trustee for Mrs. Field for her separate use were assigned to Luke Marler, who was to stand possessed of the same upon trust for Mrs. Field for life, for her separate use, and on her death for the children of the marriage, and if there should be no children of the marriage, then upon trust for such person or persons as Mrs. Field should by deed or will appoint; and in default of appointment, for her next of kin. There were no children of the marriage. Mr. Field died on the 15th June 1865, and after his death the trustee in whose name the shares were standing, by the direction of Mrs. Field, transferred the shares into her name by a deed of transfer, which was executed by Mrs. Field and duly registered. Mrs. Field died in Jan. 1872, without having made any other appointment of the shares, and intestate. The plaintiff, who was the next of kin of Mrs. Field, claimed to be entitled to the shares, and one of the questions in the suit was whether the execution of the deed of transfer by Mrs. Field operated as an appointment to herself of the shares. Sir R. Baggallay, Q.C. and Hadley for the plaintiff. Southgate, Q.C., Alfred Smith, Fry, Q.C., and W. P. Beale for the defendants. Sir G. JESSEL held, that the execution of the deed of transfer operated as an appointment by Mrs. Field to herself. Solicitors: Robinson and Preston; Matthews and Matthews. Monday, Nov. 10. LINE v. HALL. Power of appointment-Appointment to object of the power for life, with remainder to his son, not an object of the power, in tail-Doctrine of cy près applicable. GEORGE KILWORTH, by his will, dated the 1st of Jan., 1805, gave and devised an estate at Napton-on-Hill, in the county of Warwick, unto his daughter Elizabeth, the wife of Esmy Edward Hall, for life, and after her decease to the said Esmy Edward Hall for his life, and on his decease he gave and devised the same to all or such one or more of the children or grandchildren of his said daughter Elizabeth who should be living at the time of her decease, in such shares and proportions as the survivor of them, the said Esmy Edward Hall and his daughter Elizabeth should by deed or will appoint, and in default of appointment to all and every the children of his daughter Elizabeth in equal shares. Elizabeth Hall died in the year 1820, leaving the said Esmy Edward Hall her surviving, a son Giles Kilworth Hall, and three other children, but no grandchildren. Esmy Edward Hall made his will, dated the 18th March 1844, and thereby devised the said estate unto his son, the said Giles Kilworth Hall, for life, with remainder to the first and other sons of the said Giles Kilworth Hall, severally and successively, according to their respective seniorities in tail male. The question in the suit was whether, as the children of Giles Kilworth Hall were not objects of the power, the doctrine of cy près was applicable, so as to give to Giles Kilworth Hall an estate tail. Fry, Q.C. and Batten for the plaintiff. Roxburgh, Q.C., and Doughty, Speed, Field, and William Barber for the defendants. Sir G. JESSEL said this was the very case where the doctrine of cy près should apply; the donee of the power had given to a child of an object of the power an estate tail, which the law would not allow. His Honour held that Giles Kilworth Hall took an estate tail. Solicitors: Peacock and Goddard; Taylor, Hoare and Taylor; Rickards and Walker. CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. LAST DAY OF PROOF. CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. Last Day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent. BAKER (Caroline), 2, Derwent-place, Birchfield-road, Aston, Warwick, spinster. Dec. 30; J. S. Canning, solicitor, 44, Waterloo-street, Birmingham. BRISTOWE (Stephen. 21, Silver-street, Golden-square, Middlesex, cheesemonger. Dec. 20; C. R. and H. Cuff, solicitors, 82, St. Martin's-lane, Charing-cross, Middlesex. BURROWES (Isabella M.), 2 Eccleston-square, Middlesex, and of Calverden Lodge, Tunbridge Wells, Kent, widow. Dec. 31; Walker and Martineau, solicitors, 13, King's road, Gray's Inn, Middlesex. DREVER (John), Tudor Villa, Winson-green, near Birmingham, Esq, a retired surgeon in H.M.'s Madras army, Dec. 20; E. W. Crosse, solicitor, 4, Bell-yard, Doctors' Commons, London. FELTON (Sarah), formerly of High-park House, Albert- Bishop Auckland. Bolton-le-Moors. Lincoln's-inn, Middlesex. NEWBERRY (Elizabeth), Poole Cottage, Randwick, Glouces ter, spinster. Jan. 1; W. J. Fraser, solicitor, 78, DeanOs (Jas., late of Tottenham-road, Kingsland, Middlestreet, Sono, Middlesex. sex, gentleman, formerly a watchmaker. Jan. 1; H. Cowlard, solicitor, 14, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Middlesex. PARSONS (JOS.) Gloucester. innkeeper. Dec. 31; J. Wm. S. Dix, solicitor, Exchange-buildings, Bristol. PONIATOWSKI (Joseph M. X. François Jean, Prince), 28, Ebury-street, Pimlico, Middlesex, formerly a senator of the French Empire. Dec. 1; Lawrie, Keen, and Rogers, solicitors, 24, Knight Rider-street, Doctors'-commons, SMITH (Rev. Edward), formerly of Ashley, Cambridge, late of 11, Queen's Parade. Bath. Jan. 1: H. Cowlard, solicitor, 14, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Middlesex. SWYER (John), Cottage Farm, Lytchett Minster, Dorset, farmer. Dec. 31; H. W. Dickinson, solicitor, Fish-street, Poole, Dorset. London. BULL (Henry W.), formerly of 12, Wilton-cres cont, after-with. 9, New-square, Lincoln's-inn, Middlesex. Dec. 26; M. R., at twelve o'clock. DEACON (Grosvenor), 155, Stanhope-street, Morningtoncrescent, Middlesex, gentleman. Dec. 1; E. Pope, solicitor, 12, Gray's Inn-square, Middlesex. Dec. 15; V.C. B., at twelve o'clock. Gомм (Mary), formerly of Goodwyns, East Cosham, Southampton, late of Granville House, Nelson-street, Ryde. Isle of Wight, widow. Dec. 8; F. Jackson, solicitor, 55, Chancery-lane, Middlesex. HORN (John) Middleton-in-Teesdale, Durham, tailor and draper. Dec, 5; William Robinson, solicitor, Darlington. Dec. 12, M.R., at eleven o'clock. RUSSELL (John Terhill House, Cheltenham, Esq, Dec. 8; C. J. Collins Prichard, solicitor, Bristol. Dec. 20, M. R., at twelve o'clock. STACKHOUSE (Thos.), Taitlands, Stainforth, Giggleswick, York, gentleman. Dec. 20 Wm. Hartley, solicitor, Settle, York. Jan. 13; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock. WESTBURY (Right Hon. Richard Baron), Westbury, Wilts, 7: Harrison and Co., solicitors, 19, Bedford Row, London. Jan, 21; M. R., at eleven o'clock. late of 75, Lancaster Gate, Hyde Park, Middlesex. Jan. MAGISTRATES' LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISONS. HIGHWAY-NONUSER-LOCAL ACT.