£300. Fifty £10 shares (£6 paid) in Animal Charcoal Companysold for £262 108. Bethnal-green.-Nos. 9, 11, 18, and 15, Medway-road-term 76 years-sold for £720. Nos. 21, 23, and 25, Olga-street, same term-sold for £600. Friday, March 20. By Messrs. NORTON. TRIST, WATNEY, and Co., at the Mart. City. No. 77, Upper Thames-street, freehold - sold for £19,500. Wandsworth-rad.-Improved ground rent of £71 16s. per annum, terin 60 years-sold for £110. MAGISTRATES' LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. COMPULSORY LIABILITY OF LAND BY A CORPORATION SPECIAL ACT.-A Corporation, previously to applying to Parliament for a special Act, served the usual preliminary notice on A., a landowner, informing him that his property, or some part of it, might be required for the purposes of their undertaking. The schedule to the notice described his property by reference to the numbers on the deposited plans, and contained the following note: Property in the line of the proposed work, as at present laid out (including property any part of which is within eleven yards, or thereabouts, of the centre line of such proposed work, as delineated on the plan)." The special Act authorised the corporation to take such of the lands described on the deposited plans as they required for the purposes of their undertaking. The corporation then gave A. the usual notice to treat for a strip of land, thirty three yards wide, in the centre line of the proposed work, being part of the property comprised in the former notice. The whole of the strip was within the limits of deviation. Held, that the words eleven yards or thereabouts" in the preliminary notice, meant eleven yards, or so much more as might reasonably be required for the purposes of the undertaking, and did not limit the corpora tion to take eleven yards only on each side of the centre line; and that therefore they had power to take compulsorily the whole of the strip of land comprised in the notice to treat: (Corporation of Huddersfield v. Jacomb, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 78. V.C.M.) 86 RATING-OCCUPATION OF DOCKS AND SHEDS -PREFERENTIAL USE-POSSESSION OF DOCKS BOARD.-By the Mersey Docks Act Consolidation Act 1858, the dock board may appropriate docks, quays, or sheds to persons for the reception of their vessels and goods, provided they and their servants shall be subject to the regulations of the board; and the board may let such quays and sheds on such rents, terms, and conditions as they may deem expedient; but all persons employed shall be in the service of or approved by the board. By the Mersey Docks (Corporation Purchase) Act 1861, goods which have lain upon any quay or in any shed after a certain time, are liable, by way of penalty, to pay a rental per hour to the board. The appellants had appropriated to them, under the Act of 1858, certain docks, quays, and sheds; and the board fixed a charge per square yard per annum for the use of the shed space, such charge to commence from the date of occupation. This was a provisional agreement, and made during the pleasure of the board. When these appropriated premises were not actually in use by the appellants, they were, by direction of the board, and without appellant's consent, used by other vessels and their owners. The board's servants had access to all the premises. The goods of appellants were liable to the penal rent as well as those of other persons, and keys of some of the sheds were kept both by the appellants and the Customs' authorities. One of the appellants had used some ground within the dock property, as a coal depôt, for eighteen years. It was allotted to him for this purpose only and upon sufferance, he being bound to give it up at a week's notice; payment to be made for the use thereof at 1d. per square yard per week: Held, that the appellants were rateable for none of these premises: (Allan v. Liverpool Union. 30 L. T. Rep. N.S. 93. QB.) Canterbury Leeds BOROUGH QUARTER SESSIONS. When holden. Thursday, April 2. Thursday, April 9. Wednesday, April 8. Monday, April 13 Thursday, April 9. Friday, April 10.. Friday, July 10 Wednesday, April 1. Monday, March 30 Monday, April 6 Tuesday, March 31 Monday, April 13 Thursday, April 16 Thursday, April 9. Saturday, April 11 Recorder. Wm. T. Greenhow, Esq... Francis Barrow, Esq.... 8 days Thursday, April 2.. Wednesday, April 29 Tuesday, April 7 Robert John Biron, Esq. 8 days. Monday, April 13. Friday, April 10 Friday, April 10. Friday, April 10.. Friday, April 10.. Monday, April 13 REAL PROPERTY AND CONVEYANCING. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-PURCHASER FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE-LEGAL ESTATE OUTSTANDING.-The equitable doctrine that a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, who, at the time of purchase, gets nothing but an equitable title and afterwards has notice of an equitable interest, created prior to his purchase, may, nevertheless, get in a legal title and hold it as against such equitable interest, applies to a transferee under the Crown Lands Occupation Act 1861, of New South Wales. G., an occupier of lands in New South Wales, under promise of a lease from the Crown, being indebted to the appellants, gave them a transfer of his interest as security, which they neglected to register as required by the colonial statutes; he afterwards gave a transfer to the respondents, for a good consideration, without notice of the former incumbrance, they registered it and a lease was granted to them in accordance with the regulations in force in the colony. Held (affirming the judgment of the court below) that as the appellants had not made use of the documents of title they had obtained, they were entirely without any equity as against the statutory right of the respondents. Where a statute gave power to make regulations "for carrying it into full effect so as to provide for all proceedings, matters, and things arising under and consistent with the provisions thereof, and not therein expressly provided for;" held, that regulations admitted to be reasonable, and convenient, and not inconsistent with the Act, but which affected not only matters of form, but also matters of substance, were not ultra vires: (Blackwood v. The London Bank of Australia, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 45. Priv. C.) VENDOR AND PURCHASER-SALES OF LANDFARM-PARCHASER BOUND BY SPECIAL TERMS BETWEEN VENDOR AND TENANTS.