the interference complained of would maturity. The ship Aurora with her cargo was substantially affect the comfortable occupation burnt at sea, and the bank received from the insurance company the whole amount of the inand enjoyment of the plaintiff's house, according to the ordinary notions of mankind. The court surance money. C. and Co. failed before their has power to award damages although the build- acceptance matured. V. and also W. and Co. ings complained of should have been completed failed, and the bills accepted by W. and Co. were not presented to them for payment. Held, first, before the filing of a bill. A greater amount of evidence is needed to support a material injury on the construction of the letter of hypothecaby lateral or oblique buildings than that which tion, that the bank had no claim on the policy is necessary where the obstruction to access of moneys beyond the amount of C. and Co.'s light is direct: (The City of London Brewery acceptance, so as to apply the balance towards Company v, Tennant, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 755. payment of the bills on W. and Co. Secondly, Chan.). that independently of that, they had, by agreeing not to present the bills accepted by W. and Co. for their payment at maturity, released the estate of V., the drawer: (Latham v. The Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 795. V.C. B.).

WILL BEQUEST TO AFTERBORN REPUTED CHILDREN-CHILD EN VENTRE SA MÈRE AT DATE OF WILL-BIRTH BEFORE TESTATOR'S DEATHREPUTATION-PUBLIC POLICY.-A testator, who had gone through the ceremony of marriage with his deceased wife's sister, and had two children by her, by his will directed his trustees to pay the rents and profits of his real and personal estate to M. L. (his deceased wife's sister), for life, and, after her death, to stand possessed of the said estates " upon trust for my reputed children Catherine and Edith, and all other the children which I may have, or be reputed to have by the said M. L. now born, or hereafter to be born," in equal shares as tenants in common. At the date of the will M. L. was enceinte of a child, which was born six months afterwards, in the testator's lifetime, and acknowledged by him as his child. Held (Lord Selborne, L.C., dissentiente), that the afterborn child was entitled to share with her sisters under the gift in the will. Decision of Wickens, V.C., reversed: (Occlestone v. Fullalove, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 785. Chan.)

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. PURCHASER FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICEMORTGAGE TRUSTEE ADVANCING MONEY ON JOINT ACCOUNT-RECONVEYANCE OBTAINED BY FRAUD-ESTOPPEL.-In 1856 H. and C., who WILL-CONSTRUCTION-WASTING SECURITIES were trustees of a certain indenture of settlement, -ROYALTIES-TENANT FOR LIFE-CONVERSION lent £7700 of the trust money to S. upon the -Testator gave his residuary real and personal security of a mortgage in fee simple of certain estate to trustees upon trust to receive the hereditaments. C., who was a solicitor, acted on "rents, dividends, interest, and annual proceeds this occasion as solicitor for both S. and the thereof," and pay the same to his wife for life, and trustees, and took possession of the title deeds on after her decease to convert the said residuary behalf of the trustees. C. and S. had various real and personal estate. The will also contained pecuniary dealings, in respect of which an account a proviso that it should be lawful for the trustees current was established between them, and to this during the life of his wife to convert and invest account the £7700 was carried, and the interest the residuary real and personal estate, the investwas paid by C. on behalf of S. to the persons en- ments to be held both as to capital and income titled. In 1859 S., concealing the fact of the upon the same trusts as the real and personal mortgage, and representing himself as being estate from which they should have arisen. Part seised in fee simple, sold part of the mortgaged of the residuary estate consisted of freehold and property for £3080. On this occasion, (also, C. leasehold lands, stock and plant, which were foracted as solicitor for S., and on the completion of merly occupied and used by the testator and his the sale delivered such of the title deeds as re-partner, in trade as quarriers and brick and tile

MARITIME LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. BILLS OF LADING MATE'S RECEIPT BROKER'S LIEN-HYPOTHECATION.-C. and Co. were cotton brokers in Bombay, who used to buy and ship cotton for H. and Co., retaining the mate's receipts for the cotton until the payment of their charges. C. and Co. having purchased and shipped for H. and Co. a quantity of cotton, took receipts from the mate in the name of H. and Co., which were indorsed to them by H. and Co. H. and Co. obtained from the captain of the ship, to whom C. and Co. gave no notice of their lien, bills of lading for the cotton which were hypothecated to a firm of bankers who also had no notice of C. and Co.'s claim. Held, that C. and Co.'s lien was gone when they had shipped the cotton; that the bankers' security was not affected, nor the captain chargeable with default: (Hathering v. Laing, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 736. V.C. B.).

