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[See further on this subject, and as to (2) and Art. 2. Oldendorff is to have the right to use (3). Warranties: Express-Neutrality.]

5.-Violation of Embargo.

A Government in time of war having laid an embargo on all ships sailing for a particular port an insurance on a contravention of such embargo is void:

Arn. 4th edit. 639; Delmada v. Motteur, 1 Hild,
Park. Ins. 505.

6.-In violation of the Country's War Policy. Trading with the enemy during war without a licence is illegal, and the insurance on such trading is void:

Potts v. Bell, 8 T. R. 548.

Exception.-A native of a belligerent country domiciled in a neutral country may trade with the enemy of his country and insure the adventure:

Bell v. Reid; Bell v. Butler, 1 M. & S. 726 ; Willson v.
Marryatt, 8 T. R. 31.

All insurances effected in the home country to protect property liable by its situation in an enemy's country to British capture, are void : Arn. 4th edit. 612.

An insurance on goods to a friendly or neutral port there to be delivered to a neutral is valid though the neutral himself be resident in a port of hostile occupation:

Bromley v. Hesseltine, 1 Camp. 75. See Hobbs v. Hem ming, 34 L. J., 117, C. P..


NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. FORECLOSURE SUIT-COUNTY COURTS ACTSCOSTS.-In a suit to foreclose a mortgage for £50. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to his full costs of suit: (Brown v. Rye, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 872. M. R.)

(Before W. T. S. DANIEL, Esq., Judge.)
Jan. 23 and Feb. 6.




£2519 78. 10d.



and carry on the firm of Barthelmes and Co. for five years from the 1st Jan. 1870, and Barthelmes binds himself not to establish any business in Yorkshire during that period. Art. 3. Oldendorff agrees to take for his account, and credit Barthelmes with, certain stock and effects amounting to £2803 15s. 6d. Art. 4. Barthelmes hands over to Oldendorff for collection certain trade debts, amounting to £6279 12s. 4d., which Oldendorff agrees to collect and therewith pay certain trade liabilities of Barthelmes, amounting to £4429 0s. 3d., and to pay out of the remainder a balance of the receipt £1000 to Barthelmes' liquidation account at the Bradford Banking Company, and the rest upon three months' notice after 1st Jan. 1871. Art. 5. Barthelmes agrees to leave Oldendorff against guarantee capital to the amount of £2000 for five years from 1st Jan. 1870, with interest at 5 per cent. per annum, pay. able half yearly; Barthelmes takes upon himself the liability upon bills drawn previously to 1st Jan. 1870 and due in 1870 amounting to Art. 6. For cession of the goodwill of the business Oldendorff agrees to pay Barthelmes a commission of one half per cent. the amount of a business ning 1st Jan. 1870 to the end of 1874, and to turned over by him during the five years beginrender a half yearly statement of the same. Art. 8. Oldendorff agrees to take Barthelmes' warehouse in Bradford on a lease of fourteen years at a yearly rent of £400 payable half yearly, with a right to sublet part or the whole thereof. Art. Oldendorff agrees to induce Mr. H. Averdieck, of Bradford, to guarantee Barthelmes the payment of £4000 within five years from the 1st Jan. 1870, and agrees to pay all necessary stamps and legal expenses. The lease provided for by Art 8 was duly executed. The guarantee provided for by Art. 5 was duly given. From the 10th March 1870 down to the month of Jan. 1873, the agreeement was acted upon by both parties, and the terms thereof complied with, except as to the payment of the first year's commission provided by Art. 6. Barthelmes having released Oldendorff from the payment of it by reason of the badness of trade arising from the French and German war, Oldendorff carried on the business from the 1st Jan. 1870, and received the assets and paid the debts of the old firm of Barthelmes and Co., and reduced the balance due to Barthelmes to £2000, which he retained on loan according to Art. 5, secured by Averdieck's guarantee, according to Art. 9 In the early part of 1872 the account between Oldendorff and Barthelmes was made up to 31st Dec. 1871, and showed a balance of £2051 9s. 6d., the £51 93. 6d. being due for interest on the £2000. This sum of £51 9s. 6d. being small was not paid, but the balance was continued and carried forward: (See Oldendorff's affidavit, 30th Dec. 1873, pp. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9). From this evidence it is clear that the £2000 was originally a loan from Barthelmes to Oldendorff on his separate security, and the payment was guaranteed by Averdieck to Barthelmes, as the separate debt of Oldendorff. In the autumn of 1872 Oldendorff was desirous of obtaining a working partner to assist him with capital and in the conduct of the business. The defendant was introduced to him through a friend of both parties, and after some negotiation a partnership was agreed to be formed between them, and the terms were contained in an agreement dated the 22nd Nov. 1872. Art. 1. The stock of the business now carried on by Oldendorff, under the firm of Barthelmes and Co., to be taken on 31st Dec. 1872, and the assets and liabilities of the firm to be ascertained by the balancing of the books as early as possible after that day, the balance then standing to the credit of the old firm being transferred to Oldendorff's account, and reckoned as his share of capital in the new partnership business. Art. 2. This agreement to be based upon the assumption sum of that Oldendorff's capital thus ascertained amounts to £8000, and Myers to deposit £5000 in the business as his requisite share of capital. Art. 3. The capital of each partner, to bear interest at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum. Art. 4. The profit or loss to be apportioned three-fifths to Oldendorff, two-fifths to Myers. Art. 5. The drawings of the respective parties from the business not to exceed in one year £1000 by Oldendorff, and £600 by Myers, unless by consent of his copartner. Art. 7. The partnership now formed to be carried on under the name of L. H. Oldendorff and Myers, and to commence from 1st Jan. 1873, and to continue for five years from that time. Art. 14. Should any losses arise from the debts due to the firm of Barthelmes and Co., and placed to the credit of Oldendorff in the new partnership, such losses to be placed to the debit of Oldendorff's private account. Art. 15. This agreement to be rectified after the opportunity has been given of verifying the facts upon which it is based. The partnership between Oldendorff and Myers, as constituted by the agreement of 22nd Nov. 1872,

Bankruptcy-Surety-Substituted liability. In order to transfer a separate liability of A. into the joint liability of A. and B., there must be the mutual agreement of both A. and B. to do That agreement may be proved by conduct. There must also be the agreement of the creditor of A. to accept the liability of A. and B. in lieu and discharge of the liability of A.: (Ex parte Whitmore, 3 Deac. 365 ; Rolfe v. Flower, L. Rep. 1 P. C. 27.) Semble, if a creditor accept the joint liability of A. and B. in lieu of the separate liability of A., he discharges a surety for the separate debt of A., as accepting a distinct and perhaps less valuable security. (See observations by Alderson, B., Lyth v. Ault, 7 Ex. 669.) Shaw, instructed by Wood and Killick, for the motion.

Jordan, instructed by Rawson, George, and Wade, opposed.