-At the death of a landowner, three yearly tenants of his farms, on receiving from the defendants, trustees of his will, notice to quit when the tenancies should ex. pire at Michaelmas 1869, asserted that the testator had promised them leases, whereupon the defendants entered into an agreement with them, in which, after reciting the alleged promise, it was agreed that, on the expiration of their tenancies, the tenants should be allowed half a year's rent, and market value for their hay, straw, &c., whereas, by the custom of the country, fodder value only was payable. The estate was afterwards sold by the defendants to the plaintiff, under particulars of sale describing the farins by the full annual rent at which they were held, and giving the names of the tenants, but no mention of the agreement was made in the particulars or conditions of sale, or abstract of title, under the bona fide belief that it was unnecessary to allude to it; nor did the plaintiff become aware of the existence thereof until an interview with the tenants after the sale. At the expiration of these tenancies, the farmers claimed from the plaintiff for their hay, straw, &c., the fodder value, which much exceeded the market price, and he, meaning to keep the farms in hand, paid their demand, and sought to recover the amount so paid from the defendants in an action. Upon a special case: Held, that he took the estate subject to the existing rights of the tenants, and, therefore, the defendants were not liable: (Phillips v. Miller, 30 L. T. Rep. N.S. 61. C.P.) ACTION FOR PENALTY-3 & 4 WILL. 4, c. 90— POLLUTION OF WELL BY A GAS COMPANYLEAVE AND LICENCE. Where noxious matter percolates through the soil from gasworks, so as to foul a well, such percolation will render the defendants liable under the statute 3 & 4 Will. 4, Jno. Howard. c. 90, which imposes a penalty of £200 on any gas company, "who shall suffer any washings, &c., to be conveyed into any well." A well which, on account of its having become contaminated, has been disused by the owner for several years, and has been covered over, does not cease to be a well within the meaning of the Act. Non-user, and closing of his own well in consequence of its being polluted, even coupled with the acceptance by the plaintiff of the use of substituted wells of the defendants is not such an abandonment of the former as to alter its character and make it no longer a well, nor can any licence to pollute be inferred from such a state of facts. Quære per Keating, J. whether a man could by deed give an irrevocable licence to pollute a well. A prescription to foul a well will be defeated by variation and excess in the degree of fouling during the prescribed period. Where an Act of Parliament, making an act illegal, comes into running, semble, per Brett, J., that the prescripforce while the prescription to do that act is tion when acquired by due lapse of time will be an answer to an individual, suing as an individual, notwithstanding the statutory declaration (Millington v. Griffiths and others, 30 L. Tep. N. S. 65. C. P.) ANNUITY CHARGE-INCOME OR CORPUSARREARS-COSTS.-A testator, after giving an annuity of £500 to two annuitants for their lives and the life of the survivor, and directing the income of his residuary real and personal estate, after payment thereof, to be accumulated for a term of years, devised his real estate, after the determination of the term, subject, nevertheless, and charged with the payment of the annuity as if the same had been secured by a lease for years, to his nephew for life, with remainders over in tail. The payment of the annuity was allowed to fall into arrear. Held, that the arrears were payable out of the income and not out of the corpus of the estate, that the charge was not restricted to the income of any particular year, and that it would, if necessary for payment of the arrears, continue beyond the lives of the annuitants: (Taylor v. Taylor, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 49. V.C. H.) AGREEMENT TO LEASE-ABSENCE OF TITLE WITHOUT FAULT IN LESSOR-BUILDINGS COMPLETED-MEASURE OF LESSEE'S DAMAGES.Plaintiff and defendants, who occupied adjoining premises, had entered into an agreement, in pursuance of which defendants pulled down part of plaintiff's premises, erected new buildings on the site thereof for themselves, and derived substantial and permanent benefit from the agreement. They also, in pursuance of the agreement, made a passage and side entrance to his premises for the plaintiff, but other persons, whose land it was, shut up the passage, and rendered the entrance impossible. Defendants were in the bona fide belief, until after all these buildings were completed, that they were owners in fee simple in possession of the land on which they built the passage, and no negligence or want of due care could be imputed to them, nor to the plaintiff, for acting on that assumption. The agreement also provided that the defendants, within two months of the completion of the buildings, should