the event of the debtor becoming bankrupt within twelve months from the date of the sale by the sheriff: (Ex parte Villars; Re Rogers, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 104. Chan.)

BANKRUPTCY-RE-HEARING-CONTRARY DECISION BY COURT OF APPEAL SINCE ORIGINAL HEARING. On the 15th March 1873, the Court of Bankruptcy made an order declaring, amongst other things, that the mortgagees of certain leaseholds had a valid charge on the trade fixtures comprised in their mortgage as against the trustee under the liquidation of the mortgagor, although the deed had not been registered under the Bills of Sale Act. On the 25th July 1873, the Court of Appeal in another case decided that an assign. ment of trade fixtures included in a mortgage of leaseholds to which they were attached, required to be registered under the Bills of Sale Act. The 28th July 1873, and gave notice of motion for a re-hearing of their case on the 21st Nov. 1873: Held (reversing the decision of one of the Registrars) that they were not entitled to a re-hearing. Quare, whether a re-hearing would have been granted to them, if they had given notice within twenty-one days of the time when they became aware of the decision effecting a change in the law: (Ex parte Brown; Re Jeavons, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 108. Chan.)

Croome for plaintiff. Smythe for defendant.

His HONOUR.-The plaintiff in the present case (referred to this court from the Court of Exchequer) is the father or administrator of Sarah Maddison, who lost her life through the neglect of the defendant in leaving an excavation or area for a house in course of erection in a highway open and unprotected by any railing or fence. He has sued the defendant under the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, commonly called "Lord Camp. bell's Act," for damages, such action being for the benefit of himself and wife, as parents of the deceased. There was no defence to the

action, and the only question was as to the amount of damages. The plaintiff in his particu lars claimed £200 for loss of an allowance made by deceased for support of her parents, for loss of goods and wearing apparel (presents received by her parents from time to time), and for funeral and other expenses. It appeared by the evidence that the deceased was a domestic servant, and out of her wages allowed her parents about 10s. a month, say £6 a year, and occasionally made them other presents of goods and wearing apparel. With regard to the allowance it was admitted that the plaintiff was entitled to damages for actual or probable pecuniary loss, but not according to annuity tables, although, after all, such tables must form the only basis of calculation in the present and in most cases subject to whatever deductions ought to be made in respect of the circumstances of each case. In the present case I think that the loss of the parents in respect of the allowance may be fairly estimated at £30. There was little evidence as to the nature or value of the presents made by the deceased to her parents, but I think that there should be some addition in respect of them, and I fix the sum at £5. The counsel for the plaintiff also contended that in estimating the damages the sufferings of the deceased ought also to be considered, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the same damages as the deceased herself could have done in this respect, and cited the case of Armsworth v. The South Western Railway Company (11 Jur. 758), but on reference to that case and the other numerous casea collected in Fisher's Digest, 6089, tit. Negligence," I find no authority for such a proposition, and that it is, on the contrary, clearly laid down, that compensation can be given to the relatives named in the Act only for pecuniary losses, including reasonable expectations of pecuniary advantage from the relative remaining alive. As to the amount of damages which I have given, I observe that in the case Franklin v. South Eastern Railway Company (3 H. & N. 211) it was held, that £75 was excessive damages for the loss by a father, through the death of his son, of 3s. 6d. a week, say £9 a year; but the father appears to have been an old man, and the parents of the deceased in the present case are middle-aged. The claim for funeral expenses was properly with. drawn.

Verdict for the plaintiff for £35, with costs.

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

MARRIED WOMAN-DEBTS CONTRACTED BEFORE MARRIAGE - BANKRUPTCY - MARRIED WOMAN'S PROPERTY ACT 1870 (33 & 34 VICT. c. 93), s. 12.-A married woman who has no property belonging to her for her separate use is not fiable, under the 12th section of the Married Woman's Property Act 1870, to be made bankrupt. Quare, whether a married woman who has property belonging to her for her separate use is so liable: (Ex parte Holland; Re Henage, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 106. Chan.)

BANKRUPTCY-"DEBTS DUE TO HIM IN THE COURSE OF HIS TRADE OR BUSINESS."-Bankers' 'marginal notes" (which are contracts that the bankers giving them will pay the amounts represented by them whenever they receive intelligence that the bills, in respect of the discount of which they retain the amounts represented by the marginal notes, have been paid) are not "debts due" to the trader "in the course of his trade or busiwithin the order and disposition clause (s. 15 sub-sect. 5) of the Bankruptcy Act 1869: (Ex parte Kemp; Re Fastnedge, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 109. Chan.)

ness

EXECUTION CREDITOR-PAYMENTS TO SHERIFF BEFORE LEVY-ACCEPTANCE BY CREDITORS IN PART PAYMENT BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCYPRESSURE-BANKRUPTCY ACT 1869, ss. 6, 87.A judgment debtor, to avoid execution. paid part of the judgment-debt to the sheriff's officer. Two days after making this payment, the debtor filed a petition for liquidation, and notice of this was at once served on the sheriff's officer. The day before the petition was filed, the execution creditor told the sheriff's officer that he consented to accept the money paid by the debtor in part payment of his debt, but the payment was not made by the sheriff's officer till two days after the filing of the petition: Held, that there had been no seizure by the sheriff within the meaning of the 5th sub-section of the 6th section, or of the 87th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1869; that there was sufficient pressure by the creditor to support the payment, and that the creditor was entitled to retain the money paid to him by the sheriff's officer. Decision of the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy reversed on fresh evidence, that the creditor had, before the filing of the petition, consented to accept the money paid to the sheriff's officer in part payment of his debt: (Ex parte Brooke; Re Hassall, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 103. Chan.)

