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be made for bills of sale, and a mortgage, or post-nuptial settlement, of such fixtures should be registered as a bill of sale.


In dealing with lands of this tenure the principal search will be of the court rolls of the manor of which the lands are holden. The search will show what surrenders and admissions have actually taken place, and what charges (if any) affect the property, and it will also show what (if anything) is required to be done to complete a sale or mortgage, or to prevent a forfeiture by force of any special custom of the manor, and also what the customs generally are. Unless the purchaser or mortgagee, or his solicitor has notice of any judgment, it is unnecessary to search for judgments and writs of execution, but with the exception of Crown debts, for which no search need be made, the other searches and inquiries above suggested with reference to freehold property should be made.


The provisions of the Licensing Act 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 94) must not be lost sight of when dealings take place with licensed houses. After providing that upon conviction for certain specified offences, a record of the conviction is to be endorsed upon the offender's licence, sect. 30 provides that upon a subsequent conviction after two convictions have been recorded on the licence, it shall be forfeited, and the premises, in respect of which the licence was granted shall, unless the court having cognizance of the case in its discretion thinks fit otherwise to order, be disqualified from receiving any licence for a term of two years from the date of such third conviction. With respect only to the convictions of persons who after the passing of the Act (10 Aug. 1872) become licensed in respect of premises, the 31st section provides (1) that the second and every subsequent conviction recorded on the licence of any one such person shall also be recorded in the register of licences against the premises; (2) when four convictions (whether of the same or of different licensed persons), have within five years been so recorded against premises, those premises shall, during one year, be disqualified for the purposes of the Act; (3) if the licences of two such persons licensed in respect of the same premises are forfeited within any period of two years, the premises shall be disqualified for one year from the date of the last forfeiture. For the owner's protection, however, sect. 56 provides that where the tenant is convicted of an offence the repetition of which may render the premises liable to be disqualified from receiving a licence, the justices' clerk is to send a notice of the conviction to the owner. Where an order of the court has been made declaring premises disqualified, notice is to be served upon the owner, if not the occupier, with a statement that a petty sessions will be held when and where specified, at which the owner may appeal against the order on all or any of the following, but on no other grounds: (a) That notice of the prior offence had not been served upon him; or (b) that the tenant held under a contract made prior to the commencement of the Act, and that the owner could not legally have evicted the tenant in the interval between the commission of the offence, in respect of which the disqualifying order was made, and the receipt by him of the notice of the immediately preceding offence, which on repetition renders the premises liable to be disqualified; or (c) that the offence in respect of which the disqualifying order was made occurred so soon after the receipt of such last-mentioned notice, that the owner, motwithstanding he had legal power to evict the tenant, could not with reasonable diligence have exercised that power in the interval which occurred between the said notice and the second offence. Upon the owner satisfying the court that he is entitled to have the order cancelled on any of the above grounds, the court must direct the order to be cancelled, and it thereupon becomes void. The justices are to make rules, in pursuance of which any person other than the owner interested in any licensed premises as mortgagee or otherwise, is to be entitled, upon payment of a fee to be fixed by the rules, to receive from the justices' clerk a similar notice to that sent to the owner.

In Mow v. Hindmarsh (28 L. T. Rep. N.S. 644, Ex.), it was held that upon the letting by parol of a public house, a covenant by the lessee to use the premises in such a manner as not to cause a forfeiture of the licence could not be implied. Care should be taken in framing such leases to insert such a covenant, as well as a power of re-entry upon the first conviction for a recordable offence after a previous order for indorsement on the licence had been made, and the owner must be diligent in availing himself of his power so as to enable him to take advantage of an appeal in case a third conviction speedily followed the second. In cases of sales or mortgages the register of licences at the justices' clerk's office, should be carefully searched, and a mortgagee should avail himself of the clause under which he can have sent to him notices of convictions. A purchaser should see that his name was recorded as owner in lieu of that of his vendor. In case the mortgagor is also the tenant the mortgage should contain a power enabling the mortgagee, in the event of a second recorded conviction, to enter upon the premises and evict the mortgagor, notwithstanding that no principal or interest money is then, or has, in fact, become due. (To be continued.)

WHEN ARE JUDGMENTS CHARGES ON LAND. THE anomalies of the law relating to "judgments," so forcibly pointed out some years ago in a report of a committee of the Law Amendment Society, the anomaly that a sheriff should be obliged to fold his arms, when property, which he is told to extend, turns out to be an equity of redemption, and to say he knows nothing about it; that the judg ment creditor should, after finishing his action at law, have to begin again a new suit in equity to enforce his judgment; that a court of law should be unable to enforce charging orders which it is expressly empowered to grant; that sheriffs and receivers should oftentimes come into unseemly collision—are such as may, and we hope will, be cured by the Judicature Act; but it will not be able, we fear, to cure the evil and confusion which has arisen from the provisions of the Judgment Acts Amendment Act (27 & 28 Vict. c. 112), that a judgment shall not "affect land till actual delivery thereof in execution."

A notable instance of this has recently occurred on appeal from Vice-Chancellor Malins, before the full Court of Appeal in Chancery, in the case of Hatton v. Haywood (Weekly Notes, Nov. 15, 1873 and Jan. 24, 1874), which we noticed shortly a few weeks since. A judgment debtor had, at the date of the judgment, legally mortgaged his land, and afterwards became bankrupt. The judgment creditor, who had issued an elegit on which the sheriff returned " nihil," brought his bill against the trustee in bankruptcy, praying a declaration that the judgment was a lien on the land in mortgage. The trustee put in a demurrer for want of equity, which the Vice-Chancellor allowed; and his decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal, the reason given being that an equity of redemption not being extendible, the judgment could not be enforced in equity, until the legal obstacle of the mortgage had been removed. The course for the creditor to pursue, the Lord Chancellor (Selborne) said, was to redeem the mortgage and then come and petition for sale. Now, putting out of view for the moment the effect of this decision upon the earlier law and authorities upon the subject, we see what an inconvenience might arise in practice, not to say injustice, under this state of circumstances. The mortgagee might claim six months to be redeemed in, during which time the debtor might make a second mortgage, the second mortgagee might give notice of it to the judgment creditor, and it is difficult to see how he could help acquiring priority over him. The judgment creditor had not lent his money on the credit of the land, and would therefore have no right to tack his judgment to the first mortgage. And we are told this difficulty has actually arisen in practice since the decision in Hatton v. Haywood.

Now the first question that occurs to us is, what effect the 27 & 28 Vict. c. 112, has on the earlier statute, i.e., on the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. Vice-Chancellor Malins-in answer to the argument pressed on him in another case, that notwithstanding the 27 & 28 Vict. the judgment creditor has an interest in land by virtue of his judgment, because 1 & 2 Vict. is not repealed-has said, that, as the two Acts are inconsistent with each other, and cannot stand together, the earlier Act is virtually repealed by the latter: (Earl of Cork v. Russell, L. Rep. 13 Eq. 215; 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 230); whilst the late Master of the Rolls, speaking less positively, thinks a strict construction of the words "actually delivered in different parts of the later Act raises serious doubts whether sect. 13 of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110 (which first made judgments an equitable charge on land) has not been repealed; or, if not, how far it is reconcileable with the provisions of 27 & 28 Vict. (Padwick v. Duke of Newcastle, L. Rep. 8 Eq. 700; 21 L.T. Rep. N. S. 343). That was a case in which the plaintiff, a shrewd and well-known solicitor, appears to have miscarried in his attempt to enforce his judgment against a leasehold of which the defendant was equitable tenant for life, on the ground that it was not a case of simple trust, which is the only equitable interest in land which is extendible, and that he had issued a fi. fa. instead of an elegit, whereas the only cases in which sect. 11 of 1 & 2 Vict. gives the judgment creditor a remedy at law, are those in which he has sued out an elegit. On the other hand Lord Hatherley, then Vice-Chancellor Wood, in Re Cowbridge Railway Company (18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 102; L. Rep. 5 Eq. 416) thought "it could not have been intended that all the remedies given by 1 & 2 Vict. should be swept away" (by 27 & 28 Vict.) "by a sidewind."

