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causes now in my office." What was Lord Kenyon's reply to this supplicatory appeal to him! "So much the worse for your clients who have employed such a man! You shall remain suspended until the court decides on the rule." The rule came on to be heard at a future day, after the affidavits on the part of Mr. Lawless had been filed. The charges against him were found to be wholly without foundation, and the rule was accordingly discharged. Mr. Lawless was in consequence restored to his profession, but not to his character or peace of mind. He sunk under the anmerited disgrace to which he had been subjected, and died of a broken heart.' It is not improbable that under changes which are in contemplation in relation to both branches of the legal profession, the government of our own body, and the power of suspension or removal from its ranks may be altogether entrusted to the Council of the Incorporated Law Society, just as the members of the Bar are subjected to the authority of the several Inns of Court, which consist of persons of their own order." The case of Mr. Lawless, in these days happily without precedent, is yet of a nature to occasion anxiety to all of us, and the sooner the power of removing a solicitor's name from the roll is transferred from the judges to the Incorporated Law Society (of which every solicitor ought to be a member), the better.

We publish in another column a report in connection with the annual banquet of the Manchester Incorporated Law Association. Mr. P. F. Garnett (vice-president of the Incorporated Law Society of Liverpool) stated his views of the great value and utility of law societies, when proposing the toast of the evening. We fail, however, to discover the "methodical and combined influence" of which he spoke. It is the very thing that is wanted so badly. We venture to assert that there is practically no combination amongst us, none such, at all events, as Mr. Marshall, of Leeds, has advocated, but there are signs of such action as is required, the arguments in favour of which, by the most able and intelligent members of our branch of the profession, are so forcible that they must bear their fruit in due season. In all other professions, owing to combination, there are steps by which a man can rise to a position of distinction and honour, while for solicitors there at present exists no such means to such a desirable

end.

any reform is to be effected in relation to this im-
post it will be best secured by combined action on
the part of solicitors in England and Ireland. If
no substantial movement is set on foot it may
fairly be contended that we do not require such
reform.

Mr. T. REDWOOD, Professor of Chemistry to
the Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain, and
analyst under the Adulteration of Food, Drink,
and Drugs Act, writing to the Daily Telegraph
on the 19th inst, upon the subject of the adul.
teration of bread, observes, in relation to the
failure of legal proceedings in a case under the
Adulteration Act: "The result of this and some
other cases in which proceedings have been taken
under the Adulteration Act, shows the necessity
of having legal assistance to conduct the prosecu-
tions, instead of leaving them, as the county cases
are now left, to be conducted by the inspectors.
This is especially the case where the defendants
are professionally represented. I consider that
the failure of the case heard yesterday at Edgware
was entirely due to the want of legal assistance in
preparing and presenting the evidence for the pro-
secution." It certainly does seem idle to expect
that inspectors appointed under the Act in ques-
tion should be capable of instituting and conduct-
ing such proceedings. The new Government may
take a different view of what is and what is not
a wise economy as compared with that which
governed the policy of the late administration
upon such matters.

A MEMBER of the Legal Practitioners' Society, also a member of the Incorporated Law Society, writes to us to say that he considers that the first-named society ought to be supported by the Profession on the principle that prevention is better than cure-that is, that it is far wiser to protect the Profession from the depredations of unqualified men who take from them the earnings to which they are entitled, than permit such depredations, and yet support the Solicitors' Benevolent and other similar associations. We agree in part with our correspondent; for instance, if proper protection was afforded the Profession against the encroachments complained of, we cannot doubt but that much work now under taken by accountants and agents of all kinds would pass into solicitors' offices-it may be the offices of those least prosperous, who are, how. ever, none the less on that account entitled to be protected by the Legislature; and if work so changed hands, the demands on the funds of WE gather from editorial answers to correspon-solicitors' charitable institutions would certainly dents in the School Board Chronicle that the decrease. editor of that publication is beset with all kinds of questions, principally relating to the Education SHARP practice amongst solicitors is not to be Act, of a strictly legal nature. It is not, there- countenanced or tolerated for a moment in these fore, surprising to find such notes as the follow-days. A case has just been brought to our notice ing:-" With every desire to answer in full your in which a plaintiff's attorney, having received query, we must beg to refer you for a reply either from the defendant's attorney certain pleas for to the legal adviser of your board, or to any other which an order for leave to plead them was competent lawyer." necessary, and it was not issued owing to the fault of the clerk to the defendant's attorney, he (plaintiff's attorney) signed judgment for want of a plea. On a summons to set aside such judg. ment, it was stated that defendant's attorney had that the plaintiff's attorney must have known no intimation that the judgment was signed, and that the non-issuing of the necessary summons for leave to plead was a pure oversight from the fact that in engrossing the pleas which were delivered the clerk copied in the fold of the paper

THE Irish Law Times and Solicitors' Journal, remembers of Parliament, observes as follows of Mr. Charles E. Lewis, M.P., for Londonderry City:"It is true he is an Englishman, and practises in London, but we are much mistaken if he does not make the common interests of the Irish and English solicitors his especial study. He is already well known in London (independently of his large practice) for his exertions in

ferring to the Irish solicitors who are elected

estates over which he had a power of disposition
to the plaintiffs, who filed this bill to obtain
possession of the lands which, though not forming
part of the settled estates in 1719, were included
in the schedules to the Acts of 1803 and 1843.
Held, that the intention of the Legislature was to
vest in the trustees lands which were actually
part of the settled estates in 1719, and that the
plaintiffs were entitled to recover. Hald also
that where a person has intruded upon the estate
of an infant, the infant may sue in equity,
although he has both a legal and equitable title,
and is entitled to an account. Crowther v.
Crowther (23 Beav. 305) not followed: (Howard
v. Earl of Shrewsbury (29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 862.
Rolls.)
PRACTICE-SETTLEMENT-LEASES AND SALES
OF SETTLED ESTATES ACT, s. 1.-A testatrix de
vised real estate to trustees upon trust for A., in
case she should attain twenty-one, or marry pre-
viously to attaining that age; with a gift over in
strict settlement in case A. should not live to
attain a vested interest: Held, that this was a
limitation "by way of succession," within the
meaning of the Act: (Re Horn's Settled Estates,
29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 830. V.C. M.)

PLEA TO WHOLE BILL-PLEA OF "NOT A PARTNER IN THE MONTE VIDEO FIRM"-PLEA OVERRULED.-The bill alleged that the defendants, A., B., and C., carried on business as merchants at Montevideo under the firm of A. and Co.; and at Liverpool under the firm of B. and Co.; and that the members of both firms were identical. He further alleged that certain goods (the subjectmatter of the suit) were consigned to A., B., and C., to their firm of A. and Co, through their firm of B. and Co.; and that A., B., and C., as well in respect of their firm of A. and Co., as in respect of their firm B. and Co., received these goods with full knowledge that they were the plaintiffs' trust property, and sold them and received the proceeds for them on that footing. The defendant C. pleaded to the whole of the bill, that he was not, and never had been, a partner in the Monte Video firm; and averred that the members of the two firms were not identical. Held that, though this plea would have been a good plea if the bill had merely sought to charge him as a partner in the Monte Video firm, yet as it contained allegations sufficient to render him liable as a partner in the Liverpool firm, the latter liability was totally uncovered by the plea, which must therefore be overruled: (Roberts v. Le Hir, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 873. V. C. M.)

APPORTIONMENT-PARTNERSHIP PROFITS INCOME.-Profits in a partnership business partly earned in the testator's lifetime, but not ascertained until after his death, are not apportionable, but are income of the testator's estate: (Lambert v. Lambert, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 878. V. C. B. PRACTICE-EVIDENCE-CROSS-EXAMINATIONEXPENSES OF WITNESS-ORDER 5TH FEB. 1861, RULE 19.-The expenses of a witness summoned for cross-examination must, in the first instance, be borne by the parties on whose behalf his evidence in chief has been given: (Richards v. Goddard, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 884. V.C. H.).

SOLICITOR AND CLIENT PROPERTY RECOVERED FOR INFANT-FUND IN COURT-LIEN FOR COSTS-JURISDICTION-23 & 24 VICT. C.

