had a right to vote, and no one could stop him voting, but on a scrutiny his vote could be disallowed as that of a pauper. The clerk said he did not see that they need discuss the question, and when pressed for an answer to the question, said he did not see anything illegal in the matter. THE BALLOT.-A correspondent in the Times suggests that as the voting papers delivered to electors are individually marked with the number of the elector claiming to vote, a sure record is created of his voting, and access to such record may be had in a variety of ways. It is suggested that some better plan is required to frustrate the chances of intimidation or of bribery, which were to have been destroyed by the ballot, and which have been abolished according to popular belief. ELECTION PETITIONS.-By the Parliamentary Elections Act (31 & 32 Vict. c. 125) a petition against a member must be presented at the Rule Office of the Common Pleas within twenty-one days after the return has been made to the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery, and if it alleges corrupt practices and payment since the return in pursuance of such corrupt practices, then the petition must be presented within twenty-eight days of such payment. At the time the petition is lodged, or within three days, security must be given for £1000 to pay costs, or the deposit of the money be made.

MAGISTRATES' LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. POOR LAW-LIABILITY TO SUPPORT RELATIONS-CHILDREN-GRANDFATHER AND GRANDCHILD.-The word "children" in 43 Eliz. c. 2, s. 6, does not include grandchildren. A grandchild is therefore not bound to maintain his grandfather: (Maund v. Mason, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 837. Q. B.).

QUARTER SESSIONS-PRACTICE-ENTRY AND RESPITE OF APPEAL SUBJECT то A CASE.Quarter sessions granted an application to enter and respite these appeals against poor rates, subject to a case for the opinion of this court. The court heard the arguments, but, after considera. tion, and although no objection was raised by either side, declined to express an opinion in a case reserved on such an order: (Reg. v. Sutton Coldfield, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 840. Q. B.)

LICENSING ACT-SUPPLYING BEER TO A CONSTABLE ON DUTY.-Sect. 16 of the Licensing Act 1872 35 & 36 Vict. c. 74) enacts that "if any licensed person. supplies any liquor or refreshment, whether by way of gift or sale, to any constable on duty, unless by authority of some superior officer of such constable," he shall be liable to a penalty. The servant of a licensed person having supplied to a constable in uniform and on duty a certain quantity of brandy, in the ordinary course of business: Held, that the master was liable to the penalty imposed by the statute, personal knowledge on the part of the master not being necessary to constitute the offence: (Mullins v. Collins, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 838. Q. B.).

REMOVAL OF INDICTMENT BY CERTIORARI PRACTICE. Sect. 5 of 16 & 17 Vict. c. 30, after reciting that "it is expedient to make further provision for preventing the vexatious removal of indictments into the Court of Queen's Bench," enacts that whenever any writ of certiorari to remove an indictment into the said court, shall be awarded at the instance of a defendant or defendants, the recognizance now by law required to be entered into before the allowance of such writ shall contain the further provision following, that is to say, that the defendant or defendants, in case he or they shall be convicted, shall pay to the prosecutor his costs incurred subsequent to the removal of such indictment," &c. This enactment is general in its application, and renders it unnecessary that the prosecutor, in order to be entitled to the payment of his costs, should be "the party grieved or injured," as required by 5 & 6 Will. & M. c. 11, s. 3: (Reg. v. Oastler, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 830. Q. B.)

MUNICIPAL ELECTION-RIGHT TO VOTE AT WARD ELECTIONS-CHANGE OF PREMISES OCCUPATION.-By the City of London Municipal Elections Amendment Act 1867, the right of voting for ward officers is given by sect. 2 to persons who shall, for a period of not less than twelve months previous to 1st Dec. in any year, have been in the occupation of premises within the City. By sect. 3 every person on the register of voters for the city of London in use at elections for members to serve in Parliament, and then in force, in respect of the occupation of premises therein, shall be entitled to vote. By sect. 6, before voting every person shall declare that he is an occupier of premises in the ward, and is on the list of voters entitled to vote. A man whose name was on the parliamentary list changed his occupation of premises for that of others in the same ward. The alderman and council of the ward, without notice to him, struck his name off the ward register, and refused

to re-enter it upon his application at a subsequent election. Held, upon mandamus to compel the insertion of his name in the list of voters, that the third section gave a qualification quite distinct from that of the second; and that the mandamus must go (Reg. v. Ward of Cheap, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 842. Q. B.)

