Page images
PDF
EPUB
[blocks in formation]

Carriers of passengers-Delay-It is necessary, to render carriers responsible for delay in the running of trains, to show wilful misconduct. Bartrum represented the plaintiff and Wightman Wood the defendants.

His HONOUR said: The plaintiff in this action seeks to recover from the defendants a sum of 93. 4d., for breach of contract, by delay of train under the following circumstances: He is a commercial traveller, residing at Bath. On the morning of the 29th Oct. last he took a second-class ticket in the usual way at the defendants' Bath station for Abingdon. According to their time tables for that month, which were put in evidence -on his behalf, the train for which he was booked was to start at seven minutes past eight, and to arrive at Swindon at five minutes to nine; and there was another train to leave Swindon at a quarter-past nine, and to be at Didcot at twenty minutes past ten a.m. Then there was again another train to leave Didcot at twenty-five minutes past ten and to be at Abingdon at fiftyfive minutes past ten a.m. The plaintiff stated that the passengers for the north stations and Abingdon had to change at Swindon, and that he did so; that the train into which he changed does not go beyond Didcot; that he had often travelled by that train for a great many years; that the usual time at which for some while past he had arrrived at the latter place was twenty minutes past ten in the morning; that, according to his experience, the 10.25 train for Abingdon from Didcot waited for the train due at 10.20 at Didcot, and that he had never before the morning in question missed the 10.25 train. On that morning, however, there was a delay at Swindon in the starting of the train for Didcot. How long that delay was the plaintiff could not exactly tell, but I think it may be inferred it was some noticeable delay. He was informed at Swindon there had been a collision on the line, and he attributed his leaving late to that fact. He stated this in answer to a question from the defendants' counsel. There was, also, a delay in the progress of this train at some station before Wantage, between Swindon and Didcot; and the plaintiff saw that a damaged engine caused the obstruction. In the result the train arrived at Didcot at about 11 o'clock a.m., when he found that the 10.25 train for Abingdon had left. According to the time tables there was then no train for Abingdon until 1 o'clock p.m. Thereupon, having business engagements of an important nature at Abingdon that morning for the house which he represents, he posted thither from Didcot, the distance being seven posting miles. He paid 9s. for the fly and driver and 4d. for a turnpike the 9s. 4d. sought to be recovered. On cross-examination he admitted most frankly and fairly that he was well acquainted with the paragraph headed "train bills," which is on the cover of the time tables, and to which I shall refer more at length, and he also said he was aware that the train he wished to catch comes from London to Didcot, and goes thence to the north. The ticket issued to the plaintiff had on it the words "Bath to Abingdon, second class, issued subject to the conditions stated

on

the company's time bills." The paragraph above-mentioned-so far as it is material for the present case-is in these words, "Train Bills. The published train bills of this company are only intended to fix the time at which passengers may be certain to obtain their tickets for any journey from the various stations, it being understood that the train shall not start from them before the appointed time; but the directors give notice that the company do not undertake that the trains shall start or arrive at the time specified in the bills; nor will they be accountable for any loss, inconvenience, or injury, which may arise from delays or detention, unless upon proof that such loss, inconvenience, injury, delay, or detention, arose in consequence of the wilful misconduct of the company's servants." This paragraph or conditional clause is printed on page 100, as well as on the cover of the time tables put in. The plaintiff alone gave evidence on his own behalf, and at the conclusion of his case it was pressed on me, with much ability, by Mr. Wightman Wood, the defendants' counsel, that there should be a nonsuit. It is obvious, that small as is the amount involved in this case, the principles upon which it is to be decided, one way or the cther, are of the utmost importance to the railway companies, and to the innumerable travellers by rail; to the companies on account of the enormous cost which would be thrown upon them by the multiplicity of sums of more or less amount, which they would have to pay were they to be made

liable in every instance for want of punctuality in
their trains, and to travellers if they were to be
without redress, and at the absolute mercy of
the companies, however the delay might be
occasioned, with all its many vexations and
injurious consequences. For the plaintiff it was
contended that there was a contract to convey

him within a reasonable time of the hour
named in the time table, and that if the collision
at or near Wantage was caused by the negligence
of the company's servants, then he ought to
recover, but not if by a mere accident. For the
defendants it was urged first that, if there was a
contract at all it was upon the footing of the
paragraph or clause on the cover of the time
tables or book, and that, therefore, it was for the
plaintiff to show there had been wilful misconduct
on the part of the company's servants, but none
had been shown. Secondly that there was no
contract-the time book being a notice for the
convenience of the public, and nothing more.
From this latter proposition I entirely dissent.
It is contrary to the principles laid down by the
authorities bearing on the whole subject before
me. With the defendant's first proposition, how-
ever, which is in strict accordance with those
principles, I as entirely agree. In the absence of
any special contract, there would be between
travellers and the railway companies, who hold
themseves out as carriers of passengers, an implied
contract by the companies to convey within a
reasonable time. And even supposing the time
tables were not actually part of the contract, I think
they might fairly be deemed prima facie evidence
of what is reasonable time in the particular in-
stance. Then, further, the company would not be
liable for delay arising from inevitable accident,
but would be for delay proceeding from the
negligence of their servants. But there is a
special contract where the ticket issued to the
Lassenger by a company, refers to bills or tables,
which, besides indicating the hours of the depar-
ture and arrival of the trains, contain a clause
for the protection of the company. These hours
or times are then directly adopted into the con-
tract, and this is so far in favour of the passenger;
but then the protecting clause is also adopted
into it, and that is, of course, for the benefit of the
company. In the present case, the question
whether the passenger had notice of the protect-
ing clause does not arise. He admits that he had.
It is well to observe, nevertheless, that his denial
of it would have been of no avail. If notice be
denied, and the train bills not put in, then where
would be the evidence of the contract to convey
within a reasonable time with reference to those
bills? And if they are put in, then inevitably the
clause protecting the company comes in also as
part of them. On this point the case of Hurst v.
The Great Western Railway Company directly
applies, as does that of Von Toll v. The South
Eastern Railway Company, to show that notice
would be inferred. It must be borne in mind that
the Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1854 does not
apply to passengers, so that neither can the
reasonableness of the protecting clause be ques-
tioned; nor is it necessary that the special con-
tract should be signed by the passenger. The
particular clause not only negatives any guarantee
or undertaking by the company for the starting
or arrival of the trains at the time specified in the
bills, but throws upon passengers, and so upon
the present plaintiff, in order to fix the company
with liability for delay, the proof that it arose
from the wilful misconduct of their servants.
Thus the question is, has such proof been adduced?
To this I am clearly of opinion there can only be
a negative answer, and therefore that a non-
suit must be entered. To show want of punc-
tuality is not enough, to show negligence is not
enough; nor would the showing of either shift the
burden of proof which is upon the plaintiff, who
has to establish against the defendants that the
delay was occasioned by the wilful misconduct of
their servants. Whether, apart from what I hold
to be the existing law, this be right, is another
matter. If I am wrong in my view of the law, the
error can be pointed out by a superior court; but
if my opinion be correct, and there be any undue
hardship on passengers, then this can be remedied
only by legislative interference. The authorities
from which my deductions are chiefly drawn are
Denton v. The Great Northern Railway Company
(25 L. J. 129, Q. B.), Van Toll v. The South Eastern
Railway Company (31 L. J. 241, C. P. ), Hurst v.
The Great Western Railway Company (34 L. J.
264, C. P.), Zunz v. The South Eastern Railway
Company (38 L. J. 209, Q. B.), Glenister v. The
Great Western Railway Company, decided in the
Queen's Bench 11th Nov. 1873, on appeal from the
County Court at High Wycombe. My attention
has been called to some decisions in the County
Courts bearing upon the subject in question, and
especially to the well-known case of Forsyth v.
The Great Western Railway Comyany, which are
apparently favourable to the plaintiff. I have
only to observe that the circumstances in these
several cases differ from the circumstances in the
present one; and notably (as I was informed by

[merged small][ocr errors][merged small]

CHESTER COUNTY COURT.
Thursday, April 2.

