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attend to its fulfilment, or the officers referred to must be regarded in the interest of the claimants, through their mode of appointment, for the purpose of seeing to the fulfilment of such obliga. tions. The claimants contend that the libellants were in the exclusive possession of the vessel. But the provisions that the vessel shall be at the sole use and disposal of the libellants, and that the libellants shall man, coal, and victual her, and pay her running expenses (except insurance and repairs), and return her at the expiration of the charter in proper condition, less ordinary wear, and take and deliver her at New York, and pay one-half of her salvage earnings to the claimants, are not at all inconsistent with a fulfilment by the claimants of the agreed duty of keeping the vessel well fitted and provided with every requisite for the voyage, or with such possession by the claimants, through the captain and chief engineer appointed in the manner prescribed as would enable the claimants, through those officers, to represent them in that regard, to see that the agreement was performed. That the boiler and its tubes were not kept in proper condition during the voyage is established by the evidence. The boiler was not seaworthy. Whatever its apparent condition was when the vessel left Galveston for the first time, with her cargo of beef on board, subsequent events and the results show that the boiler was unseaworthy. There was no cause to produce the blowing out and leaking of the tubes, but the inherent defects of the boiler. Having left Galveston on the 31st Oct. at 11 o'clock a.m., the vessel was stopped at 7 p.m., because twenty-six out of the 144 tubes in her boiler were leaking. She lay until 10 a.m. on the 1st Nov., making repairs, and then returned to Galveston, and remained there making further repairs till 7 a.m. on the 7th Nov., thus losing full seven days of time. The return to Galveston was necessary in order to obtain a proper tool with which to make the repairs. On the voyage from Philadelphia to Galveston the vessel was stopped at sea on the 8th Oct. for five and a half hours, to make repairs on the boiler and engine, and on the 12th for two and a half hours, to plug leaking tubes, and on the 17th for two hours, for repairs to the boiler. This indicated a condition of things which required that the boiler should be thoroughly repaired before starting on the return voyage. But the repairs made were not thorough as shown by the result. The return to Galveston was the result of the co-operating judgment of the captain and the chief engineer, that such return was necessary. On the return voyage the vessel put into Key West, arriving there at 3 p.m. on the 14th Nov. During the passage to Key West the boiler leaked, though there was no stoppage. The vessel left Key West on the 15th inst at 2.30 p.m. On the 16th and 17th the boiler leaked. On the 18th the vessel stopped for seven and threequarter hours and stopped up three tubes, and on the 21st she stopped for four and a half hours and stopped up one tube and repaired three others. She arrived at Delaware city three and a half hours below Philadelphia at noon on Nov. 22nd, with twenty-six of her tubes plugged up. The quarters of beef were on slated racks in a refrigerating room in the hold of the vessel. In such room was a box, standing on the floor, about four feet square and eight or nine feet high. This box was replenished with ice from time to time. By machinery outside of the room the air of the room was driven through the box, and into contact with the ice, and out again into the room, constantly circulating. There was no opening into the room except by a hole in the top, and there was an opening into the box from the outside of the room, to replenish the box with ice from the general depository of ice elsewhere. The difficult question in the case is as to whether it is satisfactorily shown that the beef was spoiled and lost through the causes set forth in the libel. The burden of proof is on the libellants to show this. The averment of the libel is, that by reason of the detention of the steamer at Galveston, while making repairs, and by reason of the detention of the steamer in making her passage from Gal. veston to Philadelphia, owing to the unseaworthy condition of the boiler tubes, and by reason of the hot water which escaped from the defective boiler tubes, and was negligently allowed to run into the bilge of the steamer and melt the ice in the refrigerator where the fresh beef was stowed; the beef became damaged, spoiled, and entirely lost to the libellants. It is not enough to show the unseaworthy condition of the boiler tubes, and that the vessel was detained at Galveston to repair them, and was detained on her passage by reason of them and to repair them, and that hot water escaped and ran into the bilge, and some ice was melted from such cause. It must be shown that, but for such things the beef would have been and was unspoiled, and merchantable as fresh beef.

Zane, the person who came in the vessel from Galveston in charge of the beef, testifies that when the vessel left Galveston the first time the temperature of the room was 39 deg. Fahrenheit;

that while they were stopped at sea, outside of Galveston, it rose to 46 deg.; that when they returned to Galveston it was 41 deg. ; that the day before they arrived at Key West it was about 50 deg; that they had about 100 tons of ice when they left Galveston the first time, and about 95 tons when they left the second time; that they had about 15 tons left when they reached Key West; that they procured 20 tons more at Key West; that the first day out from Key West (16th Nov.) the temperature of the refrigerating room was about as usual, say 40 deg.; that the next day it became 60 deg., and afterwards increased to 68 deg., when they were about at Cape Hatteras: that then the beef spoiled and part of it was thrown overboard, and that at that time the ice was not quite all used up.

The libellants contend that the beef remained unspoiled until after the vessel had left Key West for Philadelphia, and that the cargo would have been landen in good merchantable order at Philadelphia before the time it, in fact, spoiled, but for the detentions specified in the libel, because, but for such detentions, it would have been at Philadelphia unspoiled at a time when it was at sea, unspoiled.

No complaint is made as to any loss of time by putting in at Key West. From the time the vessel left Galveston the second time (7th Nov., at 7 a.m.) till she substantially reached Philadelphia (22nd Nov., at 3 p.m.) was 15 days and eight and a half hours. Leaving Galveston 31st Oct., at 11 a.m., a trip of 15 days and eight and a half hours, would have brought her to Philadelphia, Nov. 15, at 7 p.m., at which time she was at sea, having left Key West five hours before. Was the beef unspoiled and merchantable at the time the vessel left Key West? Captain Dennison, on his direct examination. testifies that he saw the cook cutting some of the beef, and cooking it, and the men eating it, on the Monday after leaving Key West (which Monday was Nov. 18), that it was on the cabin table, and eaten by same, after leaving West Key, and that it cut as if it was good. On his cross-examination this is his evidence:-Q Did not you yourself at that time, at Key West, after the attempt was made to get the beef, say it was stinking ?-A. I do not remember that I did. Q. Will you swear you did not?-A. I will not. Q. Will you swear it was not stinking -A. I will not swear. Q. Was it not, in fact, beginning to taint ?—A. That is a hard question for me to answer, because I did not know the condition of it then. Q. You have been swearing to something about its condition; I ask whether it was not beginning to taint ?-A. I had my suspicions about it. Q. Were not your suspicions that it was beginning to taint ?-A. I was told it was not. Q. Did you not know that that beef was beginning to taint at that time? A. I would not swear it was good, nor would I swear it was bad. Q. You were one of the persons interested in the beef? A. I was very anxious to get it here safe. Q. Did you not state, in Key West, at that time, that it was beginning to taint, or was tainted ?-A. I might have said so, but I do not remember. Q. Did you not say to Mr. Sherman, your chief engineer, that the beef stank, at Key West?-A. I may have said so, but I do not remember that I did. I will not swear I did not, because I said a great deal about the beef being bad. Q. Did you not say, at Key West, that it was "all up ?"-A. Not that I remember. Q. You will not swear you did not ?-A. I will not swear I did not. Q. Did you not say, in Key West, that you were very much worried about buying the ice, as you thought it was so much money thrown away -A. I said, in Key West, that I would not buy the ice, if the party in charge did not give me a written order to buy it. I may have said I feared it; ice was so very high there that I hated to buy it, and I thought we had enough, when we left Galveston, to see us home. Zane, in his direct examination, says that the beef was in good order when they arrived at Key West; that he is sure it was good the Tuesday morning, after leaving Key West (which Tuesday was Nov. 19th); that he knows it was good then because he ate of it, and saw others eat of it; that he examined it himself, and that he detected indications of its spoiling the next day. On cross-examination, he says that he gave some of the beef to one of the government vessels at Key West, and it was good. The evidence shows that this was an experimental voyage, to see whether the refrigerating apparatus and machinery would work successfully. There were 15 tons of ice left on arriving at Key West. The consumption of ice from Galveston to Key West, in 7 days and eight hours had been 80 tons. The running time of the vessel from Key West to Philadelphia was 6 days and twelve and three-quarter hours, after deducting the stoppages. Yet the vessel did not have over 35 tons of ice (including the 20 tons purchased at Key West) for use during that time. The same rate of use as from Galveston to Key West would have required over 71 tons for the voyage from Key West to Philadelphia, instead of 35 tons. If the beef was good at Key West,