execute a lease to the plaintiff of, amongst other land, that which formed the passage, and that the lease should contain covenants similar to those in an indenture of lease recited in the agreement, so far as the same were applicable. The said recited indenture contained, amongst others, the ordinary covenant for quiet enjoyment. Held, in an action upon the agreement, that Flureau v. Thornhill (2 Wm. Bl. 1078) did not apply to this case; that the agreement between the parties was absolute, although the covenant to be inserted in the lease, and to run with the land, was to be restricted to the usual form; aud that the plaintiff was entitled to the pecuniary amount of the difference between the present state of things, and what it would have been if the contract had been performed, and the plaintiff had got a title to this entrance: (Wall v. City of London Real Property Co., Limited, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 53. Q. B.) MARITIME LAW. SPECIMENS OF A CODE OF MARINE By F. O. CRUMP, Barrister-at-Law. (Continued from page 311.) AGENTS (OF INSURERS). AGENTS for insurance purposes are so by express authority or by implication. The appointment of an insurance agent may be by writing or orally, or impliedly by the course of business and correspondence between the principal and agent; and one is agent of another for whom he volunteers to act without any authority to do so, where such other recognizes his agency and ratifies his acts. Persons having implied Authority to insure. A partner to insure partnership property. NOTE. The firm will be liable to the broker for premiums and commissions. Hooper v. Lusby, 4 Camp. 66. NOTE-Semble, a special partnership for a particular adventure implies the authority of each partner to insure the partnership property. Arn. 4 edit. 147, citing Lindsay v. Gibbs, 4 Jur N. S., 779; on app. 28 L J. 692, Ch.; Green v. Briggs, 6 Hare, 395; Alerander v. Simms, 23 L. J. 721, Ch. Philips, sect. 1852. A consignee making advances. Wolff v. Horncastle, 1 B. & P. 316; Carruthers v. Shedden, 6 Taunt. 14; Smith v. Lascelles, 2 T. Rep. 187; Crawfurd v. Hunter, 8 T. Rep. 23. See Ebsworth v. The Alliance Marine Insurance Company, L. Rep. 8 C. P. 596 (in which the court were divided as to the right of consignees under advances to insure an entire cargo in their own names, and to recover as trustees beyond their own interest for the consignors). A general agent of a foreign principal having uncontrolled and unassisted management of the business: 2 Duer. 111, 113. A master (or supercargo) (a), where the position of the subject matter raises the implication: Arn., 4th edit., p. 149, citing Crawfurd v. Hunter, 8 T. Rep. 23; (a) per Jones, J., in De Forrest v. Fulton Fire & M. Ins. Co. 1 Hall, 84. A merchant returning a consign rent as in excess of order has authority to insure as agent of the consignor : Cornwall v. Wilson, 1 Ves. Sen. 511. A prize agent as such : Stirling v. Vaughan, 11 East, 619. An agent fully empowered by owners of ship and cargo captured as prize to protect their interests in a foreign court and "to forward the ship: Robertson v Hamilton, 14 East, 522; 2 Duer. 101, 102. An agent who undertakes to insure, or, being a person to whom application would naturally be made, being applied to and not declining so to act: Smith v. Lascelles, 2 T. Rep. 187; 1 Emerig. 148, c. 5, 8. 87. Persons not having implied Authority. Part owners. Naked consignees and agents for procuring consignments. Ship's husband, merely as such. Insurance being made by a person acting voluntarily without instructions or order from the party interested for whom the policy is intended, will, if it is ratified by the latter, be available to him. Phillips, sect. 1868. Ratification may be proved by adoption of the policy or be inferred from surrounding circum stances: French v. Backhouse, 5 Burr. 2227; Robinson v. Gleadow, 2 Bing. N. C. 156; Lindsay v. Gibbs, 4 Jur. N. S. 779, 28 L. J. 692, Ch.; Routh v. Thompson, 13 East. 274; Lucena v. Craufurd, 2 B. & P. N. R. 269; Barlow v. Leckie, 4 J. B. Moore 8. Knowledge of the insurance having been made is necessary to an effectual ratification, and if a general order to insure is given before the unauthorised insurance is made, but not received until afterwards, that would not amount to a ratification: Bell v. Janson, 1 M. &. S. 201. Story on Agency, 119, 150; Wallace v. Tellfair, 2 T. Rep. 188, in notis; Hurrell v. Bullard, 3 F. & F. 445. Clear, precise, and intelligible directions must be followed as far as they are lawful. Glaser v. Cowie, 1 M. & S. 52. An agent who has faithfully followed express written instructions is not liable for omitting a provision which, from the verbal communications of his principal, he might fairly have inferred to be necessary. Fomin v. Orel, 3 Camp. 357. There is a binding obligation on the agent. (b) When he undertakes for reward. (2) When he voluntarily undertakes and does some. thing in performance. (3) When he has in his hands effects of his foreign correspondent, or funds are remitted for the purpose to a commission merchant or insurance broker. 2 Duer, 125. (4) When be has been accustomed in the course of dealing to insure for his correspondent. NOTE. Unless he has well grounded information that the correspondent is insolvent. 2 Duer, 124. (5) When he accepts bills of lading, accompanied by an order to insure as an implied condition. Arn.. 4th edit., 155. (6) When it is the usage of the particular trade to which his agency and the insurance relate that he should insure. 