(Before R. VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, Esq., Judge.)

GILBERT AND OTHERS v. PICKERING AND
ANOTHER.

Friendly societies-Indebted treasurer dying-—
Liability of executors and sureties.
THE plaintiffs, who are trustees of the court
Defence, 938, of the Ancient Order of Foresters,
which meets at the Crown inn, Four-Lane-Ends,
Tarporley, sued the defendants, who are the ex-
ecutors of the late Mr. Parkinson, formerly the
treasurer of the court, for £37 7s. 1d., balance of
an account said to be due to them.

Hilton, barrister (instructed by Cawley), appeared for the plaintiffs.

Cartwright for the defendants.

The late Mr. Parkinson acted as treasurer to

the court up to the 26th Feb. 1873, when he was indebted to the court in the sum of £83 18. 1d. After his death the business of the Crown inn was carried on by his widow and his son Enoch Parkinson, and at the first meeting of the club after the death of his father, it was decided to appoint him treasurer on condition that he gave sufficient security. On the 29th March, the widow and son gave an undertaking to be responsible for the £81 1s. 1d. According to the Friendly Societies' Act, however, to make them responsible there should have been a bond and sureties, but instead their undertaking to pay was accepted, and they did pay up to the 21st June, a sum amounting to £43 45., which reduced the balance in hand to the sum of £37 78. 1d., the amount claimed. On that date they were applied to for payment, and they refused to pay any more.

Mr. Cawley was then instructed and wrote to them demanding payment, but was refused, and as they had taken no steps to prove the will of the deceased, it was proved on the 28th. They were again applied to for the residue of the money, when one of the executors told the secretary that there was nothing to prove for, and he should not prove it.

Hilton argued that as Mrs. Parkinson and her son were executors de son tort, they had taken upon themselves the liability to pay; and further according to the 23rd section of the Friendly Societies Act, the plaintiffs had a prior claim in the case of a person holding moneys, dying or becoming insolvent.

Thomas Green, of Eaton by Tarporley, proved that after the death of the deceased an agree ment was made with the court by Mrs. Parkinson and her son to continue the office, and her word was accepted. On the Saturday prior to the 21st June, they gave notice to resign, and immediately after they refused to pay any more money.

Cross-examined-The deceased entered into a bond, signed by three sureties, but the court did not apply to them because Mrs. Parkinson undertook to pay.

His HONOUR considered the secretary was right in applying to the widow and son of the deceased before applying to the sureties.

service of a notice to Mr. John Pickering to pay Henry Challinor, clerk to Mr. Cawley, proved

the money.

Cartwright, on behalf of the legal executors, said they were desirous of having the matter sifted before they could admit a claim of this description. The action was resisted by the creditors of the deceased, who had no sympathy with a society who had conducted their affairs so loosely as to make an arrangement with the executors de son tort at one time and with the legal executors at another.

His HONOUR-What could the parties do if there were no executors appointed under the will? All they could do was to proceed against the effects held by the widow and her son. I think they did the best they could under the circumstances.

Cartwright-That may be.

His HONOUR-What is the use of enlarging on it? Supposing that the will had not been proved. After the appointment of the legal executors, they could not go against the widow and son any longer.

Cartwright then called attention to the fact that the society not only went against the legal executors, but wanted a preference over the other

creditors.

His HONOUR said upon this point he was against Mr. Cartwright, who then went on to argue

[blocks in formation]

His HONOUR.-The plaintiff in the present case (referred to this court from the Court of Exchequer) is the father or administrator of Sarah Maddison, who lost her life through the neglect of the defendant in leaving an excavation or area for a house in course of erection in a highway open and unprotected by any railing or fence. He has sued the defendant under the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, commonly called "Lord Camp. bell's Act," for damages, such action being for the benefit of himself and wife, as parents of the deceased. There was no defence to the action, and the only question was as to the amount of damages. The plaintiff in his particu. lars claimed £200 for loss of an allowance made by deceased for support of her parents, for loss of goods and wearing apparel (presents received by her parents from time to time), and for funeral and other expenses. It appeared by the evidence that the deceased was a domestic servant, and out of her wages allowed her parents about 10s. a month, say £6 a year, and occasionally made them other presents of goods and wearing apparel. With regard to the allowance it was admitted that the plaintiff was entitled to damages for actual or probable pecuniary loss, but not according to annuity tables, although, after all, such tables must form the only basis of calculation in the present and in most cases subject to whatever deductions ought to be made in respect of the circumstances of each case. In the present case I think that the loss of the parents in respect of the allowance may be fairly estimated at £30. There was little evidence as to the nature or value of the presents made by the deceased to her parents, but I think that there should be some addition in respect of them, and I fix the sum at £5. The counsel for the plaintiff also contended that in estimating the damages the sufferings of the deceased ought also to be considered, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the same damages as the deceased herself could have done in this respect, and cited the case of Armsworth v. The South Western Railway Company (11 Jur. 758), but on reference to that case and the other numerous casea collected in Fisher's Digest, 6089, tit. Negligence," I find no authority for such a proposition, and that it is, on the contrary, clearly laid down, that compensation can be given to the relatives named in the Act only for pecuniary losses, including reasonable expectations of pecuniary advantage from the relative remaining alive. As to the amount of damages which I have given, I observe that in the case Franklin v. South Eastern Railway Company (3 H. & N. 211) it was held, that £75 was excessive damages for the loss by a father, through the death of his son, of 3s. 6d. a week, say £9 a year; but the father appears to have been an old man, and the parents of the deceased in the present case are middle-aged. The claim for funeral expenses was properly withdrawn.

66

Verdict for the plaintiff for £35, with costs.

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

the event of the debtor becoming bankrupt within twelve months from the date of the sale by the sheriff: (Ex parte Villars; Re Rogers, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 104. Chan.)