a

DEBTOR'S SUMMONS DEBT COVERED BY GARNISHEE ORDERS-ACT OF BANKRUPTCY BANKRUPTCY ACT 1869, s. 6, SUB-SECT 6 AND SECT. 7.-The words in the 6th sub-section of the 6th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, which render neglect to "secure or compound for debt exceeding £50, for which a debtor's summons has been served, an act of bankruptcy, mean to secure or compound for it to the satisfaction of the creditor. An adjudication of bankruptcy founded on neglect to comply with a debtor's summons issued in respect of a debt exceeding £50 is valid, although the creditor has obtained garnishee orders to an amount exceeding his debt: (Ex parte Tupper; Re Tupper, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 102. Chan.)

debtor of a certain horse to Mr. Edward Doust, corn factor of Tonbridge, shortly before the date and filing of the debtor's petition, was not a valid sale, and that it was fraudulent and void as against the trustee of the debtor. The trustee now moved that the said horse was his property as trustee, and that the purchase money retained by Mr. Doust, in part satisfaction of a debt to him from the debtor, belonged to and formed part of property of debtor, and that such purchase money should be paid by Mr. Doust to the claimant as trustee.

The trustee was represented by A. Lumley Smith, instructed by Stenning, of Tonbridge, and Mr. Doust, by his solicitor, Palmer.

Smith, in stating the circumstances, desired particular attention to be paid to dates, which were very material. On the 18th April 1873, an agreement was come to between the parties whereby this horse, the property of Mr. Everest, was transferred to Mr. Doust. He believed the horse had been offered to Mr. Doust previously, but the gentleman said he had no use for it, and would not have it. But on the 18th April he took it, and unless it could be shown that there was some pressure put by Mr. Doust upon Mr. Everest, it would be nothing more nor less than a fraudulent preference, and came within the 92nd section of the Act. He should prove that pressure had not been put on Mr. Everest by Mr. Doust, and he called the debtor, who said, that on the At the previous Christmas he was indebted to 26th April 1873, he filed a petition for liquidation. Mr. Doust in the sum of £14 odd, and further debts were incurred. Prior to the 18th April he had several letters written him by Mr. Doust, asking him for payment of the account, but those letters he had destroyed, because he did not like to have them about the house. On the 18th April an action was brought against him by Mr. Charlton for £130 odd; a writ was issued and served upon him. The same day he saw Mr. Doust, and arranged for the transfer of the horse in part payment of his claim. At first he said he did not want the horse. He knew Mr. Doust well as a friend. Mr. Doust wrote off £26 9s. 10d., and lent witness £10 the next day. When the horse was transferred no money was paid. He had been pressed by Messrs. Punnett for money previous to the 18th April. He owed them something like £60. At this stage of the proceedings Mr. Doust was called upon to produce his letter book, but he said he kept no copies of the notes he had sent to Mr. Everest by

his man.

In answer to Mr. Palmer, Everest said that all he had stated to the court he mentioned at the meeting of creditors, which was held in the month of May of last year. The last letter he had from Mr. Doust was pressing him for payment, telling him if he did not it would be put into other hands. When the horse was transferred he gave a receipt to Mr. Doust, and Mr. Doust gave him a receipt. At this time he had not the slightest intention of filing a petition, for he was then receiving help from friends with which he thought he should be able to carry on his business. The £10 was lent him to pay his men. examination witness said Mr. Doust took no security for the £10. Mr. Palmer advised him to file a petition, and he did so at once. He had destroyed every letter pressing him for payment, but he had not destroyed the writ.

In re

Palmer submitted that whatever might have been passing in the mind of Mr. Everest at the time of this transaction, it was quite certain Mr. Doust was an innocent party, and what he had done he was perfectly entitled to do under the Bankruptcy Act of 1869. He had no notice of an act of bankruptcy at the time of this transaction, for the simple reason that no act of bankruptcy had been committed by Mr. Everest. According to sub-sect. 2 of the 194th section of the Bankruptcy Act, any transaction not attended with fraud from beginning to end, and where no notice had been given of an act of bankruptcy, was perfectly good and binding. In support of his argument he quoted Ex parte Topham; re Walker (L. J. Rep.), and read the whole of Mellish, J.'s judgment, which went to show, he said, that the transaction was a perfectly valid one, even had it been on the morning of the day on which the petition was filed.

Smith, in reply, submitted that the case quoted by Mr. Palmer did not apply, because here, he contended, there was no evidence of pressure, and a most remarkable fact was that Mr. Doust had not been called to support that part of the case. Was it likely that a man pressing another for payment would lend him £10 without security the next day.

have done had no notice of the presentation of a bankruptcy petition been served on him," only protects the sheriff and the purchasers of the goods, and does not protect the execution creditor, who is liable to repay the money to the trustee in

TUNBRIDGE COUNTY COURT. Saturday, March 14.

Judge.)

Re J. EVEREST.