2 Duer, 127, 128. Total failure to fulfil such obligation (without notice) subjects the agent to an action for all the from the non-insurance: loss which his correspondent may have sustained Sinith v. Lascelles, 2 1. R. 187; 2 Duer, 120. Notice of refusal to act as agent, inability to procure insurance on terms named, or of difficulties delaying the insurance, should be given to the principal within a reasonable time. Corlett v. Gordon, 3 Camp. 472; Arn, 4th edit. 157; A policy broker is bound to know- (1) What is material to be communicated to Seller v. Work, 1 Marsh Ins., 305; 2 Duer, 202, 203; (2) All the formal details necessary to make (3) The clauses essential to be inserted in a 6 Taunt. 495. If by failing to communicate material facts, or to make the policy valid by attention to details, or to insert essential clauses, the insurance is avoided or insufficient, he is liable to his principal for the loss. The practice being unsettled, and the law uncertain, the mistake of the agent affords no evidence of the want of reasonable skill and ordinary diligence: 2 Duer, 214. NOTE-A general order to insure seems to be satisfied by an insurance in the form in general use at the place to which the order refers; but reasonable diligence must be used to obtain the best terms. Combes v. Anderson, 1 Camp. 523; Moore v. Mourgue Cowp. 479; 2 Duer, 231. The question whether reasonable and proper care, skill, and judgment, broker exercised is one of evidence in each particular case. NOTE. It would seem that the evidence of skilled witnesses is admissible as to the construction of facts otherwise proved, or inferences to be made And he is entitled to make the same deductions as the underwriters: Harding v. Carter, 1 Marsh Ins. 309; Delany v. Stoddart, 1 T. R. 22; Wilkinson v. Coverdale, 1 Esp. 75; Glaser v. Cowie, 1 M. & S. 52. If the principal puts himself in communication with his agent and is in accord with him in what he does, or neglects to do, he cannot recover against his agent any damage that ensues: Anderson v. The Royal Exchange Assurance Company, The agent may be made liable not only for such loss as would be recoverable against the underwriter, but beyond, ex. gr. for the costs of a previous action on the policy brought with his concurrence, or brought without his concurrence but defeated by some misconduct of his in effecting the insurance not disclosed to the principal until action brought: 2 Duer. 330; Seller v. Work, 1 Marsh. 1ns. 305. Losses irrecoverable against underwriters paid by them without suit but voluntarily refunded, may be recovered against the agent: Maydew v. Forrester, 5 Taunt. 615 (concealment by the agent of certain material letters). Semble, if the principal seeks to recover from the agent for a constructive total loss he must abandon to the agent : 2 Duer. 326-7. II. After effecting Insurance. The agent retaining possession of the policy is bound: To enforce the rights and protect the interests of his principal in all matters arising out of the contract. 2 Duer, 245; Richardson v. Anderson, 1 Camp. 43n; Goodson v. Brooke, 4 Camp. 163; Xenos v. Wickham. 33 L. J., 13, 21 C. P. (Blackburn, J.) This includes: Demanding return of premium; Giving notice of abandonment;(a) Preparing and submitting proof of loss; settling amount, receiving same and handing it over to his principal. (b) (a) Jardine v. Leathley, 3 B. & S. 700; (b) Bousfield v. Cresswell, 2 Camp. 545. Cancellation of Policy. The agent can only cancel a policy by express authority of his principal. Xenos v. Wickham, 14 C. B., N. S., 452; L. Rep. 2 H. of L. 296. COUNTY COURTS. THE DERBYSHIRE COUNTY COURTS. TRANSFER OF MR. RUSSELL, Q.C. AT the Derby County Court, on Saturday week, it being understood that the judge (Geo. Russell, Esq.), who has been appointed to the Kent County Court in the room of the late Mr. Scott, would sit for the last time, there was a very large ateendance of members of the legal profession and laymen having business connections with the court The Deputy Judge (Jno. Huish, Esq.) and John Bailey, Esq., J.P., were also present, and occupied seats upon the Bench. At the conclusion of the ordinary business, which was of an uninteresting character, Mr. Leech, addressing the learned judge, said that his Honour would doubtless be somewhat surprised at the large assemblage of professional gentlemen which he saw before him, but that fact need not cause any alarm, as the business of the court had been concluded, and his legal brethren and himself were there in the performance of a bounden duty. The case which was just over, human probability, which he (the learned judge) was, he deeply regretted to say, the last, in all would ever hear in that court. The announcement of his Honour's retirement from this County County circuit, to undertake the duties of another, had come upon his legal brethren and himself by surprise, or perchance, the acknowledgement of respect and gratitude which it devolved upon himself to tender to his Honour on their behalf, might have assumed a more tangible and permanent shape than mere words. Such, however, had not been the case, and it only, therefore, remained for him to say that though they deeply deplored his Honour's removal, they ventured to hope that the step he was about to take would lead to that still higher promotion, in a legal sphere, to which they all felt he was so deservedly entitled. (Applause.) It was now precisely seven years since his Honour came amongst them as an entire stranger, and during the period of time which had since elapsed he (the Judge) had heard and adjudicated upon as many as 6000 plaints per annum, in the Derby Court alone, and those, exclusive of cases remitted to his Honour by the Superior Courts, and a vast amount of other business belonging to other departments of the law, and in which the best interests of society were deeply involved. In the mass of common law cases