COLLISION-SPEED LIGHTS OBSCURED BY SMOKE-DUTY TO STOP.-It is negligence on the part of a steamer to go at full speed under steam and sail before the wind whilst her smoke is blown over her bows so as to obscure her lights, and to prevent her from seeing and from being seen by other ships approaching from an opposite Where a steamship is approaching direction. another, whose exact course cannot be at once ascertained by reason of her lights being obscured by her own smoke, it is the duty of the former to slacken speed and to wait till that course is ascer

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ained before taking any decided step to avoid the other vessel; if before having ascertained the exact course of the other, she, without slackening speed, executes a manoeuvre, although appearing to be right at the time, contributes to the collision, she will be to blame: (The Rona, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 781. Priv. Co.)

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CHARTER-PARTY-LUMP FREIGHT-LOSS OF PART OF CARGO BY PERILS OF SEA.-A charterparty provided that the ship should load a full cargo at Colombo or Cochin, and proceed to Lon. don and there discharge (fire, and all other dangers of the seas, rivers and navigations excepted); lump sum freight of £5000 to be paid after entire discharge and right delivery of the cargo in cash two months after the date of the ship's report inwards at the Custom House." The cargo having taken fire on the homeward journey, it was found necessary to scuttle the ship in Table Bay, and a large part of the cargo which had been injured by the fire and water was there sold. The voyage was then resumed, and the remainder of the cargo was delivered in London. The charterers having refused to pay the whole of the lump sum of £5000 Held (affirming the jugdment of the Court of Queen's Bench), that the shipowners were entitled, notwithstanding the non-delivery of the entire cargo, to the payment of the lump sum of £5000.: (Merchant Shipping Company v. Armitage, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 809. Ex. Ch.) COLLISION PILOT'S DUTIES SHIP AT ANCHOR-LOOK-OUT-COMPULSORY PILOTAGE. -Where a ship in charge of a licensed pilot is anchored within pilotage waters, the pilot deter. mines and is responsible for the length of cable at which the ship rides, and it is the duty of the pilot, when the ship swings to the tide, to superintend that manoeuvre, and to regulate the helm, and it is negligence on his part to go below before the ship is fully swung, leaving the helm amidships without orders as to its regulation; and if, through want of length of cable and of regulation of the helm, the ship sheers and so parts from her anchor in swinging during his absence, the pilot will be alone responsible, provided that the watch on deck take the right manœuvre to counteract the sheering. Semble, that where the look-out has once roported to the pilot 'or officer of the watch a light on board another ship, and the report has been answered, there is no further duty on the look-out to report that light a second time on nearing the ship. The Mersey Docks Acts Consolidation Act 1858 (21 & 22 Vict. c. xcii.), providing for the pilotage of the river Mersey, and enacting (sect. 139), inter alia, that if the master of any vessel (with certain exceptions), being outward bound, "shall proceed to sea, and shall refuse to take on board or to employ a pilot, he shall pay to the pilot who shall first offer himself to pilot the same, the full pilotage rate," as if the pilot had piloted the ship, and, further, that (sect. 138) if a master requires the services of a pilot whilst his ship is lying at anchor in the Mersey, the pilot shall be paid for every day or portion of a day he shall attend, the sum of 58.; but no such charge shall be made for the day on which such vessel being outward bound, shall leave the river Mersey to commence her voyage," compels a master so proceeding to sea to take a pilot. Where a ship fully equipped and ready for sea leaves one of the Liverpool docks at night, with the intention of proceeding straight to sea, but her master, on getting into the river Mersey, determines, on account of the weather, to anchor for the night, he is proceeding to sea within the meaning of the Mersey Docks Acts Consolidation Acts 1858 (21 & 22 Vict. c. xcii.), sect. 139, and is compelled by that section to take on board a licensed Liverpool pilot on leaving dock; and if the ship break from her anchor during the night, and a collision ensues through the sole negligence of the pilot, the owners are exempted from liability. Semble, that in such circumstances the right of the pilot, under sect. 138, to an extra payment of 52. a day whilst employed on the ship, at the requirement of the master, during the time she is anchored in the river, except on the day when the ship leaves the Mersey to commence her voyage, does not alter he character of the employment during that time, so as to make it a voluntary employment: (The City of Cambridge, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 816. Adm.)