Another question which has arisen, and on which there seems a conflict of opinion between different branches of the court, is as to the necessity of making judgment creditors parties to a foreclosure suit, the Master of the Rolls having held that such creditors who have not issued execution are (Mildred v. Austin, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 939; L. Rep. 8 Eq. 220), and Vice-Chancellor Malins having held that they are not, necessary parties: (Earl of Cork v. Russell (ubi sup.), in the report of which, it should be observed, there is an error in a head-note). We hope, however, that this conflict may be guarded against for the future by the rules of procedure now being framed under the Judicature Act.

A third, and perhaps more important question is, what is an "actual delivery in execution by virtue of a writ of elegit?" Lord Hatherley thinks it “ very difficult to give any meaning to those words," and so, we confess, do we. Aud again: "There is some difficulty," said that learned Judge, "in knowing what the Legis

lature meant by saying that the land must be absolutely" (the word of the Act is actually") "delivered in execution." Now the first thing, and perhaps the only thing, which is clear in the whole matter is, that the word "actual" is not to be taken in its literal signification, and does not mean "actual," and that the delivery of an acre is a different sort of delivery from the delivery of a chair or any other purely personal chattel. For how can, for instance, incorporeal hereditaments, which are "lands" within 27 & 28 Vict. (see sect. 2), or a trust of land, where the possession is in the trustees, be "actually delivered" in that sense? "Actual" is a word often occurring in modern legislation and in private instruments, and several decisions have turned upon it, e.g., in the construction of executory trusts (see Lord Scarsdale v. Curzon, 1 J. & H. 40; Hogg v. Jones, 32 Beav. 45), though it has nowhere, so far as we are aware, been defined, as assuredly it ought to be. Vice-Chancellor Giffard was of opinion that the priorities of judgment creditors inter se against the land are ascertained according to the dates at which the writs are placed in the sheriff's hands (Guest_v._Cowbridge Railway Company, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 871; L. Rep. 6 Eq. 619), which shows that they affected the land, in his opinion, prior to delivery thereof, and the decree in Mildred v. Austin, which, like Hatton v. Haywood, was a case in which land was in mortgage at the date of the judgment, declared that the defendants, the judgment creditors, acquired a charge on the lands comprised in the mortgage from the time they had performed three acts, viz., issued the writ, placed it in the sheriff's hands, and procured a return to it. But if the return be nihil, as it would be where the debtor's interest is only an equity of redemption, we do not see how the return can give them any interest. They have, however, a right to remove a legal obstacle, e. g., to redeem, upon putting the writ in the hands of the sheriff, and before the return. They had this right under the old jurisdiction prior to 1 & 2 Vict., and it is not taken away by the recent Act, as the Court of Appeal admitted in Hatton v. Haywood. But if they had a right to redeem the land, it can only be by having an interest in the land, because those only may redeem who have such an interest (2 Cruise Dig., 4th edit., 104), and a demurrer for want of equity would lie to a bill by a party having no such interest, and that interest can be nothing short of a lien or charge, and, if so, it is difficult to understand the law which enacts, that the security shall only first affect the land upon an event, such as delivery long subsequent, it may be, to the date of the judgment.

In short, the matter is full of difficulty, and of frequent occurrence, and can, we believe, only be cleared away by a comprehensive code or digest of the whole law of judgments, both statutory under the Acts of the Queen, and otherwise-that is, under the old jurisdiction as it existed previous to those statutes.

We may notice that within the last few days the doctrine in Hatton v. Haywood has received confirmation by the Court of Appeal in another case, Re South (Times, March 17, 1874; Weekly Notes, March 21, 1874), with reference to the subject of a remainder in land.


The History of the Common Law of Great Britain and Gaul. Part I. By PYM YEATMAN, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. London: Stevens and Sons.

THIS is the first instalment of a work of apparently a similar character to Reeves' History of the English Law. Of works of this class it is difficult to form a just opinion until the whole is presented to the reader, and always ungrateful to form a hostile one, because, whatever their demerits, they are monuments in a way of considerable industry. The present work, however, cannot be read without serious doubts arising that its excessive originality will disqualify it for a very wide success. Its scope is the investigation of the ancient law of the Ancient Britons, with a view to establishing that the Roman Civil Law was in a great measure derived from it. The author is sanguine that the result of his lucubrations will be considerably to affect the modern decisions of the judges upon numerous points (p. 7). Whether such anticipations are well founded is not a matter for present speculation; but until the author more firmly establishes upon authentic evidence the facts which support his main theory of the origin of the civil law, his conclusion on the subject of the origin of that law will probably rank with another conclusion at which he arrives, p. 59, viz., "that they (i.e., the Druids) had retained the science of the Noachida and must, in fact, have been the direct descendants of that son of Noah whose issue it is conjectured settled down on this portion of the globe," &c. A conclusion not more ridiculous, however, than the fable of Brute the Trojan, which many historians condescend to notice, and which our author condescends to believe (p. 51), on the ground that Homer and probabilities establish it. A large amount of learning is undoubtedly displayed by the present work, and also considerable skill in the art of writing lucidly, which ought to be employed more profitably than in advocating the most hopeless of newly-invented theories. On many questions, a superficial acquaintance with which is credit

able, this work discloses much knowledge; but its conclusions, which are avowedly opposed to those of Maine, and certainly deviate widely from the positions maintained by the more accredited historians, are certainly unworthy of a laborious support, and incapable of a successful one. If this publication is to be continued, it will require a very careful rescension, for sometimes the author differs as widely from himself as from Freeman. Thus it is laid down (p. 79), "Britain must have become half Roman in its population," and at p. 77, "There is no reason, but the contrary, to suppose that the conquest of Britain by the Romans made any great change among the inhabitants"-two assertions which ought not to be left to the student to reconcile with one another. The necessity of asserting even by implication (p. 40) “that the ancient inhabitants of this country were the descendants of Japhet," "that (p. 54) Homer clearly referred to the Druids," and various other matters of a similar description, might also profitably be reconsidered on a rescension. On the same occasion expediency might suggest that the main theory of the work does not pledge the historian to go so far as to declare (p. 63) that the ancient Britons were superior in civilisation to their Romau contemporaries, and were "a nation of poets and philosophers, who had imparted the light of their learning to ancient Greece itself," and that declarations of such nature must be an obstacle to the success of any work which contains them. The theory which this history seeks to establish is sufficiently startling to awaken all the incredibility of mankind, and its acceptance will assuredly be rendered more difficult by being associated with many views which the world is in the habit of treating with ridicule.