THIS was a case respecting a horse transaction, Mr. John Chantler, auctioneer of Southboro', and trustee, seeking to know whether the sale by the

The REGISTRAR, in delivering judgment, said he had no doubt whatever about the order which should be made. The dates were very important, when it came to be considered whether this was a

and Mr. Doust. It seemed a very odd thing that the debtor should have destroyed the letters for the reasons given, and it was equally odd that Mr. Doust did not keep copies of the letters sent to a person owing him money and threatening him

with proceedings. Mr. Doust had not even ventured to go into the box, and he (the learned registrar), was clearly of opinion that the transaction was nothing more than an attempt to secure Mr. Doust, Everest, the debtor, contemplating at the time going into liquidation. There could have been no pressure, or Mr. Doust would not have lent the debtor £10 the next day. He was clearly of opinion the trustee was entitled to the money-the price of the horse-and also his costs as against Mr. Doust.

pay over to the third party, Mr. Constable, and by the letter of the 14th Sept. Mr. Cayley, the agent, conditionally assented to that. This money had to be paid on or before Christmas 1872, the time in which it was contemplated the building would be finished. He contended that judgment should be entered for the trustee, so that Mr. Constable should go in pari passu with the other creditors, and not take the whole corpus, which he now sought to obtain. Supposing an action had been brought against Mr. Palmer applied for an appeal, which was granted. Morley, he would have had no defence, and therefore the trustee would be entitled to the whole amount.

Re EVEREST (Second motion). THIS was a motion supported by Meadows White, solicitor, instructed by Messrs. Gorham and Warner, to try the title of Mr. Hope Constable, a builder and brickmaker, of Penshurst, against Mr. Chantler, the trustee of a certain sum of money amounting to £202 178. 10d., which was in the hands of Mr. Samuel Morley, M.P., until the 1st Dec. 1873, and afterwards deposited in the bank by his solicitors, Messrs. Gorham and Warner. The trustee was again represented by A. L. Smith.

In stating the case, White said Mr. Morley, a well-known gentleman, determined upon building some schools at Leigh, and Mr. Everest, debtor, was employed to build them in July 1872. Of course Everest wanted bricks with which to build these schools, and he accordingly applied to Mr. Constable on the 2nd Aug. asking the price of kiln, clamp, and other bricks and sand, to which Mr. Constable replied on the 4th, giving the price, and stating that an arrangement would have to be made as to payment. An agreement was prepared by Mr. Constable, which Everest accepted, the terms being that Mr. Caley, who was Mr. Morley's agent, should always retain a sufficient balance to pay for these bricks, at the close of the works, Mr. Constable to give him notice every month how the account stood. To this arrangement Mr. Caley consented verbally and by letter. Bricks were supplied, and every month Mr. Constable wrote to Mr. Caley telling him how the account with Everest stood. On the 11th April it amounted to £202 178. 10d. On the 26th of the same month Everest filed his petition for liquidation, and then the question came whether the debt was in the order and disposition of Mr. Everest, or, whether Mr. Constable should be paid. In equity Mr. Morley was prevented from disposing of the sum to Mr. Everest, and Mr Everest by his agreement was prevented from receiving it. In equity therefore it was not in the order and disposition of Everest, and both Mr. Morley and Mr. Caley would have failed under those circumstances in their duty had they paid it over, and were bound in equity to retain it. He did not think it necessary to cite authorities upon this point, for it was principle so well understood, and it was perfectly clear that this was a bona fide case, for Mr. Constable would not part with a brick until he had the agreement, and the security. Mr. Morley had been examined on the subject, at a previous hearing, and he was again present to answer any question which might be put to him.

Smith said he had an objection to that agree. ment, and it was decided that before proceeding further the opinion of court should be taken upon that objection. It was perfectly clear that all parties were acting in a bona fide manner, and the only question was whether Mr. Constable was entitled to the £202, and be placed in a better position than the other creditors. The agreement of the 6th Aug. was nothing more nor less than an order by a creditor to a third party to pay the second party a debt-it was an order by Mr. Everest to Mr. Morley, through Mr. Caley, to pay a debt due to Mr. Constable. Assuming the order was not conditional and assented to by the debtor, of course that was irrevocable. In the case of Shellard, Re Adams (29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 621), this point was discussed.

White said that the case referred to was with

White submitted that supposing an action had been brought in the way mentioned, Mr. Morley would have had a perfectly good defence, for there was not only the agreement but the letters. Then the trustee would have no locus standi in such an action. Property equitably assigned would not pass under the bankruptcy at all.

The learned REGISTRAR said that to his mind this was a very clear case. The learned counsel for the trustee had argued the question as to whether Mr. Morley would have any answer to an action which might be brought by the trustee for the recovery of this money, but it was perfectly clear under the Bankruptcy Act that, supposing an action were brought against Mr. Morley, that gentleman might have come to this court and asked for the action to be restrained, and that the court would deal with the question entirely upon equitable principles. This the court would have an undoubted right to do, in order that complete justice should be done in all matters arising out of any bankruptcy. That being so, he thought Mr. Smith's argument fell to the ground. He had no doubt whatever but that the agreement, and the subsequent transactions, constituted a valid equitable assignment to Mr. Constable, who, subject to Mr. Morley's costs being provided for, was entitled to an order.

White applied for Mr. Constable's costs, and, after some argument, it was agreed that the costs should follow the event, and that Mr. Constable's costs should be costs as against the estate.

LEGAL NEWS.

THE new Assistant Judge has been early put to proof of his capacities. At the Middlesex Sessions, which ended last week, it was his task to try the longest case that has come before the court for twenty years. It occupied four days. After an elaborate and able summing up, the prisoner was convicted and sentenced to five years of penal servitude.