This was an application by or on behalf of Ernestus Emilius Barthelmes, of Erfurt, Germany, gentleman, made in the matter of the liquidation by arrangement of Ludolf Henry Oldendorf and Joseph Myers, of Bradford, stuff merchants, trading in co-partnership as Oldendorf and Myers, for an order directing that the decision of the trustee rejecting the proof by the said E. E. Barthelmes upon the joint estate of the said debtors, may be raised or reversed, and that the trustee may be directed to admit the said E. E. Barthelmes as a person entitled to prove upon the joint estate of the said debtors for the sum of £2368 123, 5d. The notice of motion by an amend. ment made by consent at the hearing, asks for certain alternative relief, with which it will be more convenient to deal hereafter. The debt of £2368 12s. 5d. sought to be proved against the joint estate is composed of a £2000, originally a separate loan by Barthelmes to Oldendorff, and £368 12s. 5d. for commission due from Oldendorff and Barthelmes, upon an agreement which originally was the separate agreement of Oldendorff. The question whether these two debts, originally separate, have become joint, depends upon whether the facts, as established by the evidence show-first, that the firm of Oldendorff and Myers had assumed the liability to pay these two debts, as joint debts of the firm; and, secondly, that Barthelmes had, before the date of the petition for liquidation, agreed to accept the firm as his debtors, and to discharge Oldendorff from his original liability in his separate engagements. The facts are as follow:Barthelmes had for some time prior and up to the 1st Jan. 1870, carried on the business of a stuff merchant at Bradford, and by an agreement dated the 10th March 1870, between himself and Oldendorff. Art. 1. Barthelmes transferred to Oldendorff his said business as from the 1st Jan. 1870, from which date it was to be deemed to have been carried on by Oldendorff on his sole account.


was carried on from the 1st Jan. 1873, up to the 23rd July 1873, when the petition for liquidation in the matter was filed; but the embarrassments of the firm began in the month of June. Upon the question whether the firm of Oldendorff and Myers agreed to adopt the debt of 20007., and the liability of Oldendorff to the commission of half per cent to Barthelmes, there is a direct and irreconcilable conflict of evidence upon the affidavits of the two debtors. I have carefully read and considered those affidavits, and I have come to the conclusion that, whatever may have been the intention of Oldendorff upon the subject, it was never the intention of Myers to adopt those liabilities as liabilities of the partnership; that he believed, and was justified in believing, and acted on the belief, that the 20007. formed part of Oldendorff's capital, and that the commission was a liability which Oldendorff would settle and arrange with Barthelmes. it appears to me that the letters from Oldendorff to Barthelmes, set out in Oldendorff's affidavit dated 8th Nov., 11th Dec., 23rd Dec. 1872; 13th Jan., 7th Feb., and 26th June 1873, confirm the view of the transaction as given by Myers. The letter of 27th June 1873 is the first letter in which Oldendorff treats Myers as in any way interested in his proposals to Barthelmes, and I observe this was written from Whitby after Myers, as he states, had ascertained the embarrassed position of the firm, and had decided to stop payment, and Oldendorff says he never did communicate with Myers as he stated in that letter he should. It has been attempted, however, to be made out that apart from express agree. duct the firm of Oldendorff and Myers has by consentadopted these separate liabilities of Oldendorff as joint liabilities of the firm. The conduct relied upon consists in the payment to Barthelmes by cheques drawn in the name and payable out of the funds of the fimr of two cheques for £200 and £393 10s. 3d. The cheque for £200 was for half a year's rent of the warehouse. This warehouse had been leased by Barthelmes to Oldendorff for fourteen years, from 1st Jan. 1870, at £400 per annum, and was occupied by the firm at the same rent, as sub-tenant to Oldendorff; the firm were not the assignees of the lease, but they held it from Oldendorff at the same rent, and the £200 thus paid direct by the firm to Barthelmes was not a payment for which they were liable to Barthelmes, but their liability to Oldendorff being of the same amount as his to Barthelmes, the payment was made direct to avoid the needless circuit of two cheques, and appears to me to have no bearing on the question. The other cheque for £393 10s. 3d. was for the balance over and above the £2000 which was due to Barthelmes from Oldendorff up to 31st Dec. 1873: this sum was paid by a check drawn in the name of the firm by Oldendorff and which when it was pointed out to him by Myers (as stated by him in the 21st paragraph of his affidavit, and not specifically contradicted by Oldendorff). Oldendorff stated he had told Schreiber (the cashier) to place to the debit of his private account, and this payment, therefore, proves nothing to the point. I am unable, therefore, to find either from the evidence or the conduct of the partners, sufficient ground for concluding that Myers ever agreed that these separate liabilities of Oldendorff for the 20001. and the commission, or either of them, should be treated as joint liabilities of the firm. But even if such an agreement were established, it must then be shown by Barthelmes that before the petition for liquidation he knew of this agreement, and adopted the firm as his debtors in lieu and discharge of the separate liability of Oldendorff. Mr. Barthelmes is resident in Germany, and on the day on which his proof was made, the 19th Aug. 1873, he was in Bradford, and was examined and cross-examined privately and voluntarily at the office of the trustee's solicitor by his own solicitor and the solicitor of the trustee, and both parties consented at the hearing before me that the examination might be read as evidence. I have read that examination, and have not been able to find in it anything which would show an adoption of the liability of the firm in lieu and discharge of the separate liability of Oldendorff. And I am unable to understand how Mr. Barthelmes could have intended or been advised to make such an adoption. The debt of Oldendorff was guaranteed by Averdieck, who was represented to be, and I presume is, a substantial man and able to meet his guarantee; and Mr. Barthelmes was therefore always secure of receiving 20s. in the pound in this debt, treating it as the separate debt of Oldendorff, whereas by accepting the joint liability of the firm in discharge of the separate liability of Oldendorff he might (according to the judgment of Baron Alderson in Lyth v. Ault, 7 Exch. 669, probably would) have lost the benefit of Averdieck's guarantee by substituting a different and what might have been a less valuable security, the benefit of which Averdieck would have lost if he had been called upon to pay upon his guarantee. It was suggested during the argument by the counsel for the trustee that this

motion was really made in the interest of Averdieck, because as it appears from the proceedings that the dividend upon the joint estate will be much larger than the dividend upon Oldendorff's separate estate, and as upon Averdieck paying Barthelmes this debt in full, he will be entitled to the benefit of Barthelmes' proof-it is for the benefit of Averdieck that the proof should be made against the joint estate. The suggestion is plausible, and may be well founded, but I have no facts in evidence before me that show that Barthelmes' proof is made for such a purpose, and I rest my decision upon the absence of sufficient evidence that Myers ever agreed to adopt Oldendorff's liabilities to Barthelmes for the £2000, and the commission on either of them as liabilities of the firm of Oldendorff and Myers; and also upon the ground that even if such an agreement were shown to have been made. Bar. thelmes ever agreed to adopt the joint liability of the firm in lieu and discharge of the separate liability of Oldendorff; and according to the cases of Ex parte Whitmore (3 Deac. 365), and Rolfe v. Flower (L. Rep. 1 P. C. 27), both these must concur. The motion, therefore, so far as it seeks to discharge or vary the trustee's decision respecting the proof as a proof against the joint estate, will be refused with costs. The notice of motion, however, proceeds to ask in the alternative that if the court shall be of opinion that the said E. E. Barthelmes is not entitled to prove upon the joint estate of the said debtors therefor, a declara. tion that such of the assets and property now in the possession or under the control of the trustee as were on the 31st Dec. 1872, the separate estate of the debtor Oldendorff, trading as Barthelmes and Co., but which are included as assets in the joint balance sheet filed by the debtors, are the separate estate of the said Oldendorff, and appli. cable in the first instance to the discharge of his separate liabilities, and that for the purposes aforesaid, all necessary accounts may be taken, and inquiries made, and for an order declaring and ascertaining the rights of the said E. E. Barthelmes in respect of the joint and separate estates of the said debtors respectively. Upon this part of the notice of motion, I decline to make any such order as asked for. First, because the order asked for would be premature, as there is no proof on the file showing that Barthelmes is a separate creditor of Oldendorff for any definite sum, but, secondly, because it is reasonably clear that there cannot be any such assets, inasmuch as by the effect of the partnership articles of 29th Nov. 1872, and what was done under them by the debtors as shown by the twenty-first par. of Oldendorff's first affidavit, all the assets of the firm of Barthelmes and Co., were, as from the 1st Jan. 1873, carried on to the firm of Oldendorff and Myers. They formed part of the capital of Oldendorff in the firm of Oldendorff and Myers just as much as the £4000 or whatever the sum may have been which Myers brought into the firm as eapital, and the whole became joint estate and to be applied in payment in the first instance of the joint debts. If any creditor of this partnership had recovered judgment against the debtors, I apprehend it is quite clear he could have taken in execution as goods of the partner ship, the goods which are by the notice of motion sought to be declared to be the separate estate of Oldendorff. In truth, what this part of the notice of motion aims at, is to raise a question affecting the capital account between the partners-a question with which the joint creditors have no concern, and cannot be raised so as to prejudice them. I therefore make no order upon the alternative part of the notice of motion, and dismiss the rest of the motion with costs.

to the subordinate easement rights reserved to
the vendor and those claiming under him. The
vendor has already been fully compensated for
injuries sustained by him in consequence of the
company having taken his land, and the deed of
conveyance to the company recites this. The
use of the line in the way complained of is neces-
sary to the proper working of the traffic. The
claim, if recoverable at all, is in the nature of
"unforeseen damage," and must be recovered
before two justices, as prescribed by the Lands'
Clauses Consolidation Act. Moreover, the plain-
tiff must prove that he has sustained special
damage resulting in actual loss.