BANKRUPTCY-RE-HEARING-CONTRARY DECISION BY COURT OF APPEAL SINCE ORIGINAL HEARING.-On the 15th March 1873, the Court of Bankruptcy made an order declaring, amongst other things, that the mortgagees of certain lease holds had a valid charge on the trade fixtures comprised in their mortgage as against the trustee under the liquidation of the mortgagor, although the deed had not been registered under the Bills of Sale Act. On the 25th July 1873, the Court of Appeal in another case decided that an assign. ment of trade fixtures included in a mortgage of leaseholds to which they were attached, required to be registered under the Bills of Sale Act. The mortgagees became aware of this decision, on the 28th July 1873, and gave notice of motion for a re-hearing of their case on the 21st Nov. 1873: Held (reversing the decision of one of the Registrars) that they were not entitled to a re-hearing. Quare, whether a re-hearing would have been granted to them, if they had given notice within twenty-one days of the time when they became aware of the decision effecting a change in the law: (Ex parte Brown; Re Jeavons, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 108. Chan.)

MARRIED WOMAN-DEBTS CONTRACTED BEMARRIED

FORE MARRIAGE BANKRUPTCY WOMAN'S PROPERTY ACT 1870 (33 & 34 VICT. c. 93), s. 12.-A married woman who has no property belonging to her for her separate use is not fiable, under the 12th section of the Married Woman's Property Act 1870, to be made bankrupt. Quare, whether a married woman who has property belonging to her for her separate use liable: (Ex parte Holland; Re Henage, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 106. Chan.)

is so

BANKRUPTCY-"DEBTS DUE TO HIM IN THE COURSE OF HIS TRADE OR BUSINESS."-Bankers' "marginal notes" (which are contracts that the bankers giving them will pay the amounts represented by them whenever they receive intelligence that the bills, in respect of the discount of which they retain the amounts represented by the marginal notes, have been paid) are not "debts due" to the trader "in the course of his trade or busi. ness within the order and disposition clause (s. 15 sub-sect. 5) of the Bankruptcy Act 1869 (Ex parte Kemp; Re Fastnedge, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 109. Chan.)

[ocr errors]

EXECUTION CREDITOR-PAYMENTS TO SHERIFF BEFORE LEVY-ACCEPTANCE BY CREDITORS IN PART PAYMENT BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCYPRESSURE-BANKRUPTCY ACT 1869, ss. 6, 87.A judgment debtor, to avoid execution, paid part of the judgment-debt to the sheriff's officer. Two days after making this payment, the debtor filed a petition for liquidation, and notice of this was at once served on the sheriff's officer. The day before the petition was filed, the execution creditor told the sheriff's officer that he consented to accept the money paid by the debtor in part payment of his debt, but the payment was not made by the sheriff's officer till two days after the filing of the petition: Held, that there had been no seizure by the sheriff within the meaning of the 5th sub-section of the 6th section, or of the 87th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1869; that there was sufficient pressure by the creditor to support the payment, and that the creditor was entitled to retain the money paid to him by the sheriff's officer. Decision of the Chief Judge in Bank. ruptcy reversed on fresh evidence, that the creditor had, before the filing of the petition, consented to accept the money paid to the sheriff's officer in part payment of his debt: (Er parte Brooke; Re Hassall, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 103. Chan.)

[ocr errors]

DEBTOR'S SUMMONS- DEBT COVERED BY GARNISHEE ORDERS-ACT OF BANKRUPTCY BANKRUPTCY ACT 1869, s. 6, SUB-SECT 6 AND SECT. 7.-The words in the 6th sub-section of the 6th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, which render neglect to "secure or compound for " debt exceeding £50, for which a debtor's summons has been served, an act of bankruptcy, mean to secure or compound for it to the satisfaction of the creditor. An adjudication of bankruptcy founded on neglect to comply with a debtor's summons issued in respect of a debt exceeding £50 is valid, although the creditor has obtained garnishee orders to an amount exceeding his debt: (Ex parte Tupper; Re Tupper, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 102. Chan.)

debtor of a certain horse to Mr. Edward Doust, corn factor of Tonbridge, shortly before the date and filing of the debtor's petition, was not a valid sale, and that it was fraudulent and void as against the trustee of the debtor. The trustee now moved that the said horse was his property as trustee, and that the purchase money retained by Mr. Doust, in part satisfaction of a debt to him from the debtor, belonged to and formed part of property of debtor, and that such purchase money should be paid by Mr. Doust to the claimant as trustee.

The trustee was represented by A. Lumley Smith, instructed by Stenning, of Tonbridge, and Mr. Doust, by his solicitor, Palmer.

Smith, in stating the circumstances, desired particular attention to be paid to dates, which were very material. On the 18th April 1873, an agreement was come to between the parties whereby this horse, the property of Mr. Everest, was transferred to Mr. Doust. He believed the horse had been offered to Mr. Doust previously, but the gentleman said he had no use for it, and would not have it. But on the 18th April he took it, and unless it could be shown that there was some pressure put by Mr. Doust upon Mr. Everest, it would be nothing more nor less than a fraudulent preference, and came within the 92nd section of the Act. He should prove that pressure had not been put on Mr. Everest by Mr. Doust, and he called the debtor, who said, that on the At the previous Christmas he was indebted to 26th April 1873, he filed a petition for liquidation. Mr. Doust in the sum of £14 odd, and further debts were incurred. Prior to the 18th April he had several letters written him by Mr. Doust, asking him for payment of the account, but those letters he had destroyed, because he did not like to have them about the house. On the 18th April an action was brought against him by Mr. Charlton for £130 odd; a writ was issued and served upon him. The same day he saw Mr. Doust, and arranged for the transfer of the horse in part payment of his claim. At first he said he did not want the horse. He knew Mr. Doust well as a friend. Mr. Doust wrote off £26 9s. 10d., and lent witness £10 the next day. When the horse was transferred no money was paid. He had been pressed by Messrs. Punnett for money previous to the 18th April. He owed them something like £60. At this stage of the proceedings Mr. Doust was called upon to produce his letter book, but he said he kept no copies of the notes he had sent to Mr. Everest by

his man.

In answer to Mr. Palmer, Everest said that all he had stated to the court he mentioned at the meeting of creditors, which was held in the month of May of last year. The last letter he had from Mr. Doust was pressing him for payment, telling him if he did not it would be put into other hands. When the horse was transferred he gave a receipt to Mr. Doust, and Mr. Doust gave him a receipt. At this time he had not the slightest intention of filing a petition, for he was then receiving help from friends with which he thought he should be able to carry on his business. The £10 was lent him to pay his men. In reexamination witness said Mr. Doust took no security for the £10. Mr. Palmer advised him to file a petition, and he did so at once. He had destroyed every letter pressing him for payment, but he had not destroyed the writ.

Palmer submitted that whatever might have been passing in the mind of Mr. Everest at the time of this transaction, it was quite certain Mr. Doust was an innocent party, and what he had done he was perfectly entitled to do under the Bankruptcy Act of 1869. He had no notice of an act of bankruptcy at the time of this transaction, for the simple reason that no act of bankruptcy had been committed by Mr. Everest. According to sub-sect. 2 of the 194th section of the Bankruptcy Act, any transaction not attended with fraud from beginning to end, and where no notice had been given of an act of bankruptcy, was perfectly good and binding. In support of his argument he quoted Ex parte Topham; re Walker (L. J. Rep.), and read the whole of Mellish, J.'s judgment, which went to show, he said, that the transaction was a perfectly valid one, even had it been on the morning of the day on which the petition was filed.