these facts would tend to show that its subsequent spoiling was due to a want of sufficient ice; or, if there was ice enough, to the inability of the apparatus to preserve the beef. Notwithstanding the delay, the libellants were bound to use all accessible means to preserve the beef. If ice was needed, and could be procured, it should have been procured at Key West, and such additional expense, and not the loss of the beef, have been thrown on the claimants. It does not appear that more ice could not have been obtained at Key West. The impression produced by the evidence is that, as the ice was going out, the beef began to spoil, and that it spoiled because the ice gave out. The first day out from Key West the temperature of the refrigerating room was about 40deg., the usual, and as I understand from the testimony, the proper temperature. The fact that so small a supply of ice was procured at Key West, and that there was such reluctance on the part of the captain to procure what he did, looks in the direction, very strongly, of a spoiled condition in the beef at Key West, or such a condition as made it substantially unmerchantable when it reached Key West. This is confirmed by the halting testimony of the captain. If true, then the delay before the vessel reached Key West was not the reason why the beef did not reach Philadelphia in merchantable condition. Because, the delay before reaching Key West was only seven days, and the running time from Key West to Philadelphia added to the time the vessel remained at Key West was seven days and twelve and a quarter hours. If the beef was good at Key West, and spoiled afterwards for want of ice, the claimants are not shown to be responsible for the loss. If there was plenty of ice after leaving Key West, and yet the beef spoiled, it would indicate inability in the apparatus to prevent the spoiling, and for this it is not shown that the claimants are liable. As to any melting of ice by hot water in the bilge, any effect therefrom to spoil the beef is covered by the views before stated. But I am not satisfied, from the evidence, that any hot water in the bilge, from the leaking tubes, had any effect to raise the temperature of the refrigerating room or to melt any ice. On a full consideration of the whole case, I can come to no other conclusion than that the libellants have not made out the the cause of action set forth in the libel, and that it must be dismissed, with costs.


NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. WINDING-UP UNREGISTERED ASSOCIATION— PRACTICE. In reply to a circular issued by M. and D., setting forth a project for acquiring and remodelling a theatre at the cost of £12,000, with the intention of selling it to a company, to be formed for the purpose, for £40.000, which would enable a return to be made of £300 for every £100 subscribed, several persons, exceeding seven in number subscribed to the project. Held (affirming the decision of Bacon, V.C.) that the subscribers were partners, and that the partnership, as it consisted of more than seven members, could be wound-up under the 199th section of the Companies' Act 1862: (Re the Royal Victoria Palace Theatre Company, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 3. L.JJ.).

RAILWAY-LANDS CLAUSES ACT.-A vendor's costs under the 80th section of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act are not payable out of a fund paid into court by the promoters of an undertaking under the 85th section of the Act. sion of Bacon, V.C., reversed: (The Neath and Brecon Railway Company, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 3. L.JJ.).



NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. VERBAL CHARTERING-No BILL OF LADING -MATE'S RECEIPT NOT CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE AGAINST MASTER OF QUANTITY SHIPPED.-The plaintiffs having verbally chartered the ship of the defendant to carry iron from Glasgow to Swansea, the ship was loaded with iron bought by the plaintiff from W. and Co. The iron was weighed by the agents of W. and Co., to whom the mate gave a receiet signed by him for 330 tons, but there was no bill of lading. On delivery at Swansea the quantity of iron was discovered to be 326 tons only, but the mate deposed, and was not contradicted, to the delivery of all that had been shipped. The plaintiffs having paid on the full amount of 330 tons to W. and Co., who refused to repay them the difference, sued the defendant for short delivery. Held that there was no evidence of negligence in the defendants, and that if there had been, it would not be negligence causing loss to the plaintiffs, and a County Court judgment in favour of the plaintiffs for short delivery reversed: (Biddulph and others v. Bingham, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 30. Ex.)

BILL OF LADing-DeliveRY OF LESS QUANTITY THAN THAT STATED IN BILL.-The whole freight named in the bill of lading is payable to the shipowner carrying under it, although a less quantity of goods than the quantity named in the bill of lading be delivered, if the quantity delivered be no less than the quantity received by the ship. owner. By French law the whole freight is payable whether the whole quantity named in the bill of lading be carried or not, and therefore, in the case of a bill of lading executed in France, it is immaterial whether or not the shipowner received the whole quantity named in the bill of lading. By 18 & 19 Vict. c. 111, s. 3, "every bill of lading is conclusive evidence of the shipment as against the person signing it." Semble that by this statute the bill of lading is conclusive evidence as to quantity, not to weight: (Blanchet v. Powell's Llantwit Collieries Company (Limited), 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 28. Ex.)



the trustee with a legal power and control over the trust property, imposing upon him a corresponding reponsibility, which responsibility may be extended in equity to others who are not properly trustees if they are found either making themselves trustees de son tort, or actively participating in any fraudulent conduct of the trustee to the injury of the cestuis que trust. But strangers are not to be made constructive trustees merely because they act as the agents of trustees in transactions within their legal powers, even transactions of which a court of equity may disapprove, unless those agents receive and become chargeable with some part of the trust property, or unless they assist with knowledge in what they know to be a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustees. The court does not approve of solicitors or others, who are properly witnesses, and who are not primarily chargeable with any part of the relief prayed, being made parties to suits with a view of charging them with costs alone. A testator bequeathed his residuary estate to three trustees, upon trust as to one-fourth part thereof, for the separate inalien. able use for his daughter A. for life, with remain der to her children. Two of the trustees died, and the surviving trustee appointed A.'s husband sole trustee of his wife's share of the trust fund, and that share was transferred into the sole name of the husband, who employed it in his business and became bankrupt. A solicitor, who had previously acted in the affairs of the trust, prepared the deed of appointment, but only after strong protestations against the transaction, and another solicitor, after informing A. of the danger of the proposed appointment, approved of the deed on behalf of A. and her husband. Held (affirming the decision of Wickens, V.C.) that the solicitors were not liable to make good the loss of the trust fund, and that a bill seeking to make them liable had properly been dismissed with costs: (Barnes v. Addey, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 4. Chan.)



cutor of an executor de son tort may become himself executor de son tort in respect of the estate of the original intestate, and where the father was executor de son tort with regard to a lease, and the son upon his death acted as agent to the mother till her death, and then continued in possession of the lease for the benefit of himself and the other children, it was held that he became assignee of the lease, and liable upon the covenants therein: (Williams and Another v. Heales, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 20. C. P.)