which had been disposed of by his Honour-42,000 in all, there had been very few new trials indeed, so few that His HONOUR, who was visibly affected, said that he should be a very different man to what he was if he had been able to have heard unmoved the words which Mr. Leech had addressed to him, or if he could have witnessed unmoved the unmistakably hearty manner in which they had been received by those around him. He (Mr. Russell) had been indebted for many past favours to the gentlemen of the press whom he saw present that day; but one favour more he trusted that they would extend to him-viz., by embalming those words which Mr. Leech had just uttered, in order that he (Mr. Russell) might preserve them as a record of the feelings of that gentleman and of those on behalf of whom he spoke-a record of the deepest possible value to him, as being the sentiments of those towards himself, whose good opinion he most highly prized. As Mr. Leech re BROMPTON COUNTY COURT. Wednesday, March 18. (Before Mr. Serjeant WHEELER.) DAKIN V. LLOYD. ation. THIS was an action to recover £17 2s. 6d. for Tabor appeared as counsel for the plaintiff. In support of plaintiff's case a witness named Rae was called, who described himself as assistant to Messrs. Graves, of Talbot-road, auctioneers, and deposed that he made a valu ation of the damages complained of, and that £16 18. 6d. was fair, reasonable, and proper. Davies cross-examined as to the data on which his evidence was given, when the witness read from a memorandum book a list of items, which being cast up amounted to £8 10s. only, for which sum, with £1 1s. for the rate, judgment was given. On the application of Davies the Judge ordered the expenses of the witness Rae to be disallowed. MARKET DRAYTON COUNTY COURT. (Before W. SPOONER, Esq., Judge.) HICKMAN V. THE GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY. Negligence as carriers-Liability-Goods sent at · Pearson, of Market Drayton, appeared for the plaintiff. Moore, of 2, Furnival's-inn, London, for the company. Pearson said that the facts were admitted, and were, that on the 29th Nov. last the plaintiff's agent, at Yarmouth, sent to him at Market Drayton 10 pads of fish, they were not tendered to him until the 8th Dec., and then were in such a bad condition that he declined to accept them. He now sought to recover the value of the fish from the company. herrings for 7d. The company sold the minded them, it was now seven years since he well." Moore admitted the delay, but said that the sender of the fish had signed a consignment note on which was printed the following condition: "That in consideration of the company carrying the fish at a lower rate than their ordinary rate, they should be relieved from all liability, and forwarded solely at the risk of the owner, with the exception that the company should be liable for any wilful act or default of their servants if proved," &c. Ho contended that this was a good and reasonable contract, and protected the company. That the burden of proving wilful negligence was upon the plaintiff. He quoted the cases of McCawley v. The Furness Railway Company and Glenister v. The Great Western Railway in support of his contention. After hearing Pearson in reply, lieved the company from liability, and gave NORWICH COUNTY COURT. (Before W. H. COOKE, Esq., Q.C., Judge.) Consequential damages-Too remote. THIS was an action brought to recover the sum of £50 damages for loss arising out of the alleged negligence and delay of the company in forwarding a quantity of nets and hurdles from Norwich to Lakenheath in November last. Carlos Cooper, of the Norfolk circuit, instructed by Stanley, of Norwich, appeared for the plaintiff. E. Moore, of London, for the company. The company had paid into court 7s., but disputed the remainder of the claim. The plaintiff had purchased a lot of turnips at Feltwell to be eaten off the ground by sheep, which it was necessary to protect by netting and hurdles ; and having been told that if he sent them off from Norwich one day they would arrive at Lakenheath the following day, they were duly delivered over to the com pany's servants at Thorpe on the 12th Nov. On the Monday previous (the 10th) the plaintiff's man commenced his journey with twenty score sheep, and arrived at Feltwell on the 12th, but on going to the station at Lakenheath he found that the nets and hurdles had not arrived. In consequence of this the sheep had to be put where there was insufficient food, and it was not until several days after that the hurdles were delivered to the plain tiff, they having been by mistake sent to Fakenham. The result was that the sheep became depreciated in value, for which the plaintiff claimed £40. He also claimed the further sum of £9 13s. for hiring other hurdles, for money he had expended in food for the sheep, and for expenses incurred by him in going to look after the sheep, and the sum of 7s. for the man's journey to Lakenheath to fetch the hurdles. For the defence Moore said that the facts were not disputed, but the company admitted liability to the extent of 78., which amount had been paid into court, that the plaintiff might possibly be entitled to that amount, as he had made a useless journey to the station to meet the hurdles. As to the remainder of the claim he contended that, as the company had not notice, at the time of delivery of the hurdles at Norwich, that they were intended for any special purpose, the plaintiff could not recover, the damages claimed being consequential and too remote. The company never knew or supposed for what purpose the hurdles were required. His HONOUR said that there had been undoubted negligence by the defendants, but there was no contemplation in the