Smith, in reply, submitted that the case quoted by Mr. Palmer did not apply, because here, he contended, there was no evidence of pressure, and a most remarkable fact was that Mr. Doust had not been called to support that part of the case. Was it likely that a man pressing another for payment would lend him £10 without security the next day.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. BANKRUPTCY · EXECUTION CREDITOR OF TRADER-SEIZURE AND SALE BY SHERIFF.The 87th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, which requires the sheriff to retain in his hands for fourteen days the proceeds of sale of goods of a trader taken in execution in respect of a judgment for a sum exceeding £50, and provides that if no notice of a bankruptcy petition having been presented against the trader be served on him within such period of fourteen days, or if, such notice having been served, the trader is not adjudged bankrupt, "he may deal with the proceeds of such sale in the same manner as he would (Before Mr. Registrar W. C. CRIPPS, sitting as bona fide transaction or not as between the debtor

have done had no notice of the presentation of a bankruptcy petition been served on him," only protects the sheriff and the purchasers of the goods, and does not protect the execution creditor, who is liable to repay the money to the trustee in

TUNBRIDGE COUNTY COURT. Saturday, March 14.

Judge.)

Re J. EVEREST.

THIS was a case respecting a horse transaction, Mr. John Chantler, auctioneer of Southboro', and trustee, seeking to know whether the sale by the

The REGISTRAR, in delivering judgment, said he had no doubt whatever about the order which should be made. The dates were very important, when it came to be considered whether this was a

and Mr. Doust. It seemed a very odd thing that the debtor should have destroyed the letters for the reasons given, and it was equally odd that Mr. Doust did not keep copies of the letters sent to a person owing him money and threatening him

with proceedings. Mr. Doust had not even ventured to go into the box, and he (the learned registrar), was clearly of opinion that the transaction was nothing more than an attempt to secure Mr. Doust, Everest, the debtor, contem. plating at the time going into liquidation. There could have been no pressure, or Mr. Doust would not have lent the debtor £10 the next day. He was clearly of opinion the trustee was entitled to the money-the price of the horse-and also his costs as against Mr. Doust.

Palmer applied for an appeal, which was granted.

Re EVEREST (Second motion). THIS was a motion supported by Meadows White, solicitor, instructed by Messrs. Gorham and Warner, to try the title of Mr. Hope Constable, a builder and brickmaker, of Penshurst, against Mr. Chantler, the trustee of a certain sum of money amounting to £202 178. 10d., which was in the hands of Mr. Samuel Morley, M.P., until the 1st Dec. 1873, and afterwards deposited in the bank by his solicitors, Messrs. Gorham and Warner. The trustee was again represented by A. L. Smith.

In stating the case, White said Mr. Morley, a well-known gentleman, determined upon building some schools at Leigh, and Mr. Everest, debtor, was employed to build them in July 1872. Of course Everest wanted bricks with which to build these schools, and he accordingly applied to Mr. Constable on the 2nd Aug. asking the price of kiln, clamp, and other bricks and sand, to which Mr. Constable replied on the 4th, giving the price, and stating that an arrangement would have to be made as to payment. An agreement was prepared by Mr. Constable, which Everest accepted, the terms being that Mr. Caley, who was Mr. Morley's agent, should always retain a sufficient balance to pay for these bricks, at the close of the works, Mr. Constable to give him notice every month how the account stood. To this arrangement Mr. Caley consented verbally and by letter. Bricks were supplied, and every month Mr. Constable wrote to Mr. Caley telling him how the account with Everest stood. On the 11th April it amounted to £202 178. 10d. On the 26th of the same month Everest filed his petition for liquidation, and then the question came whether the debt was in the order and disposition of Mr. Everest, or, whether Mr. Constable should be paid. In equity Mr. Morley was prevented from disposing of the sum to Mr. Everest, and Mr Everest by his agreement was prevented from receiving it. In equity therefore it was not in the order and disposition of Everest, and both Mr. Morley and Mr. Caley would have failed under those circumstances in their duty had they paid it over, and were bound in equity to retain it. He did not think it necessary to cite authorities upon this point, for it was a principle so well understood, and it was perfectly clear that this was a bona fide case, for Mr. Constable would not part with a brick until he had the agreement, and the security. Mr. Morley had been examined on the subject, at a previous hearing, and he was again present to answer any question which might be put to him.

Smith said he had an objection to that agreement, and it was decided that before proceeding further the opinion of court should be taken upon that objection. It was perfectly clear that all parties were acting in a bona fide manner, and the only question was whether Mr. Constable was entitled to the £202, and be placed in a better position than the other creditors. The agreement of the 6th Aug. was nothing more nor less than an order by a creditor to a third party to pay the second party a debt-it was an order by Mr. Everest to Mr. Morley, through Mr. Caley, to pay a debt due to Mr. Constable. Assuming the order was not conditional and assented to by the debtor, of course that was irrevocable. In the case of Shellard, Re Adams (29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 621), this point was discussed.

White said that the case referred to was with regard to a bill of exchange, and in no way applied to the one before the court.

The learned REGISTRAR said he also could see a great distinction, and he overruled the objec

tion.

[blocks in formation]

Smith, in addressing the court on behalf of the trustee, said the true criterion in this case was to consider the position of parties on the 20th Nov. 1873. Supposing that the trustees had on the 21st Nov. sued Mr. Morley for the £202, Mr. Morley would have had no defence to the action. On that date Mr. Morley had the whole of this money in his hands, and it was beyond all doubt that on his behalf the work had been executed. The defence seemed to rest upon this-whether or not upon the documents there was such an irrevocable assignment of this debt by Everest to Constable. He was perfectly free to admit that an order had been given by Everest to Mr. Morley to

pay over to the third party, Mr. Constable, and by the letter of the 14th Sept. Mr. Cayley, the agent, conditionally assented to that. This money had to be paid on or before Christmas 1872, the time in which it was contemplated the building would be finished. He contended that judgment should be entered for the trustee, so that Mr. Constable should go in pari passu with the other creditors, and not take the whole corpus, which he now sought to obtain. Supposing an action had been brought against Mr. Morley, he would have had no defence, and there. fore the trustee would be entitled to the whole amount.

White submitted that supposing an action had been brought in the way mentioned, Mr. Morley would have had a perfectly good defence, for there was not only the agreement but the letters. Then the trustee would have no locus standi in such an action. Property equitably assigned would not pass under the bankruptcy at all.

The learned REGISTRAR said that to his mind this was a very clear case. The learned counsel for the trustee had argued the question as to whether Mr. Morley would have any answer to an action which might be brought by the trustee for the recovery of this money, but it was perfectly clear under the Bankruptcy Act that, supposing an action were brought against Mr. Morley, that gentleman might have come to this court and asked for the action to be restrained, and that the court would deal with the question entirely upon equitable principles. This the court would have an undoubted right to do, in order that complete justice should be done in all matters arising out of any bankruptcy. That being so, he thought Mr. Smith's argument fell to the ground. He had no doubt whatever but that the agreement, and the subsequent transactions, constituted a valid equitable assignment to Mr. Constable, who, subject to Mr. Morley's costs being provided for, was entitled to an order.

White applied for Mr. Constable's costs, and, after some argument, it was agreed that the costs should follow the event, and that Mr. Constable's costs should be costs as against the estate.