ECCLESIASTICAL LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. CHURCH DISCIPLINE ACT-DISCRETION OF BISHOPS-PROHIBITION-PRACTICE.-Where a commission has been issued by a bishop under the 3rd section of the Church Discipline Act (3 & 4 Vict. c. 86), to inquire into charges brought against a clerk in holy orders, the court will not grant a prohibition staying proceedings until the clerk has been heard by counsel before the bishop as to certain preliminary objections, and especially as to the fitness of the promoter. Decision of Bacon, V.C., affirmed: (The Rev. J. Edwards, 29 L. T. Rop. N.S., 711. L. C. and Mellish, L.J.)

COUNTY COURTS.
CLERKENWELL COUNTY COURT.
(Before GORDON WHITBREAD, Esq., Judge.)
Thursday, Jan. 29.

TURNER AND TURNER v. Gentle. Setting aside judgment obtained by default under County Court Act 1867, s. 2. THIS was an application by the defendant to set aside a judgment obtained by the plaintiffs under the County Court Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 142), 8. 2, for £17 Os. 5d. debt and costs, and execution issued thereon. The facts were set forth in an affidavit by the defendant, and were substantially admitted by the plaintiff's attorney. The defendant was sued in this court by the plaintiffs for £15 0s. 5d., and the summons being under sect. 2 of the above Act, notice of intention to defend was necessary. Upon receiving the summons the defendant saw one of the plaintiffs and disputed the account, and finally proposed to pay £10 18. 5d. at a certain date. This agreement was agreed to by the said plaintiff, who promised to abandon the action, and accordingly the defendant (who had still the five days' time) did not give notice of intention to defend, and did not defend the action. The plaintiffs subsequently signed judgment, and issued execution contrary, as the defendant said, to the agreement, and for a larger amount than agreed upon.

Whale appeared for the defendant. Popham appeared for the plaintiff, and without disputing the affidavit, raised the objection that judgment being given under the above Act, the matter could not be reopened. The County Court Act 1846 (9 & 10 Vict. c. 95), s. 80, did not apply, since there had been no hearing or trial. His HONOUR.-This court has entire control over its own judgments, and therefore, upon good cause shown, I have power to set this judgment aside. His Honour afterwards suggested as a compromise that the plaintiffs should allow part of the money paid into court under the execution to be returned to the defendant, and both parties agreed to this.

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

LONDON COURT OF BANKRUPTCY. Monday, Feb. 9.

trustees.

(Before the Chief Judge.)

Re PEACOCK.

were for sums under £50, was not affected by the subsequent bankruptcy of the execution debtor before the sale of the goods seized, notwithstanding the levy of a previous execution for a greater amount; and as to them the injunction already granted must be dissolved. As to the creditors whose executions were for over £50, the order and declaration as prayed for on behalf of the trustee would be made.

BATH COUNTY COURT.
Thursday, Jan. 29, 1874.

(Before C. F. D. CAILLARD, Esq., Judge.) Petition for liquidation-Appointment of receiver -Interim injunction-Refusal of high sheriff to withdraw-Motion to commit for contempt.