We have already commended the volume from a literary point of view, and therefore there is less objection to pointing out a few of its demerits in point of style. It seems unnecessary in discussing the Venerable Bede (p. 5), to leave that respectable author and assert "that Protestants have lied to cover every iniquity," and to declare (p. 6) that people "worship themselves instead of truth," and "pervert history into lies." The historian would do well to avoid the monosyllable which expresses mendacity, and to abandon also the forcible feeble invective, which leads to the expressions, "shocking impositions" (p. 206), " trash and trumpery of dilettanti" (p. 7), and various similar phrases which are unfitting the dignity even of unsuccessful historical compilations. There is a style of invective which demolishes those views against which it is directed and does not damage the person who employs it. If, whenever the author requires the aid of passion and denunciation he would employ such invective, his language which is generally of considerable merit would be freed from blemishes which even a coarse and blunted fastidiousness must feel to be distasteful. Our candid opinion is that this history should not absorb any further labour; the positions which it seeks to establish have no practical interest and cannot excite much popular or professional curiosity; and if the historian desires to waste his labour upon a work of the nature of this one, he will find a wider audience and an equally good subject if he turns to the famous question which has been for a long time before minds of a paradoxical and curious turn, viz., the question whether the English people are not identical with the lost tribes of Israel.


The Commentaries of Gaius and Rules of Ulpian. Translated with Notes by J. T. ABDY, LL.D., Judge of County Courts, and late Cambridge Regius Professor of Laws, and BRYAN WALKER, M.A., LL.D., Law Lecturer of St. John's College. New edition. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1874.

THE first edition of Gaius, translated and annotated by the above gentlemen, was published in 1870, and the whole of that edition having, as we understand, been exhausted, the editors now republish the work, and for the first time bind up with Gaius the wellknown "Rules of Ulpian." The contents of the book are an English translation and notes placed underneath the corresponding text of Gaius and Ulpian, an appendix consisting of nineteen short dissertations or notes, and an inder verborum.

The ability of the editors to produce a translation and annotation worthy of Cambridge has been recognised by the Syndics of the University Press, for whom the work was specially prepared. We have found the "Commentaries of Gaius" in the English dress here appearing easy and agreeable reading. The notes contain the kind of information and references which the student will, at the time he is reading the originals, be most in need of, and they are free from the sins besetting the German commentators upon the civil law of being almost interminably long and vexatiously inconclusive. Criticism and knowledge of an ampler nature involving the setting out of numerous distinctions, requirements, exceptions, and details are dealt with in the appendix, under such heads as "Status," "Potestas," "Tutors," "Acquisition," "Lex Julia et Papia Poppaa," "Bonorum Possessio," Proceedings in a Roman Civil Law Action," "The Dissolution of Obligations," &c.


The undergraduate or Bar student who is about to commence the study of Roman law will do well to place this text book upon his book shelf, and we see no reason why it should not have a prosperous future before it in the book market, notwithstanding the rival editions with which it must continue to compete.

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On the motion of Lord REDESDALE, the following resolutions were agreed to:-"That this House will not receive any petition for a private Bill after Monday, the 30th day of this instant March, unless such private Bill shall have been approved by the Court of Chancery; nor any petition for a private Bill approved by the Court of Chancery after Monday, the 12th day of May next.' "That this House will not receive any report from the judges upon petitions presented to this House for private Bills after Monday, the 12th day of May next." "That so much of Standing Order No. 179, s. 3, as requires that no such Bill shall be read a second time earlier than the fourth day nor later than the seventh day after the first reading thereof be suspended during the present session, and that every such Bill shall be read a second time on the fourth day after the first reading thereof, whether the Standing Orders applicable thereto have or have not been complied with; and that so much of the Order of the 15th day of March 1859, as requires two clear days' notice of the day on which any Bill shall be examined, shall also be suspended during the present session in respect to Bills originating

in this House."


the invention as consisting in "the use of carburet
of manganese in any process whereby iron is con-
verted into cast steel," and directed the unfused
carburet of manganese to be put into the pot con-
taining the steel in a fused state. The patentee
claimed as his invention "the use of carburet of
manganese in any process for the conversion of
iron into cast steel.' B. manufactured cast steel
by placing oxide of manganese and carbonaceous
matter into the pot at the same moment as the
steel. Evidence was given that carburet of man-
ganese would be formed by the combination of
these substances before the steel was melted.
They produced the same effect upon the steel as
the carburet of manganese, at a cheaper rate.
This method of producing the effect was not
known at the time of taking out the patent. Held,
that this was a new invention, and not an infringe.
ment of the patent. The judges, in answering the
question put to them by the House of Lords,
differed as to the question of infringement.
Crowder, J. "The process of the plaintiff in error
is an improvement upon the invention of the
defendant in error (the patentee) while at the
same time it is an infringement of his patent."
Crompton, J.-" I do not agree with the argument
for the plaintiff in error, that the question of
infringement can depend on whether the mode of
working alleged to be an infringement was, or was
not known to the patentee, or to those skilled in
the particular matter at the time of the specifica-
tion.... If a new process, of which he (the
patentee) and all others were ignorant at the
time of the specification, is found out afterwards,
the exercise of such new process may be an
infringement, provided that it is substantially the
same with or includes the patented invention.
An improved method of doing in effect the same
thing may well be an infringement of the patent,
though not known at the time of the specifi-


cation. The use of different things producing the same effect, whether operating in the same or a different manner, might be the Tuesday, March 24. use of things out of the patent, and might proHYPOTHEC, &c. (SCOTLAND). perly be called the use of an equivalent. The Mr. J. BARCLAY asked the Lord-Advocate whe. present is not, in my opinion, the use of what ther he intended, on behalf of the Government, to can be properly termed an equivalent." Wil introduce a measure abolishing agricultural hypo- liams, J.-" Though the use of a chemical or thec in Scotland, and if he was prepared to in- mechanical substitute, which is a known equivaform the House what were the "other measures lent to the thing pointed out by the specification relating to her (Scotland's) interests" referred to and claimed as the invention, amounts to an inin Her Majesty's speech. The LORD-ADVO-fringement of the patent, yet, if the equivalent CATE said there had not yet been time for maturely were not known to be so at the time of the patent considering what measures relating to Scotland and specification, the use of it is no infringement. could be advantageously introduced at present. If a patent is taken out for the application The interests of Scotland would not be neglected, of a principle, coupled with a mode of carrying but the hon. member must allow the Government the principle into effect, the patentee is entitled to choose the proper time, with reference to the to protection from all other modes of doing so, other business before the House, for the intro- whether known or not known at the time of the duction of such measures. (Hear.)- Mr. J. specification." Erle, J.-" I am of opinion that a BARCLAY said the learned Lord had scarcely patent for the use of a substance in a process answered his first question.--The LORD-ADVO- is infringed by the use of the elements of CATE said his answer had been intended to cover that substance known to be equivalent thereto it. (A laugh.)- -Mr. J. BARCLAY also asked the at the time of the use, if used for the purcause of the delay in publishing the Census re- pose of taking the benefit of the patent and turns for Scotland, and when they would be of making a colourable variation therefrom." issued.--The LORD-ADVOCATE was understood Parke, B., said: "In delivering the judgment of to say that two volumes of these returns had been the Court of Exchequer in a former stage of this presented to Parliament, and the delay as to the case, I stated the opinion of the court to be, rest was the subject of a correspondence between that there could be no indirect infringement if the present Home Secretary and the authorities the defendant did not intend to imitate at all. in Scotland. He was informed that it was caused That part of the judgment has since been justly to some extent by the necessity of preparing cer- objected to in Stevens v. Keating, and no doubt tain special returns in connection with the Edu- we were in error in that respect. There may be cation Act. an indirect infringement as well as a direct one, though the intention of the party be perfectly innocent, and even though he may not know of the existence of the patent itself. The specification must be read as persons acquainted with the subject would read it, at the time it was made; and if it could be construed as containing any chemical equivalents, it must be such as are known to such person at that time; but those which are not known at the time as equivalents, and afterwards are found to answer the same purpose, are not included in the specification." Pollock, C.B.-"The right of the plaintiff does not turn upon the extent of his claim, but upon the communication made to the public as to the mode of accomplishing his object, and he has no right to claim anything but that which he has communicated to the public, however large in point of language his claim may appear to be. The present invention has four points, but it is with the fourth alone that we have to deal, and upon which any question arises. This is stated in the specification to be, 'Fourthly, the use of carburet of manganese in any process whereby iron is converted into cast steel.' This statement does not, in my opinion, give to the patentee, as some of my learned brothers seem to think, the exclusive right of using carburet of manganese in any and every possible process, or in any and every mode of using it, in order to convert iron into cast steel; but it only gives to the plaintiff such an exclusive right as regards such process or processes as he afterwards further describes, declares, and makes known for the benefit of the public, and such other similar processes as are reasonably