REAL PROPERTY AND CONVEYANCING.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. DEVISE OF A MORTGAGED ESTATE-PAYMENT OF DEBTS-LEASEHOLDS-LOCKE KING'S ACT. A testator directed that all his just debts should be paid out of a fund consisting of the moneys arising from the sale of an estate devised in trust for sale and the residue of his personal estate. Held, that this direction was not a sufficient expression of a contrary intention within the statute 17 & 18 Vict. c. 113, as amended by 30 & 31 Vict. c. 69, and therefore that the devisees of certain estates in mortgage were not entitled to have the mortgage debts paid out of the fund: (Gael v. Fenwick, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 822. M. R.) SPECIFIC DEVISE-APPORTIONMENT OF RENTS. -The Apportionment Act 1870 applies to all wills coming into operation after the passing of the Act, whether made before the passing of the Act or not. A testator seised in fee, by a will made prior to, but confirmed by a codicil made subsequently to, the passing of the Apportionment Act 1870, devised his lands in the county of N. to A. for life, with remainders over, and died between the two half-yearly days for payment of rent: Held, that the apportioned part of the rent accruing between the last half-yearly rent day, and the day of the death of the testator, formed part of his general personal estate, and did not go to his devisee: (Capron v. Capron, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 826. V.C. M.)

TRESPASS ON LAND-NOTICE TO QUIT PART OF DEMISED PREMISES. Defendant leased about twenty acres of land for five years, at a yearly rent, from the owner in fee simple, under a memorandum of agreement, and immediately afterwards sub-let about six acres, part of the premises, to another person on a yearly tenancy. At the conclusion of the term, defendant continued possession of the whole, and during the first year after the term expired the lessor conveyed to the plaintiff the six acres which the defendant had sub-let, and agreed with the plaintiff, but without the consent of the defendant, as to the amount of rent to be apportioned to this part of the premises out of the rent which the defendant paid. Although notice of the conveyance and agreed apportionment of rent was afterwards given to defendant, he never recognised plaintiff as his landlord, but continued to pay rent for the whole premises to his lessor, who handed over the agreed portion to plaintiff. Plaintiff gave defendant notice to quit the sub-let premises six months before the expiration of a year's tenancy: and the defendant forwarded this notice, with a further notice to quit from himself, to his sub-tenant. At the end of the year the sub-tenant gave up possession of his premises to plaintiff, but the defendant wrote to the latter claiming to hold the same as tenant to the original lessor, and requiring pos session. Defendant then did certain acts upon the premises which had been in his sub-tenant's occupation, for which plaintiff brought this action of trespass.

Held, that plaintiff's notice to defendant to quit part only of the premises demised to him was invalid; that his passing on the notice to his tenant did not preclude his disputing it; and that the action could not be maintained: (Prince v. Evans, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 835. Q. B.) EJECTMENT-PAROL EVIDENCE OF BOUNDARIES.-In 1861 Burgess Plowman, a common predecessor in title of both plaintiff and defendant, being possessed of 27 rods of land, conveyed to the defendant's predecessor in title "all that piece of garden ground, containing by estimation 20 rods, bounded on the south by other land, or garden ground belonging to the said Burgess Plowman." In 1866 the same Burgess Plowman conveyed the residue of the property to the plaintiff's predecessor in title, scribing it as "15 rods more or less;" the result being that if the measurement of the deed of 1861 was accurate, the defendant took under it 12 rods instead af 20, while, if the measurement of the deed of 1866 was accurate, the plaintiff took under it 7 rods instead of 15. The plaintiff brought ejectment for the 8 rods in dispute. Held, that the parol evidence of Plowman was admissible to show that he had conveyed 12 and not 20 rods by the deed of 1861: (Jarvey v. Styring, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 847. Ex.)

MARITIME LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.

SALVAGE DERELICT ABANDONMENT BY FIRST SALVORS-RIGHT TO REWARD-PRACTICE EVIDENCE. Where in a salvage cause the plaintiffs' petition states expenses to have been incurred in rendering the services without stating their amount and the defendants' answer admits all the allegations of the petition, the High Court of Admiralty will not allow evidence to be called by the plaintiff to show the amount of the expenses. If specific amounts are claimed they must be pleaded so as to give the defendant the opportunity of admitting or denying them. Semble, that the court will, if necessary, amend the plead ings, allowing the plaintiffs to set forth the amounts, but giving the defendant time to admit or deny such amounts. Where, in a salvage suit the defendants admit all the allegations of fact in the plaintiff's petition, but deny the inferences of fact made therefrom in the petition, the plaintiffs may call evidence to establish those inferences. Where a steamship having taken in tow a vessel in distress, after towing her for some hours, on the weather getting worse and the lives of her crew becoming endangered, takes the crew out of her and finally abandons her in a place where she is afterwards picked up by another vessel and taken into port, the owners, master, and crew of the steamship are entitled to salvage reward in respect of the lives so saved, but not in respect of ship and cargo: (Eintracht, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 851. Adm.)

