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be argued that, the time tables of the company binding them, (see Denton v. Great Northern Railway Company, 25 L. J. 129, Q. B.), they have put it out of their power to stop if required by any passenger who should not choose to waive his right. Had not the section received judicial construction, it might be worth while to examine the worth of such like arguments pro and con. But we imagine that the Inland Revenue will enter the lists of the Court of Exchequer with light heart, and bearing well in mind the case of Attorney-General v. Oxford, Worcester, and Wolverhampton Railway Company (31 L. J. 218, Ex.). It was there held by Chief Baron Pollock, and Barons Channell and Wilde, that the defendants were liable for duty in respect of trains which did not stop and put down passengers at every station; that inasmuch as the defendants claimed an exemption from a duty granted in very clear terms, it was for them to bring themselves precisely within the terms creating the exemption; and that the obligation to stop if required means that "the general arrangements of the train shall be such as to admit of a passenger stopping at any station he may pass." It is true that Baron Martin dissented from the judgment, and that the case is ever so faintly distinguishable from the ordinary cases upon which the present disputes arise, on the ground that the defendant company had by express agreement with another company, put it out of its power to stop at every station "if required" without breaking that agreement, whereas in the cases of to-day the companies have only put it out of their power to stop by advertising in their time tables that they will not; but with a decision so strong to all appearance against the companies, the only wonder is that the Inland Revenue are only now suing for the full duty, and have not recovered it long ago. One reason perhaps was— to quote again from the report of the Amalgamation Committee the fear that the companies might withdraw the extra and highly popular facilities for third-class traffic which they have recently commenced giving. But the development of that traffic is becoming so prodigiously productive to the companies themselves that so suicidal a policy is in the highest degree unlikely. The third-class traffic," in fact, "no longer requires either the compulsory legislation of 1844 or the stimulus of exemption from taxation." We have already expressed an opinion in favour of the remission or alteration of the passenger duty in general, though we do not quite concur in a public utterrance made the other day, that the imposition of the passenger duty was an act of barbarity worthy of the Emperor of Morocco." But we would ask the companies to consider whether they are coming forward with the best grace in the world to ask for the repeal of a duty, half of which they appear to have for some time ceased to pay.

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SEARCHES, INQUIRIES, AND NOTICES.
(Continued from p. 322.)

As a large number of estates and interests, both in possession and reversion, are created by the exercise of powers of appointment, we must point out some precautions to be adopted in dealing with property which has been the subject of an appointment.

In nearly all settlements, whether made by will or deed, and whether of real or personal property, where the property is given to parents for lives, and afterwards to their children, it is usual to leave the extent of the share or interest of the children to the pleasure of the parents, and to give the children equal shares only in case the parents do not make any different appointment. The object of giving the power of appointment to the parents is to prevent the children dealing with their shares whilst they are still reversionary, as no purchaser or mortgagee would care to part with his money for an interest which may be superseded at the will of the parents of the vendor or mortgagor. Moreover, it would seem that the giving the parents such a power enables them after the closing of a child's bankruptcy or insolvency to make an appointment in his favour, which will not operate for the benefit of his creditors, even if the share appointed be the same as the child would have taken in default of appointment: (Re Vizard's Trusts, L. Rep. 1 Ch. App. 588; 14 L. T. Rep. N. S. 815.) The court of equity has established a rule that all appointments made in pursuance of limited powers must be made bonâ fide for the sole benefit of the appointee, and in cases of infringement of the rule, the court will set the appointment aside, and also all subsequent dealings consequent upon the appointment. In Hall v. Montague (8 L. J. Rep. 167, Eq.) a conveyance made for valuable consideration was set aside, as it proceeded upon an

appointment made two days before the date of the conveyance by a father to his son, to enable the father and son to sell. In Wade v. Cox (4 L. J. Rep. N. S. 105, Ch.) an appointment of a fund madein favour of a son was, eighteen years afterwards, set aside in consequence of an arrangement that the trustee should retain part of the fund to pay a debt due from the father to him, and notwithstanding that the son had given the trustee a release.

As an appointment would be bad if made to a person not an object of the power, so it is equally bad if made to an object of the power with an agreement under which a person not an object of the power would get an interest, and the appointment and any subsequent settlement or dealing would be set aside (Salmon v. Gibbes, 18 L. J. Rep., N.S., 177, Eq.); but it would seem that an appointment made to a daughter previously to marriage with an understanding that a settlement was to be executed by which persons not objects of the power would derive benefits, would be good even perhaps where the terms were settled by the appointor (Pryor v. Pryor, 32 L. J. Rep., N. S., 731, Eq. and 33 Ib. 441, Eq.)(See also Cooper v. Cooper, L. Rep. 5 Ch. App. 203; 22 L. T. RepN. S. 1.)

Where a female is the object of a power of appointment the property may be appointed to her for her sole and separate use but any attempted restriction against alienation will be void, unless, perhaps, where the appointee was living at the date of the instrument creating the power: (Re Cunynghame's Settlement, 11 L. J Rep. 324, Eq.)

If the appointor intended to get a benefit by the appointment, although it cannot be actually proved that he did so, the court will set the appointment aside unless the persons interested in the appointment can prove that the appointor's intention was abandoned at the time of the appointment (Humphrey v. Olver, 28: L. J. Rep. N. S. 406, Eq.), and ignorance by the appointee of the intention of the appointor, or even of the existence of the appointment, does not alter the case: (Re Marsden's Trusts, 28 L. J. Rep N. S. 906, Eq.) If the appointee agrees to carry out the wishes of the appointor it is immaterial whether the agreement be madebefore or after the appointment: (Topham v. Duke of Portland, 32. L. J. Rep. N. S. 81, Eq.)

A power to appoint by deed is well exercised by an appointment by will (Bruce v. Bruce, L. Rep. 11 Eq. 371; 24 L. T. Rep. N.S. 212), although the converse proposition does not hold good. A power can be effectually released so that any subsequent attempt to exercise it will be useless: (Whittle v. Henning, 17 L. J. Rep. N. S. 151, Eq., and 18 Ib. 51, Eq.) An appointment may be apparently invalid, yet certain subsequent events may have the effect of making it good as for instance where a person having a non-exclusive power of appointment among his four children makes an appointment of a part of the fund in favour of one and a subsequent appointment of the residue between two of the others. If the first appointment be good, the second will be bad, because by it the whole of the unappointed fund is dealt with, and one object of the power is altogether left out; but if the first appointment be set aside, the second will operate, because there will be some part of the fund to devolve upon the omitted object: (Ranking v. Barnes, 33 L. J. Rep. N. S. 539, Eq.) After a power has been once fully exercised,, the appointor cannot again exercise it, notwithstanding an appointment may have been set aside.

In Badham v. Ince (2 L. J. Rep. N. S. 4, Eq.) it was decided that where a power of appointment in fee simple in favour of his children over an estate was given to a bankrupt, and, subject to the power, the estate was limited in tail to the children, with an ultimate remainder in fee to the bankrupt, the latter could not exercise his power in such a manner as would interfere with the ultimate remainder in fee limited to him.

Whenever a person is dealing with property the subject of a special appointment, he should be particular in inquiring what, if any, previous appointments have been made in exercise of the same power, and if any had been made he should, if possible, inspect them; he should also inquire both of appointor and appointee, whether any person other than the appointee was to receive any benefit from the appointment. Where the appointment was an equal one between all the objects of the power, it would seem that an agreement between the appointor and one of the appointees for the benefit of some person other than the appointee, would not vitiate the appointment. To ascertain whether any previous appointment had been made the only safe course to adopt is to inquire of the trustees, if any, and of all the other possible objects of the power.

(To be continued.)

SOLICITORS' JOURNAL.