mind of the parties at the time the truck was hired as to the liability of the company for the depreciation in value of the sheep by its non-arrival at the period under stood. Hence the damages claimed were too remote. He suggested that he should enter the verdict for 21s., besides the amount paid into court, as the plaintiff had been a loser by the delay, but to this Moore strongly objected. His Honour said he had no alternative but to give judgment to the defendants, but without costs. Moore pressed his Honour to allow the company their costs, as by not oing so it was holding out an inducement to the public to bring vexatious and frivolous actions against the company, as they knew that even if the company won their cases, they would be put to little or no expense, but his Honour would not allow the company any costs. Verdict for defendants without costs. OSWESTRY COURT OF RECORD. (Before F. R. KENYON, Esq. Q C.) County Courts and Courts of Record. GEORGE BENNION, brewer and innkeeper, Oswes. try, sued Richard Jones, butcher and grazier, also of this town, for £1 33., the price of half a barrel of ale, purchased by defendant from plaintiff. E. Jones, solicitor, appeared for the plaintiff, Rowland Venables, instructed by W. I. Bull, was for the defence. Jones having briefly opened the case, proceeded to examine Mr. Bennion: You are the plaintiff in this case, are you not ?-Yes. Did you serve Richard Jones with a half barrel of ale in January 1871 ?-Yes. What was the price at which it was charged? -23s. Did he order it himself?-Yes. And you delivered it to him?-Yes; that is, my man delivered it. The RECORDER: You mean you directed your waggoner to deliver it ?—Yes. Examination by Jones continued: Where did the defendant live then ?-In the Castle Fields, in this town. Do you know in what position the defendant is? -He is a master butcher, and has a lot of property of his own. The RECORDER: Where was your place of business?-In Willow-street, in this town. It was there you sold the article to him? Have you applied to him for payment?-Yes, many times. What answer did he make to your application? He only promised to pay. Cross-examined by Venables: I suppose you sell a good many casks in the course of a year or two?-No, not so many. When did you first apply for payment ?-At the end of six months. Had you ever occasion to summon anyone before? Yes, once. And in what court did you summon him?-In the County Court. And why did you not summons this man there? -It was too much trouble. Did you not want your money ?-Yes. And why did you not summons him in the County Court? You know it sits every month.Yes, I am aware of that. And as you wanted your money why did you not go to the County Court ?-I thought it would be less trouble. The RECORDER.-This court sits every week. Venables. I did not know that, your Honour. Bull. For trial of issues every three months. Venables (continuing).-Did you instruct your attorney to apply for a summons in this court?Yes. Then you intended to have the action tried in this court ?-Yes. Will you swear you did not say you wanted to go to the County Court ?-No. Did the defendant ever offer to pay you ?-No, or I should soon have taken it. Did you ever hear he offered to pay your attorney?-No, although he promised most faithfully. Jones was going to call a witness to prove the delivery of the ale, but Venables said he would admit this, which concluded the case for the plaintiff. Venables called Richard Jones, the defendant, who said he was a butcher and grazier in the borough of Oswestry.-Can you tell me when you were served with that writ (produced) ?—I cannot exactly tell you. Look at the date it was issued, 13th Nov. 1873, and now can you tell me?-I cannot exactly. What did you do when you were served ?Three or four days after I took the £1 163. 4d.£1 3s. for the account, and 13s, 4d. for the summons-to Mr. Jones, and he would not receive it. Did you see Mr. Jones at the office ?- He was not in the office, and I took it to the shop. He said he could not take it, as he did not know what the expenses were. Cross-examined by Jones.-You say that three or four days after you had the writ you asked me to take the money ?-Yes. You never had anything else but the writ, no notice of declaration ?—No, no. You swear you were never served with a notice of declaration ?-I was never served with it. Bull. He does not know what a notice of declaration is. We will put them in. Jones.-Will you swear that it was not on the 19th Nov. you saw me?-I will swear I saw you, but I cannot tell when. Will you swear you did not go to Mr. Bull that day or the day after ?-I went to Mr. Bull the very same day. That was the first time ?-It was the first time I went to him in respect to this matter. And it was the same day you said you offered the money to me ?-The same day. Venables, in addressing the court for the defence, said-As I need hardly tell you after my crossexamination of the plaintiff, we really admit the debt, and the only reason we have fought it today is on account of the expense of the costs. There is a court-the County Court-formed for the speedy recovery of small debts, and in this court the expenses are made less than in the superior court. This debt is a small one-£1 3s. -and if the case had been tried in the County Court I believe I am right in saying the costs would have amounted to only 5s., whereas having come here, where they are on a higher scale, the costs will be nearly £10. There is another reason why the case should not have been brought here, and that is, that it is hardly fair to trouble men like you (the jury) to come here, when it might have been heard at the County Court. If the plaintiff were anxious for his money-and you heard him state he applied for it often, and he seemed rather cross over it-why could he not have gone to the County Court?