-A strip of land which has been declared by Act of Parliament to be a public highway will not of necessity become so until all the provisions of the Act for making and creating it have been strictly complied Where commissioners, by their award under a local Act, set out a public highway, but and the proposed road always remained impassable no road was ever made in pursuance of the award, to the public: Held, that the mere allotment of a piece of land by the commissioners was not sufficient to make it a public highway, and that all the regulations of the Act of Parliament must be complied with before it became such a highway as was in the contemplation of the Legislature, and before the parish could be called upon to repair it: (Cubitt v. Maxse, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 244. C. P.) THE PRODUCTION OF PRISONERS AT CORONERS' INQUESTS. COMMENTING on the case of Re Reardon, the Irish Law Times and Solicitors' Journal says:Writing upon the office of coroner (7 Ir. L. T. 483), before the decision now reported was pronounced, we, as lawyers, should decline to dilate upon matters so assured as that it is the proper function of the coroner's inquisition to ascertain how and by what means the deceased came by his or her death; and that the police magistrates rise the production at an inquest of a prisoner have no jurisdiction whatever to direct or autho committed to custody, under remand upon a criminal charge. And we are, therefore, not surprised to find that, in these respects, the deIt was admitted as a matter of course that the cision of Re Reardon is confirmatory of our views. magistrate did not possess this jurisdiction, how. long as it was uncontroverted, assumed the exisever convenient was the practice which, so tence of a power in aid of an ancient tribunal, and in furtherance of the ends of municipal and of natural justice. By what procedure the reversal of this practice was decreed, need not now be said. By what illusory and needlessly aggressive arguments the inspiration of the Crown was propagated need not be recalled from the oblivion which may happily overtake the echoes of a policeoffice. But, if ever it should happen to be said that coroners' juries have acquitted prisoners who were coroners' findings should not be regarded because afterwards tried and convicted, it will be remem. bered that human imperfection prevails beyond the precincts of the coroner's court; that, but lately, a judge of our Court of Bankruptcy has had ocofficialism which would arrogate to itself the concasion publicly to denounce that meddlesome duct of prosecutions that have failed, to say the least of it; and perhaps attention may be directed to certain other inquisitions of office, instituted by governmental departments, encroaching less constitutionally on the functions of the ordinary criminal administration of the land. Fortunately, in Reardon's case the effort failed to coroner's inquisition, and equally failed the effort secure his committal by the magistrate before the to prevent his being present at the inquest. But we are bound to say that, when the matter came to be discussed before the Court of Queen's Bench, the attitude then adopted on behalf of the Crown was irreproachable. It was extremely expedient that the question involved should be presented for judicial consideration; the Crown did not oppose ex-officio, but, bowing to the discretion of the court, submitted that, lest justice might possibly be frustrated, special circumstances should be shown in order to warrant the granting of the writ; at the same time intimating that, in a proper case, the Crown would apply for the writ and save the prisoner the expense of doing so. This line of interposition was conceived in a most proper spirit, and was quite what was to be expected under the adviser. And we are sure that, acting in the skilful and sensible auspices of the learned law same spirit, and acquiescing in the high authority of the decision in Re Reardon (a case which every coroner should peruse and perpend), the Crown will, in future, move for a writ of habeas corpus to have any prisoner in attendance at a coroner's inquest, and so that he may there be examined as a witness, wherever it happens that the prisoner and the coroner so desire, and that, in the opinion of the coroner and of the Crown, the presence of the prisoner would not tend to frustrate the ends of justice. But there remains another question of much moment. Is the police regulation to continue, under which prisoners are to be brought, in the first instance, before the inferior court of the magistrate, instead of before the coroner's court which, as Fitzgerald, J., in all reason declared should have the prior conduct of the preliminary inquiry ? One would suppose that the very contention, that it is the office of an inquest to ascer tain merely the cause of the death in question, would suggest that that inquiry should be an swered before assuming that it was caused by homicide and accusing a suspected person. But, as the coroner's function is of a nature more extensive, the propriety of bringing the suspected person before him, in the first instance, rests upon other reasons. The bringing of the suspected person face to face with the victim may lead, from demeanour, to important suggestions of guilt or innocence. And, if the person suspected can adduce substantial and satisfactory proof of was occasioned by natural or accidental causes, innocence, or that it appear that the death it is surely well that the cost of an expensive prosecution should be saved by his immediate discharge, and that the imprisonment, harrassment, and tardiness of trial and redress which he might otherwise have to endure, should be avoided; instead of having the accused person committed for trial by the magistrates, as in duty bound, upon a mere prima facie case against him, and made the victim of a subsebuent abortive prosecution. And it is of some further conse. quence that persons whom the law presumes to be innocent should not have increased difficulties cast upon them in the way of disproving their complications, should be avoided, which are ocguilt, and that the expense, the delay, and the casioned by having to apply for the writ of habeas corpus. The writ is a novelty in these cases, and it is difficult to forsee all its possible consequences. But we can well conceive that expense, delay, and complications, may indeed arise from the provision that, when the inquest has concluded (eventuating, it may be, in acquittal), the prisoner is unconditionally to be remitted back to custody and so detained. When traditional usage is ousted and overriden by sudden reformations, without recourse to the Legislature, and some system has to be substituted forthwith as a temporary expedient, it is hardly possible to consider and provide for every contingency, and a judicial imbroglio becomes only too possible. Certainly, the conflict of concurrent jurisdictions which has been brought about is attended with extreme inconvenience, and may not improbably lead to a failure of justice, if not to positive injustice to individuals; while, it is anything but seemly and conducive to the due administration of justice that a public scandal should be created by the deliberate disregard of the coroner's authority, and the undisguised attempt to set above it that of an inferior court, and to subject it to the surveillance and half-contemptuous toleration of a police regime. What can be more grievously detrimental to the interests of justice, than the reiterated verdicts of jury after jury, denouncing this system and its unhappy results in case after case? What more lamentable, than to find a judicial personage-whose high office and func. tions are denoted by the fact that the Lord Chief Justice himself is our supreme coroner-flouted by a sub-constable, acting on his veritable or supposed instructions from the Castle, who refuses, as in the Marron case at Belfast, to receive the corroner's warrant to bring up the suspected person, until he obtains his superior officer's permission, and, that having been graciously accorded, perfunctorily deposits the warrant in his pocket, and takes it upon himself to pronounce a dead letter; while the jury append to their verdict a statement "that, owing to what they considered important evidence being deliberately kept back by the Crown authorities, they refuse to find such a verdict as otherwise might be warranted in the case.' May not this state of things well recall the saying of Bentham, that