J. Horton Dyer, for the receiver.

J. K. Bartrum, for the sheriff.

Dyer, in opening the case, said it had been par. tially heard before his Honour's deputy, Mr. Lister, some time ago. It was then in the form of an order to commit the high sheriff, but in consequence of his having withdrawn immediately after the order calling upon him to show cause why he should not be committed was issued, it resolved itself into a question of costs. He then proceeded: At the outset I may as well say the sheriff is beyond all possible doubt connected with the acts complained of, because in the affidavits filed on his behalf it is admitted those acts were done by his officers and agents in the course of the execution of the warrants which he gave them. He then read the affidavits filed, which show, first, that of the debtor, that a receiver was appointed by order of the court on the 6th Dec., after his filing his petition; that by an order of the court made on the 6th Dec., W. S. Kirby and his wife and the sheriff of Wilts and his officers, were restrained from proceeding in the matter of an execution levied by them upon the debtor's effects; that a copy of such order sealed with the seal of this court, was served on the 6th Dec. on Samuel Hinder and Charles Hinder, the officers of the sheriff in possession; and he was informed that a like copy was served on Ezekiel Charles Petgrave, the execution creditor's attorney; that the said officers, Samuel Hinder and Charles Hinder, notwithstanding, refused to withdraw from possession, and proceeded in the matter of the execution; that the said Samuel Hinder and Charles Hinder said they should take no notice of the order; that Mr. West Awdry, of Chippenham, the under Execution creditor-Executions for sums over and sheriff, read the order and was asked to direct the under £50-Subsequent act of bankruptcy-officers to withdraw from possession, which he Respective rights of execution creditors and refused to do; that by an order of this court made on the 12th Dec. the said Kirby and his wife, and the sheriff and his officers, were absolutely restrained from proceeding in the said execution until the 31st Dec.; that the debtor thereupon sent for the manager of the sheriff, who called upon him, and the order was handed to him, but he refused to withdraw; that about three o'clock on the 13th Dec. the said Samuel Hinder came to his (the debtor's) hotel and was informed by Charles Hinder of the order that had been made, but he refused to comply, and placed another man in possession. Dyer said that was a distinct proceeding in the execution, and he is proceed ing in the execution. He was informed by his wife that Charles Hinder told her he should place another man in the bar to receive the moneys from the customers, and to maintain himself out of the same. On the same affidavit an order was made by the registrar calling upon the sheriff to show cause why he should not be committed, and why such other order as your Honour saw fit should not be made. The matter came before your learned deputy and was partially heard. Mr. Lister adjourned the matter, leave being given to both sides to file further affidavits. The first further affidavit to which I will refer is one by Charles Howse, sworn on the 25th Jan. It shows that the said Samuel Hinder and Cornelius Hinder told him they were the officers of the said sheriff, and had been directed to levy the said sum and costs, and had a warrant given them so to do, which was produced and read to him. They took possession and proceeded with the said execution. He was well acquainted with the said Cornelius Hinder and Samuel Hinder, and knew them to be officers of the sheriff; [the under sheriff admitted that they were]; that Henry Collett duly entered on his office on the 6th December, and duly informed the said Samuel and Cornelius Hinder that he had been appointed receiver, and they were required to withdraw from possession. On the 10th December the said Henry Collett came to the hotel for the express purpose of taking possession thereof. In his (debtor's) presence the officers were informed that Collett had been appointed receiver by the court, and was entitled to possession of such goods and effects. The officers were relike quested to withdraw, but they refused. request had been made on previous occasions. The under sheriff, Mr. West Awdrry, on the 16th December, instructed them to withdraw, which

IN this case, which had been referred by Mr. Registrar Pepys to the Chief Judge, the liquidating debtor was a licensed victualler. On the 25th Nov. 1873, an execution was levied upon his goods for £191 4s. 6d. On the 1st Dec. 1873, another execution was put in for £37 19s. 6d. by another creditor; on the 12th Dec. another execution by another creditor for £201 13s.; on the same day another execution by another creditor for £148 16s. 6d. ; on the 16th Dec. another execution by another creditor (Messrs. Greenless and Son) for £37 15s. 6d. ; on the 24th Dec. another execution by another creditor for £22 13s. On the 30th Dec. the debtor filed a petition for liquidation; and on the 22nd Jan. 1874 a trustee was appointed. No sale having taken place under any of the executions, the court was now moved for an order to restrain the execution creditors from selling or otherwise dealing with the goods seized, and a declaration that the goods are the property of the trustee, and that the sheriff should be ordered to withdraw from possession. This was opposed on behalf of Messrs. Greenless and Son.

Shortt (instructed by Fallows and Whitehead), for the trustee, acknowledged that if the execu tion of Messrs. Greenless and Son, being under £50, had been prior to the execution for £191 4s. 6d., levied on the 25th Nov. 1873, the title of the execution creditor should prevail as against that of the trustee, on the authority of Slater v. Pinder (26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 482; L. Rep. 7 Ex. 95), and other cases; but contended that the levy of the previous execution for more than £50 distinguished the present case, and relied on the provisions of sect. 87 of the Bankruptcy Act 1869.