COUNTY COURTS.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. COUNTY COURT ACTS, 28 & 29 VICT. c. 99, s. 9; 30 & 31 VICT. c. 142, s. 14-JURISDICTIONTRANSFER OF CAUSE TO COURT OF CHANCERYSTRIKING OUT A CAUSE.-Plaintiff filed a plaint for partition of a messuage, alleging bonâ fide by the plaint that the messuage was under the value of £500. At the hearing the defendant brought forward evidence proving that the messuage was above the value of £500, and objected to the jurisdiction. The County Court Judge struck out the cause, for want of jurisdiction: Held, on appeal, that the County Court Judge ought to have transferred the cause to the Court of Chancery (Thomson v. Flinn, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 829. V.C. M.)

COUNTY COURT-ADMINISTRATION-EX PARTE INJUNCTION BEFORE DECREE-ORDER 1, RULE 8; ORDER 12, RULE 1.-A. brought an action at law against the executor de son tort of B. A plaint for the administration of B.'s estate was subsequently filed in the County Court, and before a decree was pronounced the County Court granted law: Held, that the County Court Judge had no an ex parte injunction, restraining the action at power either to grant the injunction ex parte, or to grant it before decree in the administration suit: (Nokes v. Gandy, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 828. V.C. M.)

LIVERPOOL COUNTY COURT.
Wednesday, Feb. 11.

(Before J. F. COLLIER, Esq., Judge.) BAYLEY v. THE LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY COMPANY.

Personal luggage-Samples or patterns. Sutton for the plaintiff; Bellringer for the defendants.

His HONOUR said-The facts of the case as I find them are these:-The plaintiff, a commercial traveller, reached the Exchange station of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company on the morning of the 21st July last. He gave his luggage, consisting of a portmanteau, hatbox, and bag, into the custody of one of the company's servants, telling him it was for Nelson. The plaintiff then took a third class ticket for Nelson, and before getting into his carriage saw his portmanteau on a truck near the luggage van of the train. He again told the porter in charge of the truck that it was for Nelson. The portmanteau was de-not labelled or directed, but it had the first and last letters of plaintiff's Christian and surname engraved on a brass plate. It contained wearing apparel, a number of sheets of paper, called in the particulars "samples," but more properly described as patterns," which he was to use, and which were necessary for his use as a salesman for a commercial firm; it also contained his journey accounts and an account book or books. On the journey to Nelson the portmanteau was handed by a stranger out of a third class carriage to the station master at an intermediate station, with the statement that a passenger to whom it belonged had got out at a previous station. On the plaintiff's arrival at Nelson it was missed, and it did not reach him until about a week after, when he found it at his own home at Liverpool, to which it had been brought by the railway

MARRIAGE LICENCES.-There were 9841 in the year ending 31st March 1873, obtained in the United Kingdom, and the stamp duty amounted to £4920.

66

£65, a cheque (which he had received from a customer) for £26 3s. 6d., and three £5 Bank of England notes (thus making up £106 3s. 6d.). The rest of the debt was paid by Binns to the sheriff's officer, but not till after Hassall's liquidation petition had been filed. On the 28th July the sheriff's officer handed over all that he had received to Brooke and Sons' solicitor. Meanwhile, on the 26th July, an interim order had been made by the County Court restraining further proceedings in the action against Hassall, and this order was served on the sheriff's officer the same day. The judge of the County Court decided that the bill, the cheque, and the notes were the property of the trustee under the liquidation for the benefit of the creditors generally, and this order was affirmed by the Chief Judge. Messrs. Brooke and Sons appealed. The Court of Appeal allowed some new evidence to be adduced, and to-day Mr. Edward Brooke was examined, and stated that on the 25th July his firm told the sheriff's officer that they consented to take what he had received from Hassall in part payment of their debt.