THE Registrarship of the Lord Mayor's Court, which became vacant by the appointment of Mr. Brandon to the Assistant Judgeship of that court, is, we understand, about to be filled up. The appointment is, we believe, worth about £1000 a year, and is in the gift of the Court of Common Council of the City of London. The question of what arrangements should be made in reference to this office has been referred to the Law, Parliamentary, and City Courts Committee, of which

way, and that only those should be appointed by
the council who are especially qualified for such
duties. Whatever may be said to the contrary, it
must be generally conceded that irrespective of
the delay complained of, the questions are often
not such as can be fairly asked of law students.
What is wanted is to test their general know-
ledge, for which purpose out of the way ques
tions, such, for instance, as those often found in
books, the matter in which is accumulated by
the so-called "
'coach," should, as a rule, be
avoided.

PRACTICE-SECURITY FOR COSTS-PLAINTIFF OUT OF THE JURISDICTION-OFFICER IN THE ARMY.-The bond of an officer in Her Majesty's service cannot be objected to as security for costs on the grounds that the obligor is stationed out of the jurisdiction: (Miller v. Hales, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 10. V.C. B.) INTESTACY ADMINISTRATION OATH OF ADMINISTRATOR.-The mother of an intestate was the sole forthcoming next of kin, and as no positive intelligence had been received of the father's death, though he had been missing since swear that she believed herself to be the sole next of kin : (In the goods of Reed, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 932. Prob.)

Mr. Frederick Kent is chairman. We feel satis- IT may be interesting to our readers to know 1852, the court allowed the administratrix to

fied that the Court of Common Council, recog; nising the claims of solicitors to this post, and alive, as we are sure they are, to the necessity of bestowing it upon a professional man having pastical experience and of business habits, will

elect a solicitor to the vacant office.

REFERRING to the notices recently issued by direction of the Lord Chief Justice, and posted at judges' chambers, particular attention is called to the rules of Michaelmas Term 1867, as regards the business which the masters of the several courts are called upon to discharge in chambers. No doubt much work in chambers is often undertaken by judges which ought to be disposed of by the masters under the rules above referred to; and indeed we have known cases in which business having been disposed of by a judge, which should have gone before a master, another judge has been called upon to consider it as an appeal summons, which appeal is provided for under the rules in case either party is dissatisfied with a of the requirements in the notice referred to, by master's decision. We thoroughly approve, too, which, when on service of a summons, the usual notice is given that it will be attended by counsel, the name of counsel is to be written on the copy summons served on the opposite party. We hope to see this universally adhered to, and indeed it would be advisable that the notice of intention to attend by counsel as well as the name should be indorsed on the copy summons and on the original. As regards the necessity for certifying for counsel in such cases, in order to get the costs allowed on taxation, it is in practice often omitted by judges and masters, owing to their attention not being called to it. We think it should be in the discretion of the taxing masters to allow such costs without the

usual certificate.

MR. PETER ELLIS EYTON, of Englefield House, Rhyl, Flintshire, who has been returned for the Flint boroughs in the advanced Liberal interest in the place of Sir R. A. Cunliffe, was born in the year 1830, and was admitted on the roll of solicitors in Hilary Term 1853. He was appointed town clerk and clerk to the magistrates of Flint in 1856. He is a director of many local companies, and also holds the appointment of Registrar of the County Court at Mold. What his views are in relation to the two branches of the Legal Profession is not known, but it may, of course, be assumed that he will not be found wanting in a desire to advance the interests of solicitors whenever an opportunity offers. It may also be expected that he will always be ready to raise his voice in the House of Commons in favour of con

fining the appointment to vacant offices usually held by solicitors to members of his own branch

of the Profession.

THE duties of the taxing masters of the common law courts have by recent legislation become materially altered, and future legislation is likely to introduce further changes. We feel sure the authorities are taking, or will take, into their serious consideration the necessity of appointing solicitors to these posts as vacancies occur. Already the taxation of costs is a minor part of the duties of the masters, which are rather assuming the character of the work devolving upon the chief clerks in Chancery, and which offices are so ably filled by solicitors. With the operation of the Judicature Act, and abolition of pleading, the proper discharge of the duties of the masters at judges' chambers will more than ever involve a knowledge of the routine of a solicitor's office.

A CORRESPONDENT in our last issue complained of the delay in publishing the names of gentlemen entitled to honorary distinction in connection with the final examination at the Law Institution in Hilary Term last, and he compared this delay with the expedition used by the examiners at our universities on the same subject, and our correspondent added, parenthetically, that the latter examiners were selected because of their capacity to examine. It is perhaps not generally known that the examiners at the Law Institution receive no remuneration whatever for their labours. The time has unquestionably arrived, in our opinion, when such examiners should be remunerated in the usual

that the chief clerks and taxing masters in Chancery sit about 210 days out of the 365, from

ten to four. In vacation one chief clerk attends

for all the courts four days in the week for two hours, and one taxing master is available in vacation also. The chief clerks frequently work over office hours, indeed the preparation of their reports (technically called certificates) could hardly be got through during the period of the day allotted to the sittings in public. The taxing masters also frequently devote their evenings to the perusal of papers. It cannot be too well understood that the office of chief clerk in Chancery is a most laborious office.

THE carelessness of editors of lay newspapers, by which they constantly lay themselves open to legal proceedings in consequence of improper publications affecting individuals, is particularly illus. trated by what appeared in a London morning paper a day or two ago. It was a statement made by a person in the interest of a convict who had been a pointed to the innocence of the convict as regards clerk in a solicitor's office. This statement in effect the matters charged against him, and in reference to some of which he had been convicted. Worse than this, the statement amounted to a serious reflection on the solicitor whose clerk the convict had been. As might have been expected, in a subsequent publication of the same newspaper a letter appears from the solicitor denying the statements as affecting himself. We think the publishers are fortunate that the solicitor has selected this course of dealing with his grievance. We cannot protest too strongly against the adoption by the press of a course similar to that now complained of, whereby professional men are at the trouble and annoyance of pursuing a course as adopted herein. It would be serious indeed, if every convict was permitted to publish in a daily paper, through the agency of a friend, his explanations of the matter charged against him. We refer to the case of Reg. on the prosecution of Rowland v. Charles Barnes Nash, who was convicted at the late session of the Central Criminal Court.

FORMA PAUPERIS

INJUNCTION-COMMITTAL

FOR CONTEMPT - DISPAUPERING ORDER. - A defendant, who had been restrained by injunction had been committed to prison for a breach of the from removing the crops from a farm, and who injunction, obtained an order of course to defend in forma pauperis, upon an affidavit in the usual form, that he was not worth £5, save the matters in question in the suit: Held (affirming the decision of the Master of the Rolls), that he ought to be dispaupered: (Ridgway v. Edwards, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 906. Chan.)

COMPOSITION-APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTED— DEFAULT OF TENDER-MISTAKE OF TRUSTEEINJUNCTION TO STAY ACTION-BANKRUPTCY RULES 1870, r. 279.-When creditors, on passing trustee under the 279th of the Bankruptcy Rules a resolution to accept a composition, appoint a 1870, for receipt and distribution of the compositrustee to tender the composition to any of the tion, the court will not allow the debtor to be sued by reason of any default on the part of the creditors: (Ex parte Waterer; Re Taylor, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 907. Chan.)

PRACTICE-NOTICE OF APPEAL — VACATING ENROLMENT.-A notice of an appeal motion must be signed by the intending appellant or his solici tors, and where a notice not so signed is served, and the respondent refuses to waive the irregu. larity, the notice is of no effect, and will not prehouse Works Company, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 4. vent the enrolment of the decree: (Re The LimeChan.)

SECURITY FOR COSTS-PLAINTIFF IN SCOTLAND-31 & 32 VICT. c. 54, ss. 2 AND 5.-The residing in Scotland should give security for costs, reason for the rule of practice, that a plaintiff having ceased in consequence of the Judgments' Extension Act 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 54), s. 2, judgment shall have the same effect as a decreet which provides that a certificate of an English of the Court of Session: Held, that although security for the costs of an action is not expressly rendered unnecessary by the 5th section, yet the Andrew, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 15. Q. B.) court will not continue the practice: (Raeburn v.