Rose (instructed by H. Smith), on behalf of Messrs. Greenless, relied on Slater v Pinder (ubi sup.) and other cases, which decided that where an execution for less than £50 was levied before an act of bankruptcy was committed, a subsequent act of bankruptcy would not take away the right of the execution creditor; and here no act of bankruptcy had been committed at the time of the levy of Messrs. Greenless' execution, there having been no sale under the prior execution.

The CHIEF JUDGE was of opinion that he was bound by the authority of the cases cited to hold that the rights of the creditors whose executions

they did. The affidavit of the receiver made on the 28th Jan. was to this effect: That he was duly appointed receiver on the 6th Dec.; that the said Cornelius and Samuel Hinder were then and are officers of the high sheriff, and that they had levied an execution upon the goods of Mr. Howse; that he went to the hotel on the 12th Dec. to take possession, and found them in possession, and proceeding with the execution; that they continued proceeding under the sheriff's warrant until he took proecedings against the sheriff for contempt of court; that he acted bona fide in endeavouring to obtain possession, but was not allowed by the said officer so to do. Your Honour sees that the weight and result of the evidence is this: On the 6th Dec. there was an injunction; that was served personally on the proper person, the man in possession. The first act of contempt with which he treats it is to say distinctly that he takes no notice of it. The agent sees Mr. West Awdry, the direct agent of the sheriff; he read the injunction and was required to withdraw the men, but refused to do So. The second order was treated in the same manner. It was served personally on the man in possession, who said he should take no more notice of it than of the other. Mr. Bradbury was then seen, and he directed the man to remain even after reading the order. That was another step, another proceeding with the execution. Any word spoken by any officer of the high sheriff is an act and a proceeding with the execution if it tends to carry it on. A much more important proceeding was taken on the 13th Dec. Your Honour sees that, after the service of the injunction, that act was actually to place another man in possession. Hinder, the man who makes this affidavit, comes on the 13th, the day after the second injunction has been made. This was a distinct proceeding. On the very day of the first injunction they were told the receiver had been appointed, and that he was the person who should have had possession of the estate. These facts are brought home in the clearest way. They do not deny any of these statements, but confine themselves to saying they did not proceed with the execution. On the 10th Dec. the receiver went himself to take possession.

His HONOUR read from an affidavit to the effect that the receiver had not taken possession. Dyer-The receiver says in his affidavit that he went on the 10th to take possession. These men were told he was entitled to possession. Your honour will see that he was entitled to absolute possession of the premises. Now, my friend will say that they remained because they were not asked for possession.

His HONOUR.-Yes; that is what it seems to be. What is the present state of circumstances? Dyer.-Immediately the registrar issued this order calling upon the sheriff to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt they vanished like a vapour. The following morning Mr. F. West Awdry comes down and says, "I have received this order threatening a committal. You withdraw." This was four days after the second injunction, and one day after notice to show cause. The very next day after that notice, at the earliest possible moment the men are told to withdraw. My friend will say the sheriff and his officers acted bona fide in retaining possession until the receiver came. I take it they put it in that way because the receiver did not sooner distinctly (that is what they allege) come and ask for possession. I have two answers to that. In the first place the receiver says, "I did go, and should have taken possession, but these officers prevented me." In the next place it is apparent from these affidavits that the sheriff had notice over and over again. If it be true they only remained in possession till the receiver came, why was it they withdrew their men when the notice to show cause had been served, but before the receiver came? In Hinder's affidavit he says, "Even when I did withdraw, the receiver was not in possession." It seems to me that single admission cuts away all ground of that kind.

His HONOUR.-The question is what is the restraining order?