127, s. 28.-A solicitor's lien for costs in any suit property must be established by filing a bill under or proceeding instituted for recovering an infant's under the Attorneys and Solicitors' Act 1860: the general jurisdiction of the court, and not

reference to the Incorporated Law Society of the usual memorandums by counsel as to leave re- (Pritchard v. Roberts, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 883.

England, and has also, we believe, had the good sense to recommend his English friends to imitate the energy and intelligent zeal for the interests of their profession displayed by their brethren of the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland." Upon the subject of law reform the same journal says: "When we consider the position of legal reforms in England, and the anxious expectation with which their extension to Ireland is looked forward, we feel consoled to think we shall have in the House of Commons sufficient representatives of our professional interests to provide that due care shall be taken of them, and that efficiency of legal administration shall not be considered less important than a diminution of the charges on the Consolidated Fund." As regards the annual certificate duty, it adds: "Some time since we called the attention of the Profession to the necessity of agitating for a repeal of the duty which is now annually levied from them. The amount of this duty is not much, it is urged, and solicitors in practice do not feel it, while it may be useful; but we think it is positively of no use in the interests of the Profession or the public; it brings in a mere trifle to the treasury, and we think the present a most opportune occasion to appeal to the Government for its remission. There is a large surplus to be disposed of, and most people admit that the way to keep up a high professional standard is not to impose more taxes but to make entrance to the Profession a difficult matter by responsible apprenticeship and examinations." If

judgment to be set aside on payment of 10s. 6d.
quired, &c. The master, of course, ordered the

costs.

the master had set the judgment aside, and that
We should have preferred to hear that
the defendant was to be paid all his costs occa-
sioned by the judgment snapped as described.

IN addition to the names of solicitors elected
members of Parliament, which appeared in our
two last issues, we have to add those of Mr.
Murphy, elected for Cork City, and Mr. Fay,
who headed the poll for Cavan. This makes in
all thirteen solicitors in the House of Commons.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. PRIVATE ACT OF PARLIAMENT-MISDESCRIPTION OF PROPERTIES IN SCHEDULE-CONSTRUCTION-PLEADING-Bill by InfaNT—ACCOUNT— INTRUSION.-The settled estates of the Duke of Shrewsbury were, by an Act passed in 1719, settled upon the Earl of Shrewsbury, with a proviso against alienation. Two Acts were subsequently passed-one in 1803, and the other in 1843-by which portions of the settled estates, described in the schedules, were vested in trustees, upon trust to sell, and invest the purchase-money in the purchase of other estates to be settled upon the same trusts. Some of the lands described in the schedules did not form part of the settled estates when the Act of 1719 was passed. In 1856 the then Earl of Shrewsbury devised all his

V.C. H.).

PRACTICE-TRANSFER OF CAUSE-Judge forMERLY COUNSEL.-Where a case involving volu. minous accounts was attached to the court of a judge who had formerly been counsel in the case, and his chief clerk had after much consideration, decided the principle upon which the accounts were to be taken, the court refused to order a transfer of the cause to another branch of the court till it became necessary to make some application to the judge in person: (Jackson v. Ward, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 861. Chan.).

ARTICLED CLERK-COMPUTATION OF SERVICE-DELAY IN STAMPING-EMERGENCY-6 & 7 VICT. c. 73, ss. 8 & 9.-Upon the mistaken legal advice that articles of clerkship need not be stamped for six months after execution, the appli cant's articles were executed without stamp; and before the first six months elapsed the applicant's father became unable, in consequence of unex. pected losses in business, to pay the amount required. The service, however, continued under the articles, and three years afterwards the father paid the stamp and penalty. Held, upon application to compute the service from the date of the articles under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, ss. 8 & 9, that, although an articled clerk who has been tricked or misled should have every consideration, the court will not accept as an excuse for the ordinary requirements of the law upon admission to the profession of an attorney circumstances which are loosely called an emergency, and which do not

show a bona fide intention from the commencement to carry out the duties imposed; and that the circumstances of this case did not constitute a sufficient excuse. Ex parte Matthew Breden (31 L. J. 321, C. P.) disputed: (Ex parte Morris Roth, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 885. Q. B.)

LORD MAYOR'S COURT.
Wednesday, Feb. 18.

LANE v. OAKES (MACKENZIE, Garnishee.) (a) Married Women's Property Act, s. 7-" Become entitled to"-Reduction into possession. THIS was an attachment cause, tried at the December sittings of the court, when a verdict was obtained for the plaintiff. It appeared at the trial that the money sought to be attached, amounting to £137, was bequeathed to the defendant's wife before her marriage, subject to a life interest. The defendant married in 1871. The life interest expired in 1873, when the defendant and his wife presented a joint petition to the Court of Chancery, where the estate was being administered, to pay to the husband, in right of his wife, the money in question. In pursuance of that petition the money was paid to the garnishee, who was the attorney and agent of the defendant, and in his hands it was attached by the plaintiff, a creditor of the defendant.

McCall for the garnishee (instructed by Lake, Beaumont, and Lake), having obtained a rule for a new trial, on the grounds that there was no reduction into possession, and that the case came within the Married Women's Property Act, 8. 7,

Kemp, for the plaintiff (instructed by Reep, Lane and Co.), showed cause.-The husband receiving the fund, or authorising some one to receive it for him, is enough to change the wife's interest in the property and reduce it into pos session of the husband: (Fleet v. Perrins, 38 L. J. 259, Q. B.; Jones v. Cuthbertson, 41 L. J. 146, Q.B.) Mrs. Oakes "became entitled" to the money when the will was proved in 1865. Her right was perfect before the expiration of the life interest, and therefore the Married Women's Property Act, which did not come into force till 1870, does not apply. She became entitled before and not "during her marriage."

""

M'Call, for the garnishee, in support of his rule. -There was no reduction into the possession of the husband. This is often a difficult question to determine. The onus is upon the plaintiff to show 66 some clear and distinct act" on the part of the husband: (Scarpellini v. Aitcheson, 14 L. J. 333, Q.B). In Hart v. Stevens (14 L. J. 150, Q. B.) the interest on a promissory note given to the wife before marriage was received by the husband during coverture, and it was held not sufficient to reduce the debt into the possession of the husband. In Prole v. Soady (37 L. J. 248, Ch.), where the fund was carried over to the joint account of husband and wife, it was held no reduction into possession by the husband. Reduction into possession is a question of intention; therefore it seems to me that the joint authority of husband and wife negatives any intention on the husband's part to reduce the money into possession." (Per Cleasby, B., Jones v. Cuthbertson, 42 L. J. 223, Ex.) Secondly, the case comes within sect. 7 of the Married Women's Property Act, which provides inter alia that "where any woman married after the passing of this Act shall during her marriage become entitled to any sum not exceeding £200 under any will, such property shall belong to the woman for her separate use.' It was intended so far to do for married women what is sometimes accomplished by marriage settlements. The Act is to be construed with reference to its policy: (Winter v. Winter, 16 L. J., 112 Ch.) Her property in expectancy needed no such protection, but that in possession or capable of being reduced did, being subject to the marital rights of the husband; and the language of the section bears out this view. This section, as well as the 8th, which refers to real property, follows the language of the usual covenant in a marriage settlement. In Archer v. Kelly (29 L. J. 911, Ch.) Kindersley, V.C., held that "become entitled" signified a change of condition from expectancy to possession. According to plaintiff's construction, the language of the section should have been "shall become entitled to any interest whatsoever:" (Mackenzie's Settlement, 36 L. J. 320, Ch.) The construction for which I contend is upheld in Clinton's Trust (41 L. J. 192, Ch.), where Wickens, V.C., discusses all the cases. The wife of the defendant, therefore, became entitled to this money upon the death of the tenant for life, that is, during her marriage and after the passing of this Act. The money being therefore due to the wife, and the judgment being against the husband, this is not a debt owing or accruing to the judgment debtor so as to be attachable: (Dingley v. Robinson, 26 L. J. 55, Ex.)