MR. C. J. FAY, of Kingstown, Dublin, returned to
Parliament in the Home Rule and Liberal interests
for the county of Cavan, was born in 1842, edu-
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, LANCASTER-SER-
cated at the Jesuit College at Clongowes-wood, VICE OF WRIT OUTSIDE THE COUNTY PALATINE
Ireland. He was admitted a solicitor as recently-JURISDICTION OF THE COURT-IRREGULARITY,
as Easter Term 1866.
HOW WAIVED-APPEARANCE BY PARTY OUT OF
THE JURISDICTION.-Where plaintiff and defen-
Lancashire, and the cause of action arose also
dant both resided out of the County Palatine of
wholly outside the county, and a writ of summons
issued out of the Court of Common Pleas at Lan-
Staffordshire, who gave an undertaking to appear,
caster was sent to the defendant's attorney in
and afterwards did appear, it was held that the
service could not be set aside, as any irregularity
had been waived by the defendant's appearance.
The Court of Common Pleas at Lancaster being a
Superior Court has jurisdiction over the subject
Palatine, provided the parties come within the
matter of an action arising out of the County
jurisdiction: (Oulton v. Radcliffe, 30 L. T. Rep.
N. S. 22. C. P.)

THE following lectures and classes are appointed for the ensuing week at the hall of the Incorporated Law Society, Chancery-lane, for the instruction of students seeking admission on the roll of attorneys and solicitors: Monday, class, 4.30 to 6 o'clock, Common Law; Tuesday, class, 4.30 to 6 o'clock, Common Law; Wednesday, class, 4.30 to 6 o'clock, Common Law (the last of the present series); Friday, lecture, 6 to 7 o'clock, Conveyancing. To prevent interruption at the lectures, subscribers are not admitted to the hall after a lecture has commenced.

A COUNTRY ATTORNEY calls our attention to the following advertisement, cut from the Birmingham Daily Mail newspaper :

opening Offices in Birmingham as General Law Agent, &c., to an eminent London firm. Actions brought nominal charges. Persons served with writs, &c. Comand defended in the Superior Courts and Chancery at municate immediately.-Address No. 50, Daily Mail. This kind of advertising is on the increase, and we can but regret that no measures seem likely to be adopted to put a stop to it.

EFORM your Lawyers' Bills.-Advertiser is about

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. TESTAMENTARY SUIT-COSTS NOT PAID WRIT OF ELEGIT-20 & 21 VICT. c. 77, s. 25.-The power of issuing writs of elegit is one of the powers transferred to the court by the 25th section of the Probate Act. In a testamentary suit the defendant, who was the unsuccessful party, was condemned in the costs, but did not obey the order. On affidavit that he was possessed of realty, but of no personal property, the court ordered a writ of elegit to issue for the recovery of the costs: (Heath v. Heath, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 931. Prob.)

MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT. The plaintiff having received an order from P. to supply from 150lb. to 2001b. wound cotton daily, verbally agreed with the defendant that the defendant should undertake the winding of it, informing the defendant, as was the fact, that the plaintiff had taken upon himself the conobtaining from the defendant the assurance that sequences of late delivery, if any, to P., and he the plaintiff might rely on him. Afterwards, and on the day of the interview, the plaintiff sent the defendant a written order for the cotton, "on the express condition" that the same "should be delivered daily," but containing no notice or stipulation as to the sub-contract of the plaintiff with P. The defendant failing to deliver regu larly to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff to P., the result was that P. claimed, and the plaintiff paid to P. the sum of £300 by way of reimbursing P. for his loss upon resale of the goods which P.'s customers had refused to accept, as having been delivered late. Held that the plaintiff might recover the sum of £300 from the defendant as damages for the breach of contract to deliver the cotton daily: (Sawdon v. Andrew and another, 30 L. T. Rep. N.S. 23. Ex.).

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DAMAGES ASSESSMENT ADMIRALTY APPEAL AS TO QUANTUM.-The Court of Appeal will not entertain an appeal from an order of the court below assessing damages, unless it is shown that the court below has acted on a wrong principle in assessing the quantum of damages: (Ball v. Ray, 30 L. T. Rep. Ñ. S. 1. Chan.)

The

JURISDICTION OF COUNTY
COURT-COLLISION IN THE BODY OF A COUNTY
-COSTS.-The 3 & 4 Vict. c. 65, s. 6, gives juris.
diction to the High Court of Admiralty to decide
all claims and demands whatsoever for damage
received by any ship or seagoing vessel, whether
such ship or vessel may have been in the body of a
county or upon the high seas. The 31 & 32 Vict.
c. 71, s. 3, gives to County Courts having admiralty
jurisdiction authority to try and determine any
claim for damage by collision in which the
amount claimed does not exceed £300.
plaintiff brought an action in the Court of Queen's
Bench to recover damages in consequence of
injury caused to his ship by the defendant's barge
coming into collision with it in the body of a
county, and recovered £15 damages. The master
having allowed the plaintiff's costs, a rule was
obtained calling upon the master to review his
brought in the County Court, which had jurisdic-
taxation. Held, that the action could have been
diction, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to
Bail Court.)
costs: (Purkis v. Flower, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 40.

FALSE REPRESENTATION BY A BANK MANAGER

pay

ADMINISTRATION WITH WILL ANNEXED-ADMINISTRATION BOND-SURETIES.-Where the administrator, who was the sole person entitled in distribution had no friends in this country willing to become sureties, the court, though it refused to dispense with the ordinary bonds, allowed the amount to be spread over several sureties, or to be secured by one surety alone: (In the Goods of Col. R. Smith, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 932. Prob.) DEMURRER-CROSS BILL FOR MORE EXTENSIVE RELIEF-UNDERTAKING FOR DAMAGES.-A company who were in possession of certain coal mines after the expiration of their lease, filed a bill against the owner of the mines for specific performance of an alleged agreement for a new lease, and for an injunction to restrain the owner from taking proceedings to deprive them of possession. On motion for an injunction no order was drawn up, but the owner gave an undertaking LIABILITY OF BANK-Signature OF PARTY not to sue at law, and the company had their TO BE CHARGED-PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.-9 undertaking to be answerable for damages. Sub- GEO. 4, c. 14, s. 6.-Plaintiff was a dealer in iron sequently the owner filed a cross bill against the rails at Sheffield, and the defendants were, one the company, praying for an injunction to restrain public officer of the Gloucestershire Banking them from taking any coal from the mines, for a Company, and the other, G., a manager of the receiver, and for an order that the company should said bank. Plaintiff having been offered in deliver up possession of the mines. Held (revers- ment for certain rails an acceptance by one R. for ing the decision of Bacon, V.C.), that the under- about £3000, and having been referred, as to R.'s taking given to the other suit, did not interfere solvency, to the above named bank, requested his with the owner's right to file a cross bill, and a own bankers to make the necessary inquiries. demurrer by the company was accordingly over. The manager of plaintiff's bank accordingly wrote, ruled: (Moon v. The Original Hartlepool Collieries asking G.'s opinion in confidence as to R.'s reCompany, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 901. Chan.) spectability and standing, and whether he considered him responsible to the extent of £50,000. COPYRIGHT - PIRACY ACQUIESCENCE-IN- G. replied that R. was lord of a manor, that he JUNCTION-COSTS.-M., the proprietor of a magawas told the rent roll was over £7000 a year, &c., zine, had for eight years regularly sent to S., the and that he did not believe R. would incur the proprietor of a country newspaper, his magazine liability named unless he was certain to meet the for the purpose of being reviewed. S. from time engagement. In consequence of this reply the to time published reviews and extracts, and occa- plaintiff supplied the rails, and, R. having aftersionally entire stories, from these magazines, wards become insolvent, brough an action against always acknowledging from whence he took them, the Gloucestershire Bank and G. for a false repreand sending M. the paper containing such review, sentation as to the solvency of R. It having been extract or story. In Nov. 1873, S. published an found at the trial that the making and answering entire story from the November number of the of such inquiries was within the general scope of magazine. Shortly afterwards M., without giving the authority conferred on bank managers, and S. any notice, filed a bill to restrain S. from pirat- that the representation made by G. was false to ing his works. Held, that M. was entitled to an his knowledge. Held (affirming the judgment of injunction, but under the circumstances each the Court of Queen's Bench) that G. was perparty was ordered to pay his own costs: (Max-sonally liable for the false representation; but well. Somerton, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 11. (reversing the judgment of the Court of Queen's V.C. B.) Bench) that the Gloucestershire Banking Company could not be made liable for the fraudulent representation of G. (per Lord Coleridge, C.J., Bramwell, and Pigott, BB., Grove and Denman, JJ.) on two grounds; first, because G. was an agent of the banking company and a representation signed only by him was insufficient to render the banking company liable, under sect. 6 of 9 Geo. 4, c. 14; secondly, because the inquiry as to R.'s solvency was addressed to, and the reply given by, G. in his individual and personal capacity, and not as representing and acting on behalf of the banking company. Per Cleasby, B., on the second ground only: (Swift v. Jewesbury (P.O.) and Goddard, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 31. Ex. Ch.)