Dyer.-The words of the order of the 12th Dec. are that the" sheriff and his officers were absolutely restrained from proceeding in the matter of the said execution until the 31st day of" the same month. It is not for me to contend whether the word "absolutely" is rightly inserted or not, I say it was an injunction of this court. He then cited Ex parte Page (17 Ves. 59); Doria's Bankruptcy, 230-32; Cooper v. Asprey (11 W. R.); Ex parte Rayner, re Johnson, (L. Rep. 7 Ch. 325); Re Davis (Fisher's Digest, 1872, p. 36); General Rules 299, 260, 264; Re Dickenson, (50 LAW TIMES); Ex parte Paine, re Bernardat (14 Sols. Journ., cited Doria 235); Joyce on Injunctions, 1325, etseq. Bartrum contended that there had been no breach of the injunction, and that the sheriff was bound to remain in possession until he received instructions from the execution creditor to withdraw. If the proceedings in liquidation fell through, what would be his position? Would he

not be liable to the execution creditor in any action he might bring? Moreover, the receiver did not demand possession as he ought to have done, and there was no contempt on the part of the sheriff, because he had no knowledge whatever of the matter. He quoted several authorities in support of his contention.

His HONOUR.-I think there has been a breach of the injunction, but not a substantial breach. It was a formal rather than an avowed contempt. No injury whatever has occurred to the creditors, and the sheriff not being personally a party to the breach, I think he must bear his own costs, but all other costs must be paid out of the estate.

MANCHESTER COUNTY COURT. Wednesday, Feb. 4. (Before J. A. RUSSELL, Q.C., Judge). TAYLOR v. BOWKER; Re Fielding. Bankruptcy Act 1869–Injunction. Application for injunction to stay proceedings in a Chancery suit, and for an order for the examination of the plaintiff in that suit before answer filed, under the following circumstances: T. filed a bill in the Chancery Court of the County Palatine of Lancaster for specific performance of an agreement for sale of certain property by B. Meanwhile, B. had conveyed the property to F., who became bankrupt. F. and his trustee were then made parties to the bill, F. having had notice of T.'s prior claim. F. having conveyed the property to A. T., the latter was also made a party to the bill. Application was now made on behalf of the trustee in the bankruptcy for an injunction, under the Bankruptcy Act, to restrain the proceedings in the Chancery suit against the defendant F. and his trustee and A. T., they not having filed their answers, and also for an order for the examination of F., the plaintiff in the suit. Held, on the authority of Ex parte Isaacs (L. Rep. 6 Ch. App. 58), that the injunction could not be granted, but that the order for examination could be made, and it was made accordingly.

Storer, solicitor for Fielding and trustee.

S. Taylor and T. A. Hulme, barristers, in. structed by Vaughan, for Taylor, the plaintiff in the Chancery Court.

The facts in this case were as follows:-On the 23rd May 1873, Samuel Bowker entered into an agreement with George Taylor for the sale to him of certain property in Manchester, which agreement he refused to carry out. On the 21st July Taylor filed a bill for the specific performance of this agreement in the Chancery Court of the County Palatine. Several interviews between the parties took place in the interval that elapsed from the date of the agreement to the filing of the bill, at nearly all of which George Fielding was present, and took part in all the transactions relating to the purchase. On the 10th July, one of the interviews referred to having taken place on the 30th June, Bowker conveyed the property to Fielding. Attempts were then made to come to an arrangement, and on the 30th Aug. a compromise was agreed to upon certain terms, one of which was that Fielding should convey the property to Taylor. Tais compromise, however, was not carried out, and on the 29th Sept. Fielding filed a petition for liquidation by arrangement in the Manchester County Court. The bill in Chancery was amended by adding to it the names of Fielding and Trevor, the trustees under the liquidation as defendants, and the bill, as amended, sought a declaration that the property did not pass to the trustee under the liquidation by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1869, as Fielding, having had notice of Taylor's prior claim, only held the property as trustee for Taylor. On the 7th Nov., or thereabouts, Fielding conveyed the property to Alfred Turner, for whom Fielding stated in his examination under the liquidation that he had bought it. The bill in Chancery was again amended by adding Turner as a defendant. Fielding the trustee, and Alfred Turner, had not filed their answers in the Chancery suit, and the time for doing so had expired. The registrar had granted an interim injunction to restrain proceedings in the Chancery suit against these defendants till the sitting of the court, and had left the question of examining Taylor to be also decided by the judge. It was contended, on behalf of Fielding's trustee, that the fact of Fielding being within the jurisdiction of the court under his liquidation proceedings gave the court power to grant the injunction asked for, although the other parties to the suit were not included in such proceedings, and that they were entitled to examine Taylor under the Bankruptcy Act, although even granting that such examination was of a fishing nature with regard to the Chancery proceedings.