His HONOUR said there could be no doubt as
to the jurisdiction of the court, and he would
award 408. damages, with costs on the lower scale.
Judgment accordingly.

(Before H. J. STONOR, Esq., Judge.)
Thursday, Feb. 19.

Reservation, or grant of sporting to lessor-parol agreement within the cases of Erskine v.
Whether exclusive or Concurrent-Construction
of lease.

THE case was heard before a jury in January
The plaintiff is a farmer, residing at Faccombe,
North Hants, and he sued the defendant (Mr.
Alan Boman Heath), his landlord, who resides at
East Woodhay, for the sum of £50 as damages
sustained by him in consequence of his failing to
keep down the rabbits on the estate as he
dant) had promised to do.

W. H. Cave appeared for the plaintiff.
Sills, barrister (instructed by Smith, of And-
over), for the defendant.

The damages were admitted, and his Honour
then said the case resolved itself into a nonsuit
or otherwise upon the terms of the covenant.
He directed the jury to give a verdict for the
plaintiff for the full amount, subject to his de-
cision on the point.

the rabbits had eaten up a great deal of the wheat and vetches, and were beginning to injure the root crop. In the month of Aug. 1873, the lessee had a valuation made, and the damage to the wheat was certified to be upwards of £37 78. Notice of the valuation was sent to the defendant, but he did not attend to it. The damage to the vetches and other crops was estimated by the plaintiff at £12 13s. and upwards, and he now sues the defendant for £50 damages, according to the above valuation and estimate. The amount of damage was admitted, but the liability of the plaintiff, under the lease, or otherwise, was dis puted, and a verdiot for the plaintiff was taken, subject to the opinion of the court as to the defendant's liability. It appeared by the evidence of the plaintiff on the trial that the rabbits could be destroyed by means of ferrets in the autumn or winter, but not in the spring or summer, on account of the young rabbits, which the ferrets devoured, instead of pursuing the old rabbits. The plaintiff deposed to a conversation with the lessor's agent during the treaty for the lease, as to the rabbits on the farm, but it was of so vague a nature as certainly not to amount to a collateral Adeane (29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 234), and Morgan v. Griffiths (23 L. T. Rep. N. S. 783). The two questions which now remain for my decision are, first, whether the defendant is liable under the lease, and, secondly, whether he is liable in consequence of the subsequent transactions. With regard to the defendant's liability under the lease, it is to be observed that the provisions of that instrument are most inaccu(defen-rately framed. In the first place the usual and almost universal error is committed of excepting or reserving to the lessor the game, rabbits, and wild fowl with liberty to hunt and shoot the same, instead of inserting a grant by the lessee to the lessor to that effect, but as it is well established that such an exception or reservation will operate as a grant by the lessee, if he executes the lease (Wickham v. Hawker, 7 M. & W. 63), this point is perhaps immaterial. The next point, however, is of much importance and difficulty, and practically affects the present case, viz., whether this grant is a grant to the lessor of an exclusive right of shooting or only a grant of a concurrent right with the right which the lessee has at common law (Year Book, 14 Hen. 3, Bac. Abr." trespass" H. 3; Lifford's case, 11 Rep. 48; Moore v. Earl of Plymouth, 7 Taunt. 614), and which since 1 & 2 Will. 4. c. 32, is wholly unrestricted and unqualified unless by the agreement of the parties. Upon the whole I am of opinion, but with some doubt, that the lessor's right is not exclusive but is concurrent with the lessee's. The covenants which follow however expressly bind the lessee not to exercise his concurrent right as to "6 hares, partridges, pheasants, or other game," but not affecting whatever right he otherwise would have to shoot and destroy rabbits and wild fowl. For although the term "game" does sometimes include rabbits (Jeffreys v. Evans, 34 L. J., 263, C.P.), yet it is clear that they are not intended to be included in the term game " in these covenants, as the word “rabbits” is superadded to it in the previous reservation or grant. At the end of these covenants, indeed, comes an exception which singularly and improperly relates to rabbits, although they are not mentioned, nor, as I think, included in the covenants, and this exception appears to me to be altogether void under the rule that an exception must relate to part of a thing previously granted or covenanted to be done: (Touch. 77.) This exception provides "that in case the rabbits injure the crops and the lessor shall not, after notice in writing, destroy the same or refuse compensation for such injury, it shall be lawful for the lessee after such notice and refusal of compensation, to destroy a sufficient quantity of rabbits by ferrets, but in no case to set a gin or wire, or any other instrument for the purpose.' As I have already said, it is in my opinion utterly void, and nowise limits the concurrent right of the lessee to shoot the rabbits and to prevent them becoming a nuisance, and on this point I would refer to the dictum of Byles, J., in Jeffreys v. Evans (34 L. J. 265, C. P.), as to the right of a lessee to destroy rabbits when they become a nuisance, even where the right of sporting granted to the lessor was exclusive. To sum up this part of the case I am of opinion that under the very inaccurate and contradictory provisions of the lease, the lessee is entitled concurrently with the lessor at any time to shoot the rabbits or otherwise to destroy them. The only argument to the contrary which I can see is, that on the construction of the various provisions contained in the lease, a general intention is discoverable, that the lessee should neither shoot nor destroy game or rabbits, except in the one case of the rabbits injuring the crops or the lessor refusing compensation, and that to carry out the intention, the right of shooting granted to the lessor is to be considered as exclusive, and the word "game in the covenants is to be held to include rabbits, but I cannot conceive that this argument would

His HONOUR, this day, delivered judgment as follows: By a lease dated the 13th April 1863, Mr. A. B. Heath demised to Mr. E. Ricketts a farm at Faccombe, in the county of Hants, for a term of seven years, from Michaelmas 1862. In the lease was contained the following exception or reservation : Except and always reserved unto the said A. B. Heath, his heirs and assigns, all game, rabbits, and wild fowl, with full and free liberty for the said A. B. Heath, his heirs and assigns, and his and their gamekeepers, servants, friends, and acquaintances, and all and every other person or persons by their orders and consent, at all times during the term hereby granted to hunt, course, shoot, or sport in, upon, or over the said hereby demised lands and premises, or any part thereof." And in the said lease was contained a covenant by the lessee not to shoot or destroy hares, partridges, pheasants, or other game (but not mentioning rabbits), and not to permit any persons except the lessor to shoot or destroy the game (but not mentioning rabbits) in or upon the said premises, with an exception that in case the rabbits injured the crops, and the lessor should not, after notice in writing to that effect, destroy the same or refuse compensation for such injury, it should be lawful for the said E. Ricketts after such notice and refusal of compensation (but no mention as to refusal to destroy the rabbits), to destroy a sufficient quantity of rabbits by ferrets, but in no case to set a gin or wire, or use any other instrument for the purpose of killing such rabbits. In 1863-4-5 the lessee did not shoot or destroy rabbits. In 1865 the rabbits had increased and did damage, and such damage was valued at £50 by two valuers and paid by the lessor to the lessee. In 1866-7-8 the lessee had permission to shoot, and kept down the rabbits. In the autumn of 1868 this permission was revoked, but subsequently it was renewed and the lessee shot until Feb. 1869. Since then the lessee neither shot nor destroyed any rabbits till September last. In the spring of 1872 the rabbits had again increased, and on the 10th May in that year the lessee's attorney wrote to the lessor complaining that the rabbits were doing considerable damage to the lessee's crops and requiring the lessor to destroy them or to pay compensation, and in answer thereto the lessor wrote to the lessee's attorney a letter dated 11th May 1872, in which he says, "I am surprised to hear about the rabbits, as I am told there is scarcely a rabbit in the whole place, but I must refer you to the lease." In the summer of 1873 the rabbits had increased to a very great extent, and had done serious damage to the growing crops. On the 16th June 1873, the lessee's solicitor again wrote to the lessor, requiring him to destroy the rabbits or to pay him compensation; and on the 8th July 1873, the lessor wrote a letter to Wicks, of Cockermouth, appeared for the the lessee's solicitor, simply declining to give plaintiff. any compensation, and took no steps to deE. T. Tyson, of Maryport, for the defendants.stroy the rabbits. In Sept. 1873, the lessee put The company's statutory rights are paramount on two men to trap the rabbits, but previously