OF 700 male convicts once in state prison at Auburn, 600 were there for crimes committed under the influence of liquor; 500 of whom testified that using tobacco was the beginning of their intemperate habits.

CRIMINALS AS WITNESSES -Under the criminal code, which has just passed the General Assembly of Chicago, and only wants the signature of the government to become a law. criminals are allowed to testify in their own behalf.

A Nevada judge, after the jury had been impaneled, and counsel ready to proceed, pulled out a revolver and judiciously remarked" If any man goes frolicking around the court room during the trial of this case, I shall interrupt him in his career." The strictest decorum prevailed.

JUDGE FOX, judge of the 11th District of Arkansas, recently committed Mr. Aldridge, a lawyer, to gaol for contempt of court. He was imprisoned for ten days, and on his liberation he armed himself with a shot-gun, and went in search of the judge. Meeting him in the street, Aldridge exclaimed, "Now, Judge Fox," and fired. The judge fell dead. This is the second judge who has been assassinated in Arkansas within the last six months.

regard to a bill of exchange, and in no way applied common law office yesterday the lists of arrears

to the one before the court.

The learned REGISTRAR said he also could see

a great distinction, and he overruled the objec

tion.

Smith, in addressing the court on behalf of the trustee, said the true criterion in this case was to consider the position of parties on the 20th Nov. 1873. Supposing that the trustees had on the 21st Nov. sued Mr. Morley for the £202, Mr. Morley would have had no defence to the action. On that date Mr. Morley had the whole of this money in his hands, and it was beyond all doubt that on his behalf the work had been executed. The defence seemed to rest upon this-whether or not upon the documents there was such an irrevocable assignment of this debt by Everest to Constable. He was perfectly free to admit that an order had been given by Everest to Mr. Morley to

EASTER TERM.-On the re-opening of the in the three courts were exhibited for the ensuing term, commencing on Wednesday next. There are, in the Queen's Bench, as many as 71 rules in the new trial paper for argument, and 49 in the special paper, and one for judgment, and of enlarged rules only four. In the Common Pleas there are 27 new trial rules-six in the peremptory paper, three cases standing for judgment, and 32 matters in the special paper. In the Exchequer there are three rules in the peremptory paper, while of new trials there are three for judgment and 30 for argument. In the special paper there are three for judgment and 44 for argument, consisting of demurrers and special cases. The Chancery arrears, which have not been published, are somewhat considerable, and with the applications arising out of the recent circuit, Easter Term is likely to be one of activity. MULTIFARIOUS LEGISLATION. -We extract from the Times of Monday last, the following letter from Mr. Charles Ford. Sir,-As evi

-

dence that our present system of legislation is not complained of without reason, allow me to direct attention to the following:-A short Bill affecting solicitors and their articled clerks was recently introduced into the House of Lords. About the same time a still shorter Bill affecting solicitors, with one section relating to bills of sale, was introduced into the House of Commons. A third measure relating to bills of sale only was, about the same time, also introduced into the House of Commons. Surely these three short measures are not to become separate enactments when the whole subject-matter might with advantage be comprised in one statute."

MR. JAMES BROUN, of No. 3, Harcourt-buildings, Temple, who has been disclaimed by various other members of the Bar similarly titled, reappeared at Guildhall, charged with an unprovoked assault in Fleet-street. Medical certificates were put in from Dr. Gibson, of Newgate, stating that he was of unsound mind. Sir Thomas Dakin decided to send him to the union for safe custody, and the prisoner made no objection beyond asking if he could go before the Lunacy Commis

sioners.

THE NEW LAW COURTS OF JUSTICE.-The sum to be voted for the year ending 31st March 1875, for the new Law Courts is £78,800., being an excess of £10,000 on the preceding year voted.

CODE OR DIGEST.-"A Barrister," writing to the Times upon this subject, observes that "We seem to be as far now from obtaining a code, or even a digest, as ever. The Judicature Act has been passed, and a few workmen have even begun to appear on the site of the new law courts." "Surely," the writer observes, "it is time to begin the remaining great work which is so much wanted to free the law from obscurity, and to complete the fusion of law and equity." He trusts "the subject will not be allowed again to sleep, and that the work of codifying the law, or at least, of digesting it, may soon be seriously taken in hand." He adds, "I believe all are agreed that the difficulties and magnitude of the work are not insuperable, and all that is required is money and good workmen," and he warns us against resting satisfied "with the mere republication of the existing statutes, for however excellent the work may be done in itself, the main faults of our legal system will be left as rife as ever."