In support of the motion for the injunction were cited Ex parte Cohen (L. Rep. 7 Ch. App. 20); Morley v. White (L. Rep. 8 Ch. 214) On the

other side the case of Ex parte Isaacs (L. Rer. 6 Ch. App. 58) was quoted.

His HONOUR held that that was conclusive as

to the injunction, and he refused it accordingly.

As to the examination of Taylor it was contended, on behalf of the plaintiff in the Chancery suit, that this was an attempt on the part of not put in their answers to make a catspaw the defendants in the Chancery suit who had of the Court of Bankruptcy to evade and override the practice and rules of procedure of the Court interrogate a plaintiff before putting in his answer. of Chancery which will not allow a defendant to

His HONOUR decided in favour of the trustee, and granted an order for the examination in bank. rupcy of Taylor, the plaintiff in the Chancery suit.

CORRESPONDENCE OF THE

PROFESSION.

NOTE.-This Department of the LAW TIMES being open to free discussion on all professional topics, the Editor is not responsible for any opinions or statements contained in it.

VOTING FOR GUARDIANS OF THE POOR.

Will you or some of your correspondents be good enough to furnish me through the medium of your paper with answers to the following questions:First. In calculating the number of votes in the election for guardians of the poor of a parish, are the qualifications which a man has to vote as owner and occupier treated as separate and distinct, and as giving each of them the right of voting according to the respective rateable values? For example, A. is owner of property rated at £150, and occupies property rated at £200; will he be entitled to four votes for his ownership and five for his occupation, viz., altogether nine votes, or will the total rateable be added together, and he be allowed the value of all property occupied and owned by him maximum number of six votes? or B. owns and occupies property of the value of £10 per annum, will he be entitled to one or two votes? Second. Two persons being trustees and executors under a will are on the rate book as A.'s executors, how will they be able to vote? will each have a separate right of voting in respect of one moiety, or must they exercise their power jointly? An early answer to this letter will oblige. R. MAPER.

LEGAL NEWS.

MR. MANISTY, Q.C. wishes us to state that he was present at the dinner given to Sir Samuel Martin, on his retirement, by the late and present members of the Northern Circuit.

ATTORNEYS' CERTIFICATES.-By a return just printed it appears that in the year ended the 31st March last, the number of attorneys' certificates in the United Kingdom was 14,053, and the duty charged £92,635.

NEW POLLING DISTRICTS.-As to Middlesex, there are seventeen polling districts comprising the several parishes in this county. In the borough of Marylebone there are twenty polling districts, and ten in Finsbury; in Lambeth three, in Greenwich and Woolwich nineteen, in the city of London twenty districts divided into the wards. In Southwark are six, and in Westminster ten polling districts.

WE regret to state that a telegram has been received at the Colonial Office announcing that the Attorney-General of Jamaica, Mr. Alexander Schalch, died of the yellow fever on Jan. 31. Mr. Schalch, who left England about three years ago, had already acquired a high reputation in the colony for learning, intelligence, and unwearied industry, and his loss will be severely felt, coming as it does close upon the departure of the late Governor.

AN ECCENTRIC ATTORNEY.-Mr. Robert Dover, who resided at Barton-on-the-Heath, in Warwickshire, in the reign of King James the First, and who was much esteemed for his congenial conduct and legal knowledge, instituted an annual meeting for the practice of rustic games. Mr. Dover conducted these pastimes personally, habited in a suit of this King's clothes. Prizes were given, and the spectators attended from various parts. Anthony Wood, the author, stated that these games were continued until the rebellion was commenced by the Presbyterians. In a poem, published A.D. 1836, called Annalia Dulvensia, these games and their patron are described by some of the poets of the day.

RAILROAD LAW.-A Bill is now before Congress for the establishment of a bureau of transportation in the United States of America, similar to the railway board of commissioners which has been appointed in England, under the recent Act of Parliament. The Bill proposes to appoint five commissioners to hold office for five years, who are to enforce all the laws relating to the trans

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