COCKERMOUTH COUNTY COURT. Wednesday, Feb. 25. (Before T. H. INGHAM, Esq., Judge.) FEARON V. THE MARYPORT AND CARLISLE RAILWAY COMPANY. Railway-Obstructing a level crossing. THIS was an action brought by the plaintiff, who is a tenant farmer residing at Crosby, near Maryport, against the defendants, for having negligently and improperly obstructed a level crossing leading over the company's line of railway to the plaintiff's field at or near to Bullgill. The plaintiff alleged that he had the right to use the crossing, and that from the year 1869 up to the date of bringing his action, it had been almost uninterruptedly blocked up by mineral and other trains, being shunted over, and allowed to remain upon it. The company had compensated the plaintiff, it was alleged, on a previous occasion for a similar obstruction, and had promised him that a further repetition of it should be prevented. This the company had failed to do, and the plaintiff claimed £50 as compensation."

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prevail in a court of law. If it did, however, the result would be that in 1872, when the lessee's crops had been injured, and the lessor refused compensation, the lessee would still have then acquired the right to destroy a sufficient number of rabbits to prevent the recurrence of that injury in 1873, by ferrets, but not by gins, wires, or other instruments, which latter words I consider must be confined to instruments ejusdem generis, and therefore leave the lessee full power to shoot with guns, or otherwise destroy the rabbits as

the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy), that the applica-
tion must be refused, inasmuch as there had been
no fraud on the part of the debtor, and none of
the creditors had, in fact, been deceived as to
the value of his property: (Ex parte Linsley, re
Harper, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 857. Chan.)

Friday Feb. 20.


Re JONES; Ex parte MILES.
Liquidation by arrangement-Leave to proceed de
novo on petition-Discrepancy between debtor's
statement and proofs-Adjournment of first

Griffith Jones for Miles, a creditor.
David Pugh for trustee.

Jones applied to set aside the resolutions passed
for liquidation of the debtor's affairs by arrange.
ment at a meeting held on 20th Sept. last, on the
following grounds: First, that the court had no
power to order de novo first and subsequent
meetings on the petition, which had lapsed by
reason of the non-attendance of a quorum of
creditors at a previous meeting; secondly, that a
discrepancy appeared in the amount of two claims
in the debtor's statement of his affairs and the
proofs exhibited; thirdly, that the first meeting
summoned upon the order to proceed de novo
not having been attended by a quorum of credi-
tors, and no resolution for adjournment having
been passed, the proceedings lapsed again, and no
subsequent meeting could be legally held.

afterwards be made by the bank to the firm of Thomas and J. B. Littler, or to either of them alone. A memorandum to this effect was signed by Thomas Littler, and accompanied the deposit. In Oct. 1872 Thomas Littler retired from the business, but it appearing shortly afterwards that the firm was insolvent, the partners filed in this court, on the 12th Oct., a petition under the 125th and 126th sections of the Act of 1869. At a statutory meeting of their creditors, held on the 30th of the same month, it was resolved by the pre

they were driven out by the ferrets. It follows (Before JOHN JENKINS, Esq., Registrar and scribed majority, that the creditors accept in satisthat whether the plaintiff had all along the right to shoot the rabbits and prevent them becoming a nuisance at common law, unrestricted by, or notwithstanding, the provisions of the lease (as I think) or whether he acquired that right by the increase of the rabbits in 1872, and the refusal of the lessor to give compensation, he clearly had it in his power by destroying the rabbits in the winter of 1872 to have prevented the injury to his crops in 1873, for which he now sues, and to which he is therefore certainly not entitled, and there must be a verdict for the defendant. It becomes unnecessary for me further to consider the effect of the correspondence and transactions between the plaintiff and defendant subsequent to the lease, but I am strongly inclined to think that in any case the plaintiff would have a legal as well as an equitable claim against the defendant for the damage to his crops in 1872 if he had sued for them, inasmuch as he forbore to exercise his rights at common law or under his lease from 1869 up to that time, in the reliance, and on the implied agreement, that the defendant would compensate him for his subsequent losses, in the same manner as he had compensated him in 1865, but this point, according to my view, is immaterial at present. In the exercise of the discretion which the Legislature has wisely given to the County Courts as to costs, and which the common law courts do not possess, I shall give no costs to the defendant, and I strongly recom. mend the plaintiff and defendant, in the face of this very inaccurate lease, and under all the circumstances of the case, to leave any future differences between them to the arbitration of some competent person, unless happily they can come to a satisfactory settlement by mutual forbearance and concession without such aid.

Verdict for defendant without costs.


NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. BANKRUPTCY "PENDING PROCEEDINGS FOR OR TOWARDS LIQUIDATION"-COSTS OF LIQUIDATION PROCEEDINGS BANKRUPTCY RULES 1870, R. 292.-A debtor filed a petition for liquidation by arrangement, under which a receiver was appointed. At the first meeting the creditors negatived a resolution for liquidation by arrange ment, and on the following day the debtor was adjudicated bankrupt. Held, that the bankruptcy had occurred "pending proceedings for or towards liquidation," within the meaning of the 292nd of the Bankruptcy Rules 1870, inasmuch as through the appointment of the receiver the property remained under the protection of the court, and that the costs of the abortive proceedings for liquidation must therefore be paid out of the debtor's estate. Decision of the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy affirmed: (Ex parte Howell; re Hawes, 29 L. T. Rep. N.S. 859).

BANKRUPTCY ASSIGNMENT OF GOODWILL AND FIXTURES-NON-DELIVERY OF POSSESSION -SALE BEFORE BANKRUPTCY.-A debtor executed an assignment of the goodwill and fixtures of his business to his brother, in satisfaction of moneys advanced. Two years afterwards the debtor, who had retained possession of the goodwill and fixtures, sold them, and his brother obtained payment of the purchase-money. The debtor was then insolvent, and soon afterwards presented a petition for liquidation by arrangement. Held (reversing the decision of one of the registrars), that the payment of the purchasemoney to the debtor's brother was not a fraud upon the other creditors, and could not be set aside: (Ex parte Wilson, re Wilson, 29 L. T. Rep. N.S. 860. Chan.).