DR. KENEALY.-On Tuesday night a public meeting was held at Cambridge Hall, Newmanstreet, Oxford-street, "for the purpose of expressing sympathy with Dr. Kenealy in the persecution he was now suffering in connection with his defence of the Claimant at the late trial in the Court of Queen's Bench." The hall was densely crowded in every part. Mr. G. Skipworth occupied the chair, and was loudly cheered upon taking his position. The chairman, in opening the proceedings, having briefly referred to the treatment he had personally experienced from the Lord Chief Justice, said he felt great regret that no release of that unfortunate man who was now public effort had yet been made to obtain the unjustly languishing in prison, and whom he believed to be perfectly innocent of all that had been laid to his charge. Mr. Skipworth concluded a speech lasting more than one hour amid loud cheering, with a few expressions of dissent. The secretary of the Kenealy Fund read a list of contributions which have been received up to the present time. He also stated that the amount now owing to Dr. Kenealy for fees in connection with the late trial was 1300 guineas. Mr. Gibson moved the following resolution :"That the thanks of this meeting be tendered to Dr. Kenealy, Q.C., for his eloquent, legal, able, and fearless assertion of his client's rights as displayed by him in conducting the defence in the late Tichborne trial; also that this meeting expresses its feelings of repugnance at the onesided manner in which the late Government conducted the prosecution." Mr. Guildford Onslow, on rising to second the resolution, was greeted speak without having the fear of the Lord Chief with loud cheering. He said he was now able to Justice before him, and he would take this the first opportunity of expressing his firm conviction that the unfortunate man now languishing in prison was the real and veritable Sir Roger Tichborne. He said the prosecution was wicked, the trial a farce, and the verdict and sentence most unjust. The immediate object of this meeting was to do honour to Dr. Kenealy, one of the most able and honest men at the English Bar. He considered the Bar of the Oxford Circuit had disgraced itself by its recent treatment of Dr. Kenealy, especially pending the inquiry about to be instituted by the Benchers of Gray's Inn. He contended at some length that the Claimant had not received a fair trial, and that, as every unprejudiced person acknowledged, in face of the evidence, there was a reasonable doubt, the Claimant ought to have received the benefit of the doubt. Several other speakers having addressed the meeting the resolution was carried almost unanimously.

CORRESPONDENCE OF THE

PROFESSION.

NOTE. This Department of the LAW TIMEs being open to

free discussion on all professional topics, the Editor is not responsible for any opinions or statements contained in it. THE LODGERS' GOODS PROTECTION ACT.-I beg leave to offer a few observations and remarks which perhaps, if made public, may be thought of sufficient importance to cause either an immediate amendment or repeal of the above Act. Rent may be defined to be a return of the profits which a lessor reserves to himself on parting with for a time, his estate or part of it, and which profits are payable to him by the lessee in respect thereof, according to the terms and nature of the tenure. As rent is a profit issuing out of the land or property leased for a time, and as distress is a remedy for its recovery, and originally substituted for an entry on and possession of the land or property by the lessor, it follows that in the application of the remedy it is to the land or property itself that the distrainor must look, and not to the person of the lessee, for his claim is not in respect of the person in possession of the premises, or owning the effects there, but in respect of the premises alone. It has therefore been considered, as a general rule, that the party entitled to the rent in arrear may distrain on the premises, out of which the rent issues in whose sover possession they may be at the time of distress, whether in that of the original lessee, assignee, undertenant, or lodger, or several tenants in common, and may take, subject to certain restrictions, whatever chattels or effects are found there, whether they belong to the lessee or to any other person. The necessity of this rule is obvious when it is properly considered by what varieties of fraud and collusion the rights of the lessor may otherwise be, and unfortunately are now generally known to be, defeated by being restricted in his remedy by distress, to the possession and goods of his immediate lessee only, goods, by the bye, which it is impossible for the lessor to know without the lessee points out the same to him, which he is not compelled to do. And it seems to have been forgotten that a lodger or sub-tenant is not only protected by a legal remedy against his immediate landlord for any damage, loss, or injury, he may sustain, through his property being distrained and sold to satisfy a claim for rent due to the superior landlord, and that he can also take the law into his own hands and set-off future rent due by him in discharge of such damage or loss. And if it be said that as most persons seized upon for rent are nearly insolvent, the remedy of a lodger or other under-tenant is therefore practically nil. Admitting such to be the case, it is respectfully asked, Is it right? Is it just?-that the superior landlord, entirely an innocent party, should therefore be made the victim of pecuniary loss, and deprived of a remedy which, from time almost immemorial, the law, for the benefit of society, as much as for himself, has afforded him? In good faith a landlord lets his property even with a proviso that the same shall not be underlet, in defiance of which, however, it is not only wholly or partly let out by the tenant, but rents are received by him from the lodgers, and notwithstanding which he fails to pay the rent due from himself to his landlord. Surely in a case like this the law is at fault if the lodger or other under-tenant has not an immediate and summary remedy for such a deliberate act of dishonesty and injustice both to his lodger and his landlord by a summons before a magistrate. Surely the party guilty of such a two-fold wrong should suffer punishment, and not the superior landlord, who perhaps is not even aware his premises have been underlet. It is to be regretted that lodgers and others, generally speaking, are too negligent in making proper inquiries as to the respectability and solvency of the parties with whom they may be going to lodge, they have often only themselves to blame for the loss of their goods, which they so heedlessly place in jeopardy. But landlords, generally speaking, do not take advantage of this, nor have the goods of the lodgers been taken by landlords so frequently and to such an extent as many people imagine; in most cases there has been a special reason for taking them, one of which, perhaps the most frequent, is that the lodger himself is considerably in arrears, and the cause why his landlord cannot pay. It has been asked in what respect rent differs from any other debt. As before intimated, the landlord transfers or divests himself of his property for a certain time, upon agreed periodical future payments, called rent, to the tenant or hirer, who thus effectively has the entire use of the property for the time being, and upon default in making the payments agreed upon certain effects found upon the premises can be legally taken, first, as a pledge, and, after continued default, can be sold to satisfy such claims or rent. And it is here submitted that the lessor has properly no common law right of proceeding for the recovery of such payments or rent, as a debt, unless he has reserved to himself an addi