18th Dec. 1873, 29th Jan. 1874.
(Before W. T. S. DANIEL, Q.C., Judge.)

Piecework-Supply of materials - Liability of
A power-loom weaver, paid by piecework, but
bound not to leave his employment without
giving seven days' notice in writing, is not
entitled in the absence of express contract to
damages for loss of wages through not being
fully supplied by his employer with materials
for his loom, where the deficient supply was not
occasioned by the wilful refusal or negligence of
the employer. The limit of the implied legal
liability of the employer is to find reasonable
employment according to the circumstances of
the trade: (Pilkington v. Scott, 15 L. J. N. S.,

329, Ex.; Reg. v. Welsh, 22 L. J., N. S. 145, Mag. That, on the one hand, the wages to be earned by Cas.; Aspkin v. Austin, 5 Q. B. 674.) Deane (Blackburn) for plaintiff.

Baldwin (Burnley) for defendant.

His HONOUR.-This action is brought to re cover the sum of 10s. 6d. as damages for loss of wages to the plaintiff, through an alleged breach of contract by the defendant. Though the sum sued for is small, the case was treated as involving a question of considerable importance to the trade and industry of this district. The plaintiff is a power-loom weaver, and the defendant is a manufacturer occupying room and power in a mill in Burnley, in which he has 170 looms, upon which from 40 to 50 weavers are employed, all of whom are paid by piecework according to an agreed list of prices. The wages are paid weekly, and are made up to the Wednesday, and paid on the following Saturday in each week, and the amount of wages payable to each weaver necessarily depends upon the quantity of work done by him during the week. The following is a copy of the rules in force at the defendant's mill, and which regulates the terms on which the plaintiff was employed.

"NOTICE.-All persons employed in these works are required to give seven days' notice, in writing, at the counting house before leaving their employ, and seven days' notice in writing will be given by the undersigned before the discharge of any person from such employ, except in the event of any person being guilty of wilful neglect, or spoiling of work, disobedience of orders, or any misdemeanour, in which case the person offending will be liable to immediate discharge, and on proof of wilful damage to forfeit any wages that may be due at the time of such discharge. All notices to be given on Wednesday night before six o'clock. Any person being absent from work without a substitute will be considered to have left without notice. Any persons leaving without notice will forfeit all wages due to them.-Signed, RICHARD HARDMAN."

The plaintiff entered upon his employment as a power-loom weaver, having four looms under his management; and on the Monday in the first week of his employment his looms were stopped for two hours for want of weft, and he was stopped all day on the following Wednesday from the same cause. On that day he gave the defendant the seven days' notice in writing required by the rules to leave his employ. He was supplied with weft on the following day (Thursday), but he had none on Friday or Saturday, and notice was given by the defendant that the weavers need not come till after breakfast time on the following Monday. At that time the plaintiff attended his employment again, and he was supplied with weft and warp for his looms from that time till the following Wenesday night, when his employment terminated according to his notice. Upon his wages account being made up to that time, the quantity of work done being less than it would have been if he had had a continued supply of weft, the amount of wages payable to him was less than he would have been able and expected to have earned by the sum claimed, namely, 10s. 6d., which he demanded of defendant, and defendant refused to pay. A question was raised by the defendant as to the amount, it being insisted on his behalf that the difference between what the plaintiff earned and what he might have earned did not exceed 78. 6d., but I adopt the plaintiff's computation of his loss. The case, as at first opened on behalf of the plaintiff, was that the non-supply of weft was attributable to the wilful refusal or neglect of the defendant to supply it. The result of the evidence satisfied me that the defendant had done all that a prudent manufacturer, acting for his Own interest and the interest of those employed by him, could be reasonably expected to do under the circumstances. I am satisfied that what the defendant did he did according to the usual custom of business, and he acted for the best for his own interest and the interest of the plaintiff and the other weavers in the same employment, and he was not, in my opinion, bound to do more. It was then contended for the plaintiff that the contract between him and the defendant involved an implied obligation on the part of the defendant to keep the plaintiff supplied with sufficient material to enable him to keep his looms going during the whole period of his employment, so as to enable him to do as much work as the looms were capable of turning out under his management, and thereby secure for himself as large an amount of wages as his skill and industry would enable him to earn. And it was further contended that this obligation was absolute, and that the plaintiff ought not to be affected by any circumstances which might occasion the deficient supply, though those circumstances might be beyond the control of the defendant, and though they actually arose out of the ordinary hazards and risks of the trade, and, in short, that the defendant must be considered as insuring the plaintiff constant remunerative employment, and as taking all risks and hazards upon himself.

the plaintiff were the only fund out of which he could provide the necessaries of life for the support of himself and family; while, on the other hand, the question with the defendant was only one of more or less profit upon capital, with which labour had nothing to do. This contention would seem to apply to every description of remuneration for labour by piece work, and to every form of interruption to the continuance of that labour however occasioned. The importance of the question as thus stated to the commercial and industrial classes generally is obvions; but, in endeavouring to arrive at a proper decision of the question, it must be borne in mind that though the argument on both sides had a tendency to drift into the discussion of vexed questions between capital and labour, those questions cannot be discussed here. In this court the question can only be dealt with as one of contract, and must be determined by the application of principles and rules established by authority, and illustrated by examples of decided cases Two cases were cited and relied upon by Mr. Deane on behalf of the plaintiff as authorities for the principle of the implied absolute obligation for which the plaintiff contends. The first case was that of Pilkington v. Scott, which occurred in 1846, and is reported 15 L. J., N. S., 329, Ex. Ch. That was an action by one rival manufacturer against another for harbouring one Joseph Leigh, a servant of the plaintiff's. The defendant pleaded not guilty. The case was tried at Liverpool before Patteson, J., and an agreement of serservice between Leigh and the plaintiffs was put in, which the defendant contended was invalid as being unilateral and not mutual, on the ground that the plaintiffs were not bound to employ Leigh, but only to pay him as long as he was employed, and that such an agreement was in restraint of trade, and therefore void as being against public policy. The learned judge overruled the objection, and the plaintiff recovered a verdict for £4. The agreement was that Leigh should and would at all times during the term of seven years to be computed from the date, serve the plaintiffs, their executors, &c., as a crown glass maker; that he should not during the term work for any other person at any other glass house or place of business without the licence of the plaintiffs; that it should be lawful for the plaintiffs to deduct from his wages any fine that he might incur for breach of their rules; that during any depression of trade he should be paid a moiety of his wages; that if he was sick or lame, the plaintiffs should be at liberty to employ any other persons in his stead without paying him any wages; that the plaintiffs should pay him a sum, and so long as he should be employed and work as a crown glass maker wages by the piece (stating them), and £8 per annum in lieu of house rent and firing, and that the plaintiffs should have the option of dismissing him on giving him a month's notice and paying him a month's wages. A rule nisi for a new trial was obtained for misdirection on the ground that the judge ought to have directed the jury to find for the defendant, inasmuch as the agreement was invalid, being unilateral and not mutual, the master not being bound to employ the workman at all, but only to pay him as long as he might be employed, and that the agreement was in restraint of trade. After argument the court discharged the rule, holding that the agreement was not in restraint of trade (an objection which has no application here), and that upon the question whether the agreement was void for want of mutuality, as containing no undertaking on the part of the masters to employ the workman, Baron Alderson says, "We must take the whole of the contract together. The workman agrees to serve the plaintiffs on certain terms, and the plaintiffs agree to pay him some certain wages on certain terms. And they are to have the option of dismissing him on giving him a month's notice or a month's wages. Now, if all these stipulations are taken together, they clearly point to an undertaking on the part of the master to employ the workman for seven years, subject to the terms above mentioned. This is a reasonable bargain made with good consideration, and the amount of the consideration is not material." The other judges, Baron Rolfe and Baron Platt concurred, giving similar reasons. That case merely decided that on the agreement in question there, there arose an obligation on the part of the master to find employment for the workman, but the extent of the obligation, which is the question in this case, was not decided or even discussed. The other case relied upon was Reg. v. Welch (22 L. J., N. S., 145, Mag. Cas.), decided in 1853. This was an application by T. F. Griffiths for a rule calling on certain justices of the borough of Birmingham and Robert Whitaker to show cause why the justices should not hear, determine, and adjudicate upon an information and complaint laid by Griffiths on behalf of himself and his co-partners, under 4 Geo. 4, c. 34, against Whitaker for breach of a contract