LEGAL NEWS.

THE new Assistant Judge has been early put to proof of his capacities. At the Middlesex Sessions, which ended last week, it was his task to try the longest case that has come before the court for twenty years. It occupied four days. After an elaborate and able summing up, the prisoner was convicted and sentenced to five years of penal servitude.

OF 700 male convicts once in state prison at Auburn, 600 were there for crimes committed under the influence of liquor; 500 of whom testified that using tobacco was the beginning of their intemperate habits.

code, which has just passed the General Assembly CRIMINALS AS WITNESSES -Under the criminal of Chicago, and only wants the signature of the government to become a law, criminals are allowed to testify in their own behalf.

impaneled, and counsel ready to proceed, pulled A Nevada judge, after the jury had been out a revolver and judiciously remarked " If any man goes frolicking around the court room during the trial of this case, I shall interrupt him in his career." The strictest decorum prevailed.

JUDGE FOX, judge of the 11th District of Arkansas, recently committed Mr. Aldridge, a lawyer, to gaol for contempt of court. He was imprisoned for ten days, and on his liberation he armed himself with a shot-gun, and went in search of the judge. Meeting him in the street, Aldridge exclaimed, "Now, Judge Fox," and fired. The judge fell dead. This is the second judge who has been assassinated in Arkansas within the last six months.

EASTER TERM.-On the re-opening of the common law office yesterday the lists of arrears in the three courts were exhibited for the ensuing term, commencing on Wednesday next. There are, in the Queen's Bench, as many as 71 rules in the new trial paper for argument, and 49 in the special paper, and one for judgment, and of enlarged rules only four. In the Common Pleas there are 27 new trial rules-six in the peremptory paper, three cases standing for judgment, and 32 matters in the special paper. In the Exchequer there are three rules in the peremptory paper, while of new trials there are three for judgment and 30 for argument. In the special paper there are three for judgment and 44 for argument, consisting of demurrers and special cases. The Chancery arrears, which have not been published, are somewhat considerable, and with the applications arising out of the recent circuit, Easter Term is likely to be one of activity.

MULTIFARIOUS LEGISLATION. We extract from the Times of Monday last, the following letter from Mr. Charles Ford. "Sir,-As evi

dence that our present system of legislation is not complained of without reason, allow me to direct attention to the following:-A short Bill affecting solicitors and their articled clerks was recently introduced into the House of Lords. About the same time a still shorter Bill affecting solicitors, with one section relating to bills of sale, was introduced into the House of Commons. A third measure relating to bills of sale only was, about the same time, also introduced into the House of Commons. Surely these three short measures are not to become separate enactments when the whole subject-matter might with advantage be comprised in one statute."

MR. JAMES BROUN, of No. 3, Harcourt-buildings, Temple, who has been disclaimed by various other members of the Bar similarly titled, reappeared at Guildhall, charged with an unprovoked assault in Fleet-street. Medical certificates were put in from Dr. Gibson, of Newgate, stating that he was of unsound mind. Sir Thomas Dakin decided to send him to the union for safe custody, and the prisoner made no objection beyond asking if he could go before the Lunacy Commis

sioners.

THE NEW LAW COURTS OF JUSTICE.-The sum

to be voted for the year ending 31st March 1875, for the new Law Courts is £78,800., being an excess of £10,000 on the preceding year voted.

CODE OR DIGEST.-"A Barrister," writing to the Times upon this subject, observes that "We seem to be as far now from obtaining a code, or even a digest, as ever. The Judicature Act has been passed, and a few workmen have even begun to appear on the site of the new law courts." "Surely," the writer observes, "it is time to begin the remaining great work which is so much wanted to free the law from obscurity, and to complete the fusion of law and equity." He trusts "the subject will not be allowed again to sleep, and that the work of codifying the law, or at least, of digesting it, may soon be seriously taken in hand." He adds, "I believe all are agreed that the difficulties and magnitude of the work are not insuperable, and all that is required is money and good workmen," and he warns us against resting satisfied "with the mere republication of the existing statutes, for however excellent the work may be done in itself, the main faults of our legal system will be left as rife as ever."

DR. KENEALY.-On Tuesday night a public meeting was held at Cambridge Hall, Newmanstreet, Oxford-street, "for the purpose of expressing sympathy with Dr. Kenealy in the persecution he was now suffering in connection with his defence of the Claimant at the late trial in the Court of Queen's Bench." The hall was densely crowded in every part. Mr. G. Skipworth occu pied the chair, and was loudly cheered upon taking his position. The chairman, in opening the proceedings, having briefly referred to the treatment he had personally experienced from the Lord Chief Justice, said he felt great regret that no unjustly languishing in prison, and whom he public effort had yet been made to obtain the release of that unfortunate man who was now believed to be perfectly innocent of all that had been laid to his charge. Mr. Skipworth concluded a speech lasting more than one hour amid loud secretary of the Kenealy Fund read a list of cheering, with a few expressions of dissent. The contributions which have been received up to the present time. He also stated that the amount now owing to Dr. Kenealy for fees in connection with the late trial was 1300 guineas. Mr. Gibson moved the following resolution :"That the thanks of this meeting be tendered to Dr. Kenealy, Q.C., for his eloquent, legal, able, and fearless assertion of his client's rights as displayed by him in conducting the defence in the late Tichborne trial; also that this meeting expresses its feelings of repugnance at the onesided manner in which the late Government conducted the prosecution." Mr. Guildford Onslow, on rising to second the resolution, was greeted with loud cheering. He said he was now able to speak without having the fear of the Lord Chief Justice before him, and he would take this the first opportunity of expressing his firm conviction that the unfortunate man now languishing in prison was the real and veritable Sir Roger Tichborne. He said the prosecution was wicked, the trial a farce, and the verdict and sentence most unjust. The immediate object of this meeting was to do honour to Dr. Kenealy, one of the most able and honest men at the English Bar. He considered the Bar of the Oxford Circuit had disgraced itself by its recent treatment of Dr. Kenealy, especially pending the inquiry about to be instituted by the Benchers of Gray's Inn. He contended at some length that the Claimant had not received a fair trial, and that, as every unprejudiced person acknowledged, in face of the evidence, there was a reasonable doubt, the Claimant ought to have received the benefit of the doubt. Several other speakers having addressed the meeting the resolution was carried almost unanimously.

CORRESPONDENCE OF THE

PROFESSION.