it is even more important that justice should seem to be pure, than that it should be pure in reality? Were we not justified in our former paper, as it were almost by anticipation, in saying, as we now emphatically repeat: "If a function is no longer of public utility, it surely does not mend matters to permit the function still to be exercised, but to render its exercise so obnoxious, and the consequences of its exercise so invidious, that, in the course of time, it may come to be abated as a common nuisance. It may be that, as the constable permits a delinquent to proceed until he commits himself beyond yea or nay, so, the coroner is to be allowed to indulge in the discharge of his duties, under watchful police supervision, until the time comes for direct intervention in order to supersede the office of coroner altogether. But if the office is to be superseded (we trust that it will not), is this, too, only to be accomplished by waging a long conflict of authority with officers who are endeavouring to perform, to the best of their ability, an onerous, delicate, and ill-paid public service?" HAMMERSMITH POLICE COURT. (Before Mr. Bridge.) Wednesday, Nov. 12. THE GASLIGHT AND COKE COMPANY v. O'BRIEN. The City of London Gas Act 1868-Revision of price-Operation of award of Commissioners. In this case Major O'Brien was summoned for arrears of gas rates amounting to £5 2s. 9d. made up of 2s. 6d. rent of meter, and 2s. 9d. charge for cutting off the gas, the residue being for gas supplied. F. O. Crump (instructed by Bartholomew) appeared for the defendant and first took objec. tion to the charge for cutting off the gas. The defendant had left his house and thereupon the company cut off the gas, for which they sought to charge. The company's officer referred to a section of their Act giving power to the company to cut off gas fourteen days after default made in payment duly demanded. Mr. BRIDGE held that under that section there was clearly no power to charge for disconnecting the pipes of a consumer who had ceased to occupy the house. The charge for gas was then disputed, and the company's officers based their claim on sects. 57 and 66 of the City of London Gas Act 1868. The former section says that if in the month of Jan. 1871, or any subsequent year, application is made. to the Board of Trade for a revision of the scale of illuminating power and price, commissioners shall be appointed; and by sect. 66 the commissioners so appointed shall, after hearing the applicants, fix an illuminating power and price, to take effect as on and from the 1st Jan. in the year of revision. Notices had been issued by the company early in December that the charge would be 5s. 5d. per 1000 feet, or such other price as might be fixed by the Mr. BRIDGE said that he should hold that the COMPANY LAW. bound. Upon appeal by the plaintiff to the Exchequer Chamber, the majority of that court (Blackburn, Keating, Brett, Grove, and Archibald, JJ., dissentientibus Quain and Honyman, JJ.), affirmed the judgment of the majority of the court below, and upon the same grounds; but Quain and Honyman, JJ., were of a contrary opinion, and held, with Kelly, C.B., that there was a good contract for the 800 tons, and that, therefore, the judgment below should be reversed. Per curiam, "Reply by return of post," does not mean exclusively reply by letter by return of post." A reply by telegram, or by verbal message, or by any means, not later than a letter sent by post, would reach its destination, would equally satisfy the requisition. Two persons each in ignorance at the time of what the other had done, write letter to each other on the same day, the one offering to buy a certain article at a certain price, and the other offering to sell the same article at the same price. The letters cross each other in the post. The majority of the court (Blackburn, Keating, Brett, Grove, and Archibald, JJ.) expressed their strong opinion that such cross offers would not make a binding contract, and that the offers in one of such letters could not amount to an acceptance of the offer contained in the other : (Tinn v. Hoffman and Co., 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 271. Ex. Ch.) a WINDING-UP-CONTRIBUTORY-TRANSFER OF SHARES-ALLOWANCE FOR VALUE OF GOODWILL.-Application was made by the executors of a deceased shareholder, who had been settled on the list of contributories of a company, that B., who had formerly been a shareholder in the company, but had executed a transfer of his shares some time previous to the commencement of the winding-up, might be settled on the list of contributories. B. was a director when he executed the transfer, the validity of which was disputed on two grounds-first, that it was made in pursuance of a fraudulent scheme to relieve B. and some of his co-directors of their liability; and, secondly, that the provisions of the articles of association NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. with respect to transfers had not been complied VENDOR AND PURCHASER-CONTRACT TO DE- with. The deed of settlement required that upon LIVER IRON-ACTION FOR BREACH OF.-On the a transfer of shares the consent of the directors 22nd Nov. 1871, the plaintiff wrote to the defen- should be obtained, that a certificate of consent dauts, asking their lowest price for 800 tons of should be given, which was to be entered in the iron delivered at P., at the rate of 200 tons per share register, and that a deed of covenant, to be month, March, April, May, and June, 1872; to prepared under the direction of the directors, which on the 24th Nov., the defendants replied, should be executed by the transferee. B. obtained "We beg to offer you 800 tons at 69s. per ton the consent and certificate of the directors, but delivered at P., and waiting your reply by return, M., the transferee, did not execute any deed of remain," &c. The plaintiff did not reply by "re- covenant, the directors not having required him turn," but on the 27th Nov. wrote to the defen- to do so; and no objections were made to the transdants as follows, "Your price is high; if I made fer at two subsequent general meetings of the comthe quantity 1200 tons, delivery 200 tons a month pany. By a clause in the deed of settlement, it for the first six months of next year, I suppose was provided that "if ever the losses of the you would make the price lower." In answer company shall have absorbed, not only the whole to this the defendants, on the 28th Nov., of the fund called the reserve fund, but also 80 wrote as follows to the plaintiff, "In reply per cent. on the gross amount of the capital subto yours of yesterday we are willing to make scribed for, the said company shall then be ipso you an offer of further 400 tons, 200 tons facto dissolved, and the board of directors for the in Jan., 200 tons in Feb., at the same price time being shall within twenty-one days, or as we quoted you in ours of the 24th inst., soon after such losses being incurred as the board though the rate of freight will, doubtless, be possibly can, and they are hereby required to call higher than that of the following months. Let us a special general meeting of the shareholders in have your reply by return of post as to whether such manner as is hereinafter mentioned, and lay you accept our offers of, together, 1200 tons." a statement of the affairs of the company before No reply was actually sent by return, but on the such meeting." By other clauses in the deed, the same day, the 28th Nov., the plaintiff wrote and directors were to make up to 31st Dec. in each