CONVERSION GOODS INVOICED TO DEFENDANT BY FRAUD OF BROKER-ENDORSEMENT OF DELIVERY ORDER TO BROKER.-The defendant received from the plaintiffs two invoices in respect of a quantity of barley, which G., the broker of the plaintiffs, had falsely represented to have been ordered by the defendant. G. afterwards procured the defendant to endorse over to him a delivery order for the barley to a railway company, on the strength of which he obtained the barley and then absconded, whereby the barley was lost to the plaintiffs. The jury found that the defendant had acted bona fide in endorsing the delivery order to G. Held, that the defendant was guilty of a conversion of the barley. Per Bramwell, B. Conversion is best defined as doing an act unauthorised which deprives another of his property for an indefinite time. Per Cleasby, B. It was not necessary to ask the jury whether the defendant did what was reasonable under the circumstances or not: (Heugh v. London and NorthWestern Railway Company, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 676, distinguished): (Hiort and another v. Bott, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 25. Ex.).

MANDAMUS INSPECTION OF REGISTER MOTIVE OF APPLICANT SOLICITOR OF OPPOSING LITIGANTS.-Defendants were incorporated under Acts of Parliament which provided, a mongst other things, for inspection by the share holders of the company's books and documents. A shareholder of nine years' standing was solicitor to a waterworks company, who had obtained a decree in Chancery against the defendants, and it was under consideration whether the defendants should appeal. This shareholder applied to the defendants' secretary, without stating his object, for inspection of the register of shareholders, and was refused. Upon a rule for mandamus by the shareholder to obtain this inspection, the defendants' secretary stated on affidavit, and it was not contradicted, that the prosecutor made his application for inspection in the interest of his clients, and not for any purpose or in the interest of the defendants or of any member of the company as such; that his object was to canvass the shareholders and endeavour to persuade them to oppose the said appeal. Held, by Blackburn and Archibald, JJ. (Quain, J. dissentiente), that this was not sufficient reason for discharging the rule: (Reg. v. Wilts and Berks Canal Navigation, 29 L. T. Rep N. S. 922. Q.B.)

Correspondence.

SIR,- Under the heading of "Solicitors' Journal," in your impression of the 21st ult., you refer to a Dublin solicitor having informed you that applications by English solicitors to be appointed commissioners for oaths in the Irish courts had been several times lately made without success, and that in fact there was no utility for such an appointment, as, since the Act 30 & 31 Vict. c. 44, came into operation, English Chancery Commissioners are authorised to take Irish Chancery affidavits. This is correct to an extent, but the Act goes further; see sect. 81, whereby commissioners in common law in England, as well as those in Chancery, can take such affidavits, and who also take acknowledgments by married women to be acted upon in Ireland.

J. PERRY GODFREY.

UNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE
BANK OF ENGLAND.

[Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the

National Debt, and which will be paid to the persons
respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three
months, unless other claimants sooner appear.]
LEGGE (Hon. Augustus), Grosvenor-square, Middlesex.
£866 13s. 4d. Reduced Three Per Cent. Annuities. Claim-
ant Hon. Rev. Augustus Legge.

MORTON (Ann), Lothbury, spinster. £100 New Three Per
Cent. Annuities. Claimant John Morton, administrator
to Ann Morton, spinster, deceased.
RAVEN (Henry Baldwin), Upper Tulse Hill, Surrey, Esq.
£182 16s. 4d. Reduced Three Per Cent. Annuities.
Claimant, Henry Taylor Raven, sole executor of Henry
Baldwin Raven, deceased.

TAYLOR (James), Arthur-street East, London-bridge, gen-
tleman, HARVEY (Anne Parr), a minor. £100 Three Per
Cent. Annuities. Claimant, said Anne Parr Harvey,
formerly a minor, now of age, the survivor.

Alban's, Herts, spinster.

(Eleanora), St.
ROBERTS
06 38. 4d. Reduced Three per Cent. Annuities. Claim
ant, Rosamond Roberts, spinster, sole executrix of Elea-
nor Roberts, spinster, deceased.

TREACHER Susannah), Great Tower-street, spinster. One
dividend on the sum of £300, one on £150; one on £550,
and one on £650, Reduced Three per Cent. Annuities.
Claimant, Susannah Carter, wife of Joseph Rice Carter.
formerly Susannah Treacher, spinster.
WATSON (Geo. Bethell), Mornington-road, Regent's-park,
Esq., and DIXON (Pierson John), Bethnal-green-road,
house agent. £108 13s. 7d. New Three per Cent. Annuities.
Claimants, said Geo. Bethell Watson, and Pierson, John
Dixon.

APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT-STOCK
WINDING-UP ACTS.

PATENT CORK COMPANY (LIMITED).-Petition for winding-
up to be heard March 29, before V.C. M.
STADIL FIORD RECLAMATION COMPANY (LIMITED).-Credi-
tors to send in by April 11 their names and addresses, and
the particulars of their claims, and the names and
addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Alcock and West-
enholz, at the offices of Lakes and Co., 10, New-square,
Lincoln's-inn, London, the official liquidators of the said
company. April 20, at the chambers of the M.R., at eleven
o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating
upon such claims.

CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY.
LAST DAY OF Proof.

ANDERSON (Wm.), formerly a citizen of the state of Virginia.
but who at his death resided at Vauxhall, London, trad-
ing in the United States under the firm of Wm. Anderson
and Co., and in London in partnership with Birkett and
Co. Crosby-square, London. May 30, at the chambers
of the M. R. July 4; M.R. at twelve o'clock.

BAILEY (John), Normanton, York, farmer. April3; J. W.
Sangster, Solicitor, Pontefract. April 17; M.R. at eleven
o'clock.
BROOKS (Richard), 5, Cambridge-mews, Paddington, Mid-
dlesex, shoeing smith, March 30; John P. Poncione, jun.,
solicitor, 5, Raymond-buildings, Gray's-inn, Middlesex.
April 14 V.C. H., at one o'clock.
BROOKS (Sophia M.), 5, Cambridge-mews, Paddington, Mid-
dlesex, spinster. March 30; John P. Poncione, jun..
solicitor, 5. Raymond-buildings, Gray's-inn, Middlesex.
April 14; V.C. H., at one o'clock.
HARDING (John), Acre-lane, Brixton, Surrey, gentleman.
March 26; Wm. Lewis, solicitor, 7, Wilmington-square,
Middlesex. April 15; M. R., at eleven o'clock.
HEALD (Bertrand), Rohais-road, Island of Guernsey, gen.
tleman. March 30; Chas Cheston, solicitor 1, Great
Winchester-street-buildings, London. April 13; V.C. M.,
at twelve o'clock.

LAND (John), 93, Cannon.street, London. house decorator.
April 11; John F. Terry, solicitor, 13, King-street, Cheap.
side, London. Arrii 25; M. R., at twelve o'clock.