Cur adv. vult. The DEPUTY RECORDER (Sir Thomas Cham

(a) A short report of this case appeared last week.

bers). In this case an action was brought against the defendant and the garnishee, and the question was, whether a sum of money in the hands of the garnishee could be attached by the plaintiff. At the trial a verdict was found for the plaintiff. Objection was made by Mr. McCall for the gar nishee, that the money in question was bequeathed to the wife of the defendant, and was reduced into possession by the husband. This objection is not tenable. The husband and wife presented a joint petition to the Court of Chancery, and upon that petition an order was made for the money to be paid to the defendant in right of his wife. The money was paid to the garnishee under a power of attorney given by the husband alone. That is sufficient to reduce the fund into the possession of the husband. The second objection made was, that under the Married Women's Property Act this money belonged to the wife for her separate use, and therefore could not be attached for the debt of the husband. Two cases in particular were cited, where it was decided upon similar terms in a marriage settlement, that such words covered a reversionary interest which falls into possession during coverture, and would be protected by such a covenant. These cases (Archer v. Kelly, and Clinton's Trusts, sup.), were decided by Kindersley, and their decisions seem to apply to this section of the Act. Although at first the property seemed to me to be unprotected by the statute, I have been so much influenced by the able argument of Mr. McCall, that after conferring with Mr. Justice Quain, I think the case comes within the protection of the statute. On this ground, therefore, the rule will be made absolute for a new trial. I make no order as to costs.

THE QUALIFICATIONS OF SPECIAL

JURORS.

MR. ERLE writes to the Law Magazine :— The proper qualification of special jurors for the City of London is one of the first and most serious questions which must necessarily engage the consideration of the framer of any measure intended to affect the law relating to juries, and on the preparation of the bill of last session, the attention of the then Attorney-General was carefully directed to the matter. The point is one of some difficulty, since no criterion of the possession of intelligence and good judgment can be fixed by Act of Parliament, nor can a peculiar degree of knowledge of commercial matters, such as is supposed to be wanted to give a Guildhall special juror a proper aptitude for his duty be ascribed as a certainty to any man, except as a consequence of his following some avocation which compels the acquisition of such knowledge. But it will be found by experiment that it is, in tice, quite impossible to particularise specific callings as necessarily rendering those who pursue them desirable as special jurors in the city. To take one case only, out of a great number, as an example. Men who are described simply as "agents," take, as is well-known, a very important part indeed in mercantile transactions. But the profession of men styling themselves agents, extends from the members of a most respectable and wealthy class down to persons living from hand to mouth on their wits, and ready, like a Græculus esuriens, to do anything in the world for a shilling.

trade or clique, is the best tribunal for the trial of any issue of fact, whether the dispute be on a mercantile or any other transaction.

The Act of 1870, besides enlarging the standard of qualification of special jurors, introduced also two material alterations in the mode of summoning. It is necessary to speak of these, since they have acquired some relation to the subject of the qualification of special jurors.

The first of these was the abolition, as far as all ordinary practice is concerned, of the system of summoning a separate special jury for the trial of each particular cause; a system which had been fully shown to involve, without any adequate degree of compensating advantage, the vices of unnecessary inconvenience and expence in all their most aggravated forms. It substituted a general panel of jurors to serve for a certain limited period, and available to try all the causes which may happen to come on for hearing during that period.

The second of the main alterations introduced by the act in question in the mode of summoning juries was in fact a declaratory statement of the existing law, and an injunction that it should be better observed, rather than the initiation of any new practice. For it required sheriffs and their representatives to do what was, and always had been, their duty by summoning special as well as common jurors for service on common juries.

It has been alleged that the quality of special juries, especially in the city of London, has latterly deteriorated. Now, since it is plain that this fact, if such it be, cannot possibly be attribu table to the system of promiscuous summoning just referred to, which has affected common juries only, a supposition has been sometimes expressed that it must necessarily be due either to the enlargement of the standard of qualification, or to the new method, just now described, of summoning special juries; that is to say, by general panels instead of by a separate panel for each particular case. But the truth will be found to be that the system of summoning which is pursued in the city of London, and which, in its principle, is also followed to a greater or less extent in many of the English counties, precludes the forming of any dependable conclusion as to the quality of the special jurors' list taken as a whole. This will be understood on a statement of what that system is. To describe it in the shape in which it is found in the City. The secondary, with whom the duty of summoning jurors rests,does not at any time, when called upon to discharge this function, resort to any general list of jurors supplied from the whole area of the City, but lays the 28 wards into which the City is divided successively under contribution. His plan, as it has been given in eviprac.dence, is to "work," to use a common expression, two wards at a time, taking half the special, and half the common jurors who may be wanted at the moment, from each of these wards; and after exhausting the lists of these two districts, to treat two other wards, the next in geographical sequence, in the same manner. In actual practice, this scheme of summoning would not seem to be always quite strictly adhered to, since the result which is witnessed is that of jurors brought from even a still narrower field than would be covered by the arrangement just described. For it will be seen on inspecting the lists of special jurors supplied to any of the Superior Courts for its sittings at Guildhall, that in many instances the whole, or nearly the whole, of the men whose names appear or any particular panel are drawn from some single, and frequently very small, locality. Last year one of the panels which was furnished to the Court of Common Pleas, was almost equivalent to a column of the directory under either of the headings, "Woolbrokers," or "East India Avenue." The jurors' list is made out by streets, and not according to the alphabetical order of the names, so that in the natural course of things a summoning officer, when dispatched on a professional excursion, has to net his prey by proceeding along some series of contiguous houses. This system of summoning has prevailed for a great many years past, and was handed down to, and not introduced by, the present secondary. It is unquestionably a bad one, combining, as it is so we'l calculated to do, the maximum of public inconvenience with the minimum of expediency as regards the jury box. Each trade or business, as is well known, is concentrated in some particular locality in the city. The district which takes in a part of the Bank and of the Royal Exchange, in the Broadstreet ward, is largely occupied by stockbrokers, and dealers in stocks and shares of all descrip tions. The head quarters of corn merchants are in Mark-lane, and those of sugar brokers in Mincing-lane, both of which streets, or the greater part of each, are in Tower ward. Tower-street, with its wine merchants, is in the same ward. Fruit merchants are thickly settled in the adjoin. ing ward, that of Billingsgate. Each leading business, in short, which is followed in the City, has, generally speaking, its own local habitation, or, at any rate, a local nucleus which is its centre of vitality. The area of each ward being, roughly

In default, then, of any available test which could be founded on a man's profession of his fitness to be a special juror, and the old formula of " banker, merchant, or Esquire," having proved to be little better than useless, it was thought necessary, in framing the Juries Bill, to propose, as has been already stated, that the qualification of special jurors should be constituted by rating or rental only. It is not, of course, for a moment denied that rating or rental supplies but a very imperfect indication of a man's capacity for serving as an effective special juror. Still, these tests, rough as they are, afford some evidence, however inconclusive, of vigorous and successful habits of business, or at any rate of the prosecution of some substantial calling, or of the possession of some such means and position in life as are generally found to be accompanied by a certain degree of education, and they may, therefore, be at least preferred to the caprice, or opinion, or, as will certainly be suspected, the favour dependent on occult considerations, of the framers (in many cases very ignorant people) of the jury lists, which are probably the very worst "fancy qualifications which could possibly be invented. It may very reasonably be doubted whether there is any sufficient foundation for the common assumption that causes involving questions relating to peculiar interests, as, for example, shipping cases, cannot be satisfactorily tried except by special juries composed of men who are practically familiar with such matters. Probably, a mixed assembly containing men of business of various occupations, and thus free, as a body, from the bias or contracted opinion which may, unsuspectedly, sway the members of any particular

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speaking, not more than about one twenty-eighth of a square mile, the effect of its being fastened upon for jurors is partially to depopulate it for the time being, and the trades carried on within it are, on such occasions, more or less paralysed, the bulk of those who conduct them being carried into captivity at Guildhall. The juries also, which are thus collected, are not so completely efficient for the purposes of justice as they would be if composed of men familiar, taking them altogether, with a greater variety of occupations, and thus less liable, as a body, to be affected by any of the narrowing influences or feelings which are sometimes found to prevail in particular circumscribed localities, or among the members of limited communities. In view also of the well known natural tendency which leads some men who, although of sound intelligence, are of so diffident or pliant a disposition as to surrender their whole independence of understanding to an inveterate habit of submitting their own opinion to the control of such of their neighbours as may happen to possess a more robust decisiveness of judgment or a spirit of more active self-assertion, it is better that the members of any given jury should come from several different districts, rather than from one only, since in the latter case they would be likely to be all more or less personally known to one another, and some of them might exercise an undue ascendancy over the rest.