posted a letter to the defendants, "You can enter year a full statement and account of the debts, me 800 tons on the terms and conditions named in credits, and liabilities, and the profits, gains, and your favour of the 24th inst., but I trust you will losses made or incurred by the company; and enter the other 400 tons, making in all 1200 tons were to produce at every annual meeting a report referred to in my last at 688." These two letters of the receipts and disbursements for the year crossed each other in the course of post, and on preceding, and of the particulars and amount of the 29th Nov., the defendants replied to the the funds or property of the company, and of the plaintiff's letter of the 28th, that they could not state and condition thereof. In 1858 the company book his order for 1200 tons at less than 69s., was in an unsatisfactory state, and an accountant, and even that offer they could only leave on hand employed to investigate the affairs, reported to for reply by to-morrow before 12 o'clock." The the directors that the losses had absorbed 80 per plaintiff did not reply within that time, and sub-cent. on the gross amount of the capital subscribed sequently the defendants declined on that ground to deliver any iron at all to him, whereupon he brought this action for breach of contract, contending that, at all events, there was a binding contract for 800 tons. The majority of the Court of Exchequer (Bramwell, Channell, and Pigott, BB., Kelly, C.B., dissenting), gave judgment for the defendants, on the ground that there was no contract to deliver the 800 tons, as the plaintiff did not accept the defendants' offer of the 24th Nov., his letter of the 28th Nov. being too late for that purpose; and the defendants' offer of the 1200 tons was only open until noon on the 30th, and was not accepted within that time. The defendants' letter of the 28th Nov. was one offer of 1200 tons, and not two separate offers of 800 and 400 tons. Kelly, C.B., on the contrary, gave judgment for the plaintiff, being of opinion that the offers of the 800 and 400 tons in the defendants' letter of the 28th Nov. were distinct and separate, and that the offer of the 800 tons in their letter of the 24th Nov. had been kept open, and was acepted by the plaintiff in his letter of the 28th Nov., by which the defendants were for. In the said report, the accountant made no allowance for the value of the goodwill of the company as a going concern. A special meeting was not called, but the annual general meeting occurred soon after the said report was made. At that meeting the said report was not submitted to the shareholders, and the accounts laid before them did not show the true position of the company. The shareholders were, however, informed that the increased claims upon the company had so reduced the margin of profits that the directors were unable to recommend the payment of any dividend for the past year. Held (per Lord Cairns and Lord Hatherley, affirming the judgment of Lord Chancellor Hatherley; Lord Chelmsford and Lord Colonsay dissentienti bus), first, that the transfer from B. to M. was valid; and, secondly, that the accountant ought, in his report, to have made an allowance for the value of the goodwill, and that in the absence of such allowance, the proof of the occur. rence of the contingency contemplated by the deed of settlement, failed. Sect. 30 of 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, enacts that the discovery of any defect or error in the appointment of a person acting, or who may have acted, as a director, or that such person was disqualified, shall not invalidate acts done by him either alone or jointly with other directors before such discovery. Per Lord Cairns. -That the error of the directors in being satisfied with the execution of the transfer by a person becoming a director instead of requiring the execution of a deed, was such an error as was con templated by the above section, and that all the acts done by the directors before such discovery were consequently valid and binding on the company. The case having been decided after so much difference of opinion, and the parties having been to a great extent responsible for the irregularity and confusion that occurred, no order as to costs was made. (Murray v. Bush, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 217. H. of L.) DEBENTURE PAYABLE TO BEARER-NEGOTIABILITY PROMISSORY NOTE.-A debenture of a limited company, registered under the Companies Act 1862, payable to bearer on a particular day in the year 1872, with interest in the meantime, but liable to be "drawn" and paid off before that time, was sold by the company to M. in May 1869, and stolen from him in July of the same year. Plaintiff, at the end of the year 1871, purchased from one S., who had since absconded, this debenture, which had been "drawn" in Oct. 1871, and demanded payment thereof from the company; but the company, having received notice from M. of the debenture having been tiff, who brought an action against the company stolen from him, refused to pay it to the plainto recover the amount of it. It was found at the trial that the plaintiff had become the holder of the debenture for value, and without notice, and that similar instruments had been treated as negotiable: Held, that the plaintiff could not recover. Even if the instrument had not been under seal it would not be a promissory note on account of its liability to be drawn and paid off before the t me mentioned; and the custom of treating such instruments as negotiable, being recent, could not alter the general rule of law: (Crouch. The Credit Foncier of England (Limited), 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 259. Q.B.) Company Voluntary winding up-Three petitions -Liquidators-Supervision order. IN August last Mr. Blake, a holder of twenty-five shares in this corporation, presented a petition for a compulsory winding-up order. Two other petitions-one by Mr. Cook and one by Mr. Clapham-by much larger shareholders, were filed about the same time praying for a supervision order. Summonses to appoint liquidators were adjourned in order to give the company time to hold meetings. Accordingly a very numerouslyattended meeting was held, when it was resolved to wind-up voluntarily, and to appoint the secretary, Mr. Latchmore, and Mr. Ford liquidators. At a subsequent meeting these resolutions were confirmed. The petitions now coming on to be heard, Roxburgh, Q.C. and F. C. J. Millar, in support of a compulsory winding up, contended that the appointment of liquidators was invalid, as having taken place at the first meeting, and asked that any order to be made should be made on Blake's petition as having been the first advertised, though not the first presented. Waller, Streeten, Southgate, Q.C. (Graham Hastings with him), Fischer, Q.C. (Somers Lewis with him), Langworthy and Law for other parties. Sir G. JESSEL made one order on the three petitions for continuing the winding-up under the supervision of the court, and gave the costs of the three petitions. The carriage of the order was given to Mr. Cook, though advertised after Mr. Blake's petition. Solicitors: J. J. Darley; Mercer and Mercer. Sir G. JESSEL made the usual order to wind. the company, as no evidence was before him as to what had been done since the last available for his debt, to the prejudice of the defendant and other bonâ fide creditors of the inadjournment, and he must therefore assume that the respondents had neglected to avail them-testate. Under these circumstances the plaintiff selves of the indulgence extended to them on the and the defendant, on the 2nd Oct. 1872, consulted former occasion. Solicitors, H. W. Vallance; Wilkinson and Son, Lewis, Munns and Longden. REAL PROPERTY AND CONVEYANCING. the testator since the time of its execution, was NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. MISSING WILL-PRESUMPTION OF REVOCATION-EVIDENCE-DECLARATION OF TESTATOR. -A will, which had remained in the custody of not forthcoming at his death. A draft was pro pounded, and evidence of declaration was admitted the other side evidence was offered to show that to show an intention to adhere to the will. On the testator did not intend to leave his property in the manner in which it was disposed of by his Held, that such declarations were admissible, not will, and that he had destroyed it by burning it. as evidence of destruction, but of intention not 9 L. T. Rep. N. S. 247. Prob.) to adhere to the will: (Keen ▼. Keen and others, SETTLED ESTATES-INTERIM INVESTMENT OF PURCHASE MONEYS.