PATENT LAW. (By C. HIGGINS, Esq., M.A., F.C.S., Barrister-at-Law.)

not so.



(Continued from p. 361.)

Newton v. Grand Junction Railway Company. 1846.-Pollock, C.B. "It was argued that the same criterion is to be applied to the question of infringement as to that of novelty. But that is In order to ascertain the novelty, you take the entire invention, and if, in all its parts combined together, it answers the purpose by the introduction of any new matter, by any new combination, or by a new application, it is a novelty entitled to a patent. But, in considering the question of infringement, all that is to be looked at is, whether the defendant has pirated a part of that to which the patent applies; and if he has used that part, for the purposes for which the patentee adapted his invention, and for which he has taken out his patent, and the jury are of opinion that the difference is merely colourable, it is an infringement." Alderson, B. "If the invention consists of something new and a combination of that with what is old, then if an individual takes for his own and uses that which is the new part of the patent, that is an infringement of it." (5 Ex. 331; 20 L. J. 427, Ex.)

Unwin v. Heath. H. L. 1855.-A. obtained a patent for certain improvements in the manufacture of iron and steel. The specification described

within the description, according to the then state of knowledge; also he is protected against fraudulent imitations, or evasions of, or substitutions of equivalents in his process or processes as specified. . I entirely agree with my brothers Alderson and Coleridge (referring to their judgments as given in the Court of Exchequer Chamber), that the patent (as explained in the specification) covers and protects not only the process actually specified, but any process with chemical equivalents known as such at the date of the patent, but not chemical equivalents discovered afterwards, for this would be giving the patentee not only the benefit of his own discovery, but the benefit of the discoveries of other persons subsequently to the date of the patent." (5 H. of L. Cas. 505; 25 L. J. 8, C. P.) Coleridge, J., in delivering judgment in this case in the Court of Exchequer Chamber, said: "There can be no doubt, I think, that an equivalent has been used. If that equivalent were known at the date of the specification to the plaintiff or ordinary chemists-those, I mean, who would bring to the reading of the specification such knowledge as must be presumed in those to whom the patent must be taken to be addressed-then it is within the specification, and the use of it is an infringement. If not the contrary conclusion follows, and the use of it is an improvement, in virtue of a new discovery, Whether the equivalent be in its nature near to or remote from the thing itself, seems to be in principle wholly immaterial, and equally so that the one should be so nearly identical with the other, as in themselves the component parts may be of composite substances:" (2 Web. P. C. 244; 12 C. B. 522; 22 L. J. 7, C. P.; 16 Jur. 996; 13 M. & W. 583.)



IF the Legal Practitioners' Society continues its labours at the same rate and with the same vigour as marked its commencement, we cannot doubt but that, ere long, it will have been the principal means of accomplishing many important reforms in connection with the legal profession. We are glad to notice that the Bill entitled, "The Legal Practitioners' Act 1874," the provisions of which were published in our two previous issues was, on the 20th inst., read a first time in the House of Commons, leave being given to Mr. W. T. Charley and Mr. C. E. Lewis to introduce the same, and, seeing that the terms of the formal leave so given were to introduce a " Bill to amend the law relating to legal practitioners," the promoters are not as yet pledged to any particular form of Bill, or indeed any particular objects, the Profession ought not to lose this opportunity to include in the measure all isolated cases affecting the interests of solicitors, which need to be dealt with by legislative enactments; and the Bill itself, as at present framed, should be carefully considered by the Profession, and observations and suggestions thereon, together with the like on all other subjects needing reform, which might be included in the measure, should be forwarded to the honorary secretary, in order that he might submit them to the Parliamentary Committee appointed by the society to frame the Bill. Unfortunately, some time must elapse before the second reading of the Bill, for we are asked by the honorary secretary to state that the measure stands the first order of the day for the second reading on the 8th July next, being the first clear day that could be obtained. The best use that can be made of this long interval is, as we said before, for solicitors to use every means in their power to secure the measure becoming law in a welldigested and useful form, the object being to protect the public not less than the Profession. We are very glad to have had the opportunity of seeking to advance the interests of solicitors by giving every publicity in our power to the Bill which has been introduced into Parliament; and, this much done, it will be very disheartening to us if through the apathy of the Profession the measure goes the way of all other Bills in Parliament which have not the hearty support of those who are interested in their becoming law. We are asked to add that prints of the Bill as at present framed can be had on application by letter addressed to the honorary secretary at the office of this journal. Subscriptions, which are much needed, are limited to the sum of 5s. annually, except in the case of vice-presidents, whose subscription is one guinea.

THE subject of the issue of commissions to solicitors to administer oaths in the various courts is a matter, says a correspondent, well worthy of the attention of the Legal Practitioners' Society. The authority for the issue of these commissions is to be found in numerous Acts of Parliament, and subject to a great variety of regulations and restrictions. Our own opinion is that the better course to adopt is to await the operation of the

Supreme Court of Judicature Act, and then that the Parliamentary Committee of the society should take the matter into consideration, and, if necessary, frame a bill upon the subject, which would, no doubt, receive the support of the council of the Incorporated Law Society. There seems to be no reason why a solicitor of a certain number of years' standing should not be entitled, after notice to the secretary of the Incorporated Law Society, to a commission empowering him to administer oaths in connection with business in every court in the United Kingdom.