[ocr errors]

tional right of doing so in the lease or agreement. He is bound to exhaust the legal remedy specially provided by Act of Parliament for the purpose NOTE.-This Department of the LAW TIMES being open to before resorting to other remedies. In other cases free discussion on all professional topics, the Editor is not whereby debts, properly speaking, are incurred, responsible for any opinions or statements contained in it. there is an absolute sale of the property for a certain sum, either for cash or upon credit, and THE LODGERS' GOODS PROTECTION ACT.-I beg whereby it entirely belongs to the purchaser, and leave to offer a few observations and remarks in the event of that sum not being paid it becomes which perhaps, if made public, may be thought of a debt, for which the debtor must first be personsufficient importance to cause either an immediate ally sued, and it is only after and under a judgamendment or repeal of the above Act. Rent may ment his goods can be seized to satisfy such debt. be defined to be a return of the profits which a lessor It has also been asked why the landlord should be reserves to himself on parting with for a time, his protected more than the butcher or the baker? estate or part of it, and which profits are payable The answer is easy. The landlord is not so well to him by the lessee in respect thereof, according protected, from the nature of the case, as the to the terms and nature of the tenure. As rent is tradesman. The latter can stop credit, and a profit issuing out of the land or property leased avoid further loss, at any time he pleases, for a time, and as distress is a remedy for its whereas the former has to wait for the exrecovery, and originally substituted for an entry piration of the tenancy, which may be for on and possession of the land or property by the a long period, or to determine same by a lessor, it follows that in the application of the notice to quit; his loss is, therefore, a continuremedy it is to the land or property itself that the ing one. Again, complaints have been made that distrainor must look, and not to the person of the the law makes the landlord “ judge, jury, and lessee, for his claim is not in respect of the person executioner in his own case. I answer the in possession of the premises, or owning the effects tenant is none the worse off for that, he is neverthere, but in respect of the premises alone. It theless well protected. The landlord must conhas therefore been considered, as a general rule, form strictly to certain statutory enactments, that the party entitled to the rent in arrear may constituting the law of distress; he is seriously distrain on the premises, out of which the rent liable for any wrong he may do, and if he appoints issues in whosesover possession they may be at another person to act for him, he is prima facie the time of distress, whether in that of the liable for his acts in case of an irregularity or his original lessee, assignee, undertenant, or lodger, illegally conducting the distress. At the same or several tenants in common, and may take, time, a great advantage to the tenant must not subject to certain restrictions, whatever chattels be overlooked, the landlord has the power to, or effects are found there, whether they belong to and can be lenient; he can also allow further time the lessee or to any other person. The necessity to his tenant for payment, and he can also forego the of this rule is obvious when it is properly con- whole or a portion of his rent, according to cirsidered by what varieties of fraud and collusion cumstances; whereas if the case is in the hands of the rights of the lessor may otherwise be, and the sheriff or the County Court broker, leniency, unfortunately are now generally known to be, forbearance, and discretion are then out of the defeated by being restricted in his remedy by question, the law must be carried out to the very distress, to the possession and goods of his imme- letter. Again, it is stated that the law of disdiate lessee only, goods, by the bye, which it is tress and brokers are both objectionable; but impossible for the lessor to know without the why? Look to the causes, and let persons relessee points out the same to him, which he is not quiring the attention of either broker or sheriff at compelled to do. And it seems to have been least be decent and not speak unkindly of perforgotten that a lodger or sub-tenant is not only sons on whom society imposes unpleasant offices. protected by a legal remedy against his immediate And, again, how is it that lawyers so frequently landlord for any damage, loss, or injury, he may employ brokers to act and distrain for them and sustain, through his property being distrained and their clients, notwithstanding they have, as they sold to satisfy a claim for rent due to the superior imagine, a common law right or remedy to sue for landlord, and that he can also take the law into the rent as a debt? Are not the reasons obvious? his own hands and set-off future rent due by him Do not lawyers practically know that the process in discharge of such damage or loss. And if it be of recovery in either case is effectively the same, said that as most persons seized upon for rent are but that the remedy of distress is not only less nearly insolvent, the remedy of a lodger or other oppressive and costly to the poor tenant, but under-tenant is therefore practically nil. Admit- attended with little or no expense to, it may be, ting such to be the case, it is respectfully asked, the poor landlord? Of course, in cases with Is it right? Is it just?-that the superior landlord, wealthy clients, a suit in the Superior Courts of entirely an innocent party, should therefore be law is recommended as a matter of business, and in made the victim of pecuniary loss, and deprived of nine cases out of ten justly preferred to the County a remedy which, from time almost immemorial, courts, because in the former judges are learned the law, for the benefit of society, as much as for in the law, are not above consulting, when neceshimself, has afforded him? In good faith a land- sary, the Acts of Parliament, and are most lord lets his property even with a proviso that anxious to adjudicate in conformity therewith, the same shall not be underlet, in defiance of whereas in some of the latter courts decisions are which, however, it is not only wholly or partly let given not only contrary to law and equity, but out by the tenant, but rents are received by him apparently at the whim and fancy of the gentlefrom the lodgers, and notwithstanding which he men presiding there. Again, if we occasionally fails to pay the rent due from himself to his land-read of cases in which the law of distress has lord. Surely in a case like this the law is at been abused, it is principally the fault of landfault if the lodger or other under-tenant has not lords employing improper persons; but are not an immediate and summary remedy for such a such to be found in all trades and professions? deliberate act of dishonesty and injustice both Is the law to be despised because some persons to his lodger and his landlord by a summons professing it exhibit a minimum of legal wisdom, before a magistrate. Surely the party guilty of want of professional skill, and sometimes mis. such a two-fold wrong should suffer punishment, conduct in carrying it out, whereby their clients and not the superior landlord, who perhaps is not often lose their suits and are mulet in costs. even aware his premises have been underlet. It But even for such errors of landlords, a remedy is to be regretted that lodgers and others, gene- presents itself; there can be no reason why persons rally speaking, are too negligent in making proper acting as brokers or agents for the recovery of inquiries as to the respectability and solvency of rents, should not be compelled, like appraisers the parties with whom they may be going to lodge, or auctioneers, to take out a licence or certificate they have often only themselves to blame for the and be liable to a penalty for acting without one. loss of their goods, which they so heedlessly place It would be more satisfactory to the public, and in jeopardy. But landlords, generally speaking, at the same time afford a check upon flagrant mis. do not take advantage of this, nor have the goods conduct for which a renewal of the licence or of the lodgers been taken by landlords so certificate might be suspended, or altogether refrequently and to such an extent as many people fused, according to circumstances. Upon perusal of imagine; in most cases there has been a special the Lodgers' Goods Protection Bill (as amended in reason for taking them, one of which, perhaps the the Select Committee) I find it differs from the Act most frequent, is that the lodger himself is con- itself by the omission of the word "under-tenants." siderably in arrears, and the cause why his land- The Act is also without an interpretation clause lord cannot pay. It has been asked in what which is to be regretted, because although the word respect rent differs from any other debt. As lodger is very familiar, it is one whieh it appears before intimated, the landlord transfers or divests is not generally understood, and our dictionaries himself of his property for a certain time, upon afford us little or no assistance. For instance, is agreed periodical future payments, called rent, to a servant a lodger within the meaning of the Act, the tenant or hirer, who thus effectively has the no rent being paid for the rooms he occupies? entire use of the property for the time being, and Are persons living in model lodging houses lodgers upon default in making the payments agreed upon or under tenants? A person takes a house, and certain effects found upon the premises can be lets it out in rooms or tenements, living elsewhere legally taken, first, as a pledge, and, after con- himself; are the several occupants, some of whom tinued default, can be sold to satisfy such claims do and do not sleep there, all lodgers or under tenor rent. And it is here submitted that the lessor ants within the meaning of the Act? Again, are has properly no common law right of proceeding tenants or holders of offices, let-out manufacturing for the recovery of such payments or rent, as a business premises, stables, workshops, factories, debt, unless he has reserved to himself an addi- &c., to be considered lodgers or under tenants,