-The purchase-money of land sold under the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act is cash under the control of the court for the purposes of investment under the General Order made in pursuance of 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38, s. 10. Re Thorold's Settled Estate (L. Rep. 14 Eq. 31), fol1873, p. 113; 55 Law Times, 100), dissented from: lowed; Re Boyd's Settled Estates (L. Rep. W. N., (Re Taddy's Devised Estates, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 243. V.C. M.) PORTIONS-ADVANCEMENT-GIFT OF SHARE OF RESIDUE BY WILL SATISFACTION. A grandfather's will contained a trust term for raising portions for his son's younger children, and provided that in case the son should at any time during his life advance or pay any sum of money to or for the use of any of his younger children, then, unless the contrary should be directed by him, any sum so advanced should be in full or part satisfaction of the portion to which the younger child would have been entitled under the grandfather's will: Held (reversing the decision of the Master of the Rolls), that a gift by the son's will of a share of residue to one of his younger children was not a payment or advancement within the meaning of the proviso: (Cooper V. Cooper, 29 L. T. Rep. N.S. 321. Ch.) COUNTY COURTS. BRADFORD COUNTY COURT. (Before W. T. S. DANIEL, Q.C., Judge.) HARTLEY (Administratrix) v. THOMPSON. Administration-Transactions with adminis trators. A transaction with a person entitled to adminis. tration not validated after administration unless for the benefit of intestate's estate. After a decree in Chancery for the administration of the intestate's estate, the administratria is not at liberty to ratify, or refuse to allow an action to be brought in her name to defeat the transaction: (see Williams on Exors. 391, and the authorities there referred to.) Phillips, instructed by Dawson and Greaves, Brad. ford, for plaintiff. Robinson (Berry and Robinson), Bradford, for defendant. Re WESTERN OF CANADA OIL, LANDS, AND WORKS COMPANY (LIMITED). Company-Adjournment of petitions to wind-up-for the illegal detention by the defendant of cerNo steps taken-Order made. THE two petitions in this matter now came on for hearing, having been adjourned by the Lord Chancellor on the 4th August last, as reported in our issue of the 9th August, with a view to giving the company an opportunity of inquiry or arrangement. It will be remembered that the petitions had been filed by debenture-holders in respect of interest due on their charges. It now appeared that nothing had in the mean time been done, except sending to Canada a person who has not yet made any final report. Bagshawe, Jackson, Q.C., and Locock Webb for the petitioners. Hon. R. Butler supported the petitions. His HONOUR.-This was an action of detinue tain stuff pieces, the damages being laid at £50. The plaintiff is the administratrix of Joseph Hartley, who died on the 13th Sept. 1872, intestate and insolvent. He was a stuff manufacturer in a small way of business, and employed weavers who wove his pieces at their own homes on commission. The defendant was one of such weavers, and at the intestate's death was a creditor for work done as a weaver, for £40, or thereabouts. Several of the other weavers in the village were creditors for work done as weavers, and had woven pieces in their possession which they claimed and were entitled to retain by way of lien as security for their debts. Shortly after the intestate's death, one Bently, who was Messrs. Dawson and Greaves, of Bradford, as to the proper course to be adopted to protect the estate for the benefit of the creditors, and the advice given was that the plaintiff should take out letters of administration with as little delay as possible, and that in the mean time money should be found by some friend to take the pieces out of the hands of the weavers on payment of the debts due to them, and thereby secure the surplus value of the pieces for the benefit of the estate, and the suggestion was made that the defendant should find the money for the purpose, but he did not then agree to do so. The solicitors then received instructions from the plaintiff and defendant to prepare the necessary documents for fendant agreed to be one of the sureties in the obtaining letters of administration. The denamed as the other. administration bond, and a Mr. Waterhouse was On the following day (3rd Oct.) the plaintiff, defendant, and Waterhouse, called and executed the bond and other 27th Oct., some delay having occurred in remitnecessary papers, and the grant of administration was afterwards duly obtained, but not until the ting the money required for payment of the stamp and official fees. On the 7th Oct. the defendant, accompanied by the plaintiff, went round to several of the weavers who held pieces, upon which they had liens, paid them the sums due to them, and took from them the pieces they then held. The sum paid by the defendant amounted to £15 28., and the pieces taken by the defendant are the pieces for the detention of which the action is brought. Early in November 1872, an administration sum. for the administration of the intestate's estate. mons was taken out in Chancery by a creditor This summons was served on the plaintiff. She took it to her solicitors, Messrs. Dawson and Greaves, who appeared for her upon it; and on the 11th Nov. the common decree for the administration of the intestate's personal estate was made. The usual advertisements were afterwards issued for creditors, and under them the defendant made a claim as creditor for £61 10s. 6d. (which included the £15 2s. paid by him to the weavers), and this claim was duly allowed. The defendant having the pieces in his possession, Messrs. Dawson and Greaves, as solicitors of the plaintiff, by the direction of the chief clerk, applied to the defendant to deliver the pieces to them for the pur. poses of the administration, offering to pay him the money he had advanced to pay off the weavers with interest and costs. The sum actually offered (and which Messrs. Dawson and Greaves were ready to pay defendant) was £18, which was more than sufficient for those purposes. The defendant refused to receive the money or to deliver the pieces. He insisted upon retaining them; his words were, He would not have the money; he would stick to what he had got." He was then asked whether he had the pieces in his possession. He said he had sold some, not saying how many or for how much, and the rest he had, and they were worth £40 and £50. This