companies carrying on their business within the
City should be made liable to serve there as special
jurors. In the absence of any express provision
for bringing such officers within the scope of the
Act, by enduing them with an ex officio qualifi-
cation, they would as now, being neither rated nor
paying rent, nor being, in any sufficiently full
legal sense, occupiers of premises, escape service.
The propriety of this measure will scarcely be
questioned when it has been mentioned that there
are nearly 1500 of such companies holding pre-
mises in the City, and constantly using the courts
as litigants, and since mercantile business is pass-
ing in a constantly increasing degree into the
hands of companies, the burden of service on
juries at Guildhall, which is now thrown on
private traders only, would become more and
more oppressive and unfair if the present total
exemption of all the representatives of companies
were to continue. The very moderate proposal
of the Juries Bill was materially enlarged by the
House of Commons by extending its terms so far
as to reach, not the managing director or manager
only, but every director of every public company
carrying on its business within the City. Some
remonstrance or protest on the part of directors
who have no semblance of actual occupation in
their own persons of premises in the City, and
who are only bound to attend occasionally at their
respective offices, may probably be anticipated if
the proposal to make them liable to serve as
special jurors for the City should at any future
time pass into law.

HEIRS-AT-LAW AND NEXT OF KIN.
CROUCH (Wm.). Queen's Head, 12, Whitecross-street.
London, publican, next-of-kin to come in by March 13,
at the chambers of the M. R., Apri, 16, at the said
chambers at a quarter-past one o'clock, is the time ap-
pointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims.

BROWN (Richard), Luton, Beds, timber merchant. April
BROWNE (Richard), Bromtrees Hall, Bishops Froome,
4; Hollams and Co, solicitors, Mincing-lane. London.
Hereford, Esq. May 1; Wm. West, solicitor, Bromyard.
BUTLER (Thomas), St. Ann's Villa Burley, near Leeds.
ironmaster. April 1; Weddall and Parker, solicitors
Selby.
CLARK (Susannah), formerly of Vigo-street, Regent-street,
and late of 127, Abbey-road, St. John's-wood, Middlesex,
widow. April 12; . Wills, so.icitor, 53, Carter-lane,
Doctor's-coinmons, London.
CLIFFORD (Right Hon. Sophia, Baroness de). Kirkby Mal-

lory, near Hinckley, Leicester, and of 3, Carlton Ho280-
terrace, Middlesex, and also of Dalgan Park, near Shrale,
co. Mayo, Ireland, widow. April 13: Wing and Du Cane,
solicitors, 1, Gray's-inn-square, London, W.C.
COHEN (Justina), 41, Queen's-gardens, Middlesex, widow.
March 19: Dawes and Soas, solicitors, 9, Ange.-court,
Throgmorton-street, London.

DINNING (Henry), 45, Duke-street, St. James-square, Mid-
dlesex, East India United Service Club, St. James-square,
Middlesex, a Brevet Colonel in H.M.'s Bengall Staff
Corps. March 14; E. W. Cross, solicitor, 4, Bell-yard,
DUNDERDALE (Thos.), Horseshoe Inn, Church-street, Pres
Doctors'.
-commons, London.

ton, innkeeper. March 9; R. W. and A. Ascroft, solici-
tors, 4, Cannon-street_Preston.

or Rev. Henry), Greatworth, Northamptop. March

12th; Weston and Barnes, solicitors, Brackley, Northampton. GARLE (John), formerly of West View, Bickley, Kent, and. late of Lubbock-road, Chislehurst, Esq. March 20: Beachcroft and Thompson, solicitors, 18, King's-road, Bedford-row, London.

GREEN (St. John), formerly a Lieut. in H.M.'s 8th Regt. of
L. I., but late of Bedford, Esq. May 30; Jas. Pearse,
solicitor, Bedford.

HENDERSON (John), Ambie, Northumberland, fish curer.
April 1; Allan and Davies, solicitore, 23, Grainger-street
Newcastle-upon-Tyne.

HODGSON (John), late of Walmgate, York, innkeeper, and
of Topcliffe Park, York, farmer. April 6; Geo. Crambie,
solicitor, 46, Stonegate, York.

HOLLYMAN (Wm.), Clevedon, Somerset, butcher. March 25; H. Woodford, solicitor, Clevedon.

HUESTON (John), formerly of 39, Leman-street, Whitechapel, then of 36, Moyston-road, Addington-road, Bow, Middlesex, gentleman. March 20; J. M. Bernard, solicitor, 19, White Lion-street, Norton Folgate, London. HUME (Matthew), 8, Peveril street, Battersea, urrey, tailor. April 13: Bootys and Bayliffe, solicitors, Raymond buildings, Gray's-inn, Middlesex.

It is obvious that the quality of juries must, under the system which has been described, vary extremely according to the spots from which they may happen to have been taken. The Aldgate, Langbourne, and Tower Wards probably supply the best jurors, and those of Farringdon Without and Cripplegate Without, which are largely occu. pied by retail tradesmen, the worst. A short time ago, in the result of the arrangements which are pursued at the Secondary's Office, the common jury panel of forty-eight jurors, which served UNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE JENYNS (Soame Gambier), formerly Colonel of the 18th throughout the after-term sittings in the Court of Common Pleas at Guildhall was exclusively com. posed of men qualified as special jurors, and several of the most considerable names in the City were noticeable on it.

The special jury

panel, which was provided for the same court for the same period, was of a very inferior quality to that of the common jury. A reasonable complaint was made of the composition of the special jury panel, but could the two panels have been interchanged, no ground for adverse observation could have arisen. Application was made not long since to the Court of Common Pleas by Sir John Karslake for a new trial of a cause which had been heard at Guildhall, on the ground that the special jury which had tried the case had not consisted of such elements as to possess even any moderate degree of capacity for dealing with a mercantile question in a satisfactory manner. It may quite confidently be assumed that in the case just referred to the state of circumstances which apparently with much justice, formed the subject of complaint, arose from the accident that some infelicitous vein of special jurors had been struck by the summoning officer, and that the yield thence obtained was untempered by the admixture with it of the product of any sounder mine. It is a matter of simple arithmetical demonstra. tion that if the entire City, and not merely some one, or two, small precinct, or precincts, within its area were to be taken as the recruiting field on all occasions when jurors are demanded, a special jury of so poor a quality as that which incurred the observation of Sir John Karslake could not ever, according to all the distinct arithmetical conditions of probability, have existence.

It will thus be seen that no reliable judgment can be formed from any single example as to the result of any given standard of qualification until it has been ascertained whether the sheriff who has supplied the panel summons at all times from the whole body of the county, whether corporate or at large, for which he acts, or whether, under some private arrangements of his own devising, he draws upon limited portions of it only. Ample provision was made by the Juries Bill against the summoning by sheriffs on various independent systems of their own, of which the public has no knowledge whatever, and founded on their own caprice, convenience, or notions of expediency, by imposing on them under penalties, easily recoverable, the observance of a rota. The objection that the system which is, as has been described, followed in the City of summoning the inhabitants of a whole street at a time, economises the distance to be traversed by the summoning officer, would have been fully met by the provision of the Juries Bill, which required that all summoning should be by post, under certain prescribed arrangements. The direction to summon, by post only, secures other advantages also, among which may be mentioned that it precludes, in the sole way probably in which this can be insured, all attempts to corrupt summoning officers, and it thus relieves such officers from the imputations and suspicions of bribery to which they are now exposed.

It was proposed by the Juries Bill that in the City of London the managing directors of public

BANK OF ENGLAND.

[Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the
National Debt, and which will be paid to the persons
respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three
months, unless other claimants sooner appear.]
CREED (Geo.), Charlton, Musgrave, Somerset, gentleman.
one dividend on the sum of £1606 12. 4d. New Three
per Cent. Annuities. Claimant Wm. Perry, one of the
executors of Geo. Creed, deceased.

MORS BAD (Caroline Mary), Richmond, Surrey, spinster,
£204 24. 10d. Three Per Cent. Annuities. Chimants Sir
Warwick Chas. Morshead, Bart., surviving executor of
Caroline Mary Morshead, spinster, deceased.

APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT-STOCK
WINDING-UP ACTS.
CALLIARD'S MANUFACTURING COMPANY LIMITED.) Credi
tors to send in by March 13, their names and ad-
dresses and the particulars of their claims, and the
names and addresses of their solicitors (if any) to Jas.
Taylor, Rochdale, the official liquidator of the said Com-
pany. March 27, at the chambers of the M. R.. at eleven
o'clock is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicacing
upon such claims.

CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY.
LAST DAY OF PROOF.

ATMORE (Michael). Kirstead, Norfolk, farmer. March 10;
F. Fox, solicitor, Norwich. March 23; V.C. H., at one
o'clock.
Buss (Edwd.), Ham Farm, Lexham, Kent, farmer. March
16; Edward Norwood, solicitor, Charing, Kent. March
30 V.C. H., at two o'clock.
DELBRIDGE (John), Gwinear, Cornwall, farmer. March 11;
Frederick V. Hill, solicitor, Helston, Cornwall. March
25: M.R, at eleven o'clock.
DUNCOMBE (Wm.), 102, Gloucester-crescent, Westbourne-
park, Middlesex, job master. March 20; Robert A.
Kelley, solicitor, 88. Great James-street, Bedford-row,
FOSTER (Laura), Stubbington House, Crofton, Southamp-
Middlesex. March 27; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.
ton, and of Matlock Bath, widow. March 5; N. Don-
nithorne, solicitor, Fareham, Southampton. March
12; V.C M., at twelve o'clock.

FOSTER (Rev. Wm.), Stubbington House. Crofton, South-
ampton. March 5; N. Donnithorne, solicitor, Fareham.
HEWITT (Jonas B.), 18, Wood Vale, Forest-hill, Surrey,
March 12; V.C, M., at twelve o'clock.
journalist. March 12; Wm. M. Spencer, solicitor, 8.
Gray's-inn-square, London. March 23; V.C. M. at twelve

o'clock.

HUDSON (Wm ), Walworth, Surrey, gentleman. March 28:
W. Overbury, solicitor, Norwich. April 13; M. R. at twelve
o'clock.

HUGHES (Richard), Morden Lodge, Morden, Surrey, Esq.
March 22; Bolton, Robbins, and Busk, solicitors, 1, New-
square, Lincoln's-inn, London. March 31; M. R. at twelve
JOHNSON (John), jun., Newton-le-Willows, York, farmer.
o'clock.
March 20; John Teale, solicitor, Leyburn, Bedale, York.
March 30; M. R., at twelve o'clock.
SHEPPARD (Henry), West Camel, Somerset, yeoman. March
16; Geo. Tuson, solicitor, Ilchester. March 31; M.R., at
twelve o'clock.

CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35.
Last Day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent.
BARTLEY (Heury J.), 30. Somerset-street, Portman-square,
Middlesex, and of 19, Abbey-place, St. John's-wood,
Middlesex; and also 4, Nelson-crescent, Ramsgate, Kent,
gentleman. April 10; Bartley and Co., solicitors, 30,
Somerset-street, Portman-square, Middlesex.
BISHOP (John), 38, Bernard-street, Russell-square, Middle-
sex, Esq., F. R. S. March 25; J. F. White, solicitor, 31,
Guilford-street, London.

BOLTON (Clara), 7, Old Bond-street, Middlesex, widow.
March 25; Bowen May, 67, Russell square, London.
BOOTH (Henry), Victoria-road, Surbiton, Surrey, corn mer-
chant. March 2; T. Donnithorne, solicitor, 30, Grace-
BOTTON (Elizabeth A.), Fetcham, Surrey, widow. March
church-street, London.
17; Wm. A. Everest, solicitor, Epsom.
BRAHAM (Elizabeth), 18, Litchfield-terrace, St. John's
Wood, Middlesex, widow. March 31; Barnard and
Harris, solicitors, 12. Finsbury-circus, Lrndon, E.C.
BRIGSTOCKE (Rev. Thos.), B.D., Incumbent of St. Kathe-
rine's, Milford, Pembroke. April 20; Bootys and Ba-
gliffe, solicitors, 1, Raymond-buildings, Gray's-inn,
London.

HUNTER (Patrick), Roden, Salop, and of Liverpool, Esq. March 2; Laces and Co., solicitors, 1, ULion-court, Liver. pool.

Hussars, and late of 49, Redcliffe-gardens, Middlesex,
Colonel in Her Majesty's army, Assistant Adjutant-
General at head-quarter, C.B. May 13; Walters and Co.,
solicitors, 9, Lincoln's-inu, London.

KELHAM (Chas. B.), 79, The Grove, Camberwell, Surrey,
colonial broker. March 31; Charles R. Kelham, 79, The
Grove, Camberwell. Surrey.

KINGHORN (Margaret J.), 36. Lorrimore-square, Walworth,
Surrey, spinster. April 21: E. Byrne, solicitor, 3, White-
hall-place, Westminster, Middlesex.

KEEN Wm.), Northmoor, Oxon, gentleman. March 25
Wm H. Walsh, solicitor, 16, New-inn, Hall-street, Ox-
ford.
LAMBE (Augusta M.), Hendon, Middlesex, spinster. March
10: Harting and Son, solicitors, 21, Lincoln's-inn-fields,
Middlesex.
MACHREGOR (Walter F.), Liverpool, engineer. March 31;
Pears and Co., solicitors, 3. Harrington-street, Liverpool
MARKHAM (Arthur B.), Northampton. attorney-at-law.
April 6; Messrs. Markham, solicitors, Northampton.
MATTRISS (Geo., Bristol, confectioner. May 1; Whitting-
ton, solicitor, 14, Small-street, Bristol.
PIERCE (Mary A.), formerly of the "Yorkshire Grey" public.
house, London-street, Middlesex, late of 2, Brunswick-
villas, Wood-street, Barnet, widow. March 15; E. J.
Layton, solicitor, 2, Suffolk lane, Cannon-street, London,
E. C.
RAMSEY (Nathan), 123, Sloane-street, Chelsea, Middlesex,
butler. March 28; E. Pope, solicitor, 12, Gray's Inn-
square, London.

REEVE (John), 118, Oxford-street, Reading, Berks, gentle-
man. March 25; Satchell and Chapple, solicitors, 6,
Queen-street, Cheapside, London.

ROBERTS (John), Hempnall, Norfolk, woodman. March
28: Hotson and Furness, solicitors, Long Stratton, Nor-
folk,

SANDERS (Wm.), Chesterfield, fruiterer. April 4; John
Cutts, solicitor, Nex-square Chesterfield.
SKULL (Edwin), High Wycombe, Bucks, chair manufac
turer. March 81; Keziah Skull, Frogmore-street, High
Wycombe.

SMITH (Walter), 22, West Parade, Newcastle-upon-Tyne,
gentleman. April 4; Hoyle and Co., solicitors, 20, Col
lingwood-street, Newcastle-upon-Tyne.

STRAITON (Alexander, 45, Knight Rider-street, London,
watch and clock maker. Aug. 13; Ingledew, Ince, and
Greening, solicitors. St. Benet-chambers, Fenchurch-
stre, London.

SWAIT (James), Charlton, Andover, gentleman. March 13;
John Smith, solicitor, High-street, Andover.
TOMPKINS (John), Brill, Bucks, 'farmer. March 28; J. and
T. Parrott, solicitors, Aylesbury.

YATES (Joseph), formerly of Clarence-street, and late of
St. Mark's, Cheltenham, china and glass dealer. March
25; W. Jessop, solicitor, Cheltenham.

REPORTS OF SALES.

Thursday, Feb. 19.

By Messrs. NEWBON and HARDING, at the Mart. Waterloo-road-Nos. 25 and 27. term 35 years-sold for £790. Hornsey-Nos, 4 and 5, Rose-villas, freehold-oid for £715. Upper Holloway-No. 48, Junction-road, freehold-sold for £550.

No. 37, Gloucester-road, term 78 years-sold for £235. Barnsbury-No, 14, Huntingdon-street, term 95 years-sold for £195.

By Mr. H. E. MURRELL. Upper Holloway-Nos. 1, 3, 5, and 7, Davenant-road, term 81 years-sold for £1195. Lisson-grove-No. 15, William-street, term 17 years-sold Portland-town-Nos, 6 and 7, Townshend-cottages, term 44 years-sold for £390.

or £115.