A LETTER which appeared in the Times of the 21st inst., under the heading "Election Expenses," and bearing the nom de plume" Reasonable," is probably one of the most unreasonable for some time past published in the leading journal. Speaking of solicitors, the writer observes, "that all interested in elections" should "make a stand and resist the attempt which is being made by professional agents to establish a precedent by charging for their services sums which are unreasonable and unjust. Candidates, who had no experience of the ballot, were obliged to use the old system of agency by solicitors, one or more taking charge of each polling district; those who are selected are often men with small


legal businesses, they make the most of the opportunity, and think any charge fair at an election, and care not to check extravagant charges." This letter may be described as scurrillous. Are solicitors to blame for the operation of the Ballot Act, and the increase of expenditure occasioned thereby at contested elections? The writer in question offers no evidence or information as to the alleged attempt on the part of solicitors to establish a precedent which, if so attempted, we would readily join with him in condemning. We suppose the correspondent in question was an unsuccessful candidate at the recent election, and, of course, had to pay for the honour with which he sought to cover himself; and as regards his complaint that candidates were obliged to use the old system of agency by solicitors," it is very well known that these duties are often undertaken by solicitors in very extensive practice; and we know of cases innumerable in which solicitors, by devoting themselves with zeal to the interests of the political party with which, for years in country towns, they have been associated, have suffered losses in connection with their business, for which their remuneration as political agents, affords but an indifferent recompense. We say, too, advisedly, that solicitors, as a rule, above all things, work from genuine political zeal, and they are not ready to work for whichever side will pay them best; indeed, we are not sure whether we are wise in noticing such unjust observations. We hope, with the writer of the letter, that "the friends of candidates will speak out very decidedly, and resist" all imposition shown to exist, and which, we are quite sure, solicitors will be the first to denounce as readily as they will the disappointed correspondent of the Times, for recklessly attacking a body of professional men without the slightest justification.

solicitors are says our correspondent-known ably safe in it. He is not responsible for the fall to send such matters to persons, who slightly of the building by the careless or improper conundercut the Profession in their charges. We are duct of the builder of which he had not notice. certainly of opinion that no papers should be The defendant a livery stable keeper, employed a received into any of the registries unless bearing builder (not a servant of the defendant, but an the name of a solicitor. This would be surely ac- independant contractor), to erect on part of his ceptable to the officials, because it would be a yard a building of which the lower part was a guarantee against papers being carried in (as at shed for the reception of carriages for reward. times we are assured they are) in such a form as Plaintiff deposited two carriages with the defenclearly indicates that they have been prepared by dant for safe keeping, which were placed in the some incompetent and non-professional person. above-mentioned shed. Whilst the carriages were Law stationers whose business consists of what there the building was blown down by a high the name indicates (and there are many well- wind, and the carriages were injured. The known firms so working in conjunction with our builder was one whom a careful and prudent perProfession) would, we are sure, welcome such a son might trust, and the defendant had no notice rule which would clearly operate-as it should- of any negligence on the builder's part. An acto their advantage. We some time since called tion having been brought by the plaintiff against attention to the fact that many of the forms the defendant, evidence was offered at the trial, on and instructions issued from Somerset House re- the part of the plaintiff, to show that owing to quire that certain matters and things of a quasi the neglect of the builder and his workmen, the legal nature should be transacted "by an agent." building was in fact unskilfully built and unsafe, We urged then, and do so still, that the words and that this was the cause of the fall. The "by a solicitor" should be substituted. judge rejected this evidence and nonsuited the plaintiff Held, that this evidence was rightly rejected and that the nonsuit was right: (Searle v, Laverick, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 89. Q. B.)

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A CORRESPONDENT writes to inquire what will become of the expressions "Barrister-at-Law," "Special Pleader," and similar terms, such as Attorney-General," &c., &c., when the Judicature Act comes into operation, and the long talked of "fusion" takes place. The Act itself provides for the substitution of the name "Solicitor of the High Court" for all other names by which members of the lower branch of the Profession are known. The other titles are not affected.

GREAT complaint is made, and justly so, of the wretched production, in the shape of Common Law Stamps, recently issued from Somerset House, for use at judges' chambers and elsewhere. It seems that the stamped impression can be almost, if not entirely, removed from the paper on which it is impressed even by the heat of the hand; so much so that a report for some time existed at chambers that fraudulent stamps had been made use of, for which, how ever, there is not the slightest justification. A formal complaint has, we understand, already been made to the authorities. It is certainly a matter that needs immediate attention.

Ir is reported that the Law and Parliamentary Committee of the Court of Common Council are disposed to recommend a junior in the office of the Lord Mayor's Court for promotion to the vacant office of registrar of that court. We do not know whether the gentleman in question happens to be a professional man, but, if not, we hope the committee will hesitate before taking a step which it can hardly be expected that the Common Council will adopt.

WE are glad to notice that a solicitor, in the person of Mr. Goldney, M.P., has been appointed to serve on the Royal Commission of inquiry into the relations existing between masters and servants, the other members of the commission being the Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Winmar leigh, Mr. Bouverie, M.P., the Recorder of London, Sir M. Smith, Mr. Roebuck, M.P., Mr. T. Hughes, and Mr. M'Donald. M.P.

SINCE the time when this journal was first pub. lished, now exactly thirty-one years ago, we have always urged upon the Profession the necessity of fostering and encouraging reforms which, though NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. they may not tend to the immediate interests of the Profession, yet are necessary for the publicTIONS OF NEGLIGENCE-APPLICATION FOR PARACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE-GENERAL ALLEGAgood, and if so necessary will surely ultimately prove of benefit to solicitors. We look, therefore, TICULARS-NEGLIGENCE IN THE NAVIGATION OF with anxious expectation, for the Lord ChanA SHIP. Where the declaration in an action cellor's measure affecting the transfer of land. against the defendant for negligent navigation of If it points to benefits to be conferred upon the his ship, causing injury to the plaintiff, contains public, we, and no doubt the Profession, will only general allegations of negligence on the part accept and adopt it; but if on the other hand it is of the defendant in respect of navigation, and of a measure ill-digested, and promising nothing but keeping the machinery and the ship in good reform for reform's sake, a measure which, while it repair, the court will not require the plaintiff to curtails the legitimate profits of solicitors, offers give particulars of matters which he may suppose no equivalent in the shape of a boon to the public, such being within the knowledge of the defento constitute the negligence of the defendant, in such case it will merit all the opposition which dant and his servants, and not necessarily within it is happily in the power of solicitors to offer to it, if they only choose to exert that power by the personal knowledge of the plaintiff (George v. Watts, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 60. C. P.) proper organisation. The last measure introduced into Parliament upon the subject of the transfer of land, received its quietus rather in consequence of its own demerits than any combined efforts on the part of the Profession to expose them. The Profession will read with interest the debate that has already taken place upon the measure.

WILL-DUE EXECUTION-FOOT OR END-15 & 16 VICT. c. 34.-Testatrix made a will on a lithograph form. The disposing part began on the second side, and was continued on the third, executors, execution, and attestation clause were the fourth was a blank; and the appointment of on the first page. Held, that the will was duly executed (In the goods of Wotton, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 75. Prob.)


No doubt many law stationers work in the legitimate grooves of their calling, but some there are LIVERY STABLE KEEPER-CARRIAGE DEPOmost assuredly who undertake much work which SITED FOR SAFE KEEPING-LIABILITY OF KEEPER should be dealt with in solicitors' offices. We-OBLIGATION AS TO CONDITION OF BUILDING.are informed by a country correspondent that applications for grants of probate and letters of administration, where the estate is sworn under £500, though at times much over the amount, are made to a large extent by certain firms of law stationers, accountants, and agents. Country'