De Gex, Q.C. and Finlay Knight, were heard on behalf of the appellants. Little, Q.C. and Winslow, Q.C., supported the of the Chief Judge.

and Robert Cook. This document contained a recital that Aaron and Robert Cook had already advanced £500 to the debtors to enable them to carry on their business, and that the debtors required further advances; and it was agreed that, in consideration of the advances already made and of further advances to be made, the debtors would on demand assign the business carried on by them to Aaron and Robert Cook, together with the lease of the premises in which the business was carried on (which lease was deposited with Aaron and Robert Cook by way of equitable charge to secure the due observance of the agreement), as also the fixtures, stock-in-trade, and book debts, so that Aaron and Robert Cook might be able to carry on the business either in their own names or in the name of W. and J. Cook. If the debtors should repay the £500, and also the further advances with interest, the agreement was to be void; but if the debtors should not pay what was due, an inventory and valuation of the property was to be made, and payment of the purchase-money and valuation, or the balance thereof (if any), was to be made in the manner agreed to by the parties, or otherwise upon valuation, according to the custom of the trade. It was also agreed that Aaron and Robert Cook should retain the debtors in the manage-order ment of the business at a salary. The lease was afterwards deposited. In March 1873 the debtors became embarrassed. A demand of an assignment according to the agreement was served on them by Aaron and Robert Cook. A valuation of the lease, business, fixtures, stock-in-trade, and book debts, was made on the 4th April at the sum of £683 10s. The debt, with interest, amounted to £560. The balance of £123 10s. was paid by Aaron and Robert Cook to the debtors, and an assignment of the property was executed on the 5th April 1873. This deed included all the debtors' property except some furniture valued at £30, for which Aaron and Robert Cook also paid. Possession of the premises of the stock was given to them, and shortly afterwards a circular was sent to the wholesale firms who were the principal creditors of W. and J. Cook, informing them of the transfer of the business. The £123 10s. and the £30 were employed by the debtors in paying two of their creditors. On the 16th April the debtors filed their petition, and stated their debts at more than £1800 and their assets as nil. The registrar refused to declare the deed of the 5th April void. The trustee appealed.

De Gex, Q.C. and Finlay Knight argued for the appellant.

Roxburgh, Q.C. and Colt supported the order of the Registrar.

Lord Justice MELLISH delivered the judgment of the court, to the effect that the deed of the 5th April was not rendered void either by the Bankruptcy Act or by the Bills of Sale Act. Under the agreement of August 1870, no right to the property agreed to be assigned (except the lease) passed either at law or in equity, until demand. When the demand was made, an immediate right in equity to the property agreed to be assigned as a security accrued. The agreement, therefore, after demand became a valid equitable security on the property of the debtors. The agreement of August, 1870, was not itself, as the evidence showed, a mere security for a then existing debt; the £250 advanced by Robert Cook was really advanced on the faith of the agreement. That agreement gave to Aaron and Robert Cook a good equitable security upon all the property comprised in the deed of April 1873, and that being so, it was impossible to say that the deed itself was an act of bankruptcy. Its effect was only to convey the legal estate in the leasehold property and to furnish a record of the completion of the transaction. The beneficial interest was already in Aaron and Robert Cook. There was no evasion of the Bills of Sale Act, for possession of the property was given on the execution of the deed. On the whole, therefore, the judgment of the Registrar ought to be affirmed; but, as the circumstances of the case were very suspicious and required investigation, no order would be made as to the costs of the appeal.

Ex parte BROOKE; Re HASSALL. Execution creditor-Part payment of debt by debtor when sheriff in possession-Liquidation petition-Right of trustee to securities and money handed to sheriff by debtor. THIS was an appeal from a decision of the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy. On the 26th July 1873, John Mills Hassall, a cloth miller at Huddersfield, filed a liquidation petition. Messrs. Brooke and Sons had a short time before recovered judgment against him for £169 4s. 2d. in an action upon two bills of exchange. They had also recovered judgment against a Mr. Binns, who was also liable upon the same bills. Execution was issued, and Hassall, who expected that a levy would be made on his goods, called on the sheriff's officer on the 24th July and said that he hoped to be able to pay soon; and the same afternoon he gave to the sheriff's officer a good bill of exchange for

The LORD CHANCELLOR said the evidence given, coupled with the probabilities of the case, was sufficient to show that the creditors had accepted what the sheriff had received from Hassall in part payment before the petition was filed. That being so, there was no seizure by the sheriff, and the provisions of sects. 6 and 87 of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, did not apply. There was sufficient pressure by the creditors to support the payment, and they were entitled to retain what they had received. The order of the Chief Judge must therefore be altered. This point as to the assent of the creditors was not made the leading point in the argument before him or in that before the County Court judge, and very possibly both those judges would have arrived at the same conclusion as this court if the argument before them had been of the same character.

The LORDS JUSTICES Concurred.