and does the Act apply to and protect such parties? Or does the Act only apply to lodgers properly so called, that is to say, to persons who for a time live and sleep in the part of the premises they occupy or hire, the other part being occupied by the landlord, and in which he also dwells and sleeps? It would appear from the omission in the Act of the 14th clause to be found in the Bill, namely, "This Act shall not apply to any lettings other than those of dwellinghouses, and of rooms let for the purpose of lodging," that the Act is therefore intended to and shall apply to any lettings other than those of dwelling-houses and of rooms let for the purposes of lodging. Is this so? Again, if the distress is for an amount above £15, can a magistrate deal with it under the Act (see 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, s. 39). And in case of a tenant being in arrears of rent due to his landlord, has the superior landlord a claim on the lodger for the payment of his current and future rent, as it accrues due, on account of the arrears due to him by the lodger's landlord? And, if so, upon the refusal of the lodger to pay same, how is it to be recovered? A portion of the first section of the Act likewise creates a difficulty. The rent owing by the lodger, if sufficient, is to be taken by the broker in satisfaction and discharge of the entire claim upon the tenant by the superior landlord, and the distress being thus satisfied, is legally ended. But is a payment by the lodger amounting only to a part of the amount owing to the superior landlord to be taken by the broker on account of and in part payment of the amount distrained for and due to the superior landlord? If so, the distress will become void, for if the broker or landlord takes a part of the amount distrained for, he then upsets the distress, and must therefore withdraw, and the law will not allow him to enter again to distrain for the balance, he must also lose the costs which have attended the distress. Again, if the broker receives the amount, he must dispose of it under the Act, and thereby nullify the distress, and on the other hand if he refuses to take it, he is both liable to an action at the suit of the lodger and amenable to a magistrate. It seems that the observations made by Lord Salisbury at the passing of the Act were justifiable, namely, "that without in any way sympathising with the object or urging the necessity of any alteration in the present law, he objected to any change being made upon so hurried and imperfectly defined a plan which characterised private Bills generally," and which he described as small hour legislature. Upon the whole it seems the more the Lodgers' Goods Protection Act is investigated, the more unsatisfactory and partial it appears; it is altogether a fair specimen of legislative trifling, and the result of ignorance of practical experience upon the subject.

JAMES FERGUSON.

CLERKS OF THE PEACE AT PETTY SESSIONS.

SIR, Enclosed I forward draft of two clauses which I should like to see inserted in the proposed new Act of Parliament. It is not unusual

for one Clerk of the Peace, or his partner or his for trial, of course, afterwards to draw the clerk, to appear for a prisoner, and if committed indictments. You will easily perceive what an injustice might be occasioned.

A COUNTRY SOLICITOR. The following are the clauses referred to:"That no attorney, or other person, acting as clerk to an attorney or firm of attorneys, shall be heard in any court of petty sessions, or in any county court, on behalf of any client of such last-named attorney or firm of attorneys."

"That no clerk of the peace, or his partner, or any clerk in his or their employ, or any clerk or partner of any justice's clerk shall be heard on a prosecution or in a defence at any petty sessions. for the district for which he is such clerk of the peace or justice's clerk."

LAW SOCIETIES.

UNION SOCIETY OF LONDON. AT a meeting of this society to be held on Tuesday next at the rooms of the Social Science Associa tion at half past seven, Mr. Charles Ford will move a resolution to the effect that the rules of the Inns of Court affecting solicitors desiring to be called to the Bar require modification, and that greater facilities should be afforded to barristers desirous of becoming solicitors.

THE BIRMINGHAM LAW STUDENTS'

SOCIETY. AT a meeting of this society held on Tuesday evening last, Mr. A. D. Bolton, barrister-at-law, presiding, the following question was discussed "Is a mortgagee entitled to more than six years' arrears of interest upon a bill being filed by the mortgagor for redemption." Mr. A. Canning led in the affirmative, and was supported by Messrs.

David Hadley and W. H. Warlow; Mr. F. W.
Lowe replied, and was followed by Messrs. Blake-
way and F. Smith. After the chairman had
summed up the votes were taken and found to be
in favour of the affirmative.

LAW ASSOCIATION.

Ar the usual monthly meeting of the directors,
held at the Hall of the Incorporated Law Society,
in Chancery-lane, on Thursday, the 2nd inst., the
following being present, viz.: Mr. Steward
(chairman), Mr. Burges, Mr. Drew, Mr. Kelly,
Mr. Masterman, Mr. Sidney Smith, Mr. Styan,
Mr. Thomas, Mr. Tylee, Mr. H. Vallance, Mr.
Williamson, and Mr. Boodle (secretary). A grant
of £50 was made to the widow of a member, and
two grants amounting to £17 were made to the
daughters of two non-members. The annual
general court was fixed for the 28th May.

[ocr errors][merged small][ocr errors][ocr errors]
[ocr errors][ocr errors][merged small]

PAPERS.

MIDDLESEX-Waddell v. Wolffe

ENLARGED RULE PAPER.
For Argument.

Kish v. Cory. Demurrer
[Pigott, B.-Mr H. T. Cole Laport v. Costick. Appeal
Moved Trinity Term, 1873.
MIDDLESEX-Doulton v. Timms
[Bramwell, B.-Mr Day
Tried during Term.
MIDDLESEX-Finigan v. Fraser
[Bramwell, B.-Mr C. Russell
MIDDLESEX-Block v. Pigott [Bramwell, B.-Mr Pearce
Moved Michaelmas Term, 1873.
MIDDLESEX-Raper v. The London General Omnibus
Company
[Quain, J.-Mr Day
MIDDLESEX-Kirkstall Brewery Company v. Furness
Railway Company
[Denman, J.-Mr Price
LONDON-Dudgeon v. Pembroke
[Blackburn, J.-Sir J. Karslake
LONDON-Irlande v. Lavery [Quain, J.-Mr Holker
DURHAM-Lambert v. Madgshon
[Quain, J.-Mr Herschell
NEWCASTLE-Turnbull v. Murray
[Brett, J.-Mr Herschell
NORTHUMBERLAND-Reg. v. The Inhabitants of Alnwick
[Quain, J.-Mr Herschell
CUMBERLAND-Sloan v. Holliday
[Quain, J.-Mr Herschell
LANCASTER-Taylor v. Rushton [Quain, J.-Mr Holker
LIVERPOOL-Stephenson v. Corporation of Liverpool
[Quain, J.-Mr C. Russell
[Quain, J.-Mr C. Russell
[Quain, J.-Mr. Herschell
Company v. Eastwood
[Brett, J.-Mr C. Russell
TL. C. B.-Mr H. T. Cole

Re an arbitration between Hamlyn and Widdicombe
[Mr J. C. Mathew-Mr Charles
Blades v. Lawrence [Mr W. A. Lewis-Sir J Karslake
De Wolf and another v. The Archangel Maritime Bank
and Insurance Company [Mr Bowen-Mr Aspland
Re an arbitration between George Attree and others
[Mr Grantham-Mr A. L. Smith
CROWN PAPER.
For Argument.