WILL-SHIFTING CLAUSE-RE-SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE.-T. M., by his will made in 1837, devised his P. estates to trustees, in trust for his grandson T. C., the second son of J. C. for life, with remainder to his first and other sons in tail male, with remainder to W. M. for life, and to his first and other sons in tail male, with remainder over, and the testator declared that if T. C., or his issue male, should become seised, or entitled in possession to the S. estates settled on the marriage of J. C., then the trust of his said real estate in favour of T. C. should absolutely cease, and his said estates should go the person next beneficially entitled in remainder under the trusts, in the same manner as if T. C. were then deceased without male issue. In 1854 the S. estates were disentailed and resettled as to part thereof to the use of J. C. in fee; and, as to the rest, to uses under which, on the death of the eldest son of J. C. without issue, and of J. C., T. C. became tenant for life. On a bill filed by W. M., claiming under those circumstances the benefit of the shifting clause; Held, that the event contemplated by the testator had not happened. The shifting clause was only intended to operate in the event of T. C. under the settlement. or his issue becoming entitled to the S. estates The entail under that settlement had been barred, and T. C. had come into possession of a portion only of those estates under a different title. The shifting clause did not apply to such a state of things: (Meyrick v. Mathias, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 77. Chan.)



meat, drink, lodging, and all other necessaries, and certain wages: Held, that he was not entitled to set-off the wages due to the apprentice against the cost of clothes and washing supplied to him. A custom to do this could not be supported, as it would contravene the terms of the indenture. A custom among the masters to interpret the word "neces. saries" as excluding clothes and washing in apprenticeship indentures would not bind the apprentice, he not being a person in the trade who would have knowledge of the word bearing a meaning other than the ordinary one. A custom between parties must be a custom of trade known to control the meaning of a word in a deed to the parties, and must be definite and not variable: (Abbott v. Bates, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 99. C.P.)

ANNUITY CHARGED ON LAND-RECEIVERPOWER OF DISTRESS-4 GEO. 2, c. 28-LAND OF AMPLE VALUE TO PAY THE ANNUITY.-A tea tator by his will bequeathed certain leaseholds to the defendant, upon condition that he paid thereout, or out of the rents thereof, an annuity of during his life. The leaseholds were of amply £70, by half-yearly payments, to the plaintiff sufficient value to secure payment of the annuity. The annuity had been regularly paid since the death of the testator. One half-yearly payment of the annuity being in arrear, the annuitant filed his bill to enforce payment thereof, and for the appointment of a receiver. Held, that the annuity being charged on land of amply sufficient value to superadded by the statute 4 Geo. 2, c. 28, the secure payment thereof, with a power of distress plaintiff was not entitled to have a receiver appointed, and bill dismissed with costs: (Kelsey v. Kelsey, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 82. V.C. M.)

FREE MINER-FOREST OF DEAN.-In 1868, D., a free miner of the Forest of Dean, duly applied to have a particular gale granted to him, The obligation of a livery stable keeper, who for pursuant to the provisions of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 43, reward receives carriages for safe keeping, as to 8.60. The gaveller acceded to his application, the building in which the carriages are kept, is to and issued a notice that a grant would be made take reasonable care that the building in which to D. on a day named. Prior to this day rival the carriages are deposited is in a proper state so claimants to the gale started up, and subse that the things therein deposited may be reason-quently other claims were made, the result being

that D. died before any grant was actually made |
to him. Held, that D. had acquired a trans-
missible interest in the gale. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 43,
s. 38, enacts that " an application made by any
person for a gale, but which has not been duly
granted by' "the gaveller, "shall not confer a
title to any gale."

Semble, that this section

applied only to applications already made at the time of the passing of the Act, and did not apply to applications subsequently made: (James v. The Queen, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 84. V.C. M.)

DISTRESS-COLOUR OF RIGHT-RIGHT OF COMMON PUR CAUSE DE VICINAGE-SURCHARGE OF CATTLE.-A claim of a custom from time immemorial that cattle upon adjoining commons strayed from one to the other, is a sufficient colour of right to deprive a commoner of one common of the remedy of distress against trespassing cattle of a commoner of the adjoining common, even although the latter has surcharged his own common: (Cape v. Scott, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 87. Q. B.)

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (3 & 4 WILL. 4, c. 27), s. 3-DISCONTINUANCE OF POSSESSION— RECEIPT OF RENT BY AGENT.-So long as an agent is in receipt of the rent of land, the Statute of Limitations will not run against his employer; and if a person commence to receive rents as the agent of another, and afterwards continue to recieve such rents, without paying them over, he must be presumed to receive as agent till the contrary is shown: (Smith and Another v. Bennett, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 100. Ex.)

WILL-RENUNCIATION OF EXECUTORS-RETRACTATION OF RENUNCIATION.-A renunciation of executorship is not complete, and may be retracted at any time before it is filed in the court: (In the goods of Morant, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 74. Prob.)

BLOOMSBURY COUNTY COURT. (Before Mr. G. LANE RUSSELL, Judge.) Thursday, March 19.


PLAINTIFF, a stationer of 99, Oxford-street, W., sought to recover the amount of £6 for stationery supplied to the defendant Savory, a money-lender, &c., of 40, Great Marlborough-street, Regent. street. The circumstance, as stated by Alsopp, for the plaintiff, and the evidence went to show that the defendant ordered stationery of the plaintiff, items of which consisted of profesgional cards and envelopes. On the cards was engraved the name of the defendant "Mr. Savory, solicitor," and on the envelopes the intertwined monogram, "S. C." Plaintiff stated that defendant came to his shop and ordered the goods which were accordingly sent home, with an invoice, the money having been subsequently several times demanded. It was urged on the part of the defence, that some of the goods were for a Mr. Chidley, a solicitor, also living at 40, Great Marlborough-street, and were bought on his account. This was denied by plaintiff, who had already refused to trust him for a desk, which he had desired to purchase. It was also asserted, and not contracted, that although the defendant had acted as a solicitor he had no right to do so. He said he acted conjointly with Chidley, whose brass plate was on the door with the name of Savory underneath. The envelopes were intended for the joint and separate use of both parties, but the cards were a mistake, and were never issued.

His HONOUR was was of opinion that this case required time to consider, he therefore adjourned it for judgment.

HEIRS-AT-LAW AND NEXT OF KIN. COWPER (Lieut. Col. Jeremiah), CB., Green-street, Piccadilly, Middlesex, next of kin, to come in by April 30, at the Chambers of V.C. M. May 11; at the said chamhers, at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims.


[Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the
National Debt, and which will be paid to the persons
respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three
months, unless other claimants sooner appear.]
EGLES (Richard), Basingstoke, gentleman, deceased.
HEWER Rev. John), Tunworth, Hants, deceased, and
DENNETT (Mullens), Lodsworth, Sussex, gentleman, one
dividend on the sum of £3257 6s. 4d., and one dividend on
£1757 6s. 4d., New Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant
said Mullens Dennett, the survivor.
RATT (Francis), Dunstable, Beds, victualler, and SEAR
(Wm.), a minor, £48 118. 8d., Reduced Three per Cent.
Annuities. Claimant said Wm. Sear, now of age.


by June 24 their names and addresses, and the particulars
of their claims, and the names and addresses of their
solicitors (if any), to H. Wilson, Bartholomew House,
Bartholomew-lane, London. July 8; at the chambers of
V.C. H., at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hear-
ing and adjudicating upon such claims."
by April 30 their names and addresses, and the particulars
of their claims, and the names and addresses of their soli-
citors (if any), to Geo. Whiffin, 8, Old Jewry, London.
March 14; at the chambers of the V.C.M., at twelve o'clock,
is the time appointed for hear ng and adjudicating upon
such claims.