PocKLINGTON (Robert). Wellingborough, Northampton,

contractor. April 10; Wm. E. Tattershall, solicitor,
Queen-street. Sheffield. April 20; V.C. M., at twelve
o'clock.
ROOKE (Wm. R.), 6, Boston-park-road, Brentford, Middle-
sex. April 6; James B. May, solicitor. Russell-square,
WARNER (Henry), Damerham, Wilts, gentleman. April 15;
London. April 12; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.
Charles Cole, solicitor, Portsea. April 25; V.C. H., at
twelve o'clock.

WIGHTWICK (Rev. John B.), New Reigny, Cumberland,
clerk. April 9; Jas. Bell, solicitor, Victoria-buildings,
Queen Victoria-street, London. April 25; M.R., at eleven
o'clock.
WILSON (David), Bingham, Nottingham. miller. March
31; A, S. Lawson, solicitor, 39, Lombard-street, London,
April 15, M.R. at eleven o'clock.

CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. Last Day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent.

ADAMS (Thos. C.). Ewell, near Dover, Esq. April1; Young

and Co., solicitors, 2, St. Mildred's-court, Poultry,
London.
ALDERSLADE (Jas. L.), formerly of Union-street, then of
High-street, Ryde, Isle of Wight, draper, but since of
Swanmore, near Ryde, gentleman. March 24; C. G.
Vincent, solicitor, Ryde.

ANDREW (Robert Mac), Isleworth House, Middlesex, Esq.
April 15; Kendall and Congreve, solicitors, Union Bank
Chambers, Lincoln's-inn, London.

AUSTEN (Wm.), formerly of High-street, Borough, Surrey,
hop factor, late of Eastgate, Croydon, Surrey, and Cour-
leywood-house, Wadhurst, Sussex, Esq. March 31; G. H.
Hogan, solicitor, 23, Martin's lane, Cannon-street,
London.

AYLMER (Geo. Wm.), 47, Upper Grosvenor-street, Middlesex, Esq. April 15; Collyer Bristow, and Co., solicitors, 4, Bedford-row, London.

AYLMER (Henrietta), 47, Upper Grosvenor street, widow.
April 15; Collyer Bristow, and Co., solicitors, 4, Bedford-
row, London.

AYLEN (John), Navigating Lieutnant in the Royal Navy.
March 25; James A. Hallett, 7, St. Martin's-place, Tra-
falgar-square, London.
BENNETT (Anne G.). Woodhall Villa, Charlwood-road,
Putney, Surrey, widow. April 6; Nicholson and Co.,
solicitors, 48, Lime-street, London.
BENNETT (John L.), Merton, Wimbledon, Surrey, Esq.
April 4; J. Mackrell and Co., solicitors, 21, Cannon-street,
London.
BLOCKLEY (Thos.), Aylestone, farmer and grazier. April
23; Watson and Baxter, solicitors, Lutterworth.
BULLOCK (Archibald), 6, Lancaster-gate, Hyde-park, Mid.
dlesex. May 1; D. Woolf, solicitor, 17, King-street,
Cheapside, London.
CHOLMLEY (Eleanor, E. L.), formerly of Whitby Abbey, and
Howsham Hall, York, late of 5, Percy-villas, Campden-
hill-road, Kensington, Middlesex, widow. April 30; E.
and F. Bannister and Fache, solicitors, 13, John-street.
Bedford-row, London.

COOKE (John). 136, Claremont-square, Pentonville, Middle-
sex, gentleman. April ; Taylor and Co., solicitors, 28,
Great James-street, Bedford-row, London.
Cox (Wiltshire), formerly of Minehead, Somerset, after-
wards residing in or travelling through Darmstadt, Ost-
end, London, and various other places in Germany, Bel-
gium, and England, then of 3, Chatham-terrace, Upper
Norwood, Surrey, late of 24, Rue Albert, Ostend, Bel-
gium, gentleman. Thos. Mee, solicitor, 2, Great Win-
chester-street-buildings, England.

CURLING (Elizabeth). Kent Lodge, Eastbourne, Sussex,
widow. April 10; Baker and Nairne, solicitors, 3, Crosby-
square, London.

DAVIES (Chas.), "Plough and Harrow" Inn, Haverford-
west, innkeeper. April 30; Wm. John and Son, solicitors,
5. Victoria-place, Haverfordwest.
FIELDING (Geo.), Manchester, and of Llandudno, Car-
narvon, stock and sharebroker. April 8; Atkinson and
Co., solicitors, 14, Marsden-street, Manchester.
FORD (Matthew). 8, Lincoln's-inn-fields, and 9, Keppel-
street, Middlesex, and 58, Marine Parade, Brighton, Esq.
March 31; Wharton and Ford, solicitors, 8, Lincoln's-inn-
fields, Middlesex.

FRANKLIN (Wm. G. Titchfield, Southampton, gentleman.
March 81; Nicholas Donnithorne, solicitor, Fareham,
Hants.

FRIEND (Geo.), formerly of 17, Canonbury-park, Islington,
Middlesex, and late of 1, Magdalen-terrace, St. Leonard's-
on-Sea, bussex, Esq. April 15; Johnson and Coote,
solicitors, 11, Wardrobe-place, Doctors'-commons, Lon-
don.
GRINLING (Chas. G.), Prince of Wales, 23. Ebury-street,
Pimlico, Middlesex, licensed victualler. March 31; A. W.
Surtees, solicitor, 35, Bedford-row, London.

Thomas Rawle,

GROVES (Wm. J., 33, Thomson-street, Horselydown.
Surrey, lighterman April 15; Young and Sons, solici
tors, 29, Mark-lane, London.
HODGE (Catherine), Taunton.
1, Bedford-row, London.
HUSKISSON (Wm.), 76. Swinton-street, Gray's-inn-road,
Middlesex, manufacturing chemist. March 81; Parker
and Co., solicitors. 17, Bedford-row, Middlesex.
JONES (Dr. Henry B.), M.D., 81, Brook-street, Grosvenor-
square, Middlesex. April 1; Farrer, Ouvry, and Co.,
solicitors, 66, Lincoln's-inn-fields, London.
LAWTON (Wm.), Nottingham, woollen merchant. April 2;
Thorpe and Thorpe, solicitors, Thurland-street, Notting-

ham.
LENTON (John H.), Coventry, gentleman. May 1; Henry
J. Davis, solicitor, Hay-lane, Coventry.

LORACH (Augustus Leo), 5, Walpole-street. Chelsea, and the Parthenon Club, Regent-street, Middlesex, E'g. April 9; Paine and Hammond, solicitors, 16, Furnival's

Inn, London.

LOCH (Philip Wm.), 63, Lucas-street, Commercial-road
East, Middlesex, paper dealer. March 81; T. Whitwell,
solicitor, 17, King street, Cheapside, London.
MAXWELL (Admiral John B.), R.N., Holyrood-terrace,
Great Malvern, Worcester. March 31; N. Robarts, 5,
Godliman-street, Doctor's Commons, London.
MONTGOMERY (Emma A.), formerly of 19, Marlborough.
buildings, late of 19, Milsom-street, Bath, widow. April
30; H. W. Hooper, solicitor, 18, Bedford-circus, Exeter.
PARKER (Margaret), Badsworth, York, spinster. April
13: Pratt and Hodgkinson, solicitors, Newark-upon-
PATERSON (Wm. Boyd-Alexander F.), 9, Richmond-street,
Hammersmith, Middlesex, Esq. March 25; J. B. Nunn,
solicitor, 50, Bedford-row. London.
PRINCE (John), Oatlands Park Hotel, Weybridge, Surrey,
the Jerusalem coffee-house, London, and Queen's Hotel,
Hastings, Esq. May 1; Kynaston and Gasquet, solicitors,
88, Queen-street, Cheapside, London.
ROBINS (Thomas), Wotton-under-Edge, Gloucester, inn-
keeper. May 1; Dauncey and Turner, solicitors, Wotton-
under-Edge.

Trent.