-he would have got his money there in December. We pleaded we did not owe the money. The RECORDER.-You pleaded you were not indebted. Venables.-Yes, we were obliged to plead to raise the question of costs. The RECORDER.-You might have paid the money into court. Venables. And then the plaintiff might have taken it out and taxed his costs. letter, but afterwards remarked, "I daresay it is somewhere about the house." He said he would not pay the money, he would rather go into the court; and I said, "I will not deceive you. I will sue you in the borough court, and the cost of the summons will be 13s. 4d." He took no notice until the notice of declaration was served, and I say he is to blame for the costs being incurred. Venables. All I can say is, is this or the County Court the proper place for the action? I submit it is a question for the County Court, and if we admitted our debt it was all the more reason to go there. It is simply an action for costs, and I say that it ought to have been brought in the court where the costs would have been on a lower scale. The plaintiff would have been at liberty to take out the money and tax his costs here had we paid the money into court. The County Court Act seems to go against his case, for while, perhaps, in the case of a larger amount-£10, £20, or £30-this might be cheaper than the County Court-it is much more expensive for small cases of £1, and I do not think a precedent should be made for bringing such cases here when there is a County Court for them at an inexpensive cost. The RECORDER.-I think the case is a fit one to be brought into this court, and I have no difficulty in certifying for costs. Ample opportunity has been given for the payment of the money, as it was due in 1871, and it is now 1874. The money has been due three years, and the defendant might even have paid it under the terms of the writ of this court when summoned. He did not, however, and it therefore became necessary for the plaintiff to proceed to a notice of declaration, which was rot served until the 20th. The defendant pleads he never was indebted, which is a denial of the debt, and has brought the matter here to be tried. In February an endeavour was made by summons to stay proceedings upon payment of the debt and 28. for costs, being the costs which would have been charged for a County Court summons, but really you would not have me for a moment suppose that it was the intention of the Legislature to allow this to go on and after costs had been incurred here to let the defendant get off by paying 2s. for costs. It was assing the Registrar to do what neither he nor any registrar conid do. I think upon the whole the defendant has brought the matter upon himself and that to apply the Act in the way i have been asked to do was never intended. Costs having been certified for accordingly, his Honour thanked the jury for their attendance, and they departed thence until further summoned." SHOREDITCH COUNTY COURT. Monday, March 16. (Before J. DASENT, Esq., Judge). MICHAEL POLLESTRINI V. THE GREAT Railway company-Carriers of goods-Liability. EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY. THIS was an action brought by the plaintiff to recover the sum of £8, in consequence of the nondelivery at Christmas of some poultry and wine, and raised the question as to consequential damages. Fulcher appeared for the plaintiff. Moore (of 2, Furnival's-inn) for the defendants. From the evidence of the plaintiff and his witnesses, it appeared that on the 23rd Dec. last he had sent to him from Norwich a quantity of poultry and wine, and that the hamper contain The RECORDER read the writ, which set forth the amount claimed, and that if the money were paid within a certain number of days "furthering proceedings would be stayed," and said: If you had paid it, further proceedings would have been stayed accordingly. Venables. We were obliged to plead, or judgment would have been signed for default and the costs taxed. I am only arguing about the costs, for it is only a question of that. The RECORDER.-What have the jury to do with costs? They have simply to decide the question of the debt. Venables.-We admit the debt. The RECORDER then briefly directed the jury to find for the plaintiff for the amount claimed, which they at once did. Jones. It would appear by the 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142, that your Honour has to certify for costs before they can be allowed, and that, as I understand, seems to have been the principal objection to the action. I never dreamt, when the action was commenced, however, that any defence would be offered, as the defendant had admitted the debt to me over and over again. Venables. It is the 29th section of the Act; but I shall certainly oppose the application. The RECORDER. Of course, I shall hear you before I decide. Jones-I warned the defendant before I issued the summons what I would do. I made an application for the money in October, and he took no notice. I met him in the street, and asked him about it, and he said he had never received my the goods was delivered in Norwich at the company's station at about quarter to 10 that even. ing. The hamper was forwarded by the mail train the same evening, which ordinarily arrives in London at about half-past 4 the following morning. The hamper, however, did not arrive at the plaintiff's house, which is at Bow, until twenty minutes to 2 on Christmas Day. The plaintiff then refused to have it, saying that he wanted the goods for his Christmas dinner, and as they had not arrived sooner he had bought some more. He claimed £3 14s. 