PATENT GAS COMPANY (LIMITED). Petition for winding-up
to be heard April 17, before V.C. M.
COMPANY (LIMITED).-Creditors to send in by April 17
their names an addresses, and the particulars of their
claims, and the names and addr sses of their solicitors (if
any), to F. Whinney, 8, Old Jewry, London, the official
liquidator of the said company. April 21; at the cham-
bers of the M, K., at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed
for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims.
PHATE COMPANY (LIMITED).-Creditors to send in by April
15 their names and addresses, and the particulars of their
claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if
any), to Chas. Lowrey, 18, East Parade, Leeds, the official
liquidator of the said company. April 22, at the chambers
of V.C. M., is the time appointed for hearing and adjudi-
cating upon such claims.

-Petition for winding-up to be heard April 17, before
V.C. H.


in by April 11 their names and addresses and the particu-
lars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their
solicitors (if any) to Alcock and Westenholz, at the offices
of Lake and Co., 10, New-square, Lincoln'-inn, Middle-
sex, the official liquidators of the said company. April
20, at the chambers of the M. R., at eleven o'clock, is the
time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such


BOWER (John), 8, Botolph-lane, Eastcheap, London, frait
merchant. April 17; Thos. B. Cartwright, solicitor, 4,
Lothbury Lond n. May 1; M. R., at eleven o'clock.
BROOKS (Kichard), 5, Cambridge-mews, Paddington, Mid-
dlesex, shoeing smith and farrier. March 89; J. P. Pon-
cione, jun., solicitor, 5, Raymond-buildings, Gray's-inn,
Middlesex. April 14: V.C. H., at one o'clock.
BROOKS (Sophia M.), 5, Cambridge-mews, spinster. March
30; J. P. Poncione, jun., solicitor, 5, Raymond-buildings.
April 14: V.C. H., at one o'clock.

CAPPS (Edwd.), formerly of Barham Wood. Elstree, Hert-
ford, afterwards of 14, Park-road-villas, Forest-hill, Lewis-
ham, Kent, late of 14, High-street, Worthing, Sussex,
architect. April 11; H. W. M. Jackson, solicitor, 25, Lin-
coln's-inn-fields, Middlesex. April 24; V. C. H., at one

COOPER (Benjamin). Daw-green, Dewsbury, York. April
18; E. Holt, solicitor, Horbury, Wakefield. April 27;
V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.

DYMOKE (John), late of Scrivelsby-court, near Horncastle,
Lincoln, the Hon. the Queen's Champion, formerly a
Clerk in Holy Orders. May 8; Gregory and Co., solici-
tors, 1, Bedford-row, London. May 22; V.C. H., at twelve
FULLCHER (John N.), 39, Queen's-road, Bayswater, Middle-
sex, cabinet maker. April 27; H. M. Phillips, solicitor,
10, Old-Jewry, London, May 6; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.
GALE (Philip), Ashford Cottage, Clarendon-road, Putney.
Surrey, insurance broker. April 20; John Priest, soli-
citor, 10, Buckingham street, Strand, Middlesex.. May
7; M. R., at twelve o'clock.

GENTRY (Jas.), Washbrook, Suffolk, farmer. April 7; John
M. Pollard, solicitor, Ipswich. April 21; V.C. H., at
1 o'clock.

HIGGS (Dinah) Kidlington, Oxford, widow. April 6; A S.
Harford, solicitor, St. Michael's Chambers, Ship-street,
Oxford. April 16; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.
HOULGRAVE (Jas.), Liverpool, tar distiller. April 30:
Walter Weld, solicitor, Liverpool. May 8; V.C. H., at
twelve o'clock.

ISARD (John), 16, Cambridge-road, Bromley, Kent, tallow
chandler. April 16; Geo. R. Burn, solicitor, 33, Carter-
lane, Doctor 8-commons, London. April 28; V.C. M., at
twelve o'clock.
MACHETT (Sarah), Herne Bay, Kent, and of Meyrick-road,
Clapham, Surrey. April 23; C. Bayliss, solicitor, 30,
Poultry, London. May 5; V.C. B., at twelve o'clock.
MARSTON (John), Castle Bromwich, Warwick, carriage
builder. April 13; J. Ansell, solicitor, 42, Temple-street,
Birmingham. April 20; V. C. M. at twelve o'clock.
MAXWELL (Wellwood), Abercrombie-square, Liverpool, and
of Glenlee, Kirkendbright, Scotland, Esq. April 15;
Walter Murton, solicitor, 45, Bloomsbury-square, Middle-
REA (Geo), Spittall. Berwick-upon-Tweed. April 9; Jas.
sex. April 27; V. C. M. at twelve o'clock.
Gray, solicitor. Berwick-upon-Tweed. April 20; V. C. B.
at twelve o'clock.

ROOKE (Wm. A.), 6, Boston Park-road, Brentford, Middle-
sex. April 6; James Bowen May, solicitor, 67, Russell-
square, Middlesex. April 13; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.
SPOONER (Wm.), St. Giles' street, Norwich, cabinet maker.
April 20; Wm. Sadd, solicitor, Norwich. May 1; V.C. M.,

at twelve o'clock.

WATERS (Geo.), formerly of Croydon, Surrey, late of 17,
Market-street East, Emerald Hill, Victoria, Australia,
coachbuilder. Sept. 30; Henry Parry, solicitor, %
Gresham-buildings, Basinghall street, London, England.
Oct. 31; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock.

CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35.
Last Day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent.
ABRAHAM (John), formerly of Southcliff House, Niton, Isle
of Wight, afterwards of Newport, Sandown, and Rye,
respectively in the said Isle, gentleman. April 30; Jas.
Eldridge, solicitor, Newport, Isle of Wight.
AKERS (Samuel R.). Mildmay-park, Highbury, Middlesex.
May 1; Edwin Brooks, 26. Mildmay-park, Highbury.
ARGYLL Anne, Duchess Dowager of), late of 40, Rutland-
gate, Hyde-p_rk, Middlesex, and theretofore of Ardin-
caple, near Helensburg, Dumbarton, Scotland. May 1;
Few and Co., solicitors, 2, Henrietta-street, Covent-
garden, London.

ATKINSON (Anthony O.), LL.D., Clare House, Kingston-
upon-Hull. May 1; Owst and Co., solicitors, Quay-
chambers, Hull.

BENTLEY (Elizabeth A.), formerly of Kingston-on-Thames,
Surrey, late of Brighton, spinster. May 1; Torr and Co.,
solicitors, 38, Bedford-row, Middlesex.

BLANDY (William), Westwood, Tilehurst, Berks, banker.
May 1; W. F. Blandy, solicitor, 1, Friar-street, Reading.
BLUNT (Robert), New Windsor, Berks, saddler. April 18;
Meynell and Pemberton, solicitors, 29, Whitehall-place,
Westminster, London.

CARRINGTON (Thomas, Holywell House, Chesterfield,
Derby, coal and iron master. April 30; Burdekin and
Co., solicitors, 51, Norfolk street, Sheffield.
COOPER (Mary A. G.) 15, Talbot-road (formerly 3, Carlton-
place), Westbourne-park-road, Bayswater, Middlesex,
widow. April 30; Oldershaw and Son, solicitors, 18,
King's Arms-yard, Moorgate-street, London.
CRISP (Geo.), Sunderland, miller. May 1; Wm. Moore,
solicitor, 59, John-street, Sunderland.

DAVIES (John), Glanaber, near Abergele, Denbigh, Esq.
May 1; Gold, Edwards, and Weston, solicitors, Den-

DEAN (Robert), Peterborough, gentleman. July 11;
Broughton and Wyman, solicitors, Peterborough.
DRINKWATER (Elizabeth), 25, Lansdown-crescent, Alstone,
near Cheltenham, spinster. June 15; Pidcock and Son,
solicitors, 40, Foregate-street, Worcester.