of service. In that case, by an agreement well as liable to great practical injustice in the
in writing dated 2nd Dec. 1852, Whittaker application." These remarks, resting upon such
agreed with Griffiths and his partner, in considera high judicial authority, are, as it seems to me,
tion of £3 lont by Griffiths and Co., and of wages pointedly applicable to the present case. The
to be paid him to serve Griffiths and Co. as a tin- rules, after providing for seven days' notice
plate worker, and not to serve anyone else with being given on each side before determining the
out their leave in writing, for the term of twelve employment, expressly provide that any person
months, and until the expiration of three calendar being absent from work without a substitute will
months after notice by Whitaker to Griffith and be considered to have left without notice; and any
Co., of his intention to determine the service. persons leaving without notice will forfeit all
And in consideration of his good and faithful wages due to them. The plaintiff's contention
services Griffiths and Co. agreed to pay him on would require that there should be considered as
Saturday night in every week during the said inserted in the rules a converse provision to this
term such wages as the articles made by Whitaker effect: That if from any cause 8 weaver
should amount to at Griffiths and Co.'s usual paid by piece-work shall not be kept con-
workmen's prices. The agreement then contained stantly supplied with weft and warp in his loom,
a proviso enabling either party to determine the the employer shall pay him by way of damages
service after the said term of twelve months by a such a sum as he might have earned as wages for
three months' notice, and a stipulation authorising the work he might have done if his looms had
Griffiths and Co. to deduct 10s. per week until the been kept constantly supplied with weft and
sum of £3 was paid. The justices refused to warp. Such a provision might, of course, be the
adjudicate upon the hearing or to order Whitaker subject of express agreement, but for the law to
to return to the service on the ground that imply it against the defendant, and without his
the agreement was bad on the face of it, for consent, would be unjust. The defendant might
want of mutuality-there was an express obliga- and did say such a provision is contrary to the
tion on the part of Whitaker to serve, but no express universal and well-known usage of the particular
obligation on the part of Griffiths and Co. to employ industry, as was proved to be the fact in this
him. The court, however, held that there was an case. The plaintiff admitted he had never made
implied obligation on Griffiths and Co. to find or heard of such a claim being made before. And
Whitaker employment. During the argument the defendant might and did further urge that
Lord Campbell observed: "It would be for the the constant and continuous supply of weft and
jury to say what was a reasonable quantum of warp for his looms is a matter in which he is as
work. The agreement provides for its continu- much and even more interested than his weavers,
ance until one or other party gives notice. Does his loss in such supply failing being greater than
not that imply a contract to find employment?" theirs, and that this supply depends upon circum-
And in giving judgment, Lord Campbell, after stances which involve trade risks which are
stating the terms of the agreement, says: "Under beyond his control, and must be and are known
these circumstances it is surely a necessary impli- to be so to the plaintiff and all engaged in this
cation that the employers shall find reasonable branch of skilled labour. For instance, the risks
work for the servant as well as pay him wages for of irregularity and unavoidable delay in transit
the articles he makes. The contrary would be to whether by railway or otherwise, besides the
suppose a most unreasonable intention, which risk of disputes and differences arising between
could never have entered into the heads of either employers and workmen in other branches of
party. The stipulation as to giving notice after industry, which are involved in placing the
the expiration of the twelve months shows that weft and warp in the loom, and other instances
some obligation was cast upon the employers, and might be given. The result, therefore, which I
I think that was, according to the circumstances have arrived at is that, as a fact, the plaintiff has
of the trade during the time of the contract to had reasonable employment according to the
find reasonable employment for the servant. circumstances of the trade, and that his further
This being so, the contract is not a unilateral one, claim is unsuppoted by any decided case, and is
but one binding each party to the performance of not warranted by any sound principle, and recog-
some obligation, and therefore valid." The ex- nised by law as applicable to the construction of
pressions of Lord Campbell in that case were this contract. I should not have considered it
strongly relied upon by Mr. Deane as justifying necessary to have entered into the case at such
his contention that there was in this case an great length, as I believe I decided the same point
implied obligation on the part of the defendant to the same way in a case which occurred some time
find work, arising from the fact that by the terms since at Chatham; but I was informed that in
of the agreement the defendant had stipulated for this case the claim had been brought forward at
seven days' notice being given by the plaintiff the instance and in the interest of the general
before he could leave his employment. But body of weavers in this district, who are paid
when Lord Campbell says that there is an im- piece work, with the view of having their rights
plied obligation on the employer to find work, he in this matter settled by the decision of a court
limits that obligation to finding reasonable em- which it will be their duty to respect, and as the
ployment according to the circumstances of the decision of this court is binding only as a decision
trade. The question what is reasonable employ- of the particular question in the particular case
ment is left undetermined, as it must depend upon between the particular litigants, and is of no
the circumstances of each case. All that was de-authority as a precedent, I am willing to grant
cided in that case, as in the case of Pilkington v. the plaintiff leave to appeal, but of course upon
Scott, was that there was a sufficient considera- the usual terms. And these, as he is supported
tion upon the face of the agreement to enable the by his union, there will be no difficulty on his
court to say that it was not void for want of part in complying with. The judgment will be
mutuality, and thus afford an excuse for the entered in this court for the defendant with costs.
workman for a breach of his contract. I cannot
regard either case as an authority for the conten-
tion raised here. Admitting that the provision in
the rules which requires the plaintiff to give seven
days' notice before leaving his employment raises
an implied obligation on the part of the defendant
to find the plaintiff employment, the case of Reg.
v. Welsh decides that that is reasonable employ.
ment according to the circumstances of the trade.
Now, what that reasonable employment is is a
question of fact to be determined by evidence
it is not a question of law to be deduced
from the terms of the contract or the nature
of its provisions. The parties might by express
stipulation define what should be the limits
and extent of the obligation; but those limits and
extent, if intended to modify or increase the
limit and extent prescribed by law, would depend
upon the mutual intention of the parties, and should
therefore be made the subject of express stipula-
tion. In the case of Aspkin v. Austin (5 Q. B.674),
Lord Denman, C.J., in delivering a considered
judgment of the court, thus speaks of the danger
and impropriety of implying terms that might, if
intended, be made the subject of express stipula.
tion: "It is one thing for the court to effectuate
the intention of the parties to the extent to which
they may have, even imperfectly, expressed them-
selves, and another to add to the instrument all
such covenants as, upon a full consideration of the
court, may deem fitting for completing the inten.
tion of the parties, but which they either purposely
or unintentionally may have omitted. The former
is but the application of a rule of construction to
that which is written; the latter adds to the obli-
gations by which the parties have bound them
selves, and is, of course, quite unauthorised as

Wednesday, March 4.
(Before J. M. HERBERT, Esq., Judge.)