COMPOSITION MOTIVE OF KINDNESS TO DEBTOR-FRAUD- PROPERTY SUFFICIENT TO PAY DEBTS IN FULL-BANKRUPTCY ACT 1869, s. 127. A debtor, whose property was sufficient to pay his debts in full, filed a petition for liquidation, and the requisite statutory majority of his creditors, with a knowledge of the value of his property, passed resolutions to accept a composition of 10s. in the pound, partly from a desire to assist the debtor, and partly in order to avoid the necessity of waiting for their money till the property was realised. Two months after the creditors had granted the debtor his discharge, a dissenting creditor applied to the court to rescind the resolutions. Held (affirming the decision of

The REGISTRAR.-Respecting the first ground,
I was at the time I granted the order to proceed
de novo, and still am of opinion, that this was a
case in which I ought to exercise the enabling
power given by the Bankruptcy Act 1869 to hold
a first and subsequent meetings of creditors,
where the first lapsed for want of the presence of
a quorum of creditors; secondly, I am also of
opinion that a discrepancy between the debtor's
statement of some of his creditors' claims and the
proofs exhibited, if I believe the same arose from
forgetfulness or error of judgment, is not a ground
for invalidating the proceedings, and that it would
be necessary to show the debtor wilfully mis-
stated the claims of friendly creditors, or inserted
fictitious claims to constitute the statutory
majority of creditors favourable to the debtor, or
for some other fraudulent purpose-there is
nothing to lead me to believe that this exists in
this case; thirdly, I am of opinion the first
meeting of creditors, which was properly convened
upon the order to proceed de novo for the 13th
Sept. not having been attended by a quorum of
creditors, the law of its own motion adjourned the
meeting to the 20th of the same month, at the
same hour and place, pursuant to Article 94 of the
Bankruptcy Rules, 1870. The proceedings which
took place at that meeting appear from the file to
have been quite regular, and the resolutions passed
thereat for liquidation of the debtor's affairs by
arrangement having been subsequently registered,
I cannot and will not set them aside. Mr. Jones
further applied to rescind an order bearing date
17th Feb. 1872, to restrain one John Williams, a
creditor from proceeding in an action commenced
by him against the debtor in the Exchequer of
Pleas to recover £120, on a promissory note of the
debtor, but I see no ground whatever for doing so,
and as the other and principal application failed,
this and the other restraining orders granted in
this case continue. I think the trustee is entitled
to his reasonable costs of resisting the applica-

Wednesday, Feb. 18.

(Before ST. J. YA? ES, Esq., Judge.)
Re T. and J. H. LITTLER; Ex parte T. LITTLER.
Creditor and surety-Resolution to accept com-
position to which creditor assents-Aboslute
release of surety.

THIS motion was heard on 13th Jan.

Jordan, instructed by Lisle, supported the
motion on behalf of T. Littler.

Heelis, solicitor,
opposed for the Manchester
and Liverpool Dictrict Banking Company, who
are creditors for £1669 12s. 9d.

Feb. 18.-His HONOUR delivered his judg.
ment, as follows: Mr. Jordan, by his motion,
asked for an order upon the Manchester and
Liverpool Banking Company to deliver up certain
title deeds which had been deposited with them by
Thomas Littler in June 1870. In June 1870
Thomas and James Brotherton Littler, who
were then in partnership as bone grinders
and manure dealers, got into difficulties, and
Thomas deposited with the Manchester and
Liverpool District Banking Company the deeds
which were the subject of this motion, and which
related exclusively to his private estate, as security
for advances which had already been or might

faction of their respective debts a composition of 108
in the pound, payable in two instalments of 5s., the
second to be guaranteed by the persons named in
the resolution. It was also resolved that the
terms of the composition be embodied in a deed, to
be prepared by Mr. C. S. Brooke and approved of
on behalf of the creditors, such deed to contain
proper covenants for carrying into effect the reso-
lutions and for releasing the debtors. At a second
statutory meeting in the same matter, held on the
11th Jan. 1873, the foregoing resolutions were,
with a modification which is for present purpose
immaterial, duly confirmed. The Manchester and
Liverpool District Banking Company was an
assenting creditor at both meetings, and voted in
favour of the resolutions. Similar meetings were
also called of the private creditors of the partners,
at one of which—namely, of J. B. Littler's credi
tors-the foregoing resolutions were unanimously
adopted; at the other it appeared that there was
only one private creditor of Thomas Littler, and
he had been paid. On the 10th Feb. the resolu
tions were duly registered, and the composition
was afterwards paid and accepted by the creditors.
The deed prepared by Mr. Brooke with the view of
carrying the resolutions into effect was in sub-
stance as follows: It bore date the 20th March
1873. The parties were Thomas Littler and J. B.
Littler, of the first part; the creditors who might
execute it, of the second part; and Thomas
Fowles and John Issard, as trustees, of the third
part. After reciting, amongst other things, the
proceedings in composition, and that it had been
agreed that the securities held by the Manchester
and Liverpool District Banking Company upon
the private estate of Thomas Littler should not be
prejudicially affected by their assenting to and
receiving payment of the composition, Thos. and
J. B. Littler assigned the property comprised in
the securities held by the bank, and also their
personal estate and effects, to Fowles and Issard,
to indemnify them against any loss they might
sustain by reason of their having guaranteed
the second instalment of the composition. Then
followed a release of the debtors conditioned upon
the payment of the composition, covenanted by
them, and the sureties to pay it, and a declara-
tion that the deed should in nowise prejudice the
rights and remedies of the creditors against sure-
ties, or in respect of any collateral securities they
might hold. Upon this state of facts Mr. Jordan
contended, first, that the principal debtors being
discharged by force of the resolutions, followed by
payment of the composition, the liability of
Thomas Littler as surety was also at an end:
(Slater v. Jones, 29 L. L. Rep. N. S. 56; Capes
v. Ball, Ibid; Edwards v. Combe, L. Rep. 4
C. P. 519). Secondly, that as a right of
action once suspended is gone for ever, and
cannot be revived (Ford v. Beech, 11 Q. B.
867), the deed of the 20th March 1873, in so
far as the provisions were framed with a view to
set up or keep alive for the benefit of the bank,
Thomas Littler's guarantee, and the securities
deposited by him for the partnership debt was
inoperative. The learned counsel also submitted
that it was inoperative because, while it professed
to embody the terms of the composition, it con-
tained stipulations which the creditors did not
contemplate in passing the resolution. Mr. Heelis
on the other hand, relied upon Ex parte Peacock
(2 G. & J. 27) and Ex parte Davenport (1 M. D. &
D. 313), as showing that where a joint creditor has
a security upon the separate estate of one partner
he may prove against the joint estate without
giving up his security. He also argued that as
Thomas Littler was solvent as to his separate
estate at the date of the resolutions, he was free to
deal with it as he might think fit, and at all events
he could not be admitted to falsify his own solemn
act. Upon the first point I hold altogether with
Mr. Jordan, for whether the resolutions operate
as an accord and satisfaction defeasible by con-
dition subsequent, that is by nonpayment of the
composition, or a new agreement of which the
consideration to each creditor is the forbearance
of the others, the effect of them is that by the
agreement of the creditor the surety is placed in a
situation different from that in which he had con-
tracted to be placed, and his liability is gone.
Creditors may, no doubt, when they resolve on a
composition, reserve their rights and remedies
against sureties: (Re Glendinning, ex parte
Buck, 517; Bateson v. Gosling, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S.
570.) But the reservation must appear on
the face of the resolutions. If it do not the
defect cannot be cured by parol evidence of