ECCLES (Richard), Waithew House, near Wigan, and of
Lark-hill. Lord street. Southport, Esq. April 8; John
Bewley, and Son, solicitors, 4, Brown's-buildings, Ex-
change, Liverpool.

ELIOTT (Sir Daniel', K.C.S.I., 12, The Boltons, West
Brompton, Middlesex. April 22; D. E. Forbes, sul citor,
31, Bedford-row, London.

ELIOTT (Dame G orgina, 12, The Boltons, West Brompton.
Middlesex, widow. April 22, D. E. Forbes, solicitor, 34,

FORD (Geo.). Butterton-park, near Newcastle-under-Lyme.
April 30: Clark aud Hawley, solicitors, Longton, Staf-

GARRETT (Wm. H.), late of Glencairn-villas, Apsley-road
South Norwood, Surrey, and formerly of 109, Long-lane,
Bermondsey, Southwark. April 0; Geo. Tyler, 272,
Liverpool-road, Islington, Middlesex.

GOER (Henry, J. A.), formerly of the Crystal Palace Hotel,
Norwood, Surrey, late of Connaught House, Montpellier-
road, Brighton, Sussex, gentleman. May 11; R. and A.
Russell, solicitors, 59. Coleman street, London.
GRANDON (Wm.), Leicester, tanner. June 24; Dalton and
Salusbury, solicitors, Leicester.

HARRIS (Elizabeth, Baddesley Ensor, Warwick, widow,
May 15; Power and Armishaw, solicitors, Atherstone,
JOHNSON (John), Altrincham and Hale, Chester, timber
merchant. April 30; M. Fowden, solicitors, Altrincham,

JONES (John), formerly of Rownham, Clifton, late of Sion
Cottage, Cumberland-road, Bristol, gentleman. May 1;
Press and Inskip, solicitors, Small-street, Bristol.
KNIGHT Geo.), Perry Farm, Preston, next Wingham, Kent,
farmer. April 21; Surrage and Emmerson, solicitors,

LOGAN (John), formerly of The Maindee, near Newport,
Mons., afterwards of 11, Lansdown-crescent, Bath, con-
tractor of railways and public works. May 14; Thomas
M. Llewellin, solicitor, Newport, Mons.
MARKHAM (Arthur B.), Northampton, attorney-at-law.
April 6; Messrs. Markham, solicitors, Northampton.
MILLICHAP (Davia), Farnham, Surrey, coke, coal, salt, and
pottery merchant. April 18; Hollest and Mason, soli-
citors, West-street, Farnham, Surrey.

PEARCE (Kichard L.), 21, Glasshouse-street, Regent-street,
Middlesex, and San Remo, Italy, dealer in works of art.
April 28; T. F. Peacock, solicitor, 12, South-square,
Gray's Inn, London.

PENROSE (Elizabeth), Waterhouse-lane, Kingston-upon-
Hull, common brewer. May 1; Owst and Co., solicitors
Quay-chambers, Hull.

POLDEN (Wm.), Portsea, licensed victualler. April 30;
Edgcombe and Co., solicitors, Hants.

PORTER (Wm.), Twyford, Berks, draper and grocer. April
16; F. L. Soames, solicitor, 10, New Inn, Strand, Middle-


POINDER (Thomas H. A.), Upper Brook-street, Grosvenor-
square, Middlesex, and Hartham Park, and Hillmarton
Manor, Wilts, Esq. May 81: Burne and Parker, solici
tors, 1, Lincoln's-inn-fields, London.
Ross (Captain Geo. C.), in H. M.'s 5th Regiment of Foot.
April 13; Edward Norwood, solicitor, Charing, near
Ashford, Kent.

ROUTLEDGE (James), New Park-street, Southwark, and 12-
Manor-road, Forest-hill, Kent, wholesale chemist. May
14; Redpath and Holdsworth, solicitors, 23, Bush-lane.

SMITH (Naomi), Cherry Orchard, Shrewsbury, spinster.
May 1; H. T. and G. Ware, solicitor, Shrewsbury.
STANTON (Wm.), late of 19, Acacia road, formerly of 28,
Loudoun-road, St. John's Wood, Middlesex, and of Gold-
smith-street, London, commission agent. April 30; J. G.
Shearman, solicitor, 10 Gresham-street, London.
TANNER (Chas. Wm.), Ham Hail, Forest-gate, and of
Stratford, West Ham, Essex, coin and coal merchant.
May 1; Messrs. Hilieary, solicitors, 5. Fenchurch-build-
ings, Fenchurch-street, London.

TOWARD (John), Newcastle-upon-Tyne. June 1: Hodge
and Harle, solicitors, Wellington-place, Pilgrim-street.
TRYON (Anne F.), St. Martins, Stamford Baron, North-
ampton, spinster. May 2; J. Torkington, solicitor,

WEST (Rev. Chas.), 6, Langham-place, Northampton 30
rector of Kislingbary, near Northampton.

H. J. Godden, solicitor, 16%, Fenchurch-street, London.
WILLS (Henry M.), 2, Victoria-place, Greenhundred-road,
Peckham, Surrey, commercial travelier. May 1; Wm.
Sturt, solicitor. 14, Ironmonger-lane, London.
WRIGHT (Robert), 48, Cochrane terrace, Middlesex, builder.
April 27; J. Goren, solicitor, 29, South Moulton-street,
Oxford-street, London.

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Blackheath.-An improved Ground Rent of £39 16s. 6d. per annum, term 15 years-sold for £500

Clerkenwell.-An improved Ground Rent of £34 per annum, term 41 years-sold for £150.

Islington. The moiety of No. 163, Shepperton-road, term 34 year-sold for £65.

Bow-road.-The moiety of Nos. 1 to 3, Alfred-street, term 28 years-sold for £310.

An improved Ground Rent of £18 per annum, term 42 years -sold for £615.

Brixton-road.-Nos. 161 and 163, term 27 years-sold for


Brighton.-A moiety of No. 19, Devonshire-place, freehold
-sold for £155.

Nos. 10 and 13, New Steine, freehold-sold for £3620.
Mile-end-road-The conditional moiety of Nos. 303, 310, 312.
and 316-sold for £900.

Drury-lane.-Nos. 10 and 11, The Marquis of Granby, free-
hold-sold for £1560.

City.-Nos. 8 and 9, Aldgate, freehold-sold for £1340.
By Messrs. C. C. and T. MOORE.
Whitechapel.-The Blue Peter public house, copyhold-sold
for £1410.

Wellclose-square.-No. 11, St. George's-street, freehold-
sold for £805.

St. George's-in-the-East.-No. 12, Back Church-lane, freehold-sold for £585.

Commercial-road.-No. 11, King's-place and No. 1, Berners-
street, term 29 years-sold for £505.

No. 26, Greenfield-street, freehold-sold for £430.
No. 12, Charles-street, freehold-sold for £805.
Limehouse.-Freehold ground rent of £6 68. per annum-
sold for £130.

Freehold land with three honses-sold for £305.
Hackney-road.-No. 81, Margaret-street, term 5 years--sold
for £130.

Essex. Redbridge-lane, a plot of land 9a. Ir. sp., freehold-
sold for £60.

Bow road.-No. 5, Avenue-road, term 59 years-sold for £250.

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