tional right of doing so in the lease or agreement. He is bound to exhaust the legal remedy specially provided by Act of Parliament for the purpose before resorting to other remedies. In other cases whereby debts, properly speaking, are incurred, there is an absolute sale of the property for a certain sum, either for cash or upon credit, and whereby it entirely belongs to the purchaser, and in the event of that sum not being paid it becomes a debt, for which the debtor must first be personally sued, and it is only after and under a judgment his goods can be seized to satisfy such debt. It has also been asked why the landlord should be protected more than the butcher or the baker? The answer is easy. The landlord is not so well protected, from the nature of the case, as the tradesman. The latter can stop credit, and avoid further loss, at any time he pleases, whereas the former has to wait for the expiration of the tenancy, which may be for a long period, or to determine same by a notice to quit; his loss is, therefore, a continuing one. Again, complaints have been made that the law makes the landlord "judge, jury, and executioner in his own case. I answer the tenant is none the worse off for that, he is nevertheless well protected. The landlord must conform strictly to certain, statutory enactments, constituting the law of distress; he is seriously liable for any wrong he may do, and if he appoints another person to act for him, he is prima facie liable for his acts in case of an irregularity or his illegally conducting the distress. At the same time, a great advantage to the tenant must not be overlooked, the landlord has the power to, and can be lenient; he can also allow further time to his tenant for payment, and he can also forego the whole or a portion of his rent, according to circumstances; whereas if the case is in the hands of the sheriff or the County Court broker, leniency, forbearance, and discretion are then out of the question, the law must be carried out to the very letter. Again, it is stated that the law of distress and brokers are both objectionable; but why? Look to the causes, and let persons requiring the attention of either broker or sheriff at least be decent and not speak unkindly of persons on whom society imposes unpleasant offices. And, again, how is it that lawyers so frequently employ brokers to act and distrain for them and their clients, notwithstanding they have, as they imagine, a common law right or remedy to sue for the rent as a debt? Are not the reasons obvious? Do not lawyers practically know that the process of recovery in either case is effectively the same, but that the remedy of distress is not only less oppressive and costly to the poor tenant, but attended with little or no expense to, it may be, the poor landlord? Of course, in cases with wealthy clients, a suit in the Superior Courts of law is recommended as a matter of business, and in nine cases out of ten justly preferred to the County courts, because in the former judges are learned in the law, are not above consulting, when necessary, the Acts of Parliament, and are most anxious to adjudicate in conformity therewith, whereas in some of the latter courts decisions are given not only contrary to law and equity, but apparently at the whim and fancy of the gentlemen presiding there. Again, if we occasionally read of cases in which the law of distress has been abused, it is principally the fault of land. lords employing improper persons; but are not such to be found in all trades and professions? Is the law to be despised because some professing it exhibit a minimum of legal wisdom, want of professional skill, and sometimes misconduct in carrying it out, whereby their clients often lose their suits and are mulet in costs. But even for such errors of landlords, a remedy presents itself; there can be no reason why persons acting as brokers or agents for the recovery of rents, should not be compelled, like appraisers or auctioneers, to take out a licence or certificate and be liable to a penalty for acting without one. It would be more satisfactory to the public, and at the same time afford a check upon flagrant mis. conduct for which a renewal of the licence or certificate might be suspended, or altogether refused, according to circumstances. Upon perusal of the Lodgers' Goods Protection Bill (as amended in the Select Committee) I find it differs from the Act itself by the omission of the word "under-tenants." The Act is also without an interpretation clause which is to be regretted, because although the word lodger is very familiar, it is one whieh it appears is not generally understood, and our dictionaries afford us little or no assistance. For instance, is a servant a lodger within the meaning of the Act, no rent being paid for the rooms he occupies ? Are persons living in model lodging houses lodgers or under tenants? A person takes a house, and lets it out in rooms or tenements, living elsewhere himself; are the several occupants, some of whom do and do not sleep there, all lodgers or under tenants within the meaning of the Act? Again, are tenants or holders of offices, let-out manufacturing business premises, stables, workshops, factories, &c., to be considered lodgers or under tenants,

persons

and does the Act apply to and protect such parties? Or does the Act only apply to lodgers properly so called, that is to say, to persons who for a time live and sleep in the part of the premises they occupy or hire, the other part being occupied by the landlord, and in which he also dwells and sleeps? It would appear from the omission in the Act of the 14th clause to be found in the Bill, namely, "This Act shall not apply to any lettings other than those of dwellinghouses, and of rooms let for the purpose of lodging," that the Act is therefore intended to and shall apply to any lettings other than those of dwelling-houses and of rooms let for the purposes of lodging. Is this so? Again, if the distress is for an amount above £15, can a magistrate deal with it under the Act (see 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, s. 39). And in case of a tenant being in arrears of rent due to his landlord, has the superior landlord a claim on the lodger for the payment of his current and future rent, as it accrues due, on account of the arrears due to him by the lodger's landlord? And, if so, upon the refusal of the lodger to pay same, how is it to be recovered? A portion of the first section of the Act likewise creates a difficulty. The rent owing by the lodger, if sufficient, is to be taken by the broker in satisfaction and discharge of the entire claim upon the tenant by the superior landlord, and the distress being thus satisfied, is legally ended. But is a payment by the lodger amounting only to a part of the amount owing to the superior landlord to be taken by the broker on account of and in part payment of the amount distrained for and due to the superior landlord? If so, the distress will become void, for if the broker or landlord takes a part of the amount distrained for, he then upsets the distress, and must therefore withdraw, and the law will not allow him to enter again to distrain for the balance, he must also lose the costs which have attended the distress. Again, if the broker receives the amount, he must dispose of it under the Act, and thereby nullify the distress, and on the other hand if he refuses to take it, he is both liable to an action at the suit of the lodger and amenable to a magistrate. It seems that the observations made by Lord Salisbury at the passing of the Act were justifiable, namely, "that without in any way sympathising with the object or urging the necessity of any alteration in the present law, he objected to any change being made upon so hurried and imperfectly defined a plan which characterised private Bills generally," and which he described as small hour legislature. Upon the whole it seems the more the Lodgers' Goods Protection Act is investigated, the more unsatisfactory and partial it appears; it is altogether a fair specimen of legislative trifling, and the result of ignorance of practical experience upon the subject.