7d., the amoun he paid for the poultry and wine at Norwich, and also £4 5s. 5d. for the eatables he had to buy to supply the place of those ordered from Norwich. In cross-examination by Moore, the plaintiff stated that although he had intended to have the contents of the hamper for his dinner on Christmas day, he could not tell what was in the hamper. Moore, for the defence, contended that, as the plaintiff's claim was for goods which he expected at a certain time, and for a certain purpose, he could not recover the amount he claimed, unless he proved that the company had entered into a special contract to deliver the hamper by that time, and quoted the cases of Lord v. The Midland, and Taylor v. The Great Northern Railway Company. That the company would only be liable if there had been unreasonable delay in carrying the hamper. He would show by evidence that owing to the enormous pressure of the Christmas traffic, the company used their best endeavours to deliver the hamper at the earliest moment possible, considering the increase and press of traffic. He had several other points to raise and argue, but the learned Judge stopped him and said that he thought the defence was a good one, and that the plaintiff was wrong in refusing to accept the hamper, the company having had no notice given to them that the goods were intended for any special purpose. His HONOUR asked Fulcher if he had anything further to say, but as he had not, the plaintiff was non-suited, costs being allowed for the defendants' witnesses and attorney. Plaintiff nonsuited. WANDSWORTH COUNTY COURT. Robins for the respondent. His HONOUR delivered judgment in the following terms: On the 1st Dec. 1873 execution was levied on goods upon premises occupied by the execution debtor for £56 11s. 4d., debt and costs in the above action, and on the 2nd Dec. notice was given to the bailiff by the claimant's agent that the goods seized were the property of the claimant, a money lender, under a bill of sale dated the 25th Jan. 1872, duly registered. The bailiff inquired of the claimant's agent what sum of money was due on the bill of sale, but the latter refused to give him any information. The goods were valued at £116 158., and the claimant paid into court £62 9s. 10d., being the debt and costs (£56 11s. 4d.) and expenses of levy (£5 18s. 6d.), and was let into possession of all the goods. The money was paid to the bailiff by the claimant in the presence of the execution debtor, and the latter actually borrowed £3 of the bailiff to make up the amouut, and handed it to the claimant. The sum was subsequently repaid by the execution debtor to the bailiff. These circumstances are in themselves very suspicious. On the 16th Dec. an interpleader summons issued returnable on the 6th Jan. The hearing of the interpleader summons was postponed, partly by consent and partly through the accidental default of the claimant, until the 20th of Jan. when it appeared for the first time that the sum of £25 only was due on the bill of sale (£19 for principal and £6 for expenses), and that the bill of sale had been originally given as a security for £50, advanced at the date thereof and any further advances not exceeding £250 and interest. At the hearing an order was made by consent that the same should be adjourned to the 3rd Feb., that the bailiff should in the meantime sell the goods in the possession of the claimant and pay the costs of the levy, the claimant's demand of £25, the execution creditor's debt, and costs of £56 11s. 4d, and the balance to the judgment debtor. Of course, if this order had been carried out, the sum of £62 9s. 10d. deposited in court would, on the adjourned hearing, have been ordered to be paid to the claimant, and there would have been an end of the matter. But, unfortunately, this was not the case. The bailiff proceeded on the same day, and almost immediately on the order being made, on the premises, and found that the claimant or his agent had allowed the execution debtor to take posses sion of all the goods, and that the execution debtor had barricaded the premises and refused possession to the bailiff. The latter applied to the claimant to assist him in getting possession, but he refused to do so. The summons came on again for hearing on the 3rd Feb., and was again adjourned by consent to the 3rd March, in order to give the parties an opportunity to come to some arrangement. No arrangement, however, was come to, and on the 3rd March the claimant applied for a verdict in accordance with his claim, and for an order for the payment to him of the money deposited in court. It then appeared that the judgment debtor had made away with a considerable portion of the goods, amounting in round numbers to one-half of the whole in value, and that the claimant had regained possession of the remaining goods of the like value. The counsel for the execution creditor suggested that the case ought to be decided in the same way as if the order of the 20th Jan. by consent had not been made, to which the counsel for the claimant assented. If this view were correct I think it would follow that as the claimant at that time appeared to have had a valid claim under his bill of sale, although only for £25, that he was then entitled to the possession of the goods, and also to the return of his deposit of £6298. 10d. But, on consideration, I do not think that this view is correct. The order made by consent between the parties, the failure of that order through the act of the claimant or his agent in giving possession of the goods to the execution | them, had, previously to the institution of the To BANKRUPTCY LAW. BRADFORD COUNTY COURT. Secured creditors-Proof. North (North and Son, Leeds) opposed. |