intention, or by subsequent arrangement. Ex parte Peacock and Ex parte Davenport, upon which Mr. Heeils relies, are not in point. They cases in bankruptcy. This is a composition, which is a very different thing. In bankruptcy there is no agreement. It is as the result of adjudication that the estate is realised, and distributed so far as it will go. But the debts are not realised, at all events until the bankrupt obtains his discharge. In composition the creditors agree to accept part of their respective debts in satisfaction of the whole, and upon payment of the sums agreed to be accepted the original liability is ipso facto at an end. It remains only now for me to deal with the deed of the 20th March, upon which Mr. Heelis in a great measure rests his case. His contention was in reality that, whatever might be the effect of the composition, his clients, the bank, were by force of the special provisions contained in that deed expressly restored to their original rights and remedies against Thomas Littler and his private estate, precisely as if the resolutions of the 10th Feb. had never been passed. Whether as between the principal debtors and the general body of creditors the deed is void, only in so far as it goes beyond the scope of the resolutions, or void as a whole, and to use Mr. Jordan's words "so much waste paper," is a matter which I am not called upon to decide, nor is it material, for the instal. ments are paid. The question is whether as between the surety and the creditor claiming the benefit of the suretyship, the provisions of the deed suffice to renew the liability of the former, which was suspended or discharged by the resolutions to which the latter had assented. I am of opinion that they fail altogether in their object upon principle, for a right of action once suspended by the act or agreement of the party entitled to it is gone for ever and cannot be revived: (Cheetham v. Ward, 1 Bos. & P. 630, 633; Ford v. Beech (11 Q. B. 867). And upon authority, the recent decision of Bacon, V.C., in Wilson v. Lloyd (28 L. T. Rep. N. S. 331) is conclusive. The facts were almost on all fours with those of the case now before me. Omitting all extraneous matters, the plaintiff in that case was surety for the defendant in respect of certain bonds in which Messrs. Harvey were the obligees. The defendant and his partner, Chatteris, filed their petition under sects. 125 and 126 of the Act of 1869. The creditors resolved to accept a composition, payable by instalments, and that a deed should be prepared to give effect to the resolutions. Messrs. Harvey proved their debt and were assenting creditors. The resolution contained no reservation of the existing rights against sureties; but in the deed which was afterwards executed the creditors reserved to themselves, as in bankruptcy, their respective rights and remedies against any surety or sureties or person or persons other than the said debtors in respect of the said sums of money thereby released. Provisions were added to meet the event of the debtors making default in payment of the instalments, and the debtors were released. The learned Vice-Chancellor, in the course of a lengthened judgment, in which he goes fully into the law of the subject, citing numerous cases, especially Oakely v. Pasheller, decided in the House of Lords and reported in 4 C. & F. 203, says "The resolutions are clear and distinct, beyond the possibility of doubt, and contain no reservation of any rights, though there is a reservation in the deed. But even if I were to give more effect to that reservation than I am disposed to do, it would be still to be observed that the resolutions were binding before the deed was executed. They were capable, no doubt, under the statute, of any reasonable modification, but the modification must be agreed to at the meeting of the creditors, and must not depart from the original stipulation, or it must not depart to the prejudice of any one.' The more recent decision in Ex parte Radcliffe Investment Company, re Glover (L. Rep. 17 Eq. 121), contains expressions which are in accordance with these views. It may perhaps be urged that the cases are not analogous; that in Wilson v. Lloyd the surety was not a party to the conposition deed; that in the present instance he was. But that is not the case, nor would it I think, as the deed is framed, be material if he were Thomas Littler is not, however, a party to the deed of the 20th March as surety, but as one of the principal debtors; and in that character he, and his late partner (J. B. Littler), by the description of "the debtors," join in the provisions relating to the composition, as also in the clause upon which Mr. Heelis relies to defeat this motion. In fact, the two deeds resemble each other so clearly that they might have been the work of the same hand, and they fail in operation for the same reasons. Upon the ground, therefore, that by force of the resolutions of Feb. 10, the rights and remedies of the bank against Thomas Littler, as surety, were suspended or discharged; and that the deed of 20th March failed in reviving them, I

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hold that Thomas Littler is entitled to the return

by the Manchester and Liverpool District Bank

ing Company of the deeds deposited with them in June, 1870. The order will be made accordingly, and the bank must pay the costs.


MR. C. J. COLEMAN, of the Northern Circuit, has been appointed stipendiary magistrate for Sheffield.

THE Times states that "It was proposed to confer upon the Right Hon. Russell Gurney the Grand Cross of the Bath, in recognition of his labours in the Washington Claims Commission, seemed incompatible with his profession." but Mr. Gurney did not desire a distinction which There is a special service in this edifice every Wednesday evening during Lent, at eight o'clock, and a lecture by the Rev. Dr. Vaughan, Master of the Temple. The subject of the lectures will be "The Lord's Prayer."


CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT.-The next Sessions will commence on the 2nd March. The judges on the rota are Mr. Justice Keating, Mr. Justice Archibald, and Baron Pollock.

POOR RATES.-For the year ending the 25th March 1873, the sum levied in England and Wales was £12,426,566, being 10s. 6d. per head, less a halfpenny. The sum of £24,068 was disbursed in legal charges during this period. that Lord Cairns will continue to act as arbitrator in this matter, as it is so near completion. The final dividend has been paid, and the final award may be looked for within the three years from the passing of the Act, which received the A short Royal assent on the 25th May, 1871. Act is to be passed to deal with the unclaimed dividends, and the arbitrator's duties will then be ended.


PAUPER ELECTORS.-The chairman of the Kid

derminster Board of Guardians stated recently that it was an "abstract question"-whether it was legal to fetch a pauper out of a workhouse to that it was not illegal for the pauper to vote, and, poll at an election. The clerk to the board stated cussed; but according to another opinion, on a consequently, the question should not be disscrutiny the vote would be disallowed as being that of a pauper, although as his name was on the register the pauper had a right to record his vote without impediment. As in the case of a close Blom-election-and the recent Hertfordshire election is an instance-even one vote is of consequence. This question is one which should be decided by competent legal authority.

MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT.-A correspondent that members of both Houses of Parliament of the Times directs public attention to the fact now take the same oath before taking their seats, so that no person can be excluded for his religious belief. The statute 29 Vict. c. 19 (30th April 1866) is cited in support of this statement. INNKEEPERS' LAW.-The Rev. Arthur field, in the Times inquires whether the Licensing Act has repealed, what he terms the "old law," cited in the Cabinet Lawyer, Digest of Laws, pp. 166-7, that "Innkeepers are bound by law to receive guests who come to their inns," and that "if an innkeeper refuses to entertain a guest on tendering him reasonable price, not only may his house be suppressed, but damage obtained by action."

DR. MAIR, Editor of "Debrett's House of Commons, and the Judicial Bench," in an elaborate summary of the late Parliament, published by him in the Times a few days ago, stated that the said Parliament existed five years and forty-eight days, during which period 54 members died, 23 resigned, 18 succeeded to peerages, and 11 to baronetages, 11 were created peers, 5 were promoted to baronetcies, 20 were sworn Privy Councillors, 15 accepted office of profit under the Crown which were incompatible with Parliamentary position, 31 were unseated, 9 received the honour of knighthood, 1 changed his constituency, 6 seats were disfranchised, 135 new members were elected.

FRENCH LAW OF MARRIAGE. The Civil Tribunal of Toulouse has given judgment in a cause of nullity of marriage recently, under these circumstances: About fifteen months since notice was given to the Maire of the Commune that two persons would appear before him for the performance of the civil form of marriage. The maire, for some unexplained reason, quitted the town suddenly, after receipt of the notice, and instructed his deputy not to perform the ceremony. A member of the municipal council, a general of division, consented to act in lieu of the maire, and solemnised the marriage. Proceed ings were adopted to declare the marriage null and void; but the court, after hearing the evidence, decided it to be valid. It was pleaded that the irregularity was caused by the ill-will of the maire, and that the husband and wife had acted honourably.