MIDDLESEX-Reg. v. The Guardians of Stepney Union.
To stand over.

NORFOLK-Same v. Middle Level Commissioners
KENT-Caballero v. Lewis

LIVERPOOL-Jefferson v. Querner

SITTINGS AND CAUSE LIST IN AND AFTER | LIVERPOOL-Ashcroft v. Crow Orchard Colliery Com

[blocks in formation]

pany

LIVERPOOL-Francis and

DEVON-Mears v. Evans
CORNWALL-Temby v. Rule
CORNWALL-Pender v. Hicks
BRISTOL-Ayles v. Maidment
BRISTOL-Same v. Same
HERTFORD-Chapman v. Lapworth

[L. C. B.-Mr Collins
[L. C. B.-Mr Kindon
[L. C. B.-Mr Lopes
[L. C. B.-Mr H. T. Cole
[Martin, B.-Mr J. Broun
SURREY-Chasemore v. Turner [Martin, B.-Mr Garth
SURREY-Kavanagh v. Kerkham [Martin, B.-Mr Day
SURREY-Marc v. Rony [Martin, B.-Hon. A. Thesiger
SURREY-Pearson v. Lawson. S. & N. Co.

[Pigott, B.-Mr Murphy [Pigott, B.-Mr W. Williams SURREY-Coyte v. Elptrick [Pigott, B.-Mr C. W. Wood LEEDS-Marks v. Hick [Pollock, B.-Mr D. Seymour Tried during Term.

SURREY-Nicholls v. Chambers

MIDDLESEX-Lane v. Hanbury [Pigott, B.-Mr Prentice
MIDDLESEX-Dalrymple v. Low [Pigott, B.-Mr Pope
MIDDLESEX-Stopher v. Townshend
[Pollock, B.-Mr Herschell
MIDDLESEX-Lapage v. Kerr
[Pollock, B.-Mr H Matthews
MIDDLESEX-Loveridge v. Hallward
[Pollock, B.-Mr M. Chambers
Moved Hilary Term 1874.
LONDON-Miller v. Watkins
LONDON-Mogge v. Briant
LIVERPOOL.-Cummins v. Beckett
LIVERPOOL.-Curtis v. Williamson
Tried during Term.
MIDDLESEX.-Marshall v. King

London.

May 13 Hayward v. Newton

May 9 Wednesday

NEW TRIAL PAPER.
For Argument.

Moved Michaelmas Term, 1872.

LONDON-Ionides v. Pender and another (part heard)

[Hannen, J.-Mr Butt

BRISTOL-London and South-Western Bank v. Williams

[Mellor, J.-Mr Lopes

Moved Hilary Term, 1873.
MIDDLESEX-Angel v. Collins
[Mellor, J.-Mr M Chambers
LONDON-Parker v. The Imperial Royal Azienda Co.
[L. C. J.-Mr Day
LONDON-Morrison v. Thompson
[L. C. J.-Sir J. Karslake
LONDON-Corry v. Patton L. C. J.-Mr H. Matthews
MANCHESTER-Taylor v. Greenhalgh

[Mellor, J.-Mr Pope

[blocks in formation]

v. Holley
[Blackburn, J.-Mr Brett
[Denman, J.-Mr Day
[Quain, J.-Mr Holker
[Quain, J.-Mr Holker

[Honyman, J.-Mr Forbes
SPECIAL PAPER.
For Judgment.

For Argument.

Chartered Bank of India v. Just. Demurrer.
Owen v. Wright. Demurrer.
Jones v. Palmer. Demurrer.

Mid-Wales Railway Company v. Cambrian Railway
Company. Special case.

Jefferson v. Querner. Demurrer.

To be argued with New Trial.
Leatham ". Bank. Appeal.
Coyte v. Elptrick. Demurrer.
To be argued with New Trial.
Dudgeon v. Pembroke. Demurrer
To be argued with new Trial.
Grant v. Budd. Demurrer
Cox v. Leigh. Special case
Lane v. Hanbury. Demurrer
Isnaredi v. Watts. Demurrer

CORNWALL-Kittow v. Assistant Commissioners of Lis keard Union

SHEFFIELD-Cutler v. Turner

SHEFFIELD-Haigh v. Town Council of Sheffield

YORKSHIRE-Banks v. Crossland

[blocks in formation]

Brunninghans v. Manchester, Sheffield, and Liverpool Wednesday. April 15 Motions and new trials

MANCHESTER-Pendlebury v. Same
MANCHESTER-Pearson v. Johnson and another

[Mellor, J.-Mr Pope

Railway Company. Demurrer
Isnaredi v. Watts. Demurrer

Wood v. May. Appeal

Joseph v. Holroyd. Demurrer

Walsh v. Walley. Appeal

Stenton v. Nourse. Demurrer

Green v. Reade. Appeal

[blocks in formation]

[Mellor, J.-Mr Pope
[Lush, J.-Mr Herschell
Tried during Term.
MIDDLESEX-Smith v. Palmer [Lush, J.-Mr Salter
MIDDLESEX-Tuson v. Parkhouse [Lush, J.-Mr Day
MIDDLESEX-Scott v. The London General Omnibus
[Lush, J.-Mr Giffard
Company
Moved Easter Term, 1873.
MIDDLESEX-Burnaby v. Earl [L. C. J.-Mr Garth
LONDON-Dean v. Stokes [L. C. J.-Mr D. Seymour
LONDON-Toole v. Young [L. C. J.-Sir J. Karslake
LONDON-Lazard v. Javal
[Mellor, J.-Mr Day
LONDON-Die Elbinger v. Armstrong
[Lush, J.-Sir H. James
KENT-Harvey v. Lewis
[L.C.J.-Mr Biron
NEWCASTLE-Robinson v. River Wear Commissioners.
Stands over
[Archibald, J.-Mr Herschell
DURHAM-Oliver v. North-Eastern Railway Company
[Pollock, B.-Mr Holker

LIVERPOOL-Stiven v. Heineman

[blocks in formation]

James v. National Arms Company. Special case
Cooper v. Hills. Demurrer

Guano, &c., Company v. Kellock. Special case
Woollett v. Goodchild. Demurrer
Mellor v. Watkins. Special case

Metropolitan Board of Works v. Imperial Gas Light
and Coke Company. Appeal

Imperial Gas Light and Coke Company v. Metropolitan
Board of Works. Special case
Trevelyan v. Sampson. Special case
Smidt v. Tiden. Special case

Pulbrook v. Laws. Demurrer

Horne v. Lymington Railway Company. Special case
Coveny v. Northfleet Coal and Ballast Company. Special

[blocks in formation]

Friday

Thursday

16 Ditto

Friday..

17 Ditto

Saturday

18 Ditto

[blocks in formation]

Thursday

[blocks in formation]

23 Special paper

24 Motions and new trials 25 Ditto

27 Special paper

28 Motions and new trials 29 Ditto

30 Special paper

May 1 Motions and new trials

2 Ditto

4 Special paper

5 Motions and new trials

6 Ditto

Thursday

7 Ditto

Friday

Friday.

8 Ditto

The Court of Common Pleas will, when convenient,

sit in two divisions.

[blocks in formation]
« EelmineJätka »