ROGERS (Thomas), formerly of 54, Moneyer-street, Hoxton,
Middlesex, and late of 8. Marlborough-road, Peckham,
Surrey, gentleman. March 30; Chinery and Aldridge,
solicitors, 36. Essex-street, Strand, Middlesex.
Ross (McCulloch), formerly of Bedford Office, Bloomsbury,
Middlesex, late of South Saxon Hotel, St. Leonard's-on-
Sea, Sussex, gentleman. May 8; Wing and DuCane,
solicitors, 1, Gray's-inn-square, London.
SMITH (Chas. F.), Rose-hill, Smedley-lane, Cheetham, Lan-
caster. and of Manchester, merchant. April 8; J. R.
Bridgeford and Sons, 30, Cross-street, Manchester.
SMITH (Thos.), late of the Maynard Arms, Park-road,
Middlesex, and previously of the Rising Sun, Wych-
street, Strand, Middlesex, licensed victualler. April 20;
S. Potter, solicitor, 36, King-street, Cheapside, London.
STEPHENS (Thos.), North Villa, Regent's Park, Middlesex,
and Lime-s reet-square, London, insurance broker. April
1: Hensman and Nicholson, solicitors, 25, College-hill,
London.

ELECTION LAW.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.
LEE AND OTHERS (pets.) v. GREEN (resp.);
WAKEFIELD ELECTION PETITION.
Summons for particulars under under the Par-
liamentary Elections Act 1868.

A PETITION against the respondent, the sitting
member for the borough of Wakefield, alleged
bribery by the respondent and his agents, also
general bribery.

The election took place on the 3rd Feb. 1874,
and the petition was duly presented against the
return of the respondent, within twenty-one days
after the return.

On the 4th March a summons was taken out for
the delivery by the petitioners of full particulars
of the allegations contained in the petition within
ten days from the date of the order (if any) to be
made thereon, and was heard before Lord Chief
Justice Cockburn at chambers.

Chandos Leigh for the petitioners.
Forbes, for the respondent.

shall be liable to a penalty. Justices refused to convict defendant, who was charged under this section; but they stated, in the case reserved at the complainant's request, that defendant exposed greengrocery, in which he dealt, on a cooler or tray of wood, projecting 2ft. 9in. beyond the line of the brickwork of his building. This tray fell forward from the shop window, and when used was supported by iron stanchions and hinges. The steps of the adjoining house projected three inches further than this tray during the day. At night, and on Sundays, the tray was not beyond the line of defendant's and the adjoining house; the street was exceptionally wide at this particular part. The defendant's premises had been erected between thirty and forty years, and during that period the tenants had always used the same cooler or tray, or something of the same description. Held, that the Act must be taken to refer to the line of shop existing at the time of its passing, which in this case was the line of the tray; and that the justices were right: (Wilson V. Cunliffe, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 913. Q. B.) PAVING AND Sewering-INCIDENTAL COSTS time-Defendant was owner of some houses, and occu pied land bounding or abutting on a new street, which the plaintiffs had paved under sect. 105 of the Metropolis Management Act 1855, and sewered under sect. 52 of the Amending Act of 1862. Amongst other items which the plaintiffs had apportioned to defendant's contribution were costs of collecting apportioned amounts, of survey plan and obtaining names of owners, and of filling up, printing, advertising, and serving notices. These sums were all paid to persons employed for the purpsoe, and not plaintiffs' servants, although plaintiffs had in their employ a surveyor and a clerk, and payments were requested at their Tatter-office. Defendant occupied the said land under a

Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., intimated that the
heretofore allowed for particulars to be given was
too short to enable the respondent fairly to meet the
case against him, and made an order that the
particulars asked for by the summons should be
delivered eight days, including Sunday, before the
day fixed for the hearing of the petition, but that
the petitioners should have leave to add any fresh
particulars of cases coming to their knowledge
after the commencement of the eight days, and
up to three clear days of the day appointed for
hearing the petition.

Agents for petitioners, Van Sandau and Cum-
ming.
Agents for respondent, Singleton and
shall.

MAGISTRATES' LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.
CORRUPT PRACTICES (MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS)
ACT 1872 (35 & 35 VICT. c. 60)-JURISDICTION
OF JUDGE AT CHAMBERS TO AMEND PETITION
—WHAT IS A FRESH PETITION-POWER OF SUPE-
RIOR COURT UNDER SECT. 21.-Sect. 13 of the

STOKOB (Mary) Longhorsley, Northumberland, widow. Corrupt Practices (Municipal Elections) Act 1872

June 4; Wm. Woodman, solicitor, Stobhill, Morpeth,
SWEETMAN Thos., 6, Cheapside, Brighton, gentleman.
May 1; Clarke and Howlett, solicitors, 8, Ship-street,
Brighton.
TURNER Thomas, Plas Brereton, Carnarvon, Esq. May
1: Dauncey and Turner, solicitors, Wotton-under.
Edge.
WEBER (Chas. F.), 2, Royal Exchange-buildings, London,
and 75, Portsdown-gardens, Maida-hill, Middlesex, mer-
chant and shipbroker. April 13; T. W. Denby, solicitors,
8. Frederick's-place, Old Jewry, London.
WILLIAMS (Sarah), Wotton-under-Edge, Gloucester, widow.
May 1; Dauncey and Turner, solicitors, Wotton-under
Edge.
WILSON (Richard), medical superintendent of the County
Lunatic Asylum, at Cottingwood, near Morpeth. May
20; Wm. Woodman, solicitor, Stobhill, Morpeth.
WOODTHORPE (Frederick), Cambridge-villa, Haverstock-hill,
Middlesex, gentleman, formerly town clerk of London.
April 13. A. D. Michael, solicitor, 2, Gresham-buildings,
Basinghall-street, London.

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THE Prudential Life Assurance Company, in their twenty-fifth annual report show the following prosperous general results :-The total premium income is £537,711 1s. 11d., showing the very remarkable increase of £109,968 10s., and being the largest accession of income during any year of the company's operations. The total amount of claims is £168,388 17s. 8d., raising the whole sum to £1,103,402 88. 6d. These have, as usual, been paid with undeviating regularity. The assurance fund at the close of 1873 was £482,933, showing an increase of £73,799 48. 4d. for the year. In addition to the assurance fund there are-shareholders' capital, £10,052; contingency fund, £16,096; guarantee fund, £15,000; total, £41,148; which, together with the assurance fund of £482,933, make a total fund of £524,081 for the protection and security of the constituents of the company. The foregoing facts are so remarkable that the directors consider it unnecessary to do

more than call attention to them.

PATENT LAW.-A paper will be read on Monday evening next, the 16th inst., at a meeting of the Law Amendment Society, to be held at their rooms in Adam-street, Adelphi, by John Coryton, Esq., "On the Policy of granting Letters Patent for Inventions, with observations on the Working of the English Law."

(35 & 36 Vict.) c. 60, directing that a petition shall
be presented within twenty-one days after the day
on which the election was held, is imperative, and
admits of no exception but the one specified in
that section, and therefore when a petition has
once been presented it cannot be amended by the
addition of other charges against the respondent,
and a judge at chambers has no power under sect.
21, sub-sect. 5, to make an order allowing an
amendment, which varies the charge originally
preferred. Per Lord Coleridge, C.J., two classes
of offences are included in sect. 7 of the Municipal
Elections Act 1872-viz., the employment of voters
living within the ward, and the voters living with-
out the ward: (Maude and others v. Lowley, 29
L. T. Rep. N. S. 924. C. P.).

ELEMENTARY EDUCATION ACT-INJURY TO
PREMISES NOT TAKEN UNDER COMPULSORY
POWERS.-Where a school board acquires land as
a site for a school, under the compulsory powers
given by the Elementary Education Act, and
builds a school so as to obstruct the ancient
lights of an adjoining landowner, the remedy of
the adjoining landowner is by claiming compen-
sation under the 68th section of the Lands
Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, and not by bill
for an injunction: (Clark v. The School Board
for London, 29 L. T. Rep. N.S. 903. L. C. & L.JJ.).