LAW REFORM.-It seems to be admitted that the new Government may venture upon doing much in the way of law reform if its chiefs can agree among themselves as to what should be done. Lord Derby two years ago indicated this sphere as one upon which a Conservative administration might enter without embarrassment and without timidity. It may be added that law reform would certainly be popular with the country. The law is viewed by laymen as an awful institution, the ways of which are not to be understood by ordinary mortals; and if anything can be done to make its nature more simple, the amendment will be welcomed with amazement and gratitude. There will, indeed, be much incredulity until the result is accomplished, for we have been so often promised wonders, and they are so slow in coming. Who that read a short paragraph in our Law Reports last week which told us, on the authority of Vice-Chancellor Malins, that the winding-up of a small company, with a bona fide subscribed capital of only £4500, and legitimate debts under £4000, had already cost £6750, though the process was not yet complete, would have believed that this was the result of that simplification and cheapening of legal processes for which we have trustfully waited ? It is a scandal, one scandal out of many, and any resolute attempt to abate it deserves support, even though it prove ineffectual. Things can but end as they are now, and, while they may get better if we try, they will certainly get worse if we let them alone. So we pluck up hope once more, and watch to see what will be done.-Times.

LORD CHANCELLOR O'HAGAN AND THE IRISH BAR.-Dublin, Feb. 21.-A gratifying demonstration was made to-day in the Court of Chancery on the occasion of Lord O'Hagan sitting for the last time before handing over the seals of office. As it was expected that some public expression would be given to the feeling of respect and esteem entertained for him by the Bar, all the benches of the court were filled with members of the Profession representing different political parties. Among the Queen's Counsel who testified their desire to join in paying a tribute to the Chancellor for the uniform courtesy and kindness which he evinced to all who came within his court, and for his impartiality and dignity in the discharge of his official duties, were some prominent members of the Conservative party who are spoken of as likely to hold office under the new Government. After judgment had been given in two causes which stood on the list, the Solicitor-General asked permission, on behalf of the Bar, to express their appreciation of the manner in which the Lord Chancellor had presided during the last five years. They cordially acknowledged the attention and patience with which he had ever listened to each one of them, as well as the kindness and unfailing courtesy which he had shown to them all, and the dignity with which he had discharged the duties of his high office. They felt that his exercise of the important jurisdiction committed to him had been such as to command the respect and confidence of the Bar and of the public, and now that he was about to retire they desired to assure him that he carried with him the very best wishes of the Irish Bar for his welfare and happiness. Lord O'Hagan listened to the valedictory address with visible emotion, and replied as follows:-"Mr. Solicitor-General,-I am deeply moved by the words you have spoken, and by the feeling which they indicate on behalf of the Bar of Ireland. With that distinguished body it has been my pride to be identified throughout the chequered years of a laborious life, and never, in all its chances and vicissitudes, have I for one instant failed to main. tain with them the best relations of cordiality and confidence. And now, when my judicial career is closing, I feel a just pride in receiving such signal proof that those relations have continued unbroken to the end. Fully conscious of many shortcomings, I am conscious, also, that I have striven to fulfil the duties of my great office with impartiulity and faithfulness, and I thank the eminent persons who have thronged to meet me to-day for their spontaneous assurance that I have not so striven entirely without success. I pass from the Bench, remembering with the truest pleasure the uniform courtesy, consideration, and respect which I have received at all times from all to whom I have so long had the daily privilege of listening in this court; and I should be the most ungrateful of men if, in the coming years and in the new sphere of activity on which I may enter, I should not be eager and earnest on all fit occasions to aid in advancing the honour and the interest of our noble profession. I believe that the maintenance of the Irish Bar and the Irish Judiciary in full integrity, efficiency, and independence, is essential in the highest sense to the welfare of Ireland; and I trust that the day may never come when anyone of them will lose its lustre and sink into decay; Again I thank you for your great kindness, and with a full heart and faltering tongue I bid you all farewell." At the conclusion of Lord O'Hagan's reply the Bar rose and applauded him with great.

fervour as he retired from the bench. The demonstration was creditable to the generous spirit of the Bar, and was in perfect unison with the feeling of the public. No chancellor has ever presided in the court who so fully enjoyed or deserved the sympathy, esteem, and friendship, of all ranks and classes of the Irish people.

A paper "On the Rules of Evidence, as applicable to the Credibility of History" will be read by Mr. Forsyth, Q.C., M.P., at the meeting of the Victoria (Philosophical) Institute, on Monday next, when the election of several new members will take place. MIDDLESEX SESSIONS.-The John Bull, with reference to the selection of a judge in lieu of Sir W. Bodkin, observes that "without saying anything disparaging to Mr. Edlin, for a post requiring great experience and tact as well as legal knowledge, he cannot compare with Serjeant Cox, who has fairly earned the post, while by his courtesy and consideration, he has won the respect of all. Few men have had larger experience, and are able with greater facility to get at the real gist of a story overlaid, as it often is, with extraneous matter, while his ready detection of imposture, and the facility with which he detects a criminal and protects a prisoner who has been taken in by rogues, makes him no ordinary judge. The outgoing Attorney-General may be glad to see Mr. Edlin provided for, but in doing so, he strangely forgets the good turn that Serjeant Cox has done him in the Taunton election.

THE GENERAL ELECTION.-The aggregate number of votes polled throughout the United Kingdom was 2,485,183, of which 891.836 were polled in favour of unsuccessful candidates. In Scotland there were 36 contests, in which 24 Liberals polled 102,160 votes, against 30,218 votes polled by 12 Conservatives. In Ireland, 83 seats were contested, 83,970 votes having been given to 50 Liberal candidates, and 54,696 to 33 Conservatives. The 346 members who stood a contest in England and Wales received 1,306,405 votes, of which 718,545 were given to 188 Conservative members, and 587,880 to 158 Liberal members. According to a parliamentary return published in February 1873, there were 2,645,564 registered electors in the United Kingdom: 2,157,295 in England and Wales, 262,758 in Scotland, and 225,511 in Ireland. The aggregate polls in EngLand and Wales were 2,053,511, in Scotland 212,330, and in Ireland 219,342. The House of Commons now consists of 653 members, 351 Conservatives, and 302 Liberals. The four disfranchised boroughs are Beverley, Bridgewater, Sligo, returning formerly 6 members. There is a double return for Athlone.

THE NEW HOME SECRETARY.-An episode in the General Election of 1868 is brought to our mind by the fact of Mr. R. A. Cross, just fifty years of age, having at one bound risen from the position of a private member to that of a Cabinet Minister. In 1857 he entered Parliament as one of the members for Preston, being then in full practice as a barrister of the Northern Circuit. At once he made his mark as a practical member, and carried a Bill reforming our municipal councils so far that candidates now require to be named several days before the day of election, instead of coming in by stealth, as was often the case before. He then turned his attention to the vexed subject of church rates, and introduced various Bills on that subject, but his Parliamentary career had to be cut short in 1862, by the exigencies of the Old Bank at Warrington-of which his deceased millionaire father-in-law had been a chief proprietor-requiring new blood to meet the extraordinary extension of the town and trade of Warrington. For four years he became a banker, and missed an excellent chance of one of the legal prizes which fell in showers during the term of office as Prime Minister of Lord Derby, and then of Mr. Disraeli. As a banker, a chairman of quarter sessions, and the leading resident Conservative gentleman of the district, he was pursuing a quiet course when the General Election of 1868 took place. There was a great want of a first-class candidate among the Conservatives of South-West Lancashire to run against Mr. Gladstone. Day after day passed, and one after another refused to be a David for the time being. The Warrington Guardian, from which we extract the previous facts, called attention to Mr. Cross, then relieved from the most onerous duties of a banker by the Old Bank being purchased by a company of which he became chairman. The Times and other papers copied the article; the Conservative press endorsed it, Mr. Cross was received with acclamation, and his course through South Lancashire, and especially at Preston and Warrington, where he was best known, was quite an ovation. It is matter of history how he defeated the first man of his age among the Liberals -Mr. Gladstone-and that so thoroughly that no opposition was offered to him at the late election. His experience as a barrister eminently fits him for the office of Home Secretary, and his further experience as a banker will enable him to give practical aid, when required, to his colleague, the