LIVERPOOL BANKRUPTCY COURT. (Before J. F. COLLIER, Esq., Judge.) Friday, Feb. 13.

Re HILL AND SMITH.

Bankruptcy Act 1869, sect. 15-Reputed ownership. Held, that goods in the order and disposition of bankrupt at the date of bankruptcy are not in his reputed ownership where it is a custom in the particular trade for the purchaser of goods to leave them with the vendor until required. Ex parte Watkins, re Couston and Co. (28 L. T. Rep. N. S. 793) followed.

THIS was a motion under the bankruptcy of this firm, rice cleaners and merchants in Liverpool. Mr. Samuel B. Hill was the only representative of the firm, and he absconded in September last. An adjudication of bankruptcy ensued, and Mr.Banner was chosen trustee. The present motion on his behalf involved a sum of between £4000 and £5000. The circumstances were these:-The firm of Hill and Smith were in the habit of importing large quantities of rice, and Messrs. James Maxwell and Co. acted as their brokers, the National Bank being the bankers. The course of business between the parties was for the bankrupt firm, on the arrival of a cargo of rice, to warehouse it either in the dock warehouse or those of a private individual, in the name of Messrs. Maxwell, the bankrupt firm drawing upon Messrs. Maxwell for an amount equal to the value of the cargo, and discounting the bills with the National Bank, giving the latter a letter of hypothecation on the cargo. In the month of July last the bankrupt firm imported 12,756 bags of rice, for which bills amounting to £9300 were drawn in the manner described, and letters of hypothecation were given to the bank. Other transactions in relation to 10,835 bags of rice took place between the parties, and on the maturity of the bills drawn they were renewed, and fresh letters of hypothecation given to the bank. In the months of July and Aug. last, after the letters of hypothecation had been given, the bankrupt, without the knowledge or consent of the bank, obtained from Maxwell and Co. delivery orders for certain portions of the rice in the warehouses mentioned in the letters of hypothecation, and removed it to his mill in Edmundstreet for the purpose of cleaning, a process necessary before sale. On the rice being cleaned it was replaced in sacks and set aside in a separate part of the mill distinct from the other rice. The bankrupt, in fraud of the bank, as was alleged, disposed of a large quantity of this rice, and the residue in the warehouse at the date of the bankruptcy were sold, and the proceeds held by the trustee to abide the decision of the court as to the rights of the parties.

Butler, instructed by Hull, Stone, and Fletcher, appeared for the trustee.

W. Thompson (of the Chancery Bar), instructed

by Bateson, Robinson, and Morris, appeared for the bank.

His HONOUR, who had reserved his judgment, now said:-I am opinion that the documents signed by Maxwell and Co. were declarations of trust under which they undertook as trustees of the bank to hold the rice for the bank and to pay the proceeds to the bank in discharge of the bills on the goods unsold. Maxwell and Co. as trustees, with a power of disposition, were, I think, the true owners of the rice. That it was in the possession, order, and disposition of the bankrupt at the time of the bankruptcy is not disputed. Taking the facts as set forth in that statement, I am unable to distinguish this case from that of Ex parte Watkins, re Couston (sup.) (L. Rep.8 Ch. App. 520). I do not think that any reputation of ownership attached to the bankrupt's possession of the rice, and this being so, I must hold that it did not pass to his trustee. The rice being trust property did not pass to Maxwell and Co.'s trustee in bankruptcy, and having been sold by arrangement between the parties, that is to say, by someone acting on behalf of Maxwell and Co., the proceeds are the property of the bank. The costs will come out of the estate. The next and only remaining question to be considered is whether the bankrupt was at the time of the bankruptcy the reputed owner of these goods, for if this ingredient is absent the title of the trustee fails. This question was not argued on the first occasion when the case came before me, and my impression was that the reputed ownership of the bankrupt was admitted; on this, however, being strenuously denied, I suggested that it should be argued on a future day, and that has now been done on a statement of facts agreed upon by both sides.

SALFORD COUNTY COURT.
(Before J. A. RUSSELL, Esq., Q,C., Judge.)
Wednesday, Feb. 11.

Re MORRISSY; Ex parte TAYLOR. Bankruptcy Act 1869-Meeting of creditorsResolutions-Rejection of vote. T., a creditor, claimed £250 "at the least" under an unfulfilled agreement. At a meeting of creditors, at which the solicitor for the debtor presided, proof of this debt was refused, and the creditor's proxy was ejected from the room. Held, on application to register the resolu tion passed at this meeting, that proof of T.'s debt ought to have been accepted: Re Buffle (42 L. J., N. S. 82, Bank.); also, that the resolutions passed at a properly constituted meeting of creditors are only provisional, and that the ejection of T.'s proxy rendered the proceedings at the meeting in question null and void. Registration refused.