His HONOUR said: This was a suit for neces-
saries, instituted by the plaintiff for the recovery
of a sum due for the pilotage of the ship from
Penarth Roads to a point beyond Ilfracombe and
back, the master having put back from stress of
weather. The plaintiff claimed £5 168., being
the amount which a regular pilot of this port
would be entitled to under the bye-laws; but the
plaintiff being only a dock pilot, and his licence
not extending beyond Penarth Roads, he is not
entitled to the amount allowed by the bye-laws,
but only to such a sum as might have been agreed
upon, or as his services were worth. The plaintiff
swore that he had told the captain that the
pilotage to Lundy would be £4 7s. 6d., and the
master having decided upon going back to
Penarth Roads after the pilot had passed Il.
fracombe, he contended that he was entitled
to one-third more for the back pilotage, as
allowed under the bye-laws to the licensed pilots.
The captain refused to pay him the sum claimed
on the ground that he had not taken the ship to
Lundy, and referred him to Mr. Lucovich, as the
agent of the ship. Mr. Lucovich having seen the
plaintiff, and knowing the captain's ground for
disputing the claim, agreed with the plaintiff that
the captain should pay him £4 for his services;
and the plaintiff having agreed to accept that
sum in full, Mr. Lucovich gave him a letter to the

captain, directing him to pay the plaintiff £4. The plaintiff took away the letter, leaving Mr. Lucovich under the impression that the matter was thus settled; but instead of delivering the letter to the captain, he destroyed it, and commenced this suit, and had the ship arrested. Mr. Lewis Reece appeared for the plaintiff, and Mr. Ingledew for the owners. Mr. Ingledew objected that the suit was wrongly brought, and that pilotage could not be recovered in a suit for necessaries, but only, if at all, in a suit for wages. This objection, if tenable, is one of importance, because the jurisdiction of the County Court in admiralty, being limited to certain specified causes of suit or grounds of claim, it is necessary that the præcipe should set forth the ground of claim in proper form and with sufficient accuracy to show that it comes within the jurisdiction. It is further necessary with regard to the rights of the sureties, for if the bail bond be given to secure the plaintiff his damages to be recovered in one form of suit, it would, I conceive, be impossible to enforce the bond for the recovery of damages for a cause of suit not coming under or within the head or description of claim set forth both in the præcipe and the bail-bond. Now it is clear that a claim for pilot's services, if it can be enforced in the County Court in Admiralty, must come under the head of necessaries or of wages. There is no other subject-matter of the jurisdiction given by the statute applicable to it. But if it comes within a suit for necessaries, no such claim could have been brought in the High Court of Admiralty before the passing of the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 65, the 6th section of which enacts "That the High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdiction to decide all claims and demands for necessaries supplied to any foreign ship or sea-going vessel, and to enforce the payment thereof, whether such ship or vessel may have been within the body of a county or upon the high seas when the necessaries were furnished in respect of which the claim was made." And this right to sue in the Admiralty Court for necessaries was extended by the 5th section of the Admiralty Act of 1861, to "any claim for necessaries supplied to any ship else where than in the port to which the ship belongs, unless it is shown, to the satisfaction of the court, that at the time of the institution of the cause any owner or part owner of the ship is domiciled in England or Wales." Hence a claim for necessaries supplied to a ship can only be enforced in the High Court of Admiralty, when the ship is either a foreign ship or a British ship, not in her own port, and not having an owner or part owner domiciled in England. And it appears from The Dowse (22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 627; L. Rep. 3 Ad. 135), and Everard v. Kendall (L. Rep. 5 C. P. 428; 22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 408), that the jurisdiction of the County Court in admiralty is limited in the same way as the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty is limited. Hence it follows that if pilotage be recoverable as neces saries, it could only be so recoverable when the pilotage services were rendered to a foreign ship or to a British ship when not in her own port, and not having an owner or part owner domiciled in the kingdom. But it seems pretty clear from the authorities that a pilot could always sue for his wages in the Admiralty Court. In the Prince George (3 Hag. 379), it was held that any person employed on board a ship is entitled to the privi lege of arresting the ship in the Court of Admiralty for his wages, and so widely has the term "Mariner" been stretched as to include the surgeon of a ship, so as to entitle him to arrest the ship for his wages. In Ross v. Walker (2 Wils. 266) a pilot had sued in the Admiralty Court for his wages, and a prohibition was applied for; and it was held that, though a pilot is a mari ner, yet if he sue for wages for piloting a ship from Sea Reach to Deptford, both within the body of a county (which circumstance took away the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court until the passing of the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 65), prohibition will lie; and in "Pritchard's Digest" this case is cited as an authority that a pilot may sue in the Admiralty Court for his wages unless the contract be made and the work done infra corpus comitatus," 2 vol. 922. The Benjamin Franklin (6 C. Rob. 350), was a suit for wages on the part of a pilot for conducting the ship, an American vessel, from the Downs to Flushing; and the demand was resisted on a suggestion of want of skill in running the vessel on a sand bank, by which considerable damage was sustained. This suit was instituted in 1806 (during the war), and Sir W. Scott decided against the pilot on the ground of his navigating a foreign ship to an enemy's port. This point was not raised by the owner, and Sir W. Scott, at the end of his judgment, says, "Costs are asked, but as the owners did not take the objection on which my judgment is founded, by appearing under protest, and since by that omission the other party has been led on to defend himself upon the merits, I shall not give costs." This case appears to me to be inferentially a strong authority that the


was cause



brought for wages. Being then satisfied by these authorities that pilotage is included under the head of claim wages," I think however much disposed I may feel to consider that the service is in the nature of a necessary, that I ought to hold that the Legislature did not intend to include it under the class or description of necessaries, for which the right to sue is given by the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 65, especially as such right to sue is limited in the way I have mentioned. I, therefore, am of opinion that the suit was wrongly brought, and that I ought to discharge the bail. But I intimated at the hearing that I was inclined to think I might amend, under the provisions of the County Courts Acts, those Acts being incorporated with the County Courts Admiralty Act by the 34th section; and inasmuch as the agent of the ship and the captain had full notice of the nature of the claim, I think I ought to exercise the power if it exists, without prejudice to the right of the sureties to be discharged from the bail bond. Now the 57th section of 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, appears to me fully large enough to give me the power of amendment required. It is, The judge of a County Court may at all times amend all defects and errors in any proceeding in such court, whether there is anything in writing to amend by or not, and whether the defect or error be that of the party applying to amend or not; and all such amendments may be made with or without costs, and upon such terms as to the judge may seem fit; and all such amendments as may be necessary for the purpose of determining in the existing suit the real question in controversy between the parties shall be so made, if duly applied for." The only question in controversy between the parties to this suit is the question of plaintiff's wages. I shall, therefore. under this section, if I am asked by the plaintiff so to do, strike out the word "necessaries" from the præcipe, and substitute for it the word wages," But, having regard to Mr. Lucovich's evidence that the plaintiff agreed to accept £4 in full payment of his claim, and being of opinion that that agreement was binding upon him under the circumstances (for, notwithstanding he swore that the master agreed to his terms, and the master was not called to contradict him, it was clear that the master denied the agreement and its performance, as stated by the plaintiff, and therefore the matter was sufficiently in dispute to make the compromise binding), I shall decree only the sum of £4 for the plaintiff's services; and inasmuch as the destruction of Mr. Lucovich's letter was most improper and inexcusable, and as the institution of this suit was, in my opinion, under the circumstances, quite uncalled for, I shall not allow the plaintiff any costs of the suit.