[blocks in formation]

A. B.-The advertisement headed "Who's your Lawyer?" which you take from the South Wales Daily News, has so often been exposed in this journal that we feel its reso-called law agents are contravening the 32nd section rated Law Society to deal with.-ED. SOLS.' DEPT.

production will serve no good purpose. No doubt the

of the Attorneys Act 1848, it is a matter for the Incorpo

No less than fifty-seven members of the Bar (in addition to those who at the recent election gained admission to the House of Commons as parliamentary representatives), sought election, and were defeated or withdrew. This, with the 107 in the House, makes 164 who sought to enter it. MR. J. A. FREEMAN, of Brighton, has been appointed town clerk of that town. He was admitted an attorney in Hilary Term 1852. The town council marked their appreciation of the services of Mr. Black, the late town clerk, by passing a very flattering resolution.

Mr. C. K. FRESHFIELD, M.P. for Dover, was

admitted an attorney in Easter Term 1834. He had previously sat in Parliament, and was formerly solicitor to the Bank of England, one of the most responsible posts that it could possibly fail to the lot of a member of either branch of the Profession

to fill.

MAGISTRATES' LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.

BASTARDY-APPLICATION-HEARING OF SUM. MONS-CONSTRUCTION OF RATE.-The mother of a bastard child signed a form of application for a summons against the putative father containing the words "who saith that she hath been delivered of a bastard child since the passing of the Bastardy Laws Amendment Act 1872." When the summons came on to be heard, objection was taken by the defendant that the child was born before the passing of the Act; the mother was sworn and admitted this was so, and the justices dismissed the summons. Upon another summons, reciting the same application but without the mistake therein, justices made an order of 2s. 6d. a week against the defendant. Held, upon certiorari, that the dismissal of the first summons was not such a hearing as to exhaust the application; and that the order upon the second sum. mons was within the justices' jurisdiction: (R. v. The Justices of Lancashire, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 886. Q.B.)

DEBTORS' ACT 1869, s. 15, SUB-SECT. 5FRAUDULENT REMOVAL OF PROPERTY BY DEBTOR-ASSIGNMENT BEFORE LIQUIDATION. -A debtor on the 17th Oct. 1873 filed his petition for the liquidation of his affairs by arrangement, and a trustee was duly appointed. In Dec. 1872 he had assigned his property to L. and W., to whom he was indebted (L. having then advanced a further sum of £350 for the purpose of enabling the business to be carried on), upon trust, for the benefit of L. and W. and his scheduled creditors. There were other creditors than those scheduled. On the 14th, 16th, and 17th Oct. 1873, the debtor fraudulently removed portions of the property so assigned to L. and W., and in respect of these removals, he was indicted under the Debtors' Act 1869, s. 11, sub-sect. 5, for having, within four months next before the commencement of the liquidation of his affairs, fraudulently removed part of his property, of the value of £10 and upwards: Held that the offence was not proved, for the property was not his at the time of removal, but that of L. and W., the trustees under the assignment. Secondly, that the assignment required to be registered under the Bills of Sale Act. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36, and was inoperative against the trustee under the liquidation: (Reg. v. Creese, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 897. Cr. Cas. Res.)

CHIEF CLERK TO THE LORD MAYOR.

ON Tuesday, at a meeting of the magistrates of the City of London, held at the Mansion House, the Lord Mayor presiding, the Court, pursuant to notice, proceeded with the further consideration of a report of their General Purposes Committee on the reference of the 20th Jan. last relative to the duties and emoluments of the Chief Clerk to the Lord Mayor, and recommending that the salary of the office be £1000, and that the payments for copies of depositions should no longer form part of the emoluments of the Chief Clerk; also that the committee be authorised to advertise for candidates for the office. Sir Benjamin Phillips now moved that the report of the committee be approved and adopted. To that Mr. Alderman Sidney objected, holding that £1000 a year was an extraordinary leap from £300, the salary of which the late Chief Clerk was in receipt on his first being appointed Assistant Clerk in the justice room. He moved, as an amendment, that the report of the committee be adopted, with the modification that £750 be substituted for £1000. The amendment was seconded by Mr. Alderman Allen, who took occasion to remind the court that, although Mr. Oke was originally in the receipt of £300 a year as Assistant Clerk, he was

in due time paid £900 as Chief Clerk. Mr. Alderman Figgins said up to that time he had sup. ported the motion for the increased stipend in connection with the office of Chief Clerk, believing it to be the duty of the court to maintain the high standard in the administration of justice with which the Mansion House justice room had been long associated, but when he saw the class of candidates who were presenting themselves for election he thought £1000 a year was a great deal too much, some of them having been junior clerks at salaries of between £200 and £300 a year. He submitted that even £750 was too much. Alderman Sir Thomas Gabriel, replying to Mr. Alderman Figgins, said, with much emphasis, knowing well the onerous and responsible duties which devolved on the Chief Clerk to the Lord Mayor, he hoped the selection would be made from no such class as that to which Mr. Alderman Figgins had referred. It occurred to Sir Thomas that a rational way of solving the matter was to resolve that, instead of making the salary £1000 a year, it should not exceed £1000. That would give the Court of Aldermen a discretion in the matter; and if they got a man for the office worth £1000 a year, well and good; but if not they could hold their hand. Mr. Alderman Sidney, as the mover of the amendment, said he had no objection to adopt the suggestion of Sir Thomas Gabriel by inserting in the amendment that the stipend should not exceed £1000. Mr. Alderman Stone said he had no doubt they would find a man in all respects competent to discharge the duties of the office for £1000 a year, and well worth the money. He thought Mr. Alderman Figgins was in error as to the class of men who were solicting the office. The court had not yet advertised for candidates. He submitted that if they made it a condition that none but members of the legal profession should be eligible, they would find no difficulty in electing a suitable man. He thought the salary should not be less than £800 a year, if they did not give £1000 a year eventually. He suggested that there should be a reference back to the committee that the salary should not be less than £800, but should be increased to £1000 if the committee should think fit. This suggestion was supported and enforced by Mr. Alderman Cotton, M.P., who held that £1000 a year was none too much to enable a man in such a responsible position to live as a gentleman, and that Mr. Alderman Figgins had been a little wrong in his premises, seeing that the Court of Aldermen had never given it out that the salary was to be £1000. The motion for that sum as the salary was also warmly supported by Sir Thomas White. Alderman Sir Benjamin Phillips explained that the matter had been well discussed by the committee, who were of opinion that, if an eminent man could be obtained, a salary of £1000 a year would not be too much, the duties of Chief Clerk at the Mansion-house, as they all knew, being very onerous, and requiring a thoroughly able man for their satisfactory discharge. The only question with the committee was whether a proper man could be obtained for £1000 a year. He was sorry Mr. Alderman Figgins had to some extent prejudiced the matter. The duty of the court clearly was to avoid appointing an inferior man, and to bid for a thoroughly good one. He was willing so to amend his motion that the minimum salary might be £800, and not exceed £1000. Eventually the motion was adopted in that form. Mr. Alderman Stone then suggested that it be an instruction to the committee to select the candidates from the legal profession, submitting that, to fill such an office worthily, the Chief Clerk should be a man of position and education, and capable of holding his own. The suggestion was supported by Mr. Alderman Gibbons, who argued that, if they could not find in the legal profession a gentleman competent to perform the duties, they were not likely to meet with him out of it. The motion for confining the selection to the legal profession was agreed to, and the court adjourned.

COMPANY LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. PRACTICE-PETITION-CONSENT.-A petition to wind-up a company will, for the future, be called on in its turn in the list of petitions, instead of being treated, as heretofore, as an opposed petition: and if, when the petition is called on, the company appear and consent, and no one appears to oppose, the petition will be taken as unopposed, and the order made thereon accordingly: (Re Bedway, &c. Coal Company, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 828. V.C. M.)

EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE-CROSSING OF LINE BY PERMITTED TRESPASS-WHETHER ANY WARNING NEED BE GIVEN TO PERMITTED TRESPASSERS.-The defendants drove trains over a line belonging to a dock company, and running between the dock and a public promenade. The public were allowed to cross the line at all points, but there was one regular crossing where

they more usually crossed. The plaintiff crossed the line at à point some distance from the regular crossing, and was knocked down and injured by a train of the defendants' driven at four miles an hour. There was a short curve at the spot, but no whistle or other warning was given by the defendants. Held, no evidence of negligence to go to the jury, and a rule to set aside a nonsuit discharged: (Harrison v. The North-Eastern Railway Company, 29, L. T. Rep. N. S. 845. Ex.).

WINDING-UP-COMPROMISE OF ACTION-CREDITING SHARES OF THIRD PARTY AS FULLY PAID UP.-An action having been brought by W. against the company, a compromise, which was made a rule of court, was agreed upon, whereby the company were to pay £3200 to W., and to credit cer. tain shares held by F., with a sum which would make them fully paid up. Certificates of the shares as fully paid up were given to F., and they were marked in the books of the company as such. Shortly afterwards the company was ordered to be wound-up. Held, that the crediting F.'s shares under the terms of the compromise with W. was a payment in cash within the meaning of the 25th section of the Companies Act 1867: (Ferrao's Case, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 876. V.C.B.).

CONTRIBUTORY-TRANSFER OF SHARES BY A MORTGAGEE TO HIS SERVANT.-By the direction of P. certain shares in a company, of which he was mortgagee, were transferred into the name of E., one of his servants. The company was ordered to be wound-up and a return of capital had been made to the shareholders. E. duly ac counted to P. for the moneys received by her in the winding-up. Notice of a further return of capital had been given, and E. now claimed to be absolutely entitled to the shares, on the ground that the transfer to her was made in fraud of the company, in order that P. might escape all liability in respect of the shares. On bill filed by P., held, that the transfer was not fraudulent, and that E. was a trustee of the shares for P.: (Colquhoun v. Courtney, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 887. M. R.)

RAILWAY COMPANY-AGREEMENT TO BUILD A STATION-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.-In consideration that W. would withdraw his opposition to a Bill before Parliament for the construction of a railway, the promoters agreed with W. to erect "a station" on his land. W. accordingly withdrew his opposition, and the Bill was duly passed. The company subsequently, while admitting themselves bound by the agreement, refused to build the station. On a bill filed by W. for specific performance of the agreement, Held, that the agreement was too vague in its terms to enable the court to make a decree for specific performance, but an inquiry was directed as to com. pensation to which W. was entitled, and the com. pany were ordered to pay all the costs: (Wilson v. The Northampton and Banbury Railway Com pany, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 879. V.C. B.) CREDITOR'S PETITION PRACTICE. A creditor who has presented a petition for winding-up a company is dominus litis, and is therefore entitled at the hearing to have his petition dismissed upon payment of the costs of all parties, including the costs of a creditor who appeared, although he had notice that the petitioner intended to have the petition dismissed: Re The Hereford &c., Engineering Co., 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 881. V.C. B.)

WINDING-UP

AGREEMENT OF COMPANY TO ASSIGN PROPERTY-ULTRA VIRES-COMPANIES ACT 1862.The directors of a limited company agreed to assign the property and goodwill of the company to A., who was to use his best endeavours to form a new company. The agreement did not bind A. to form a new company, or state anything as to its proposed name, capital, or shares. B., a shareholder, gave notice of his objection to the proposed transfer, but resolutions were passed confirming the agreement, and for winding-up the company voluntarily. The resolutions for winding-up the company were subsequently abandoned. Held, on bill filed by B. against the directors and the company, that the agreement with A. and the resolution confirming it were ultra vires, and that the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction restraining the transfer to A.: (Bird v. Bird's, &c., Sewage Co., 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 881. V.C. B.) RAILWAY NEGLIGENCE INVITATION ALIGHT-SEASON TICKET HOLDER-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.-Where, upon the approach of a train to a station the name of the station is called out by the officials of the company, and the train overruns the platform and comes to a final stop, and no warning is given to the passengers, and no attempt made to back the train, held suffi cient evidence of negligence on the part of the company to be left to a jury. If a passenger gets out after the train has stopped, and is injured by falling where there is no platform, the fact that it was so dark where the plaintiff alighted that he could not see the platform is not necessarily proof of contributory negligence on his part, the other facts having happened: (Wellen v. The London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 888. C. P.)

TO

REAL PROPERTY AND CONVEYANCING.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.

PRACTICE SUIT BY MORTGAGEES FOR SALE AND GENERAL ADMINISTRATION OF TESTATOR'S ESTATE COSTS.-A legal mortgagee who insti tutes a suit for the sale of the mortgaged property, and for the general administration of the mortgagor's estate, is entitled to have the amount of his principal, interest, and costs, paid out of the proceeds of the sale of other mortgaged pro. perty in priority to the costs of the suit: (Pinchard v. Fellows, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 882. V.C. B.)

WILL-CONSTRUCTION-ELECTION.-A testa. trix advanced £900 to M. on an assignment by him of a covenant by F. to transfer to M. £1000 stock, and to pay interest at £5 per cent. By her will she gave F. £3000, and all sums due to her by him, and directed her executors not to require payment of the £900 due from M., but out of the £3000 given to F. to retain enough to purchase £1000 stock, in satisfaction of the covenant by F., and to pay the surplus thereof beyond the £900 and interest to M. F. having predeceased her, she by her codicil directed the £3000 to form part of her residuary estate, but directed her executors not to call on F.'s representatives for payment, or transfer of the £1000 stock, nor to enforce payment by M. of the £900. A special case having been filed, in order to ascertain the rights of the defendant M., and the representative of F., Lord Justice James (sitting for ViceChancellor Wickens) decided that M. was not at liberty to enforce against F.'s estate, the covenant to transfer the £1000 stock. Held, on appeal, that the decision of the court below was correct, except as to the trifling difference between the the

£900 and the value of £1000 stock (£10 12s. 6d.) the payment of which M. was at liberty to enforce against F.'s estate: (Synge v. Synge, 29 L. T. Rep. 855. Ch.)

MARITIME LAW.

SPECIMENS OF A CODE OF MARINE
INSURANCE LAW.

By F. O. CRUMP, Barrister-at-Law.
(Continued from p. 219.)

PERILS OF THE SEA.
Definition.

PERILS of the sea embrace all kinds of marine casualties, such as shipwreck, foundering, stranding, &c., and every species of damage to the ship or goods at sea by the violent and immediate action of winds and waves, not comprehended in the ordinary wear and tear of the voyage, or directly referable to the acts and negligence of the assured as its proximate cause.

Aru. 4th edit. 681; Ph. sect. 1099.

Element of Negligence.

Although negligence may be the remote cause of the loss, yet if the perils of the sea be the proximate cause the loss may be recovered:

Davidson v. Burnand, L. Rep. 8 C. P. '117. (A discharge pipe left open and by loading brought below the water line); Heman v. Parish, 2 Camp. 149; Everth v. Hannam, 2 Marsh. Rep. 74; 6 Taunt. 375; Blyth v. Shepherd, 9 M. & W. 763, to be considered overruled; Buller v. Fisher, 3 Esp. 67; Hodgson v. Malcolm, 2 B. & P., N. S. 339.

If the negligence of agents of assured in allow. ing a ship to be condemned and broken up when she might have been repaired brought about condemnation the underwriters are not liable: Tanner v. Bennett, Ry. & M. 182. Examples of what are Losses by Perils of the Sea. Foundering at sea proximately caused by the fury of storms and tempests.

Shipwreck caused by the ship being driven ashore, or on rocks and shoals in mid-seas, by violence of the winds and waves.

The immediate and necessary consequences of shipwreck:

Dent v. Smith, L. Rep. 4 Q. B. 414.

Stranding, where it is fortuitous and not arising in the ordinary course of the voyage: Fletcher v. Inglis, 2 B. & Ald. 315. (Ebbing tide, hard and uneven bottom, swell in harbour.) Ship taken in tow by man-of-war, and obliged to carry a press of sail to keep up with her, shipped seas and damaged cargo:

Hagedorn v. Whitmore, 1 Stark. 157.

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Taylor v. Dunbar, L. Rep. 4 C. P. 206. Loss by spontaneous combustion generated by grounds: chemical change of the thing insured:

Boyd v. Dubois, 3 Camp. 132.