S. Taylor (barrister), instructed by Vaughan, the solicitor to the creditor T.

Jordan (barrister) instructed by Hampson, the solicitor to the debtor.

In this case it appeared that the debtor had filed his petition under the 125th and 126th sections of the Act, and that a meeting of creditors had been summoned, to be held at the offices of a Mr. Hampson, the solicitor of the debtor. No notice of this had been sent to the Messrs. Taylor, with whom the debtor Morrissy had entered into a contract for certain alterations and additions to dwelling-houses in Regent-road, Salford, Feb. 1873, and who failed to carry out such contract, but they by their proxy attended the first meeting and tendered a proof, in which they claimed "the sum of £250 at the least'" for money due to them from the said Morrissy under the agreement above referred to, and for the breach or non-performance of such agreement by the said Morrissy. The solicitor to the debtor objected to the proof, and also to the proxy being present, and to the examination of the debtor, and on his declining to leave the meeting ejected him by force. Notice to register a resolution passed at this meeting was given to Messrs. Taylor.

Taylor contended that first there was no meeting, as the chairman was not elected by a majority of the creditors, or those claiming to be creditors present. Secondly, that the proper course would have been for the chairman to have left the registrar to deal with the objections, and that the chairman had no such power, and cited the case of Ex parte Bule, re Drummelow (42 L. J. Rep. N. S. 82, Bank.), as an authority for the proposition, that where a creditor in respect of a breach of contract will pledge his oath that there is so much at least, due he is entitled to vote in respect of that sum. He also contended that the vote at a properly constituted meeting was only a provisional one, and liable to be altered or reversed on the registration of the resolution.

Jordan, on the other hand, contended that the case was governed by sect. 16, sub-sect. 3, of the Bankruptcy Act, and that the case cited was in reality in his favour.

His HONOUR ruled that the creditors were entitled to vote in respect of the sum as to which they had pledged their oath; that the vote was a

MR. PALLES, the Irish Attorney-General, has accepted the vacant office of Chief Baron of the Exchequer.

ADULTERATION.-Out of 212 samples of tobacco analysed by the Inland Revenue Board in the year 1872, 129 samples were adulterated. Out of 26 parcels of snuff only one was proved to be adulterated.

AMERICAN THIEVES.-Five armed highwaymen robbed the stage coach near Hot Springs, in Arkansas, on 15th Jan. The robbers opened the mail bags and stole the best of the horses belong. ing to the stage. About 2000 dols. were taken from the passengers, including money belonging to a Mr. Crump, of Memphis, one of the passengers. This individual was robbed of his watch also; but he received from the leader of the band his money and watch, as he had been a Confederate soldier, and the enmity of the robbers was against the Yankees.