RATING OF RAILWAYS-BRANCH RAILWAYS.-
The appellants, a railway company, were owners
of a branch line connecting their main line with
three other main lines. If the branch were in the
market, either of the three companies which
owned these three other main lines would, in
consequence of the traffic which it would bring to
their line, be willing to acquire it upon the same
terms in every respect as those upon which the
appellants held it; if so acquired by either of
such other companies, they would work it in a
similar manner to that in which it was worked by
the appellants, and under such circumstances the
traffic upon it would not produce a higher rateable
value, caculated upon the mileage principle in
respect to the traffic of the branch only, than
what it produced to the appellants. Held that, in
assessing the part of the branch line within the
respondents' parish, this circumstance must be
taken into consideration in estimating the rateable
value: (Reg. v. the London and North Western
Railway Company, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 910. Q.B.)
LINE OF SHOPS-GOODS PROJECTING.-By a
local Act of 1872, if any person places, hangs up,
or otherwise exposes any furniture, goods, pro-
duce, wares, merchandise, matter or thing, so
that the same projects or project into or over any
footway, or beyond the line of any house, shop or
building, at which the same is or are exposed, he

building agreement, by which the owner of the land agreed to demise to defendant or his nominees the several pieces of land upon which the defendant was to build, as the houses and buildings respectively became erected and covered, for 80 years, at the rent of a peppercorn for two years, and of sums increasing every year up to £364 in the sixth and following years. The defendant was to be considered as holding the undemised portion on the terms of the leases. There was & power of re-entry upon non-completion of the building covenants. The houses at this time were in every stage of building progress, and some had been demised to other persons at defendant's nomination. Held, upon an action to recover defendant's apportionment, that with the, exception of the houses demised to other persons, the defendant was liable as owner of all the premises, and that the above items were incidental costs and charges within the 77th section of the said Act of 1862. (Poplar Board of Works v. Love, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 915. Q. B.)

HIGHWAY-DEDICATION TO THE PUBLIC-NEW STREET-METROPOLITAN LOCAL MANAGEMENT. Respondent had leased land for building purposes, and the road between the houses he had built was, before 1863, used for sawpits and building materials. Since then footways on each side had been made by the appellants' vestry, and paid for by the lessees or owners of the houses. A barrier had been kept by the respondent across part of the carriage way, and the remainder could be closed by a folding bar. Respondent had occa sionally prevented the passage of vehicles, and had once recovered damages for trespass along this road. The freeholders also had given public notice that they objected to this road being used

as

a thoroughfare. The appellants, without notice to the respondents, resolved to pave, and paved this carriage way, and summoned respondent for his proportion of the expenses of a new street, under the Metropolis Management Act 1855, s. 105. The justices decided that this road had not been dedicated to the public, that it was not a new street within that section, and that respondent could be liable only if the appellants had proceeded under sect. 106. Held, on a case stated, that upon these facts the finding of the justices was conclusive as to the dedication of the road to the public; but that sect. 105 relates to the paving or forming new streets, as may deemed expedient by the vestry, whether highways or not; that sect. 106 relates only to the repair of streets, not being highways, which have not been paved by the vestry; and that, therefore, the appellants had here proceeded rightly under sect. 105, and were entitled to recover: (St. Mary, Islington v. Barrett, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 11. Q. B.)

POOR RATE-HOSPITAL-BENEFICIAL OCCUPATION.-St. Thomas's Hospital was founded by royal charter for the relief and sustenance of poor sick and infirm people, and vested in the mayor, commonalty, and citizens of London. The pa tients pay nothing for their maintenance or the medical services rendered to them. There is a medical school connected with the hospital, and its students pay certain fees, which are wholly devoted to the expenses of the medical school, and are not paid to or in any accounted for to the

governors of the hospital. Held (affirming the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench), that the hospital was liable to be rated, and not at a merely nominal sum: (Governors of St. Thomas's Hospital v. The Churchwardens and Overseers of Lambeth, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 37. Ex. Ch.)

MARITIME LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. COLLISION STEAMSHIP - DUMB BARGE LIGHTS-COURSE ON THE THAMES-DUTY. Dumb barges in motion driving with the tide up or down the river Thames at night are not bound to carry lights. A dumb barge coming up the river Thames in a flood tide may keep on either side of the river, and there is no obligation on her by custom or otherwise to keep in mid-channel. There is no duty on a dumb barge driving with the tide in the Thames to keep out of the way of a steamship; but it is the duty of the steamship to keep out of the way of the barge: (The Owen Wallis, 30 L. T. Rep. N.S. 41. Adm.)

COLLISION-PRACTICE-DUTY

ΤΟ

BEGIN FOG OVER ANCHORAGE GROUND.-In all causes

of damage, the onus being upon the plaintiff to establish negligence against the defendant, the plaintiff must begin; and this rule applies to cases where the only defence is inevitable accident and the plaintiff's vessel is at anchor, contrary to the former practice of the High Court of Admiralty. Where a steamship, whilst in a good and well-known anchorage ground, enters a dense fog, it is her duty to anchor at once; and if she neglects to do so, and continues her course, she will be to blame for a collision ensuing, provided that the other vessel has done all that the law requires (The Otter, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 43. Adm.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT. SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. Reported by R. D. BENEDICT, Proctor and Advocate. THE STEAMSHIP FRANCIS WRIGHT. Charter-party-Unseaworthiness of vessel-Injury to cargo by delay-Agency of master and engineer.

A steamship was chartered by a written charter for six months to run between certain ports. The owners covenanted that the vessel should be kept tight, staunch, well fitted, tackled, and provided with every requisite for such a voyage; that the whole of the vessel except the necessary room for the sails and cables should be at the dis. posal of the charterers; and that the owners would take and receive on board during the voyage all the merchandise which the charterers desired to ship. The charterers covenanted to man, coal, and victual the steamer, and pay all expenses except insurance on vessel and repairs, and to pay charter money at a certain rate. The charter also contained these clauses: "Vessel to be returned to the owners at the expiration of this charter in the same order and condition she is now in, less the ordinary wear, and charterers to take and deliver the steamer at New York. Owners to nominate and char. terers to appoint chief engineer, to be paid by the charterers. Charterers to appoint captain subject to the approval of the owners." The captain and chief engineer were appointed as agreed, and the vessel was taken from New York to Philadelphia, where the charterers resided, and was there fitted up with a refrigerating apparatus. She took on board a quantity of ice and some general cargo, and sailed for Galveston. On the voyage out there were several stoppages, owing to the tubes of the boiler giving out. At Galveston she took on board a quantity of fresh beef, which it was intended to keep fresh by the refrigerating appa. ratus. She started from Galveston on her return voyage, but a few hours after starting twenty-six tubes of her boiler gave out without any ostensible cause, and she was compelled to put back, and was detained seven days before the repairs to the boiler were completed. She then sailed again, and put into Key West, where she took on board some coal and 20 tons of ice, and sailed again; but before reaching Philadelphia the beef was spoiled, and was thrown overboard. But for the delay in going back to Galveston, the vessel would have reached Philadelphia on the day she left Key West. The charterers libelled the vessel to recover 25,000 dols., the value of the beef, claiming that the beef was good till several days after the time when the vessel would have reached Philadelphia but for the delay, and that the loss of the beef was due to the delay caused by the unseaworthy condition of the boiler. Held, that, under the charter, the owners were bound to keep the boiler and its tubes in proper condition during the voyage, through the master and chief engineer as their agents. That the boiler and its tubes were not kept in proper con.