course of proceeding by the defendant having been communicated to the chief clerk, Messrs. Dawson and Greaves, as solicitors for the plaintiff, were directed to bring this action in the name of the plaintiff. After being served with the summons the defendant communicated with the plaintiff, and prevailed upon her to endeavour to stop this action by giving a notice to the registrar of this court that the action had been brought without her authority, and he procured an attorney at Leeds to draw up a notice to that effect, and which the plaintiff signed, and this notice has been put in evidence by the defendant, with some correspondence which afterwards passed between the attorney and Messrs. Dawson and Greaves upon the subject. If the plaintiff had adhered to the notice she was thus induced to sign, she would through her ignorance have been led into committing a contempt of the Court of Chancery, for which she would have been liable to be committed, and if not actually imprisoned, would have subjected herself to the payment of what to her would have been a large sum for costs. The facts as stated by me have been proved upon the evidence of the plaintiff and Mr. Greaves, and the plaintiff, as far as she could, showed her willingness to acknowledge a right in the defendant to retain the pieces to cover his own debt. And on behalf of the defendant it was urged that, as the defendant took possession of the pieces in question with the authority of the plaintiff, although that transaction took place before the grant of administration, yet as such grant was afterwards obtained, and before the withdrawing from the case, and it was not for his Marshall submitted that it rested with an at- decree in the administration suit was made, the CHELTENHAM COUNTY COURT. (Before C. SUMMER, Esq., Judge.) Costs in interpleader--Application. F. Marshall applied for costs in this case. His Honour would remember that a short time ago he committed a young gentleman named Maule for a term for non-payment of a judgment debt. It having come to Mr. Solomon's knowledge that Mr. Maule had an interest in a horse, the animal was seized instead of executing the warrant of commitment, but Mr. Morse subsequently claimed it as his, and under circumstances that led him (Marshall) to believe it was nothing less than a conspiracy between two or three who were concerned in it to make out the horse to be his property, and not Maule's. He had had a great deal of trouble in getting up the case, and had examined fifteen witnesses, several of whom he subpoenaed, and it was only within the last three days that Mr. Gabb, Mr. Morse's attorney, had sent him a note Baying he disclaimed the horse. He therefore asked his Honour to order costs as in an ordinary case. Gabb, on behalf of Mr. Morse, submitted that it was not a case in which his Honour ought to order costs, the circumstances being somewhat peculiar. The Registrar explained to his Honour the circumstances under which the action was brought. The horse was seized by Mr. Solomon, and Mr. Morse paid the amount into court, under protest, in order to recover possession of it, and then brought the present action, which he had since withdrawn from. Marshall said the action was withdrawn last Tuesday, after all the work had been done. Gabb then submitted whether his Honour had power to order costs. The money which Mr. Morse had paid to redeem the horse had been paid into court, and then they had withdrawn the case, and had given notice they had withdrawn it. It was a case in which Mr. Marshall's client ought to think himself very fortunate if he got the money at all, and if it had gone on, there was some doubt what the result would have been. His HONOUR.-So Mr. Marshall says. Gabb, resuming, said at all events the matter was arranged, and there was no object in bringing it into court. There were, he submitted, no rules to enable his Honour to order costs as in an ordinary action. The plaintiff had the power of His HONOUR had no doubt he had the power to allow costs in a case of interpleader, as well as other actions. He thought for this purpose the 174th rule made summonses in interpleader cases operate exactly as summonses in ordinary cases. He therefore thought that the notice of abandonment not having been given within five days, the execution creditor was entitled to costs. With regard to the point Mr. Gabb stated that it was necessary he should ascertain what witnesses were material, it would be very inconvenient for him to do so. He thought the much more convenient course was to leave it to the Registrar, and if either party was dissatisfied the matter might then come before him by way of appeal; and if it should be considered necessary, he should be glad to confirm the ruling of the Registrar. Costs to follow, as in ordinary cases. attendance. WILLIAMS U. CHESSHYRE. Stroud, who appeared for the plaintiff, stated suit, in which his friend was concerned for Mr. that the case arose out of an interesting law. J. B. Ferryman, who was summoned before the NORTHAMPTON COUNTY COURT. Wednesday, Nov. 3. Ex parte RINGROSE; Re GIBSON. Bill of sale-Stock in trade purchased since the bill-Liquidation. THIS case raised some important points in connection with the subject of bills of sale. It ap peared from the affidavits filed in the case, that Mr. John F. Gibson, draper, of Long Buckby, in consideration of £120 advanced to him by Mr. John Ringrose, of the same place, assigned by bill of sale to the latter gentleman, in May 1872, all the stock in trade and furniture which to him were or thereafter should be on his premises, as security for the repayment of the said sum. There was a power given to Ringrose to take peaceable possession of the property after default made by Gibson in payment on demand. On the 4th August in this year Ringrose demanded payment of the £120 to be made on the 8th. Gibson did not pay, house, and told him he intended to realise and on the 9th Ringrose went to Gibson's his security. On Gibson's representations, however, Ringrose consented to wait until the 11th to see if Gibson could find a person to purchase the goods privately, so as to enable him to repay Ringrose. No purchaser being found, on the 11th Ringrose said he should at once realise his security. There was some conflict of testimony as to what passed at the latter interview; but it appeared that early on the morning of the 12th Gibson went to Northampton after sending a letter to Ringrose to inform him of the fact. Ringrose at once instructed Mr. North, an auctioneer, to take possession and sell the goods. North proceeded to Gibson's house at ten in the morning of that day, and, finding the house locked, was unable to seize the property. At two p.m. Gibson filed his petition for liquidation of his affairs; a receiver was at once appointed, and at about six p.m. the receiver took possession, and was immediately followed by North, who also put in a man on behalf of Ringrose. It appeared that nearly all the stock in trade then on the premises had been purchased since the execution of the bill of sale. Hensman (Norfolk circuit), instructed by Leake, of Long Buckby, now asked the court for an should be given up to Mr. Ringrose. He argued order that the furniture and the proceeds of the stock in trade, which had been since sold, that although at law goods not in existence magistrates at the instance of the town commissioners, for not paying the demand made upon could not be assigned, yet that there was a sufficient "new act him for the making of certain roads in Nauntonon the part of Gibson