Saturday, Feb. 21.
(Before J. WORLLEDGE, Esq., Judge.)

Tithes-Covenant running with the land-Right of assignee.

HIS HONOUR this morning gave judgment in a case in which Miss Mary Ann Doughty sought to recover from Mr. Edward Press the sum of £39 43, being the amount of eight years' landtax, which the plaintiff had been called upon to pay, and had paid, in respect of a moiety of the tithes arising from certain lands in the parish of Syleham, and which moiety of tithes Miss Doughty's father purchased of Mr. Press's uncle as long ago as the year 1827. The case came on for trial at Harleston, in May 1873, when Mr. Merewether was counsel for the plaintiff; Mr. Blofeld for the defendant. On the 19th Dec. 1827, John Latham Press, defendant's uncle, was owner for the residue of a term of 1000 years, created by deed, dated 26th Jan. 1549, of the tithes of Syleham, and contracted with the plaintiff's father, George Clarke Doughty, for the sale to him of a moiety of the tithes, which were then compounded for at £216 16s., for the sum of £2703 158. purchase money. No conveyance was then executed, but instead thereof, by an indenture dated the 19th Dec. 1827, John Latham Press covenanted to convey upon request. The indenture also contained a covenant to indemnify against various charges, including land tax. Mr. Doughty died on the 22nd April 1832, and Mr. Press on the 19th Dec. 1835, both before any conveyance had been cuted. Doughty bequeathed his moiety or the tithes to his daughter, the plaintiff, and Press, his moiety to his nephew, Edward Press, the defendant, and George Latham Press; the defendant being also his heir-at-law. Mr. J. L. Press also in his will directed two of his executors, William White and Thomas Lombe Taylor, to perform the agreement contained in the deed of 1827. On the 14th March 1839, a deed was executed, to which the executors, defendant, and his brother, and Miss Doughty were parties, by which the executors assigned the moiety of the tithes to Miss

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Doughty, and personally covenanted that they did not encumber. The two brothers Press were, then, merely parties for the production of the deeds. There was no covenant in this deed, however, by either of the parties indemnifying Miss Doughty against land-tax. In 1821 the tithes were commuted to £245; but no demand was made upon Miss Doughty for land tax till 1853, when she paid £2 12s. 4d., and had since paid various other amounts. She made no demand, however, for the repayment of these amounts till the 4th April 1872, when Messrs. Josselyn and Sons, having been consulted by the plaintiff, wrote to the defendant, calling his attention to the deed of 1827, and requesting payment of £106 53. 6d. Mr. Merewether argued that plaintiff, as assignee of his uncle, the covenantee in the deed of 1827, was entitled to sue the defendant as assignee of his uncle, the covenantor, upon the covenants contained in that deed, or if not as assignee, as heir-at-law of his uncle; in other words, that the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit, and defendant was liable to the burden of the deed of 1827. His Honour remarked that it was clear that by the deed of 1827 the legal estate in the moiety of the tithes did not pass to Mr. Doughty, and he, in fact, never acquired the legal estate in it, the latter being vested in Mr. J. L. Press. After the death of Mr. J. L. Press it vested in the executors, and passed, by the deed of 1839, to Miss Doughty, so that, as far as the legal estate was concerned, she was the assignee of J. Latham Press, the covenantor, and not of her father, the covenanted. Until he (His Honour) heard Mr. Merewether's argument, he always supposed that for a covenant to run with land-and it was the same with tithes

the assignee of the covenantee was enabled to sue on it, and the covenantee must have some legal estate in the land to which the covenant could be attachel, and this view was supported by the case in Coke upon Littleton, 387 A., and by Webb v. Russell (3 Term Rep. 393). Mr. Merewether contended that Webb v. Russell was not a binding authority, and referred to a case in which Lord Tenterden was reported to have remarked that the decision in that case had caused a great deal of feeling at Westminster, and the Real Property Commissioners expresed an opinion that it would be well if the law as laid down in that case could be altered. Mr. Merewether also quoted Wakefield v. Brown (9 Q. B. Rep. 209) and Magnay v. Edwards (22 L. J., N. S., 170, C. P.). The latter was a case in which the Court of Common Pleas had confirmed a previous judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench. His Honour said the facts in Wakefield v. Brown were not identical with the present case, and not only so, but from the words of Jervis, C.J., in giving judgment in Magnay v. Edwards, and from the remarks made by Willes and Keating, the learned editors of Smith's Leading Cases, it was clear that the case Wakefield v. Brown was regarded as a doubtful authority. He would, therefore, decline to follow it, and extend its operation to the present case. Mr. Merewether had also referred to two Irish cases, Averall v. Wade (Lloyd's and Goold's Reps., Temp. Sugden, 252), and Hatton v. Waddy, a case on the equity side of the Irish Court of Exchequer (2 Jones's Irish Exchequer Reps. 541). He (his Honour) did not consider that these cases applied. It, therefore, appeared to him that at the time of the execution of the deed of 1827 Miss Doughty, the covenantee, had no legal estate in the moiety of the tithes in question, and these cases were no authority whatever that Miss Doughty could maintain an action at Common Law, upon the covenant to indemnify contained in the deed of 1827. Therefore upon the sole ground that Miss Doughty had no right of action at common law, whatever remedy she might have had at equity, he would give judgment for the defendant with costs. But in the event of an appeal against his decision the other points raised by Mr. Blofeld, the defendant's counsel, must be open to the defendant.

Saturday, Feb. 7.
(Before J. A. RUSSELL, Q.C., Judge.)

Bankruptcy Act 1869-Partnership-Death of
partners-Distribution of property.
J. A. S. entered into partnership with his son,
W. S., in April 1864, as cotton spinners. J. A. S.
died, and in May 1865 an agreement was entered
into by and between the executors of J. A. S.
and the several parties interested in his estate,
under which it was arranged that three of the
sons, W. S., C. J. S., and F. S., should take the
goodwill, stock, and machinery of and in the
said business at an agreed price, and should
carry on the business in manner set out in that
agreement. The business was carried on for
two or three years, when another son, A. S., was
taken into the partnership, and the business was
carried on under the agreement of May 1865 and

a further agreement then made with the execu tors. On 2nd Jan. 1871 articles of partnership were entered into by the four brothers, which provided, amongst other things, that in case of the death of either of the four brothers in the partnership, the partnership should not be dissolved, but the survivors should carry on the business, and the shares of either of them should be ascertained at the succeeding stocktaking after such death. There were other provisions as to the mode of dealing with the property in such an event. The capital of the firm consisted of money left by the father, debts owing to the concern, and the machinery and stock. No balance sheets were made out, as provided by the articles.

A. S. died in Sept. 1871; C. J. S. died in Jan. 1872. Their shares were not ascertained at the stocktaking succeeding their decease. The business was carried on by the two surviving brothers, the assets of each of the deceased remaining in the business. New stock was purchased and intermixed.