Chancellor of the Exchequer. The financier under whose chairmanship a bank has been able to pay 17 per cent., is no mean addition to even the strong Government of Mr. Disraeli.-Sun. SUIT BY A BARRISTER.-A suit, instituted by Mr. Charles Neate, late M.P. for Oxford, and of Lincoln's Inn, barrister-at-law, against the Hon. Richard Denman and the Hon. George Denman, the executors of the late Lord Denman, and the Right Hon. Sir W. M. James, the treasurer of the Society of Lincoln's Inn, came before ViceChancellor Hall on Wednesday upon a demurrer to the plaintiff's bill. In 1869 the plaintiff petitioned that his name might be taken off the books of the Society of Lincoln's Inn, and received an order to that effect, conditionally upon certain customary payments being made within a month. He did not, however, pay the dues within a month, but subsequently offered to pay all dues owing by him upon the bond of release being delivered up to him, but the society declined to release him till he had signed an altered form of petition, which had since been adopted by them, which, however, he was unwilling to do. He, therefore, filed a bill for a decree which would practically enable him to leave the bar without making any further payments or declarations. THE TICHBORNE CASE.-A limit has at last been definitely set to the Tichborne trial. Yesterday the Lord Chief Justice announced that his summing up would be finished on Saturday, and the jury will then be permitted to enter upon their final labours. Whatever regret or inconvenience individuals may experience at the conclusion of this case, the public generally will welcome the statement of the judge. The trial during its progress has aroused much unhealthy excitement, and has exercised an influence on popular feeling which cannot be regarded as beneficial. Whatever the termination may be, no one can suppose that the respect due to the administration of justice has been increased, or the interest so widely felt in the result has assisted the cause of culture in the country. The direct tendency of a trial of this kind is to render the process of law a matter of popular interest, and to attract to legal proceedings a vast amount of unintelligent criticism. One of the chief advantages of the complexity and difficulty of the English legal system is that its decisions are above the reach of shallow comment. Nowhere else does there exist the same reverence for courts of justice, and this reverence is no doubt due to the absolute impartiality with which law has been administered. The sort of feeling which has been raised with regard to the Tichborne trial tends to render the position of English Judges more difficult than it has been, and the intelligence that the end is near is therefore on every ground to be regarded as satisfactory.-Globe, Thursday.

TRANSFER OF LAND.-Mr. Swanston, Q.., is reported by the Hampshire Telegraph to have spoken as follows on the subject of the transfer of land, when addressing his would-be constituents in South Hants at the recent elections :-"Let me say a word on another point-the free transfer of land. One of the articles of the creed of the Liberal party is that we should have a plan for an easy and cheap transfer of land. (Hear.) Our object is that the capital of the small capitalist should be applied to the culture and improvement of land, so that the owner of a few hundred pounds may buy without difficulty and without serious expense the land on which he can lay out the rest of his capital and labour, without fear of the tyranny of the landlord, or the terrible difficulties which sometimes oppress the leaseholder. At present he is deterred by seeing, before he can become owner in fee simple, what a fearful process he has to go through. It is true he may contract with the owner of the land to buy a few acres. But years may elapse before he can get actual possession of the land; and in all this fearful process he may have to pay more to the various lawyers engaged than to the owner for the land. This is a rag of the barbarous ages, a remnant of the feudal laws which, abolished in other matters, remains still in connection with landed property. The Liberal party seek to sweep it away. It is done in Australia by the bill of Mr. Torrens, and nothing is more simple than to do it in England. Can you have anything more easy and simple than to have a list with one column for the owner of the land, and another for the land; and if John Smith, the owner of acre No. 1, be minded to sell to Richard Jones the said piece of land, to go to the register-office, say 'I have entered into a contract for the sale of acre No. 1, and I ask you to register Richard Jones as the owner instead of me?' The whole thing is done with the stroke of a pen, and is as simple as the transfer of stock or shares. And what stands in the way? A heap of vested interests and Conservative policy; but if you return Liberal members to Parliament in sufficient strength, yon may be sure that this nonsense and red-tapism will soon be swept away." [We suppose the expression vested interests refers to solicitors.] At the same meeting, speak ing on the subject of the codification of


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the law, he is thus reported: "One] topic more, and I have done with the measures we propose-the codification of the law. You may be told, and to your cost, by its administrators, that every Englishman is supposed to know the law. Nothing can be a greater absurdity. No lawyer knows the law. He may know better than others where, among the hundreds of volumes, to find the law or decided cases, and he may give an opinion, which may be worth little or more, as to what the law is. But in this 19th century, in a nation calling itself highly civilised, priding itself on its intelligence and its education, which, it says, it is spreading through all classes, what prevents us having what some nations on the Continent have a simple code of law in an octavo volume, so simple that a man who runs may read, and which would prevent the idea of every Englishman knowing the law being any longer a mischievous absurdity? I would have this taught in the higher classes of our elementary schools. I would have no man start in life who had not had preliminary instruction in this code; and if you return honest, hard-working Liberals, there will not be the slightest difficulty in reducing all the various laws of the country into a small volume."



NOTE.-This Department of the LAW TIMES being open to free discussion on all professional topics, the Editor is not responsible for any opinions or statements contained in it.

REPEAL OF ATTORNEYS' CERTIFICATE DUTY. -Now we are so ably and numerously represented in the present Parliament by gentlemen belonging to our branch of the Profession, really something ought to be done to secure their aid to make an effort to have this tax repealed. It bears heavily on the younger members of the Profession who can barely bring both ends to meet, because in addition to this yearly tax of £6 the income tax gatherer does not forget to make his call. I quite concur with your remarks and those made by "J. T. S." in your last issue. As the leading members of our Profession to whom the payment of £6 is a mere flea-bite, are supine in the matter, those who are needy and feel the effect of the burthen ought to be up and doing and not cease agitating the questions until the tax is removed altogether, it being for many reasons a most unjust one. That a practitioner whose income does not exceed £150 net should have to pay a tax of £6 is a great injustice, and our present Premier, I feel assured, would not permit any class to be so unfairly burthened if the matter was properly brought to his notice. I trust, Mr. Editor, at every favourable opportunity, you will give us your assistance by giving the subject ventilation. SUUM CUIQUE.


THE WORKING OF THE BALLOT.-In p. 295 ɔf your publication of this day, Mr. Ford suggests that to avoid delay in counting up the votes presiding officer might, in the presence of the necessary agents, examine the ballot papers, and register each vote on a list, so that almost on the closing of the poll each presiding officer might go to the returning officer with a correct summary." I would suggest to Mr. Ford the great protection to the secrecy of the ballot, secured by sect. 34 of the first schedule, providing that before the counting begins the whole of the ballot papers from the various polling stations must be mixed together, and will illustrate it thus. An extensive landowner may have estates reaching over the whole of a polling district, and every tenant might vote for the opposite candidate; at present it would be impossible for him to trace how his tenants had voted, but if the numbers in every box could be checked with the numbers of votes

for each candidate, he could make a tolerable guess as to how the bulk of them had voted, and the protection to the voter intended by the ballot. would be much reduced. The same observation would apply to the more probable tyranny exercised by trades' unions, &c. I have had some little experience in the working of the Ballot Act, and consider the present system is admirably adapted for the purpose intended. The immediate ascertainment of the result of the poll is of little consequence. I would rather provide that the boxes should not be opened till 10 o'clock on the following morning; everyone would then be fresh for work. A TOWN CLERK.

Feb. 21.

Referring to my letter hereon which found a place in your issue of to-day, may I add as an improvement on my suggestion (it is nothing more than a suggestion which may be capable of prac tical application) upon the subject of counting the ballot papers as the votes are recorded, that an elector having been supplied with a ballot paper, and having marked the same as he wishes, should, instead of depositing it in the ballot box,,

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