to show crescent. His friend carried the case to a suchis intention that the after acquired goods should cessful issue, and before the case came on at the pass to Ringrose, but if not, such goods, as soon police-court he employed the plaintiff Ches in equity. That being so, were they the goods of as they came on to the premises, passed to him shure: "Mr. Ferryman emploved him."] Well, Williams's case was that Mr. Chesshyre employedsition of the bankrupt, with the consent of the true another person in the possession, order, and dispohim, and that he told Mr. Chesshyre he had several men at work at Prestbury, but Mr. Chesshyre said, "You go along and see this road, and I will pay you what is fair and reasonable." Upon that his friend took Williams to the locus in quo, and attended before the magistrates, and he (Stroud) there he made his investigation, and afterwards believed that Williams was one of the chief means whereby his friend obtained his triumph at the police court. For that Williams had made his The plaintiff was sworn, and bore ont this state- stone on the road when there were 3in. Mr Chesshyre said, "You come, and whatever you Chesshyre, the defendant, was His HONOUR. with regard to the general ques- matter. Judgment for the defendant, wrth costs. The bankruptcy commenced at two p.in. on the owner at the commencement of the bankruptcy? 12th August, but at ten a.m. Ringrose had done all that was lawful and reasonable in trying to take possession. He therefore did not consent to Gibson's possession. Shoosmith, on behalf of the trustee for the creditors, opposed the application, and contended that Ringrose had not done all he could to get possession. He had allowed Gibson to remain in have seized on the 8th of August. As to the after possession until the last moment. He ought to acquired goods, Gibson had not consented to their passing to Ringrose. The property in them therefore remained with Gibson. Numerous cases were quoted during the argument. His HONOUR said the case was one of conit had lasted a long time its nature fully justified siderable importance and difficulty, and although that fact. He was of opinion, however, after carefully considering the arguments, that Ringrose was entitled to the whole of the stock in trade and furniture on the premises at the commencement of the bankruptcy, and made an order accordingly. READING COUNTY COURT. WILSON v. GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COM- PAVY. Carriage of goods-Personal luggage. THE plaintiff in this case is a horse dealer living in Reading, and the action was brought to recover £14, the value of some horse clothing belonging to the plaintiff which the defendants lost at Chester, in course of conveyance from Reading to Holyhead, on the way to Dublin. Gledhill appeared for the plaintiff. The defendants were represented by Mr. Mason, from their Paddington office. Gledhill stated that the plaintiff was from time to time going to Ireland to purchase horses, and in the winter time he took with him sets of horse clothing, which he put upon the horses he purchased. He had taken them as passengers' lug. gage. On 30th Sept. 1872 plaintiff took a third Mr. Mason contended that by 5 & 6 Will. 4, Great Western Railway Act, a passenger could only take with him 40lb. weight of articles of personal clothing, and the company were not answerable for merchandise or anything else. He argued that this horse-clothing was merchandise. His HONOUR: I don't think it is creditable for the company to take such a course. It is right that it should be generally known that nothing is safe on the Great Western Railway except articles of personal clothing. If a gentleman, say a barrister, takes books, or another gentleman a gun, they are not safe on the Great Western Railway. Gledhill I take it that this Act must have been repealed; a first-class passenger is now allowed 112lb., a second-class passenger 70lb., and a third-class passenger 561b. you His HONOUR.-I will adjourn the case, if like, to look into the law. Gledhill.-Will your Honour go into the facts of the case? It has been adjourned two courts from no fault of plaintiff's, and the facts are not disputed; so as to avoid the necessity of his coming here again. The plaintiff was then examined by Gledhill. He said: I took a ticket on 30th Sept, 1872, to go to Dublin, with four sets of horse-clothing, rolled up in the ordinary way. I gave them to the porter, and saw them labelled to North Wall, Dublin. I had been in the habit of travelling by defendants' line to Dublin for two or three years. I always take horse-clothing in the winter time. I have not been refused to be allowed to take them as luggage, nor has the weight been complained of. I saw the luggage in the van at Reading. I asked the porter to remove the clothing at Chester into the Irish train. I found it was not removed into the Irish train, and "blew" the porter up, and told the station master, and he said he would telegragh for them, and I asked him to send them to Dyson's repository, Dublin. I went to Balinasloe fair, which lasted a week. The horse clothing was not forwarded to Dublin. When I got back to Chester the station master said it was forwarded to Dublin. Then they asked me where they should send it to, and I gave them my address. I have not seen it to this time. The plaint was therefore dismissed. BANKRUPTCY LAW. COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. (Before the LORD CHANCELLOR (Selborne) and Ex parte COTE; Re DEVEZE. a The class ticket to Dublin, seeing the horse clothing | daughter Anne until after the death of Anne, the | R. Wilson, a draper in Warrington, filed a petition put into the van at Reading and at Chester, widow of the testator. This interest, intended in this court, with a view to a liquidation of his where, in the removal from one train to another, for the benefit of the daughter, is not to take affairs by arrangement or composition. His the clothing was lost. Plaintiff looked for it in effect until the death of the mother. The interest creditors resolved to proceed by liquidation; the the Holyhead train and missed it. The nature of is not that of a fixed sum as a principal sum of usual steps were taken, and Lewis Voisey was passengers' luggage was decided in the case of money, the payment of which was delayed, but of appointed trustee 20th Aug. 1873, but on proceedMcCrow v. The Great Western Railway Company. rents divisible at an uncertain time from the ing to realise the property of the debtor he found The facts were not disputed. No objection was farms, and these rents were not of a certain one John Edwin Jones had already taken possesraised to the quantity, and the defendants had amount. The rents were to be paid as they might sion of the household furniture and stock-in-trade notice that it was horse clothing. accrue during the two years after the death of the by virtue of a bill of sale purporting to have been mother. The claim of the plaintiff seems to be given to him by the debtor on the 19th April to founded on the authority of the case of Wright secure the sum of £355 and interest, and that he v. Wilkin (31 L. J. Q. B.; 6 L. T. Rep. 221), had sold or caused to be sold nearly the whole of where there was a bequest of numerous legacies the household and trade effects of the debtor. to various persons of certain definite sums of Whereupon a summons was taken out calling money, giving an immediate interest to the upon the said John Edwin Jones to show cause legatees in such specified sums of money, and the why the said bill of sale should