On the bankruptcy of the firm, after the death of A. S. and C. J. S., those creditors whose debts were contracted before that time contended that the proceeds of such of the machinery as could be distinguished as having belonged to the partnership of the four should be divisible amongst the creditors of the early partnership, in priority to those of the creditors who had become so after the death of A. S. and C. J. S. respectively.

Held, that the matter must be decided by the terms of the agreement of May 1865, and that the proceeds of such of the machinery as could be distinguished as having belonged to the partnership of the four should be divided amongst the credi. tors of the four partners.

Ambrose, barrister, instructed by Boote and Edgar, appeared on behalf of the creditors of the two surviving partners.

Coventry, barrister, instructed by Cooper and Sons, for the creditors of the four original partners.

Jones, attorney (of the firm of Sale, Shipman, and Co.), for the trustee under the bankruptcy.

It appeared that on the 12th April 1864, Mr. J. A. Simpson, who was the father of the debtors, Walter Simpson and J. A. Simpson, entered into a partnership with Walter Simpson to carry on business at Park-lane Mills, Preston. J. A. Simpson died on the 25th April 1864, and on the 3rd May 1865, an agreement in writing was entered into between the executors of J. A. Simpson and the beneficiaries under the will. By the agreement it was arranged that Walter Simpson, C. J. Simpson, and Frederick Simpson, the sons of the testator, should carry on the business, and should take the goodwill, stock, and machinery thereof, at an agreed price. The business was carried on till June 1867, when a further agreement was entered into. The business was continued by Walter Simpson, Fred. Simpson, C. J. Simpson, and Arthur Simpson, under the agreement of the 3rd May. On the 2nd Jan. 1871, articles of partnership were entered into which contained a clause that, in case of the death of either of the four brothers-the members of the partnershipthe partnership should not be dissolved, but the survivor or survivors should carry on the business, and the shares of either of them should be ascertained at the succeeding stocktaking after such death. The half of the balance then found to be due to any of them was to remain in the hands of the firm, except as to a sum of £200 for the period of three years from such decease, and the other half, except as regarded the £200, should remain in the hands of the survivors for five years, and the whole of the said balance should be secured to the representatives of either or any of them by the promissory notes of the survivors, such notes bearing interest at the rate of 7 per cent., payable to such representatives quarterly, and the £200 should be paid to the representatives of the remainder within one calendar month of the death of any one of them. The brother Arthur died on the 27th Sept. 1871, and the business was continued by the three surviving partners. Charles J. Simpson, another of the brothers, died on the 15th Jan. 1872, and from his death up to the commencement of the proceedings in liquidation on the 19th Dec. 1872, the business had been carried on by the two survivors. There had been no stocktaking after the death of either of the brothers, nor had their shares been ascertained. No promissory note had been given to the representative of either of the deceased partners, nor was the £200 paid in either case within the month. Small sums had from time to time been paid to the widow of each, but not specifically in respect of the £200. Upon the death of Arthur, the assets remained, and were used for the purpose of the business, and the same happened at the death of Charles John.

The question for the opinion of the court was whether the creditors of the four partners were entitled to have the machinery or such part as could be distinguished as having belonged to the

partnership of the four, or the proceeds of such
machinery divided amongst the creditors of the
four in priority to the other creditors.
Coventry contended that the clause in the
partnership deed, although it might amount to the
agreement to assign the shares of the deceased
partners, was executory, and that therefore the case
came within the rule laid down in Ex parte Wheeler,
Buck, 25, and Ex parte Cooper (1 M. D. & D. 358),
and the shares of the deceased partners remained
subject to the lien of their representatives to have
the creditors of the old firm paid, and that such
creditors could take advantage of that lien, and
claim priority over creditors of the new firm. He
cited also Ex parte Ruffin (6 Vesey, 119), Ex
parte Williams (11 Vesey, 6), and was then stopped
by the judge.

Ambrose, on the other hand, contended that whether or not the agreement was executory, the ascertaining of the shares was not a condition precedent to the passing of the property or shares of the deceased partners to the survivors, and distinguished the cases of Ex parte Williams and Ex parte Cooper.

In giving judgment-His HONOUR stated the facts as given above, and having referred to the clause in the agreement on which the case turned, said :-On one side it is contended that the clause operates as an absolute assignment, and on the other that it does not operate absolutely. The principle on which the decision of this case depends is laid down in Lindley on Partnership, p. 674, 3rd edit. After quoting the principle as here stated, he went on-Let us look at the position of the parties at the time of this agreement being entered into. The clause says, that the partnership should not be disturbed in case of death, and that the business should be carried on. Without such a clause death would have dissolved the partnership, which would have been most inconvenient. But there is something further, viz.,that on the death of one of the partners, all that had been the property of the firm should not eo instanti become the property of the three surviving partners, but that the share of the deceased partner should be ascertained, and then left in the concern; that his share, which by his death had been severed, should be ascertained and brought back as a share. Before it was ascertained, how could it be valued? Before it was valued, how could it be bought? As the value of the share had never been ascertained, it has never become the property of the surviving partners. Matters stand now as they stood at the moment of the death of the first of the partners. I therefore answer the question left for the opinion of the court in the affirmative, and find that the creditors of the four are entitled to have the machinery or such part thereof as can be distinguished as having belonged to the partnership of the four, or the proceeds thereof, or such portion of them as can be distinguished as aforesaid divided amongst the creditors of the four in priority to the other creditors; the costs of those for whom Mr. Ambrose appears to be paid out of the estate, and I refer it to the registrar to inquire whether the machinery referred to, or any and what part thereof, could at the date of the petition be distinguished as having belonged to the partnership of the four, and in what manner such machinery was fixed to the freehold, with liberty for any party to apply.


an annexed schedule. The debt of M. and H. was
not inserted in the schedule, the bills being con-
sidered by the trustee of no value, but there was
no intention of reserving a right of action to the
trustee in respect of them, and they ultimately
were given to G. by the holders. In an action by
M. against G. for a separate debt, G. pleaded an
equitable set-off, setting up the debt due to him
from M. and H. Held, that the discharge of H.
did not discharge M., and that it left M. liable to
G., who could therefore maintain his right of set-
off in the action. Held, also, that the right of
action was either legally in the defendant or
legally in the trustee, to hold it in equity in trust
for him, and that evidence was admissible as to
the reasons why the plaintiff's liability in respect
of the bills was not inserted in the schedule of
debts to be transferred to G. by the trustee
(Megrath v. Gray, Gray v. Megrath, 30 L. T. Rep.
N. S. 16. C. P.)

-In 1870 two traders who carried on business in
partnership agreed, in consideration of past and
present advances, that they would, on demand,
assign to their father and brother the business
then carried on by them together, with the lease
of their business premises (which lease was after-
wards deposited with the lenders), and also the
fixtures and their stock and utensils in trade;
and it was provided that if the debtors should
repay the sum due with interest, then the agree-
ment should be void, but should they be unable
to repay the sum due, then a valuation of the pre-
mises thereby agreed to be assigned should be
taken, and the amount whereby such valuation
should exceed the sum then due should be paid by
the father and brother of the debtors. În 1873
an assignment was made in accordance with the
agreement, and the amount whereby the valuation
exceeded the sum then due to them was paid by
the father and brother to the debtors, who ex-
pended the same in paying certain creditors, and
shortly afterwards presented a petition for liqui-
dation, stating their assets to be nil, and their
debts to be £1833: Held, that the agreement of
1870 gave the father and son a good equitable
security upon all the property of the debtors in-
cluded in the assignment of 1873, and that the
assignment therefore was not fraudulent or an
act of bankruptcy. Held, also, that the effect of
the assignment was only to pass the legal estate
in the lease, and that if the assignment had never
been executed, and the debtors had merely given
possession to their father and brother of the pre-
mises, stock-in-trade, &c., comprised in the
agreement, on receiving the balance of the
valuation, the title of the father and brother to
the property under the agreement would have
been good. Held, also, that the assignment was
not an evasion of the Bills of Sale Act, inasmuch
as possession of the property assigned was given
at the same time the deed was executed. Deci-
sion of Mr. Registrar Murray affirmed: (Ex parte
Izard; Re Cook, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 7. Chan.)