STATISTICS OF THE ENGLISH COURTS OF JUsTICE. On Monday evening, at the fourth ordinary meeting for the present session of the Statistical Society, held at the society's rooms, at St. James's-square, Dr. Guy, F.R.S., presi. dent, in the chair, Mr. F. H. Janson president, of the Incorporated Law Society, read a paper entitled Some Statistics of Courts of Justice and of Legal Procedure in England." The lecturer, in opening, observed that, from an expression put into the mouth of Hamlet, it was clear that even in Shakespeare's time the "law's delay" had become proverbial, and it can readily be conceived that in ancient times much delay must necessarily have resulted from the centralisation of the courts of justice. The delays in the administration of justice, especially in the business of the Court of Chancery, may be said to have culminated in the first quarter of the present century. Our courts of justice might be classified in two grand divisions-those of common law and those of Chancery, and there were two general courts of ultimate appeal-the House of Lords and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Two hundred years ago, in the reign of Charles II., when the population of England and Wales was about one-fifth, that of the metropolis one-tenth of its present number, and the business of the courts bore no comparison with that of the present day, there were twelve common law judges, with the same number of assistant masters as at present; a Lord Chancellor and a Master of the Rolls, who were assisted by the Masters in Chancery. The additions to the judicial force made since that period are-to the three principal courts of common law two judges each, six in all; to the Court of Chancery three Vice-Chancellors; and for appeals in the first instance two Lords Justices; but, independently of the increase of business arising from the growth of wealth and population, there are now thrown upon the common law judges the business of hear ing petitions on disputed elections and appeals from the decisions of the revising barristers; whilst the Chancery judges have the heavy work of what are called " winding-up" cases, viz., the settlement of the affairs of joint stock companies in liquidation, besides the various kinds of administrative business confided to it in recent years by various statutes. He ought not to omit to mention that the apparent expedition with which some judges of the Court of Chancery have got through the business of their courts is attributable to the practice of throwing upon the chief clerks important duties which they were not originally intended to perform. The delays at common law are less severely felt, but still the work is always more or less in arrear, and a fresh arrangement of business between the judges of the various courts, which may be the result of the new Judicature Act, will not lessen the total quantity to be got through. This is manifestly too great for the present staff, the increase of labourers not having by any means kept pace with the increase of the work to be done. In his own opinion the real cause of the delays in the administration of justice arose from, first, the want of a sufficient judicial force in the Court of Chancery; and, secondly, the occurrence of what are technically called vacations. To many it seemed remarkable that there should be any period during which the machinery of justice is allowed to stand still. No doubt the judges and their subordinates, like other people, require a holiday to recruit their powers, which are often severely tried; but with a proper system of relays there need be no cessation of judicial work throughout the year; while each judge and official would have a fair amount of rest from his labours. Appended to the paper was an elaborate statistical analysis showing the judicial power and the judicial work of the various courts. The reading of the paper was followed by an animated discussion, in which Mr. W. G. Lumley, Q.C., Mr. W. J. Bovill, Q.C., Mr. J. T. Hammick, Mr. R. B. Martin, Mr. Brewer, and other gentlemen took part. After a warm vote of thanks had been passed to the lecturer, the proceedings closed with the usual compliment to the chairman.

MR RAFFLES, the Liverpool stipendiary magis. trate, had before him a charge against a cabman for being drunk and assaulting the police. One of the policemen admitted charging the pri. soner with knowing more "about a jackass than a horse;" and Mr. Raffles wished it to be underderstood that if the police "chaffed" a man under the influence of drink, he would not commit him for assault. It was, he said, the business of the police to receive "chaff" and not to give it.

THE CIVIL SERVICE.-Law Department.-Mr. Bernard Edward Hodgson has been appointed to a clerkship in the Queen's Bench Master's Office. The East Indies.-Mr. F. Clarke, barrister-at-law, receiver of the High Court, Bengal, in place of Mr. H. Millett, resigned; Mr. R. Evans, assistantmagistrate and collector of Cawnpore, North-West Provinces; Mr. E. H. Little, C.S., has been confirmed in his appointment to act as Registrar of the High Court, Bombay, appellate side, during Mr. Jardine's absence on private leave: Major N. B. Thoyts, S.C., as cantonment magistrate at Kurrachee.

LEGISLATION AS TO MERCHANT SHIPPING.We have received from Mr. David McIver a rough memorandum of his views in regard to the present position of merchant shipping legislation. He thinks that there is no reason why the attention of the Marine Department of the Board of Trade should, so far as annual survey is concerned, be devoted exclusively to British passenger steamers; nor any reason why foreign vessels should be permitted to load outwards from British ports, on conditions other than those under which British vessels may compete with them. He regards the Marine Department of the Board of Trade, as at present constituted, as being an unfit tribunal to be intrusted with increased arbitrary powers, but thinks that there would be no difficulty in Government nominating a board, as a court of appeal or otherwise-say, not less than three, nor more than seven-of persons possessing the confidence of the country, who could perform such duties satisfactorily. Mr. McIver thinks the system of courts of inquiry into maritime disasters is so bad that hardly any change could be made for the worse; and therefore that it is high time the question were intrusted to competent legal authority, with a view to practical suggestions for improving the mode of procedure in such manner as would be likely to best elicit information, while giving shipmasters reasonable opportunities for defence-which at present is not always the case. There are many instances where substantial injustice has been done to unfortunate shipmasters; and also where the owner has been prejudiced in a court of law by the allegation that his master had been adjudged in default-and that, perhaps, by a tribunal not very competent.