Ship necessarily on ground when tide was low. Nothing fortuitous :

Magnus v. Buttemer, 11 C. B. 876; 21 L. J. 119, C.P. Ship in graving dock blown over by a violent gust of wind:

Phillips v. Barber, 5 B. & Ald. 161.

Ship driven on an enemy's coast bilged in being hauled up on beach:

Green v. Elmslie, Peake, 212.

Leakage of oil by pitching of ship. But stowage not disturbed:

Crofts v. Marshall, 7 C. & P. 597.

Damage sustained by a ship from the fire of another vessel of the same nation mistaking her for an enemy:

Cullen v. Butler, 5 M. & Sel. 461.

Damage caused to a merchantman by the fire of the enemy when being defended against cap

ture:

Taylor v. Curtis, 6 Taunt. 608; 2 Marsh Rep. 309. Electric cable insufficiently insulated; expense of laying it down lost through the chemical action of the salt water on the wire:

Peterson v. Harris, 1 B. & S. 336; 30 L. J. 354, Q. B. Destruction of ship's bottom by worms in seas where worms ordinarily assail ships, unless sheathing be torn off by violent action af the sea and the bottom thus exposed:

1 Ph. 1101; Kent. 3, p. 305-306; Rohl v. Parr, 1 Esp. 444; Martin v. Salem, 3 Mass. Rep. 429; Hazard v. N. Eng. Ins. Co., 8 Pet. Sup. C. Rep. 557. Damage by rats:

Hunter v. Potts, 4 Camp. 203; Laveroni v. Drury, 8 Exch. 166; 22 L. J. 2, Ex. Commingling of goods, and owners refusing to accept an apportionment:

Spence v. Unien Marine Ins. Co., L. Rep. 3 C. P. 427. Live stock thrown overboard to save the rest, a scarcity of provisions having occurred owing to the protraction of the voyage in consequence of the gross ignorance of the captain:

Live stock perishing from want of food, owing to the unavoidable prolongation of the voyage fault of the captain and crew: in consequence of bad and stormy weather, without

Gregson v. Gilbert, 3 Dong. 282 2 Marsh. Ins. 493;
Tatham v. Hodgson, 6 T. R. 656; 5 B. and Ald. 111.
By Collision.

The loss recoverable in each case is governed by the terms of the running down clause. See Coey v. Smith, 22 Court of Sess. Ca. N.S. 955;

and Taylor v. Dewar, 5 B & S. 58; 33 L.J., 41 Q.B.,

which are in conflict, and; Xenos v. Fox, L. Rep.

3 C. P. 630.

Where the collision is purely fortuitous, and there is no fault on either side, the loss is recoverable:

Buller v. Fisher, 3 Esp. 67; Xenos v. Fox, L. Rep. 3 C. P. 630; Smith v. Scott, 4 Taunt. 126; De Vaux v. Salvador, 4. Ad. & E. 420.

If damage to the ship only be provided for by the "running down" clause, damages for personal injuries sustained from the same collision by persons on board either of the vessels, cannot be recovered:

Taylor v. Dewar, 5 B & S. 58; 33 L. J. 141, Q. B. An owner whose ship had done damage to another standing by and seeing his ship sold, under a decree of a court of admiralty, for less than she is worth, can only claim for the amount actually paid under the decree, and cannot claim for loss by reason of the forced sale under decree :

Thompson v. Reynolds, 7 E. & B. 172; 26 L. J. 93,
Q. B.; Xenos v. Fox, L. Rep. 4 C. P. 665.
ILLEGALITY.

interest insured is illegal, or if the contract conAn insurance upon a subject is void if the templates an unlawful use of it.

Redmond v. Smith, 1 M. & Gr. 437.

If the trade be illegal it defeats the policy on the ship as well as that on the cargo.

Any illegality in the prior stages or at the outset of an integral voyage vitiates a policy, though Loss of masts, spars, sails, and rigging by carry- effected only to protect some later stage of it in ing press of sail to escape an enemy: which there is no illegality.

Covington v. Roberts, 2 B. & P., N. Š., 378. Deterioration of tobacco by foetid odours of hides damaged by salt water shipped in bad weather:

Montoya v. Lond. Ass. Co. 6 Ex. 451.

Damage below the water line from violent grounding as the result of a storm:

Harrison v. The Universal Marine Insurance Company,

3 F. & F. 191.

Plunder by wreckers:

Bondrett v. Hentigg, Holt, 149.

Live stock bruised and lacerated by the viol

The illegality of a distinct and separate voyage has no effect on the voyage or venture described in the policy.

Arn. 630, 631, 4th edit.; Phillips, sect. 231; Sewell v. Royal Exchange Assurance Company, 4 Taunt. 855.

A contravention of law, though it have relation to the subject or the risk, will not affect the insurance if it be remote, and distinct from the contract, or only collateral.

Phillips, sect. 221.

A risk legal in its commencement becoming

(1) That the adventure is opposed to the policy of the law.

See Arn. 4th edit., pt. II., c. 5.

(2) That it is in fraud of the Revenue,
Trade, or Navigation Laws of the home
country.

(3) In contravention of international com.
mercial treaties and occasional statutes.
(4) In contravention of the law of nations.
(5) In contravention of embargo.

(6) In violation of the country's war policy. 1 and 2.-Revenue and Navigation Laws. The export or import of goods being prohibited, illegal and void. a contract of insurance in respect of them is

NOTE.-A contemplated violation of the laws of foreign countries does not affect the insurance: (Arn. 531, 4th edit.; 3 Kent, Com. s. 263.) [The latter author says: "The principle does no credit to the commercial jurisprudence of the age."} A violation of statutory regulations as to the equipment of vessels would seem to be an illegality avoiding a contract of insurance.

Arn. 4th edit. 635.

void.

3.-Commercial Treaties and occasional Statutes. All insurances on ships or goods navigated or conveyed contrary to the provisions of any commercial treaty to which the home country is a party or statute passed for temporary purposes is NOTE.-Lord Stowell says, "Every treaty is part of the private law of each of the countries which are parties to it, and is as binding on the subjects of each as any part of their own municipal laws: (The Eenroom, 2 C. Rob. Adm. R. 1, 6.) Prohibited Trading.

No licence being obtained an insurance is invalid.

If only a small portion of a cargo owned by one person, or by several acting in partnership or by a common agent, covered by one contract of insurance, comprises prohibited goods, the contract is vitiated entirely.

Parkin v. Dick, 2 Camp. 221; Hagedorn v. Bazett, 2
M. & G. 100.

If part of a cargo is legal, but the residue, though legal, is intended to cover an illegal design, and the whole is insured in one policy, the insurance is void:

Gibson v. Vaughan, 12 East, 302.

A licence having been obtained, the contract is not void by reason of prohibited goods of other Persons being on board, but is invalid to the extent that the assured has exceeded his licence by shipping a surplus of prohibited goods:

Keir v. Andrade, 6 Taunt. 496; Butler v. Allnutt, 1
Stark, 223.

An informality in the mode of obtaining a licence for exporting prohibited goods makes it of no effect, and avoids the contract of insurance if made on a general cargo belonging to the same owners:

Camelo v. Britten, 4 B. & Ald. 184; Gibson v. Service, 5 Taunt. 433.

An act may contravene the strict terms of an order in council without amounting to an illegality so as to avoid a contract of insurance. Ex gr.-If the object be legal:

Atkinson v. Abbott, 1 Camp. 535; 11 East, 135.

4.-The Law of Nations.

Contravention may be:

(1) By a neutral supplying to a belligerent
articles which are contraband of war.
(2) By violating blockade.

(3) By engaging in the privileged trade of a
belligerent.

Contraband of war includes:

Arms, warlike equipments and naval and military supplies.

Provisions destined for a military force, or to a place which is beseiged or blockaded.

Articles of ordinary convenience or necessity if going to a belligerent port where such articles are used for warlike purposes.

Raw materials capable of being turned to the purposes of war.

[See fuller enumeration of particular goods, Arn., 4th edit., pp. 647, 648.]

Marsh Ins., 54, 55.

Contraband of war may be insured in a neutral country if its nature is made known to the underwriter.

[See "Concealment: Liability to Capture."] Such insurances are void in the country of the hostile belligerent, and cannot be enforced in his courts.

Arn., 4th edit., 649, n. 3.

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