RESIDENCE.-A debtor's summons for a debt
exceeding £50 was issued out of a County Court
within the jurisdiction of which the debtor's
father lived, the creditors being unable to find out
his residence. The summons was served upon
the debtor in London, the debtor having, after the
summons was issued, stated that he resided at a
house in London, to which the goods in respect of
which the debt arose had been sent. Held (affirm-
ing the decision of one of the registrars), that as
the debtor's summons had been issued out of a
Court within the jurisdiction of which the debtor
did not reside, neglect to comply with it was not
an act of bankruptcy within the Bankruptcy Act
1869, s. 6, sub-sect. 6. Petition for adjudication
of bankruptcy accordingly dismissed with costs:
(Ex parte Boyle, re Plummer, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S.
2. Chan.)

Wednesday, March 11.


Feb. a debtor's summons, under the Bankruptcy Act 1869, was issued against him, and on the following day he filed a petition for liquidation. A few days before the presentation of the petition a first meeting was held under proceedings for liquidation by Messrs. Burrs, which resulted in an adjournment to the 26th ult.; and at the adjourned sitting the present debtor, with the assent of the receiver, proved a debt of £16,934 against the estate, after deducting the value of certain securities which he held and which he assessed at £10,000, and by his proxy voted in favour of a resolution for the acceptance of a composition of 1s. in the pound. The grounds of the application were substantially these, that after the debtor had presented a petition for liquidation he had no right to vote upon the resolution, and that the value of the securities was not properly stated; but from an affidavit filed in reply, it appeared that the debtor at the first meeting under Messrs. Burrs's liquidation tendered a proof; the composition of 1s. in the pound was more than the assets showed; and the securities had been gone through and their value agreed upon.

His HONOUR said this was quite a novel application; an experiment, indeed, to induce the court to exercise its discretion in a way which would be productive of great mischief and inconvenience. The proof had been tendered and the matter was in the hands of the creditors, and any objection would be dealt with in the usual way. The application was made, not with the view of ascertaining a principle, but with transparent object of affecting the validity of the composition, and the court was bound to refuse it.


Charge of Libel.
RUPERT RAINS, a solicitor, was charged with
publishing a libel.

Hume Williams was counsel for the prosecution.

Montagu Williams defended the prisoner. When the case was called on, Montagu Williams stated that he proposed, with the consent of the court and of the other side, to take a course which would save all further trouble. The defendant was a solicitor of forty years standing, and he had been mixed up with certain matters in much regretted having written the letter conwhich the prosecutrix was concerned. He very taining the alleged libel, and he wished to disclaim which the prosecutrix and her advisers had done. any intention to place that construction upon it He, therefore, made this apology for his conduct.

Hume Williams thought the defendant had, making an unqualified apology to the prosecutrix, under the advice of his counsel, acted wisely in which she was perfectly willing to accept, and he hoped the recollection of these proceedings would

serve as a caution to him for the future.

Alderman BESLEY expressed his satisfaction at the course that had been adopted, and allowed the summons to be withdrawn, the defendant paying the cost of the proceedings.

LAW AND PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE OF THE COURT OF COMMON COUNCIL.-This committee dined together at the City Terminus Hotel, Cannon-street, on Monday evening, under the presidency of the chairman, Mr. F. Kent, solicitor, who was supported by Mr. Serjeant Simon, M.P., Mr. Skinner (recorder of Windsor), Mr. Brandon, Mr. Deputy Shephard, Mr. R. Cox, Mr. Fricker, Mr. Creasey, Mr. Greenwood, Mr. Scott, Mr. Mathews, Mr. Innes, jun., Mr. Lowe, Mr. Catty, and others. After a well-served dinner, a variety of toasts were given, those relating to royalty being the prelude to others. "The Lord Mayor and Corporation" was allotted to Mr. Skinner, who spoke of his admiration of the public spirit of the corporation, and concluded by expressing a hope that it would be preserved for ever. The name of Mr. R. Cox was connected with the toast, and he

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. DISCHARGES UNDER LIQUIDATION AND COMPOSITION RELEASE OF CO-DEBTOR JOINT CREDITOR-EQUITABLE SET-OFF.-The 49th and 50th sections of the Bankruptcy Act 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 71), which enact that an order of discharge shall release the bankrupt from all debts provable under the bankruptcy (cases of fraud excepted), but shall not release any person who at the date of the order of adjudication was a partner with the bankrupt, apply to discharges under sect. 125 and 126, and the word " bankrupt " in sects. 49 and 50 is to be read as applicable to any debtor (Before Mr. Registrar MURRAY, sitting as Chief replied to it, saying that, in common with those obtaining a discharge under the statute. A discharge releases only the debtor to whom it is granted, and leaves a co-debtor liable to be separately sued by a joint creditor. M. and H., Proof-Voting-Application to restrain creditor. who were partners, gave their acceptances to G. for goods sold. The acceptances became due, and were dishonoured, after which M. and H. dissolved partnership, H. undertaking to pay all the firm's obligations. H. then filed a petition for liquidation by arrangement under the Bankruptcy Act 1869, and it was subsequently agreed that a composition of 10s. in the pound should be accepted by H.'s creditors, among whom were the holders of the acceptances, endorsed by G. to them, and H. was granted his discharge. G. then filed a petition, and the creditors, on condition that G. should pay 9s. in the pound. authorised the trustee to transfer to G. any debts which should not be realised, the names of the debtors being set out in

THE debtor, Henry Elford, a metal merchant of
Oxford-street, recently filed a petition for liquida.
tion under which the court appointed a receiver.
This was an application on behalf of creditors to
restrain the debtor from voting, under a resolution
passed in the case of Messr. Burrs, whose failure
was announced some weeks since, for the accept-
ance of a composition of 1s. in the pound.
Stibbard, solicitor, appeared in support of the

Finlay Knight opposed it.

It would seem that the debtor had been engaged in transactions of an extensive character with Messrs. Burrs, and in consequence of their failure his affairs became embarrassed, and on the 16th

with whom he was associated, he fully appreciated any compliment to the corporation. The chairman and took occasion to say that, whatever party was proposed the "Houses of Lords and Commons," at the helm of affairs, they would endeavour to so discharge their public duties as to add lustre to the name of England. Mr. Serjeant Simon responded, paying a tribute to the constitution under which we live, and concluded by an assurance that, though he would be one of those in the cold shade of opposition, he should in no way be factious in his treatment of the action of the ministry. "The Bench" was given by the chairman, who associated with the toast the name of Mr. Brandon, who, he said, was always polite and attentive in his judicial duties. This gentleman had recently been appointed assistantjudge of the Mayor's Court, which was the best court in the city. Mr. Brandon, in acknowledg

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