THE RIGHT to ONE'S FACE.-The right of a man to control the publication of his own features is a rather delicate point of personal law which has never been sufficiently elucidated. The wellknown practice of photograpers in exhibiting copies of the portraits which they have taken is one which, on some grounds, may be deemed open to grave exceptions. The position of the illustrated papers in the matter might also repay inspection. A contemporary, having prepared for publication a portrait of a lady whose husband is in high official position under the present Administration, the picture was reluctantly suppressed at the request of the latter on the assurance that it was the lady's wish. At the same time, the journal announced that this was the last time such a concession would be made to private prejudices. It proclaimed the doctrine that neither man nor woman had any property in the reflection of their features, and that hereafter, in a similar case, it should not "feel compelled to regard the wishes or request of the party concerned." The same journal announced in one of its early impressions that it would give representations of private wedding parties whenever it felt inclined, and that it "should not feel compelled to rogard the objections of the parties concerned." In cases like these it is difficult to draw the precise line where liberty ends and licence begins; but men of right feeling and true delicacy know by instinct what is correct, and what is a violation of personal rights and domestic privacy. If the portraits thus published in disregard of wishes and requests were uniformly artistic or approximately like, one part of the objection, though not the essential part, would vanish; but they are often such hideous caricatures as to amount to positive pictorial libels. The paper we speak of published a day or two after his death, what is called a portrait of Charles Astor Bristed. The face depicted might have belonged to a butcher or a drover, but had not a trace of the intellect and high breeding marked in every feature of its pretended subject. It may be said that very few people really object to have their portraits pub.

CORRESPONDENCE OF THE

PROFESSION.

NOTE.-This Department of the LAW TIMES being open to free discussion on all professional topics, the Editor is not responsible for any opinions or statements contained in it.

THE WORKING OF THE BALLOT. - Having acted as a presiding officer in one of the Metropolitan boroughs at the recent Parliamentary election, I am able to confirm the observations in your last issue upon this subject, and especially as to the stupidity shown by electors from whom it could not be expected, in reference to complying with the provisions of the Act relating to the mode of recording votes, and as to the many errors on the register by which the balloting is checked. The chief of the new government in embryo will do well to consider the suggestions upon the former subject, contained in the letter of a "Town clerk," which appears in to-day's Times, namely, inter alia, that the voter should either strike out the names of the candidates for whom he does not wish to vote, or else that he should be required to put the cross against such names. As regards the delay in ascertaining the state of the poll-at present wholly unavoidable in large constituencies-I suggest that from time to time during the polling day the presiding officer might, in the presence of the necessary agents, examine the ballot papers, and register each vote on a list, so that almost immediately on the closing of the poll each presiding officer might go to the returning officer with a correct summary of the votes taken by him, having a separate list of the papers on which any irregularity appears. Thus could the returning officer, within a few hours of the closing of the poll, make the necessary declaration. While writing on the above subject, I must add that the front of the building in which I acted as stated, was so covered with the bills of one of the candidates that it cannot have failed to favourably impress many an ignorant elector in favour of such candidate. When we reap the expected results of the Education Act and School Boards, such a matter will be of no moment, but until then I think that if common decency does not forbid such a proceeding, the Legislature ought. CHARLES FORD.

Feb. 18, 1874.

THE CITY OF LONDON COURT.-I beg to call attention to an occurrence that took place to-day before Mr. Commissioner Kerr, at the City of London Court, as showing the judicial impartiality that distinguishes that tribunal. The occurrence took place in an action brought by a plaintiff for a sum of about £3, for tea sold and delivered. Incidentally it came out in the course of the proceedings that the plaintiff had previously sued defendant in the Mayor's Court for a sum of about £16, and recovered judgment, and that the sum of £3 now sued upon had been omitted by mistake in the former action. The judge, who had been sharply questioning the defendant, now asked to have the Mayor's Court plaint handed up to him, and on observing that there was an amount of £2 48. 8d., or thereabouts, for costs, exclaimed, "Two pounds four and eightpence costs on a debt of sixteen pounds!" and suddenly turning to plaintiff, asked him," Are you lost to all sense of shame ?" The plaintiff, who seeemed a quiet young man, was rather taken aback by this strange question so suddenly put to him. Again the judge asked him, "Are you lost to all sense of shame?" The plaintiff faltered out something to the effect that his solicitors had acted for him in the Mayor's Court proceedings, whereupon the judge remarked, "That if ordinary people had any sense of shame attorneys had not," or words to that effect. He continued his abuse of the attorneys for some time in this strain, and said that if plaintiff had come to the City of London Court for his £16 he might have had a plaint for 16s. Thus the whole ground of this abuse of the unoffending plaintiff and the profession of attorneys was that he had adopted a course of procedure regulated by the same authority as that from which the learned judge himself derived his authority-a course by which he had obtained judgment at the expiration of eight days from issuing the plaint without any trouble to himself, but at an expense of £2 4s. 8d. Had he on the other hand adopted the course proposed by the judge, he must have waited for a month, in entire uncertainty whether the case would be defended or not, his costs would have been, not