JAMES FERGUSON.

CLERKS OF THE PEACE AT PETTY SESSIONS. which I should like to see inserted in the pro-SIR,-Enclosed I forward draft of two clauses posed new Act of Parliament. It is not unusual clerk, to appear for a prisoner, and if committed for one Clerk of the Peace, or his partner or his for trial, of course, afterwards to draw the You will easily perceive what an injustice might be occasioned.

indictments.

A COUNTRY SOLICITOR. The following are the clauses referred to :"That no attorney, or other person, acting as clerk to an attorney or firm of attorneys, shall be heard in any court of petty sessions, or in any county court, on behalf of any client of such last-named attorney or firm of attorneys."

"That no clerk of the peace, or his partner, or any clerk in his or their employ, or any clerk or partner of any justice's clerk shall be heard on a prosecution or in a defence at any petty sessions. for the district for which he is such clerk of the peace or justice's clerk."

LAW SOCIETIES.

UNION SOCIETY OF LONDON.

AT a meeting of this society to be held on Tuesday next at the rooms of the Social Science Association at half past seven, Mr. Charles Ford will move a resolution to the effect that the rules of the Inns of Court affecting solicitors desiring to be called to the Bar require modification, and that greater facilities should be afforded to barristers desirous of becoming solicitors.

THE BIRMINGHAM LAW STUDENTS'

SOCIETY. AT a meeting of this society held on Tuesday evening last, Mr. A. D. Bolton, barrister-at-law, presiding, the following question was discussed "Is a mortgagee entitled to more than six years' arrears of interest upon a bill being filed by the mortgagor for redemption." Mr. A. Canning led in the affirmative, and was supported by Messrs.

David Hadley and W. H. Warlow; Mr. F. W. Lowe replied, and was followed by Messrs. Blakeway and F. Smith. After the chairman had summed up the votes were taken and found to be in favour of the affirmative.

LAW ASSOCIATION.

Ar the usual monthly meeting of the directors, held at the Hall of the Incorporated Law Society, in Chancery-lane, on Thursday, the 2nd inst., the following being present, viz. : — Mr. Steward (chairman), Mr. Burges, Mr. Drew, Mr. Kelly, Mr. Masterman, Mr. Sidney Smith, Mr. Styan, Mr. Thomas, Mr. Tylee, Mr. H. Vallance, Mr. Williamson, and Mr. Boodle (secretary). A grant of £50 was made to the widow of a member, and two grants amounting to £17 were made to the daughters of two non-members. The annual general court was fixed for the 28th May.

THE COURTS AND COURT PAPERS.

MIDDLESEX-Waddell v. Wolffe

[Bramwell, B.-Mr Day

Kish v. Cory. Demurrer [Pigott, B.-Mr H. T. Cole Laport v. Costick. Appeal Moved Trinity Term, 1873. MIDDLESEX-Doulton v. Timms Tried during Term. MIDDLESEX-Finigan v. Fraser [Bramwell, B.-Mr C. Russell MIDDLESEX-Block v. Pigott [Bramwell, B.-Mr Pearce Moved Michaelmas Term, 1873. MIDDLESEX-Raper v. The London General Omnibus Company [Quain, J.-Mr Day MIDDLESEX-Kirkstall Brewery Company v. Furness LONDON-Dudgeon v. Pembroke Railway Company [Deaman, J.-Mr Price

[Blackburn, J.-Sir J. Karslake [Quain, J.-Mr Holker

LONDON-Irlande v. Lavery DURHAM-Lambert v. Madgshon [Quain, J.-Mr Herschell NEWCASTLE-Turnbull v. Murray [Brett, J.-Mr Herschell NORTHUMBERLAND-Reg. v. The Inhabitants of Alnwick [Quain, J.-Mr Herschell CUMBERLAND-Sloan v. Holliday [Quain, J.-Mr Herschell LANCASTER-Taylor v. Rushton [Quain, J.-Mr Holker LIVERPOOL-Stephenson v. Corporation of Liverpool [Quain, J.-Mr C. Russell LIVERPOOL-Jefferson v. Querner [Quain, J.-Mr C. Russell [Quain, J.-Mr. Herschell [Brett, J.-Mr C. Russell [L. C. B.-Mr H. T. Cole

EASTER TERM.

pany

LIVERPOOL-Francis and Company v. Eastwood

[L. C. B.-Mr Collins [L. C. B.-Mr Kindon [L. C. B.-Mr Lopes [L. C. B.-Mr H. T. Cole

DEVON-Mears v. Evans
CORNWALL-Temby v. Rule
CORNWALL-Pender v. Hicks
BRISTOL-Ayles v. Maidment
BRISTOL-Same v. Same
HERTFORD-Chapman v. Lapworth

[Martin, B.-Mr J. Brown

SURREY-Chasemore v. Turner [Martin, B.-Mr Garth SURREY-Kavanagh v. Kerkham [Martin, B.-Mr Day SURREY-Marc v. Rony [Martin, B.-Hon. A. Thesiger SURREY-Pearson v. Lawson. S. & N. Co.