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ON the 13th Sept. 1872, Messrs. Duncan and Poey, of Philadelphia, entered into a written charter-party with Woodhouse and Rudd, owners of the steamer Francis Wright, then at New York, whereby Woodhouse and Rudd chartered the steamer to Duncan and Poey "for the term of six months, to run between Philadelphia or New York, and Galveston, or any intermediate safe port in the United States, or any foreign port not prohibited by the insurance," with the agreement that the charterers were to have the privilege of cancelling the charter at the expiration of three months, on giving Woodhouse and Rudd fifteen days' notice, and the payment of 1500 dols. bonus. The instrument then set forth the following agreements by Woodhouse and Rudd: First, that "the said vessel in and during the said voyage shall be kept tight, staunch, well fitted, tackled, and provided with every requisite for such a voyage;" secondly, that "the whole of the said vessel (with the exception of the necessary room for the sails, cables), shall be at the sole use and disposal of the libellants during the voyage aforesaid;" thirdly, that Woodhouse and Rudd will "take and receive on board the same vessel, during the aforesaid voyoge, all such lawful goods and merchandise as the libellants may think proper to ship." The instrument then set forth the following agreements by the charterers. They were (1) to man, coal, and victual steamer, and pay all expenses of every nature (including port charges, &c.) connected with running of the steamer, except insurance on vessel and repairs;" (2) to pay to Woodhouse and Rudd for the charter of vessel" eighty-five dollars per day, United States currency, due daily, but payable at the expiration of each and every month, in New York; vessel to be returned to the owners, at the expiration of this charter, in the same order and condition as she is now in, less the ordinary wear, and charterers to take and deliver the steamer at New York." Then followed these provisions :"Owners to nominate and charterers to appoint chief engineer, to be paid by charterers at the rate of 125 dols. per month. Charterers to appoint captain subject to the approval of the owners. It is also agreed that this charter shall commence at New York on the 18th Sept. 1872. If, from any derangement of machinery, a steamer is delayed, the time lost is not to be paid for by charterers, and in such derangement (if any) owners to have privilege of cancelling charter. In case of any wreckage, towage, or salvage accruing to the vessel, whilst under this charter, one half of said earnings to be paid to the owners of the steamer." In accordance with the terms of the charter party, John A. Sherman was appointed chief engineer of the vessel, and Henry Dennison was appointed her captain. She was taken to Philadelphia, and there the charterers fitted her with a refrigerating apparatus to bring a cargo of fresh beef from Galveston, Texas, to Philadelphia. The put on board of her at Philadelphia a general cargo of merchandise and proper fuel, and about 260 tons of ice, the latter to be used in connection with the refrigerating apparatus, to preserve the fresh beef on the homeward voyage. She left Philadelphia for Galveston on the 3rd Oct. 1872, and arrived at Galveston on the 17th of the same month. This libel was filed by them to recover for the entire loss of the beef on the homeward voyage.

The libel alleged that during the voyage from Philadelphia to Galveston, the vessel gave evidence of unseaworthiness by having a number of her boiler tubes blown out, and by great and unusual leaking in her boiler tubes, which rendered it difficult to make steam on the vessel by reason of the water from the blown out and leaking tubes escaping into the furnaces, and affecting and diminishing the fires therein; by reason whereof the steamer was unable to attain her usual and proper speed, and was fourteen days in making the passage from Philadelphia to Galveston, instead of ten days, which is the full, usual, and ordinary time for a steamer of that capacity to make such voyage; that when the vessel arrived at Galveston, Woodhouse and Rudd, through their agent and representative, the chief engineer of the vessel, were requested to make the proper and necessary repairs to the boiler and to its tubes, in order that there might be no further delays, after the cargo of fresh beef was laden on board, and and that the vessel might make the return passage in ten days; that the chief engineer promised that all necessary and proper repairs to the boiler and its tubes should be made; but they were not made, by reason whereof the steamer, having on board about seventy tons of fresh beef,

was, on the 31st Oct. 1872, being then four hours at sea out of Galveston, on her voyage to Philadelphia, compelled to put back to Galveston for repairs, by reason of the tubes of the boiler blowing out and leaking badly, and was detained at Galveston seven days thereafter in repairing some of the tubes; that the steamer again left Galveston for Philadelphia on the 7th Nov. 1872, and was fifteen days making the voyage owing to the unseaworthy condition of the steamer, some of the tubes blowing out, and others of them leaking so badly, that the boiler could with difficulty make steam, and thereby the speed of the vessel was greatly reduced below what her ordinary speed would have been if her boiler tubes had been kept in a proper and seaworthy condition; that by reason of the detention of the steamer at Galveston while making repairs and by resson of the detention of the steamer in making her passage from Galveston to Philadelphia owing to the unseaworthy condition of the boiler tubes, and by reason of the hot water which escaped from the defective boiler tubes, and was negligently allowed to run into the bilge of the steamer and melt the ice in the refrigerator where the fresh beef was stowed, the beef became damaged, spoiled, and entirely lost to the libellants; that Woodhouse and Rudd did not perform their covenant, that the vessel in and during said voyage, should be kept by them tight, staunch, well-fitted, tackled, and provided with every requisite for such a voyage; that the value of the fresh beef at Philadelphia was 23,000 dols.; that by reason of the failure of Woodhouse and Rudd, and the vessel to comply with said covenant, the fresh beef has been wholly lost to the libellants; and that at the time of the making of the charter-party Woodhouse and Rudd knew that the steamer was chartered by the libellants for the purpose of carrying fresh beef from Galveston to Philadelphia, and also knew that the steamer was in an unseaworthy condition as regards her boiler and its tubes. The libel claims 30,000 dols. damages against the vessel and her owners.

The answer of Woodhouse and Rudd as claimants, set up that the libellants had the entire charge and possession of the vessel, and denied that the chief engineer was the agent or representative of the claimants, and averred that the repairs which the claimants were bound to make were made, and that the steamer was, so far as the claimants were bound to do so, kept as called for by the charter-party, and denied all the allegations of the libel in which the libellants claim a recovery.

R. D. Benedict, for the libellants, argued that under the charter the owners must be held to have retained the possession of the vessel, as far as was necessary for the making of repairs, and that the master and engineer were their agents for that purpose: (citing Certain Logs of Mahogany, 2 Summer's Rep. 597; Hooc v. Grovermann, 1 Cranch's Rep. 215; Christie v. Lewis, 5 Moore, 211; The Milches, 5 Blatchford's Rep. 336; Swainston v. Garrick, 2 L. J. N. S. 255; Blackie v. Stembridge, 5 Jurist, N. S. 1128; Sandeman v. Scurr, 2 L. Rep. Q. B. 86; Fenton v. The Dublin Steam Packet Company, 8 Ad. & El. 835; Reeve v. Davis, 1 Ad. & El. 312; Havelock v. Geddes, 10 East, 555; Myers v. Burns, 35 N. Y. Rep. 269). That the vessel was not kept in repair, but was unseaworthy: (citing Wright v. The Orient Mercantile Insurance Company, 6 Bosworth's Rep. 269; Hathaway v. The Sun Mercantile Insurance Com pany, 8 id. 54). That the owners having agreed that the vessel should be kept in repair, were bound to keep her so: (citing Paradine v. Jayne,

Aleyn, ; Harmony v. Bingham, 12 N. Y. Rep. 107) and were liable for the damages resulting from the delay occasioned by the failure to keep her so, and that the loss of the beef resulted from that delay.

For the steamer, C. Donohue.

BLATCHFORD, J.-It may not be difficult to hold that, under the charter-party, the claimants were bound to keep the boiler and its tubes in proper condition during the voyage, through the master and the chief engineer as their agents; that the claimants remained in possession of the vessel for such purpose, through those officers, as agents for such purpose; that the boiler and its tubes were not kept in proper condition; and that from that cause the voyage was delayed and prolonged. By the charter-party the claimants agree so keep the vessel, while on a voyage named in the charter-party, well fitted and provided with every requisite for such a voyage; and it is agreed that the libellants shall not pay any expense of repairs. To enable the claimants to discharge such duty, it is provided that they shall have the nomination of the person who is to be chief engineer, and that no appointment of a captain shall be made otherwise than subject to their approval. The chief engineer was nominated by them, and the captain was appointed with their approval. The claimants assumed absolutely the obligation referred to. They either deprived themselves voluntarily of all means of fulfilling it, by not having any agent on board to

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