not be declared testator devised to the defendant in the action cer- void and ordered to be given up and cancelled, tain real and copyhold estates, and the residue of and why the said John Edwin Jones should not be her personal estate on the express condition that called upon to account to the trustee for all the within twelve months he should discharge and property of the debtor which had come to the hands pay the legacies, and the testatrix charged and of the said J. E. Jones or his agents under the made chargeable her real and personal estate, said bill of sale or otherwise. The case came on with the payment of the legacies. The court for hearing before me on the 23rd Oct., Mr. held that the devise was not a condition working Smyley, of Manchester, representing the trustee, a forfeiture on its non-performance, but a trust. and Mr. Kirby, of Liverpool, the claimant under But these facts materially differ from the case the bill of sale. When the bill of sale was probefore me. Here no interest was intended to duced, it purported to have been given for an pass until the determination of the life estate existing debt of £350 and a further advance of There is no bequest of a sum certain, the payment £5 only, and to assign everything in the shop and of which was delayed. The legatee died during dwelling-house (except a trifling amount of book the existence of the life estate of the testator's debts, books of account, and wearing apparel), wife, and it appears to me that under the autho- unless the sum of £355 and interest should be rity of the case of Pawlett v. Pawlett and others, paid instantly on demand in writing. Mr. Kirby in dealing with real estate there has existed no admitted that such a bill of sale would no doubt interest transmissible to the executors of Ann amount to an act of bankruptcy under ordinary Morgan, the daughter of the testator. circumstances, but in this case he contended it could not be so considered, inasmuch as the bill of sale was in effect taken in exchange for a security of greater value, viz., a promissory note, signed both by Wilson and his mother, who is quite able to pay, and which Jones gave up when the bill of sale was given; and even then Mr. Kirby expressed Jones's readiness to surrender all advantages under the bill of sale provided he could get back the promissory note he had given up when the bill of sale was executed. answer to that is that in point of fact the goods have been sacrificed by a forced sale, and in point of law that this is not a question between Jones and Wilson, but between Jones and the creditors of Wilson, who may have given him credit on the strength of the very stock in trade and furniture comprised in the bill of sale. Jones may not have intended to take an unfair advantage of anyone, but the object of the bill of sale was manifestly to enable him to sweep everything away, to the exclusion of all except himself who might have given credit to Wilson; and if a man chooses to hold out another to the world as a man of substance when in reality he is only a man of straw, he must take the consequences. A conveyance of a man's whole property to secure a past debt is fraudulent within the 2nd sub-section of the 6th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, and voidable as an act of bankruptcy, no matter what the consideration may have been: (Re Wood, L. Rep. 7 Ch. App. 302.) Mr. Kirby then contended that as Jones had taken possession on the 21st July, and the debtor did not petition until the 25th, and no trustee was appointed until nearly a month after, Jones could not be ousted, inasmuch as this is a proceeding in liquidation under sect. 125, and not a proceeding in bankruptcy under sect. 6. The 4th sub-section of sect. 125 saye "The liquidation by arrangement shall be deemed to have commenced as from the date of the appointment of the trustee," and there is no provision as in bankruptcy that the title of the trustee shall relate back to any act of bankruptcy. Citing Jones v. Harber (6 Q. B. 77), Lomax v. (L. Rep. 6 C. P. 107), Ex parte Todhunter (L. Rep. 10 Eq. 425); but in the case of Ex parte Duignan, re Bissell, decided by the judge of the County Court of Warwickshire, upheld by Bacon, C.J.) (L. Rep. 11 Eq. 604), and affirmed by Lord Hatherley and the Lords Justices (L. Rep. 6 Ch. App. 605), it was held that the title of the trustee appointed in liquidation relates back in the same manner as the title of a trustee under a bankruptcy, Mellish, L.J., in that case observed, "No doubt the words of sub-sect. 4 do create some difficulty, but they cannot control the other part of the Act, which clearly makes the property vest in the trustee as in bankruptcy," and James, L.J., said, "There was no bankruptcy here, but it seems to me clear that the liquidation by arrangement is only different in the machinery by which the same object is to be obtained; and the creditors are not to be in a worse position because they prefer dealing with the property themselves, instead of dealing with it under the Court of Bankruptcy. The inten tion of the Act is that the same property shall be given to the creditors in each case. I, therefore declare the bill of sale to be void as an act of bankruptcy, and order that all moneys received by the said E. J. Jones, or his agents by virtue of the said bill of sale, be accounted for His HONOUR refused to allow Mr. Mason to cross-examine the plaintiff, stating that the company ought to be represented by a professional man. No evidence was offered to dispute the facts, and His HONOUR gave judgment for the plaintiff for the full amount with costs, subject to the question of law. SWANSEA COUNTY COURT. Monday, Nov. 3. (Before T. FALCONER, Esq., Judge.) LEWIS AND WIFE v. WILLIAMS. Construction of will-Vesting of legacy. Arthur Williams, of the South Wales Circuit, instructed by Brown and Collins, appeared for the plaintiffs. Howell, Llanelly, for the defendant. His HONOUR gave the following judgment: In this case I forced on the hearing at the last court, and the result illustrates how easily the facts of a case can be ascertained without the formality of pleadings. One David Williams, who died in 1855, in his will dated the 24th May 1863, devised and bequeathed to his wife Anne, a certain farm called Ffolsyrefel, and an annuity of £6 for the term of her natural life should she continue unmarried, and he devised the same farm to the defendant, his grandson William Williams, and his heirs after his wife's decease, on condition that the first two years' rent should be paid to the testator's daughter, Anne Morgan, widow, and subject to a sum of £14, to be paid annually to his son William, during his life, which was to commence two years after the defendant had possession of the said farm. Anne, the wife of the testator, died in 1870, but Anne Morgan, the widow and the daughter of the testator, died two years before her mother-namely, in 1868. It is alleged by the plaintiffs, who are the personal representatives of Anne Morgan, the daughter, that during two years next after the decease of Anne Morgan, the testator's widow, the said farm was let for £50 a year, and it is prayed that it may be declared that the defendant is a trustee of this amount of the rents for the two years next after the decease of Anne Morgan, the daughter of the testator, for the plaintiff, Sarah Anne Williams. There is no interest given by the will to the THIS was an appeal from a decision of Mr. Regis- De Gex Q.C. and Winslow for the appellant. Appeal accordingly allowed. WARRINGTON COUNTY COURT. Buxton |