London.

.........

For Argument.

ENLARGED RULE PAPER. For Argument. Re an arbitration between Hamlyn and Widdicombe [Mr J. C. Mathew-Mr Charles Blades v. Lawrence [Mr W. A. Lewis-Sir J Karslake De Wolf and another v. The Archangel Maritime Bank and Insurance Company [Mr Bowen-Mr Aspland Re an arbitration between George Attree and others [Mr Grantham-Mr A. L. Smith CROWN PAPer. For Argument.

MIDDLESEX-Reg. v. The Guardians of Stepney Union.
To stand over.

NORFOLK-Same v. Middle Level Commissioners
KENT-Caballero v. Lewis

LANCASHIRE-Overseers of Bootle-cum-Linacre v. Clerk
of the Peace for Lancaster
KENT-Redgrave v. Lee

Union

MIDDLESEX-Same v. The Guardians of Norwich Incor poration

CHESHIRE-Roberts v. Egerton

ANGLESEY-Reg. v. Williams

EXETER-Same v. Sandford

DERBY-Same v. The Treasurer of Matlock Turnpike Trust

WARWICK-Same v. The Great Western Railway Com◄

pany

DEVON-Halse v. Halder

SUSSEX-Reg. v. The Visiting Justices of Lewes County Gaol

DURHAM-Barnes v. Hutchinson

BRISTOL-Reg. v. The Guardians of Bedminster Union SOUTHAMPTON-Peninsula and Oriental Steam Company v. Holley

DEWSBURY-Eastwood v. Millar

NORWICH-Reg. v. The Corporation of Norwich

SUSSEX-Pickering v. Marsh

CORNWALL-Kittow v. Assistant Commissioners of Lis

keard Union

SHEFFIELD-Cutler v. Turner

SHEFFIELD-Haigh v. Town Council of Sheffield

YORKSHIRE-Banks v. Crossland

MIDDLESEX-Reg. v. Harvey

ABERYSTWITH-Wemyss v. Hopkins

LONDON-Reg. v. Fenner

SURREY-Burnett v. Dart

23

No London sittings this Term.

AFTER TERM.

May 9 Wednesday..

NEW TRIAL PAPER.
For Argument.

Moved Michaelmas Term, 1872.

LONDON-Ionides v. Pender and another (part heard)

[Hannen, J.-Mr Butt

BRISTOL-London and South-Western Bank v. Williams

MANCHESTER-Pendlebury v. Same [Mellor, J.-Mr Pope MANCHESTER-Pearson v. Johnson and another [Mellor, J.-Mr Pope LIVERPOOL-Batcheldor v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company [Lush, J.-Mr Herschell Tried during Term. MIDDLESEX-Smith v. Palmer [Lush, J.-Mr Salter MIDDLESEX-Tuson v. Parkhouse [Lush, J.-Mr Day MIDDLESEX-Scott v. The London General Omnibus Company [Lush, J.-Mr Giffard Moved Easter Term, 1873. MIDDLESEX-Burnaby v. Earl [L. C. J.-Mr Garth LONDON-Dean v. Stokes [L. C. J.-Mr D. Seymour LONDON-Toole v. Young [L. C. J.-Sir J. Karslake LONDON-Lazard v. Javal [Mellor, J.-Mr Day LONDON-Die Elbinger v. Armstrong [Lush, J.-Sir H. James KENT-Harvey v. Lewis [L.C.J.-Mr Biron NEWCASTLE-Robinson v. River Wear Commissioners. [Archibald, J.-Mr Herschell DURHAM-Oliver v. North-Eastern Railway Company [Pollock, B.-Mr Holker

Chartered Bank of India v. Just. Demurrer.
Owen v. Wright. Demurrer.
Jones v. Palmer. Demurrer.

Mid-Wales Railway Company v. Cambrian Railway
Company. Special case.

Jefferson v. Querner. Demurrer.

To be argued with New Trial.
Leatham v. Bank. Appeal.
Coyte v. Elptrick. Demurrer.
To be argued with New Trial.
Dudgeon v. Pembroke. Demurrer
To be argued with new Trial.
Grant v. Budd. Demurrer
Cox v. Leigh. Special case
Lane v. Hanbury. Demurrer
Isnaredi v. Watts. Demurrer

Brunninghans v. Manchester, Sheffield, and Liverpool

Stenton v. Nourse. Demurrer
Green v. Reade. Appeal

James v. National Arms Company. Special case
Cooper v. Hills. Demurrer

Guano, &c., Company v. Kellock. Special case
Woollett v. Goodchild. Demurrer
Mellor v. Watkins. Special case

Metropolitan Board of Works v. Imperial Gas Light and Coke Company. Appeal

Imperial Gas Light and Coke Company v. Metropolitan
Board of Works. Special case
Trevelyan v. Sampson. Special case
Smidt v. Tiden. Special case
Pulbrook v. Laws. Demurrer

Horne v. Lymington Railway Company. Special case
Coveny v. Northfleet Coal and Ballast Company. Special